https://news.mcmedia.cam/feed/Law MCMedia News RSS Feed - Law specific feed https://news.mcmedia.cam/rss-info.html MCMedia RSS Generator v1.0 Thu, 11 Jun 2026 18:50:34 +0000 https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/11/some-question-for-todd-blanches-upcoming-confirmation-hearing/ Thu, 11 Jun 2026 14:54:54 +0000 It's hard to think of a better illustration of the dramatic changes that our President has wrought in the world of law and lawyering than the (still-very-much-unfinished) Todd Blanche story. Blanche's actions since being named Acting A.G. – the risible Comey indictment ("SeashellGate"?) [1] , the "Anti-Weaponization" slush fund for Trump's cronies and January 6 insurrectionists that even Trump's long-time supporters couldn't stomach, [2] the waiver of claims against the President of the United States (his boss) that he forgot to include in the Settlement Agreement the DOJ had negotiated [3] (!) – would surely, in earlier times, have gotten him fired, and possibly sanctioned or worse for having perpetrated a fraud on the court. [4] Instead, it earned him a promotion. To paraphrase Vince Lombardi, loyalty isn't everything, it's the only thing. But the good news is that the nomination will allow the Senate Judiciary Committee to ask Blanche some questions at his confirmation hearings. Here are some questions that I'd like Blanche to answer: Were you involved in the negotiations leading up to the May 18 "Settlement Agreement" between the President and the I.R.S.? And/or the drafting of the Settlement Agreement itself? If you were not involved, were you briefed beforehand on the deal that was being struck? If you were involved, in what capacity were you acting – as counsel to the I.R.S.? Were you concerned about potential conflicts of interest in such a scenario, given that (a) before you became Acting AG you were the President's personal lawyer, and (b) as Acting A.G. the President - your adversary in the action - is your direct superior and can fire you at will? Before the Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims in the Florida case, the Court had ordered special briefing on the question of whether there was a "case or controversy" in the action. Briefs were due in less than a week after Plaintiffs' motion to have the claim dismissed was filed. Presumably, the DOJ was hard at work preparing its briefs on the question. What position was the DOJ going to take on behalf of its client (the IRS) on the matter? Was there, or was there not, a justiciable "case or controversy"? You didn't sign the Settlement Agreement (although it was signed on behalf of the United States by your deputy, Assistant A.G. Woodward). Why not? When did you become aware that the parties had negotiated a provision pursuant to which the IRS would waive all of its claims against Mr. Trump that may have accrued up to that point in time? Do you know why the Settlement Agreement did not include any waiver of IRS claims? Was that just an oversight? On whose part? Is your order of May 19 an attempt to correct that oversight? The Settlement Agreement states that Mr. Trump and the other Plaintiffs will receive "a formal apology from the United States,"and that this was their "sole and complete relief " in the case. [Sec. III(A)] But that would suggest that the IRS' waiver was not part of the settlement between the parties. Is that correct? But if the waiver was not part of the settlement between the IRS and Mr. Trump, then what authorizes you to include it in your May 19 Order? If I promise to stop asking you uncomfortable questions about your behavior as Acting Attorney General, will you give me a waiver of all claims the IRS might have against me? And putting aside whether you'd like to do that - do you seriously believe that you are authorized to grant me such a waiver on behalf of the United States ? Please explain. The Settlement Agreement states that "the corpus of the Anti-Weaponization Fund's funding does not represent the value of any current claim by Plaintiffs, but rather is based on the projected value of future claimaints' claims." On May 18, the DOJ announced that the fund would receive $1.776 billion. Although you have backtracked on this point and declared that the DOJ is not moving forward with the Anti-Weaponization Fund, I am just curious - was this actually "the projected value of future claimants' claims"? You must have some worksheets and/or calculations to back that up, yes? May we see them? [1] See Eugene's takedown of the charges against Comey here . [2] See my earlier postings here , here , and here . [3] Seriously. You can see for yourself that the IRS did not waive any claims against Trump in the Settlement Agreement . That waiver was granted in the special "Order" Blanche issued on the following day. Why wasn't it included in the Settlement Agreement? The only explanation I can come up with is that the lawyers simply forgot to include it. Maybe they got confused; the Settlement Agreement does have a "waiver of claims" clause (see Sec III(B)) – but that one goes in the opposite direction! Plaintiffs are waiving their claims against the IRS! You can imagine the scene: Blanche: "Did you put that waiver into the Settlement Agreement?" Lawyer in Charge of Drafting Settlement Agreement: "We sure did!" That kind of thing would get a first-year associate fired. But Mr. Blanche has turned it into nomination to be our next Attorney General. [4] We will learn, I hope, a great deal more on this score shortly. Judge Williams, in the SD FL case, has asked for briefing, due this Friday, on possible collusive conduct by the two parties in this case, and I suspect she will hold at least one public hearing on the matter as well. The long and the short of the allegation is that the two sides – Trump on one side, the IRS on the other – agreed that Trump would file a phony lawsuit against the IRS, that he would voluntarily dismiss his claims before the IRS had to answer the claims, and the parties would announce that they had "settled" the case. This would enable them to get their hands on the DOJ's "settlement fund," without any of that nasty Congressional oversight or approval. The post Some Question for Todd Blanche's Upcoming Confirmation Hearing appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/11/some-question-for-todd-blanches-upcoming-confirmation-hearing/ Thu, 11 Jun 2026 14:54:54 +0000 It's hard to think of a better illustration of the dramatic changes that our President has wrought in the world of law and lawyering than the (still-very-much-unfinished) Todd Blanche story. Blanche's actions since being named Acting A.G. the risible Comey indictment ("SeashellGate"?) [1] , the "Anti-Weaponization" slush fund for Trump's cronies and January 6 insurrectionists that even Trump's long-time supporters couldn't stomach, [2] the waiver of claims against the President of the United States (his boss) that he forgot to include in the Settlement Agreement the DOJ had negotiated [3] (!) would surely, in earlier times, have gotten him fired, and possibly sanctioned or worse for having perpetrated a fraud on the court. [4] Instead, it earned him a promotion. To paraphrase Vince Lombardi, loyalty isn't everything, it's the only thing. But the good news is that the nomination will allow the Senate Judiciary Committee to ask Blanche some questions at his confirmation hearings. Here are some questions that I'd like Blanche to answer: Were you involved in the negotiations leading up to the May 18 "Settlement Agreement" between the President and the I.R.S.? And/or the drafting of the Settlement Agreement itself? If you were not involved, were you briefed beforehand on the deal that was being struck? If you were involved, in what capacity were you acting as counsel to the I.R.S.? Were you concerned about potential conflicts of interest in such a scenario, given that (a) before you became Acting AG you were the President's personal lawyer, and (b) as Acting A.G. the President - your adversary in the action - is your direct superior and can fire you at will? Before the Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims in the Florida case, the Court had ordered special briefing on the question of whether there was a "case or controversy" in the action. Briefs were due in less than a week after Plaintiffs' motion to have the claim dismissed was filed. Presumably, the DOJ was hard at work preparing its briefs on the question. What position was the DOJ going to take on behalf of its client (the IRS) on the matter? Was there, or was there not, a justiciable "case or controversy"? You didn't sign the Settlement Agreement (although it was signed on behalf of the United States by your deputy, Assistant A.G. Woodward). Why not? When did you become aware that the parties had negotiated a provision pursuant to which the IRS would waive all of its claims against Mr. Trump that may have accrued up to that point in time? Do you know why the Settlement Agreement did not include any waiver of IRS claims? Was that just an oversight? On whose part? Is your order of May 19 an attempt to correct that oversight? The Settlement Agreement states that Mr. Trump and the other Plaintiffs will receive "a formal apology from the United States,"and that this was their "sole and complete relief " in the case. [Sec. III(A)] But that would suggest that the IRS' waiver was not part of the settlement between the parties. Is that correct? But if the waiver was not part of the settlement between the IRS and Mr. Trump, then what authorizes you to include it in your May 19 Order? If I promise to stop asking you uncomfortable questions about your behavior as Acting Attorney General, will you give me a waiver of all claims the IRS might have against me? And putting aside whether you'd like to do that - do you seriously believe that you are authorized to grant me such a waiver on behalf of the United States ? Please explain. The Settlement Agreement states that "the corpus of the Anti-Weaponization Fund's funding does not represent the value of any current claim by Plaintiffs, but rather is based on the projected value of future claimaints' claims." On May 18, the DOJ announced that the fund would receive $1.776 billion. Although you have backtracked on this point and declared that the DOJ is not moving forward with the Anti-Weaponization Fund, I am just curious - was this actually "the projected value of future claimants' claims"? You must have some worksheets and/or calculations to back that up, yes? May we see them? [1] See Eugene's takedown of the charges against Comey here . [2] See my earlier postings here , here , and here . [3] Seriously. You can see for yourself that the IRS did not waive any claims against Trump in the Settlement Agreement . That waiver was granted in the special "Order" Blanche issued on the following day. Why wasn't it included in the Settlement Agreement? The only explanation I can come up with is that the lawyers simply forgot to include it. Maybe they got confused; the Settlement Agreement does have a "waiver of claims" clause (see Sec III(B)) but that one goes in the opposite direction! Plaintiffs are waiving their claims against the IRS! You can imagine the scene: Blanche: "Did you put that waiver into the Settlement Agreement?" Lawyer in Charge of Drafting Settlement Agreement: "We sure did!" That kind of thing would get a first-year associate fired. But Mr. Blanche has turned it into nomination to be our next Attorney General. [4] We will learn, I hope, a great deal more on this score shortly. Judge Williams, in the SD FL case, has asked for briefing, due this Friday, on possible collusive conduct by the two parties in this case, and I suspect she will hold at least one public hearing on the matter as well. The long and the short of the allegation is that the two sides Trump on one side, the IRS on the other agreed that Trump would file a phony lawsuit against the IRS, that he would voluntarily dismiss his claims before the IRS had to answer the claims, and the parties would announce that they had "settled" the case. This would enable them to get their hands on the DOJ's "settlement fund," without any of that nasty Congressional oversight or approval. The post Some Question for Todd Blanche's Upcoming Confirmation Hearing appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/11/blockbuster-nyt-reveal-about-judge-ross-scandal/ Thu, 11 Jun 2026 14:00:50 +0000 For several weeks now, I have been surprised that the major newspapers have not covered the Judge Ross scandal. In particular, I was shocked to see nothing from the New York Times and the Washington Post . I even noted how Bloomberg Law was winning the coverage. Well, it seems the Times was working on something big. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs and Mattathias Schwartz published a story this morning about Judge Ross. And we learn a lot. They got three law clerks to speak, plus they got a copy of the "apology" letter. The New York Times confirmed it was Judge Ross through interviews with three of her former clerks and two people familiar with the matter, and obtained a signed apology letter that she wrote as part of a judicial reprimand. First, this "secret" was passed down from year-to-year among law clerks: For years, Judge Eleanor Ross's secret was passed down from law clerk to law clerk. They whispered about the sultry jazz music that emanated from her chambers when a uniformed police commander, a man they called her "visitor," disappeared into her private office. The clerks could sometimes hear the unmistakable sounds of sex from behind the door. They chalked it up as one of the burdens of working for Judge Ross, who routinely rubber stamped their draft orders and added little else before issuing them as rulings. But the clerks in the Atlanta courthouse felt helpless: Do you report your married boss, a federal judge no less, for having a clandestine in-office affair with a law enforcement officer? One day last year, a clerk did exactly that. Second, Judge Fogel--unlike Judge Wood-stated the obvious. The punishment handed down was woefully inadequate. Jeremy Fogel, a retired federal judge who consults with judges on ethics questions, said some in the judiciary disagreed with how Judge Ross's case had been resolved. "Many of the sitting judges with whom I've spoken believe the findings as a whole warranted a more significant sanction," he said. Another judge who shall remained unnamed wrote to me, saying that my post Judge Wood was out of line, and demanding and I should apologize. I added an update to my post, but my criticism stands even stronger in light of the correction. Third, we get more details about her chambers: She soon settled on the 17th floor of the federal courthouse, in an office with two couches, a meeting table and windows that overlooked the Atlanta Falcons' stadium. Among the décor in her chambers was a picture of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg with a quote from a Beyoncé and Drake song overlaid: "All them fives need to listen when a ten is talking." Elsewhere, she hung an apology letter from a lawyer she had chastised for being underdressed and underprepared in court. In their first year of the prestigious two-year clerkship, Judge Ross's clerks would sit at a desk just feet away from the door to her office. In addition to their legal work, they were tasked with greeting visitors, and they kept a small CCTV screen nearby to see who was outside. And details about the sex: So it was odd when they would see a uniformed police officer walk down the hallway toward the back door of Judge Ross's office. The walls were thin, and the clerks could sometimes hear music and the judge and officer chatting. Then the music would continue, and the talking would stop. Other times, what they heard was more explicit. The three clerks told The Times that their stomachs churned when they realized what was taking place. But, coupled with her other actions, it also represented something fundamentally painful to them: that a person with a role they revered, a person whose job it was to decide America's laws, seemed not to care the way they cared. Fourth, the clerks were even more troubled about her utter disregard for the civil docket. They insist barely 5% of the civil orders were reviewed, and only then for typos and gramma. One clerk said it felt like their belief in the legal system had been yanked out from underneath their feet, and that they wondered whether to continue working in law. While the clerks said they might have been willing to overlook isolated personal foibles, they were more broadly disturbed by the lack of attention Judge Ross paid to the civil disputes that came before her. While Judge Ross was engaged on her criminal cases, the clerks — often fresh out of law school — told investigators that she largely let them decide how to rule on key motions in lawsuits. It was not unusual to go weeks without hearing much from her except for a brief email — "Please docket." — a few minutes after they sent her a draft order, three clerks told The Times. They estimated that she provided edits on roughly 5 percent of the civil orders that they drafted in her name, and even then mostly just for grammar or typos. Judge Ross later disputed the clerks' account to the judicial committee, saying that she made edits to 30 to 40 percent of drafts. The Eleventh Circuit could have compared her draft orders and published orders, but decided not to investigate this ground. Fifth, the Times obtained a copy of the "apology" note. I put "apology" in quotes because this is woefully inadequate. It's like saying, "I'm sorry you were offended." Ultimately, the committee required the judge to send apology letters to the six law clerks who spoke to investigators. The committee said the letters "should be sufficiently specific so as to make clear to the recipient the sexual misconduct for which the judge is apologizing." The letters she sent, dated May 27, were three sentences long and identical. "Thank you for your contributions to our court during your clerkship," Judge Ross wrote, according to a copy obtained by The Times. "I convey my deepest apology for not taking steps to ensure that it was a more positive experience. I wish you all the best in your future legal endeavors and in life." I wonder if ChatGPT wrote this? Sixth, the clerks found the letter "offensively vague." The three former clerks who spoke to The Times said that they viewed the letter as offensively vague. One decided to share it with the chief judge of the 11th Circuit, believing it didn't comply with the committee's order. I agree. The whistleblower clerk should appeal this matter to the Judicial Conference of the United States. The Chief Justice needs to confront this mess. Seventh, the Times actually got members of the Atlanta bar to go on record. Judge Timothy C. Batten, Judge Ross's former colleague in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, worried that her misconduct would affect how courts and judges were viewed by the public. "I'm really sorry this happened and reflects poorly on the court," he said in an interview. Judge Batten retired last year as chief judge of the district court and said he had never gotten wind of Judge Ross's misconduct. Now, some in the Atlanta legal world wonder if Judge Ross's career will survive. "I don't know where you go from here," said Don Samuel, a criminal defense lawyer in Atlanta who has long known, and respected, Judge Ross. "There's so much snickering going on by everybody that I can't imagine what it will be like to be on the bench and wonder what everybody's thinking," he said. I hope this reporting jumpstarts impeachment talk. The post Blockbuster NYT Reveal About Judge Ross Scandal appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/11/blockbuster-nyt-reveal-about-judge-ross-scandal/ Thu, 11 Jun 2026 14:00:50 +0000 For several weeks now, I have been surprised that the major newspapers have not covered the Judge Ross scandal. In particular, I was shocked to see nothing from the New York Times and the Washington Post . I even noted how Bloomberg Law was winning the coverage. Well, it seems the Times was working on something big. Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs and Mattathias Schwartz published a story this morning about Judge Ross. And we learn a lot. They got three law clerks to speak, plus they got a copy of the "apology" letter. The New York Times confirmed it was Judge Ross through interviews with three of her former clerks and two people familiar with the matter, and obtained a signed apology letter that she wrote as part of a judicial reprimand. First, this "secret" was passed down from year-to-year among law clerks: For years, Judge Eleanor Ross's secret was passed down from law clerk to law clerk. They whispered about the sultry jazz music that emanated from her chambers when a uniformed police commander, a man they called her "visitor," disappeared into her private office. The clerks could sometimes hear the unmistakable sounds of sex from behind the door. They chalked it up as one of the burdens of working for Judge Ross, who routinely rubber stamped their draft orders and added little else before issuing them as rulings. But the clerks in the Atlanta courthouse felt helpless: Do you report your married boss, a federal judge no less, for having a clandestine in-office affair with a law enforcement officer? One day last year, a clerk did exactly that. Second, Judge Fogel--unlike Judge Wood-stated the obvious. The punishment handed down was woefully inadequate. Jeremy Fogel, a retired federal judge who consults with judges on ethics questions, said some in the judiciary disagreed with how Judge Ross's case had been resolved. "Many of the sitting judges with whom I've spoken believe the findings as a whole warranted a more significant sanction," he said. Another judge who shall remained unnamed wrote to me, saying that my post Judge Wood was out of line, and demanding and I should apologize. I added an update to my post, but my criticism stands even stronger in light of the correction. Third, we get more details about her chambers: She soon settled on the 17th floor of the federal courthouse, in an office with two couches, a meeting table and windows that overlooked the Atlanta Falcons' stadium. Among the décor in her chambers was a picture of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg with a quote from a Beyoncé and Drake song overlaid: "All them fives need to listen when a ten is talking." Elsewhere, she hung an apology letter from a lawyer she had chastised for being underdressed and underprepared in court. In their first year of the prestigious two-year clerkship, Judge Ross's clerks would sit at a desk just feet away from the door to her office. In addition to their legal work, they were tasked with greeting visitors, and they kept a small CCTV screen nearby to see who was outside. And details about the sex: So it was odd when they would see a uniformed police officer walk down the hallway toward the back door of Judge Ross's office. The walls were thin, and the clerks could sometimes hear music and the judge and officer chatting. Then the music would continue, and the talking would stop. Other times, what they heard was more explicit. The three clerks told The Times that their stomachs churned when they realized what was taking place. But, coupled with her other actions, it also represented something fundamentally painful to them: that a person with a role they revered, a person whose job it was to decide America's laws, seemed not to care the way they cared. Fourth, the clerks were even more troubled about her utter disregard for the civil docket. They insist barely 5% of the civil orders were reviewed, and only then for typos and gramma. One clerk said it felt like their belief in the legal system had been yanked out from underneath their feet, and that they wondered whether to continue working in law. While the clerks said they might have been willing to overlook isolated personal foibles, they were more broadly disturbed by the lack of attention Judge Ross paid to the civil disputes that came before her. While Judge Ross was engaged on her criminal cases, the clerks often fresh out of law school told investigators that she largely let them decide how to rule on key motions in lawsuits. It was not unusual to go weeks without hearing much from her except for a brief email "Please docket." a few minutes after they sent her a draft order, three clerks told The Times. They estimated that she provided edits on roughly 5 percent of the civil orders that they drafted in her name, and even then mostly just for grammar or typos. Judge Ross later disputed the clerks' account to the judicial committee, saying that she made edits to 30 to 40 percent of drafts. The Eleventh Circuit could have compared her draft orders and published orders, but decided not to investigate this ground. Fifth, the Times obtained a copy of the "apology" note. I put "apology" in quotes because this is woefully inadequate. It's like saying, "I'm sorry you were offended." Ultimately, the committee required the judge to send apology letters to the six law clerks who spoke to investigators. The committee said the letters "should be sufficiently specific so as to make clear to the recipient the sexual misconduct for which the judge is apologizing." The letters she sent, dated May 27, were three sentences long and identical. "Thank you for your contributions to our court during your clerkship," Judge Ross wrote, according to a copy obtained by The Times. "I convey my deepest apology for not taking steps to ensure that it was a more positive experience. I wish you all the best in your future legal endeavors and in life." I wonder if ChatGPT wrote this? Sixth, the clerks found the letter "offensively vague." The three former clerks who spoke to The Times said that they viewed the letter as offensively vague. One decided to share it with the chief judge of the 11th Circuit, believing it didn't comply with the committee's order. I agree. The whistleblower clerk should appeal this matter to the Judicial Conference of the United States. The Chief Justice needs to confront this mess. Seventh, the Times actually got members of the Atlanta bar to go on record. Judge Timothy C. Batten, Judge Ross's former colleague in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, worried that her misconduct would affect how courts and judges were viewed by the public. "I'm really sorry this happened and reflects poorly on the court," he said in an interview. Judge Batten retired last year as chief judge of the district court and said he had never gotten wind of Judge Ross's misconduct. Now, some in the Atlanta legal world wonder if Judge Ross's career will survive. "I don't know where you go from here," said Don Samuel, a criminal defense lawyer in Atlanta who has long known, and respected, Judge Ross. "There's so much snickering going on by everybody that I can't imagine what it will be like to be on the bench and wonder what everybody's thinking," he said. I hope this reporting jumpstarts impeachment talk. The post Blockbuster NYT Reveal About Judge Ross Scandal appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/140041/fix-us-ai-exports-program/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=fix-us-ai-exports-program Thu, 11 Jun 2026 12:50:50 +0000 The administration must treat the program as economic statecraft rather than a vehicle for green-lighting deals industry would pursue anyway. The post It’s Not too Late to Fix the AI Exports Program appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/140041/fix-us-ai-exports-program/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=fix-us-ai-exports-program Thu, 11 Jun 2026 12:50:50 +0000 The administration must treat the program as economic statecraft rather than a vehicle for green-lighting deals industry would pursue anyway. The post Its Not too Late to Fix the AI Exports Program appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/11/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-11-1993-7/ Thu, 11 Jun 2026 11:00:57 +0000 6/11/1993: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah decided. The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 11, 1993 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/11/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-11-1993-7/ Thu, 11 Jun 2026 11:00:57 +0000 6/11/1993: Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah decided. The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 11, 1993 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/11/open-thread-232/ Thu, 11 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/11/open-thread-232/ Thu, 11 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/upcoming-national-constitution-center-annual-supreme-court-review/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 21:56:38 +0000 NCC The National Constitution Center's annual Supreme Court Review event is being held on July 7 in Philadelphia. I wanted to highlight it here, because three different regular Volokh Conspiracy bloggers will be among the speakers: Jonathan Adler, Keith Whittington, and myself. There are lots of other speakers - many of them highly prominent - as well. Thus, loyal VC readers will surely want to attend, or at least watch online! Additional information and free registration available here . You can watch either online or in person. The post Upcoming National Constitution Center Annual Supreme Court Review appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/upcoming-national-constitution-center-annual-supreme-court-review/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 21:56:38 +0000 NCC The National Constitution Center's annual Supreme Court Review event is being held on July 7 in Philadelphia. I wanted to highlight it here, because three different regular Volokh Conspiracy bloggers will be among the speakers: Jonathan Adler, Keith Whittington, and myself. There are lots of other speakers - many of them highly prominent - as well. Thus, loyal VC readers will surely want to attend, or at least watch online! Additional information and free registration available here . You can watch either online or in person. The post Upcoming National Constitution Center Annual Supreme Court Review appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/remembering-gordon-wood/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 18:29:44 +0000 Gordon Wood was a towering scholar in every way. He was the best historian of the American Revolution and of the writing of the Constitution and, in general, of the period from 1760 to 1826, of all time. No-one else in the 237 years since the Constitution went into effect even comes close. Gordon's two biggest contributions were (1) in expanding our understanding of the American Revolution to include a rejection of hereditary hierarchy as well as a rejection of taxation without representation, and (2) in explaining how Americans came to put their faith in our written and amended Constitution. Gordon knew each of the Framers vividly, and he wrote about all of their lives. He described their virtues and vices with perfect precision. He was as institutionally honest an historian as one will ever find. He did not write hagiographies, but instead painted an accurate portrait of the great men he wrote about. He was as great an historian as Herodotus and Thucydides, which is high praise indeed. Gordon was also a brave man—a public intellectual who was not afraid to challenge popular errors. He led the effort to denounce the New York Times' 1619 Project, which argued that the Framers were all about slavery and the triumph of racism. Gordon earned some heated criticism for his courageous stance against the DEI effort to paint the founders as racist villains. He was equally outspoken in criticizing Vice President J.D. Vance for arguing that Americans were defined by their bloodlines and not, as Gordon believed, by their devotion to the principles of the Declaration of Independence and of the Constitution. In a speech within the last year, and an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal , Gordon wrote that the United States has always been a creedal nation. He saw us all as from the start of our history as being defined by believing in the idea that all human beings are created equal and have an inalienable right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. We are Americans because we believe in that idea whether our ancestors were English, French, German, Italian, Irish, Polish, Jewish, or of African or Asian dissent. Gordon was just as adamant in denouncing nativism as he was in denouncing the 1619 Project. Gordon also never overstated or understated his case on any point or person of historical interest. The four cardinal virtues identified by the Greeks and Romans are practical wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance. Gordon embodied all four of the cardinal virtues. He was firm, sharp, and decisive, but also a deeply humble, modest, and kind man who loved his neighbor as himself. When the meek inherit the earth, Gordon will inherit all the land east of the Mississippi River. I tried to persuade him to let me write a biography of him, and he adamantly refused. He wanted to be known as a great historian, not as a celebrity. Although Gordon was an agnostic Episcopalian, he embodied the three Christian virtues identified by St. Thomas Aquinas: faith, hope, and love. He lived an exemplary life in every way, down to celebrating the 70th anniversary of his marriage to his wife Louise shortly before he died. He was also one of my five best friends in the world because he was so much fun to talk to. He had an immense knowledge, having read and remembered more books and articles than anyone else I had ever known. He was cheerful and a wonderful colleague. During two semesters during which he taught at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, he every day ate lunch—a brown bag lunch he had made himself—in the faculty commons, engaging in countless conversations. When I moved to Rhode Island in 2007, I had lunch with him right away, and we became good friends immediately. I will miss those conversations and treasure their memory for the rest of my life. Gordon Wood was both the best scholar ever of the American Founding, and a wonderful and virtuous human being. The post Remembering Gordon Wood appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/remembering-gordon-wood/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 18:29:44 +0000 Gordon Wood was a towering scholar in every way. He was the best historian of the American Revolution and of the writing of the Constitution and, in general, of the period from 1760 to 1826, of all time. No-one else in the 237 years since the Constitution went into effect even comes close. Gordon's two biggest contributions were (1) in expanding our understanding of the American Revolution to include a rejection of hereditary hierarchy as well as a rejection of taxation without representation, and (2) in explaining how Americans came to put their faith in our written and amended Constitution. Gordon knew each of the Framers vividly, and he wrote about all of their lives. He described their virtues and vices with perfect precision. He was as institutionally honest an historian as one will ever find. He did not write hagiographies, but instead painted an accurate portrait of the great men he wrote about. He was as great an historian as Herodotus and Thucydides, which is high praise indeed. Gordon was also a brave mana public intellectual who was not afraid to challenge popular errors. He led the effort to denounce the New York Times' 1619 Project, which argued that the Framers were all about slavery and the triumph of racism. Gordon earned some heated criticism for his courageous stance against the DEI effort to paint the founders as racist villains. He was equally outspoken in criticizing Vice President J.D. Vance for arguing that Americans were defined by their bloodlines and not, as Gordon believed, by their devotion to the principles of the Declaration of Independence and of the Constitution. In a speech within the last year, and an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal , Gordon wrote that the United States has always been a creedal nation. He saw us all as from the start of our history as being defined by believing in the idea that all human beings are created equal and have an inalienable right to Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. We are Americans because we believe in that idea whether our ancestors were English, French, German, Italian, Irish, Polish, Jewish, or of African or Asian dissent. Gordon was just as adamant in denouncing nativism as he was in denouncing the 1619 Project. Gordon also never overstated or understated his case on any point or person of historical interest. The four cardinal virtues identified by the Greeks and Romans are practical wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance. Gordon embodied all four of the cardinal virtues. He was firm, sharp, and decisive, but also a deeply humble, modest, and kind man who loved his neighbor as himself. When the meek inherit the earth, Gordon will inherit all the land east of the Mississippi River. I tried to persuade him to let me write a biography of him, and he adamantly refused. He wanted to be known as a great historian, not as a celebrity. Although Gordon was an agnostic Episcopalian, he embodied the three Christian virtues identified by St. Thomas Aquinas: faith, hope, and love. He lived an exemplary life in every way, down to celebrating the 70th anniversary of his marriage to his wife Louise shortly before he died. He was also one of my five best friends in the world because he was so much fun to talk to. He had an immense knowledge, having read and remembered more books and articles than anyone else I had ever known. He was cheerful and a wonderful colleague. During two semesters during which he taught at the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, he every day ate luncha brown bag lunch he had made himselfin the faculty commons, engaging in countless conversations. When I moved to Rhode Island in 2007, I had lunch with him right away, and we became good friends immediately. I will miss those conversations and treasure their memory for the rest of my life. Gordon Wood was both the best scholar ever of the American Founding, and a wonderful and virtuous human being. The post Remembering Gordon Wood appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/google-isnt-a-common-carrier-ohio-court-of-appeals-rules/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 18:27:19 +0000 From State ex rel. Yost v. Google, LLC , decided Monday by the Ohio Court of Appeals (Judge Andrew J. King, joined by Judges Craig R. Baldwin and Robert G. Montgomery): On June 8, 2021, the State filed a complaint against Google out of a concern that Google prioritized the information it provided that best boosted its bottom line instead of providing the most useful and relevant information to the public…. [It] sought a declaration that Google was a … common carrier under Ohio common law…. The court concluded: Google Search is not a common carrier under Ohio common law. It fails under either prong of our traditional test. While the Attorney General points to facts such as monopoly power and suggests a more robust judicial intervention is required, we decline to depart from our precedent. Among other reasons, the apparent preemption and free speech issues, together with the expressive character of search outputs under the Munn framework, counsel against departing from our traditional two-prong test. This conclusion is consistent with the historical limits of the common carrier doctrine, the practical mismatch between traditional rate regulation and modern platform economics, and the judiciary's proper role in deferring complex policy choices involving speech and technology to the legislative branch…. The court began with a broad historical outline; an excerpt: The common carrier doctrine is one of the oldest bodies of Anglo-American law. Its roots lie in medieval English "public callings" i.e., occupations whose very nature required service to all members of the public without discrimination. The first reported case involved a ferryman in 1348. By the seventeenth century, the obligation extended to innkeepers, farriers, and carriers…. In Munn v. Illinois (1876), the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois statute fixing maximum rates for grain storage in Chicago warehouses, holding that when private property is devoted to a use in which the public has an interest, the owner may be forced to submit to regulation. The Court rejected the argument that such regulation violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, affirming the state's broad police power to regulate businesses "affected with a public interest." … "Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large." … "Common carriers exercise a sort of public office, and have duties to perform in which the public is interested." … The Court went on to conclude that since every bushel of grain "pays a toll" that is a common charge, then it ought to be subject to public regulation that only a reasonable toll is to be extracted. Although the legislature intervened rather than the judiciary, the Court found that to be without consequence; the doctrine applied the same…. Thus, after Munn , the doctrine had both established its constitutional blessing and had arguably expanded its reach, allowing for more legislative intervention. As this doctrine was applied in a myriad of contexts and to emerging technologies, the principle of non-discrimination emerged as a frequent judicial explanation for intervention; these courts usually held that common carriers must "serve the public without partiality and without unreasonable discrimination." But it is fair to say that legislation intervention has become more common. As new technologies and market conditions emerged, the doctrine adapted, primarily through legislative action. Railroads prompted the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887; telegraph and telephone companies were regulated under the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 and the Communications Act of 1934 (Title II). Consumer protection concerns, particularly the need to curb monopoly power and combination that drove rates to excessive levels, supplied an important justification for rate regulation. It then laid out and applied the Ohio law of common carriers: Ohio's common law definition of a common carrier is well-established. A common carrier is one who, as a regular business, undertakes for hire to transport persons or property from place to place and holds itself out to the public as ready and willing to serve all members of the public indifferently. Two distinct elements must be satisfied: (1) the carrier element - actual transportation of the property (or persons) of others; and (2) the common element - holding out to serve the public indiscriminately…. [A.] Google Does Not "Transport" the Property of Others (The Carrier Prong) Typically, when we are considering the carrier prong, we are asked to review the transportation of property or people. That is not the case here. As discussed in several of the cases cited above, a carrier handles the property akin to a bailment. It is simply moving it from one place to another. At its most general, the core concern of this prong is receiving the property of another and returning it unaltered after transporting it or transporting a person from one point to another. Based on the facts before us, we conclude that Google does not transport the unaltered property of others. It affirmatively creates a new expressive product, the SRP, through discretionary crawling, indexing, ranking, filtering, and formatting. This is curation and synthesis, not carriage. The trial court correctly rejected the State's attempt to treat underlying "information" as the transported property. See Richards v. Google LLC (W.D.Va. 2026); Zhang v. Baidu.Com Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The State's analogy to telephone service breaks down when one examines the actual flow of data. A user sends a query to Google; that query is a simple request consisting of the user's own words or terms. Even assuming arguendo that Google has some common law duty to transmit the incoming query fairly and unaltered, the State's complaint centers on the return leg - the SRP Google delivers back to the user. That return data is not the user's property, nor is it third-party content transmitted unaltered. Google receives the query, consults its own proprietary indices, applies its own ranking algorithms, makes relevance and quality judgments, filters results, and assembles a new, curated response that did not previously exist in that form. The SRP is Google's own expressive product, not the user's or any third party's property being carried back unaltered. Traditional common carriers do not create the cargo they transport; they accept the shipper's or speaker's existing goods or message and deliver them substantially as received. Google does neither on the return leg. {Google fails the carrier prong on the undisputed facts.} We acknowledge the test announced in Munn [as to legislative regulation] is plainly broader than how Ohio courts have looked at the question of judicially regulating a common carrier…. But here there is … [no] statute for us to consider …. Moreover, we observe that the Ninth Circuit questioned the application of the common carrier doctrine to Google Gmail, which appears to function more like a common carrier than Google's search function…. [B.] Google Does Not Hold Itself Out to Serve the Public Indifferently (The Common Prong) Perhaps the most defining characteristic of common carrier status, in all its forms, has been the obligation to serve the public without unjust discrimination, or stated in the affirmative: to provide the service on indifferent terms. Historically, the primary remedy associated with this obligation was judicial or regulatory oversight to ensure that rates were reasonable, properly differentiated according to cost and competitive conditions, and free from unjust or arbitrary discrimination. We turn now to that consideration. Google's pervasive presence in modern life is undeniable. For many Ohioans, Google Search is the de facto gateway to information. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Google's Terms of Service would not, by themselves, justify refusing certain user inputs (queries), the Attorney General's concern lies primarily with outputs - the ranking, presentation, and curation of search results. At this point the common carrier doctrine encounters a fundamental mismatch. Traditional common carrier regulation centers on the relationship between price and service. Courts and regulators assess whether rates are just and reasonable. Google, however, provides its core search service to users at no direct charge. Its revenue comes overwhelmingly from advertising, not from the users whose results the State seeks to regulate. There is no traditional "rate" for the court to review or adjust. Scholarship in this area often concludes classic common carrier rate regulation is poorly suited to two-sided, zero-price-to-user, innovation-driven markets; any nondiscrimination obligation imposed here would necessarily target the content and ordering of outputs rather than prices, raising a distinct and more constitutionally sensitive set of issues. Thus, even if one were to accept the State's position that Google qualifies as a common carrier, fashioning an appropriate remedy would take this Court far outside the traditional judicial role in common carrier cases. The common law of common carriers does not supply a ready template for regulating the editorial output of a free service whose business model does not depend on user payments. The trial court concluded correctly that Google does not hold itself out to serve the public indifferently in the sense required by the common carrier doctrine. [C.] Ubiquity, Monopoly Power, and the "Affected with a Public Interest" Doctrine The State argues that Google's search engine has become so ubiquitous and central to modern life that its business is "affected with a public interest" in the sense articulated by Lord Chief Justice Hale and the Supreme Court in Munn . There is no question that Google Search exerts enormous influence over the flow of information. Consumer protection and monopoly concerns have historically justified regulation of true common carriers. However, the "affected with a public interest" principle supplies a constitutional justification for legislation and regulation; it does not dispense with the common carrier doctrine's two core requirements for judicial intervention…. The essence of the judiciary is to resolve disputes between the parties and not to engage in extensive, top-level policy making that the legislative branch is better equipped to handle…. [U]biquity and market share do not justify novel judicial intervention here. Munn supplied a constitutional justification for legislative intervention in a natural-monopoly setting; it did not authorize courts to judicially impose common carrier status on new technologies whose core function is editorial curation rather than neutral transport…. The court also suggested that any common carrier finding might be federally preempted, because "Congress and the FCC have long distinguished 'information services' (a category that includes search engines) from traditional telecommunications services subject to common carrier regulation." And it noted that any common carrier conclusion might violate the First Amendment: [T]he core concern underlying this litigation is the regulation of Google's editorial judgments in curating, ranking, and presenting information. This is, at bottom, an attempt to regulate speech. We do not discount the legitimate policy concerns that animate the State's position. Google's dominant market position gives it outsized influence over the modern public square. Congressional investigations and disclosures regarding government-platform communications have raised serious questions about content moderation practices, viewpoint discrimination, and the influence of dominant technology platforms. These issues may indeed support a compelling governmental interest in narrowly tailored legislation designed to promote transparency or address demonstrable harms. But the ancient common carrier doctrine is not the proper vehicle for addressing these concerns. Imposing common carrier obligations on Google's search functions would necessarily compel the company to carry, rank, or display speech it would otherwise choose to de-emphasize or exclude — precisely the type of editorial discretion the First Amendment protects when exercised by private entities compiling and presenting third-party speech… Extending common carrier status here would not avoid First Amendment scrutiny; it would trigger it. Because Google's search results are its own expressive product rather than neutral carriage, the common carrier doctrine does not fit this business model. Any broader regulatory response belongs to the legislative branch…. Michael R. Gladman, Justin E. Herdman, Molly M. Dengler, John E. Schmidtlein, Kenneth C. Smurzynski, and Gloria K. Maier represent Google. Note that Don Falk and I argued in a 2012 paper commissioned by Google that Google indeed has a First Amendment right to pick and choose what goes in search results; that article was cited in Zhang v. Baidu.com , which the Ohio court cited in turn. The post Google Isn't a Common Carrier, Ohio Court of Appeals Rules appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/google-isnt-a-common-carrier-ohio-court-of-appeals-rules/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 18:27:19 +0000 From State ex rel. Yost v. Google, LLC , decided Monday by the Ohio Court of Appeals (Judge Andrew J. King, joined by Judges Craig R. Baldwin and Robert G. Montgomery): On June 8, 2021, the State filed a complaint against Google out of a concern that Google prioritized the information it provided that best boosted its bottom line instead of providing the most useful and relevant information to the public. [It] sought a declaration that Google was a common carrier under Ohio common law. The court concluded: Google Search is not a common carrier under Ohio common law. It fails under either prong of our traditional test. While the Attorney General points to facts such as monopoly power and suggests a more robust judicial intervention is required, we decline to depart from our precedent. Among other reasons, the apparent preemption and free speech issues, together with the expressive character of search outputs under the Munn framework, counsel against departing from our traditional two-prong test. This conclusion is consistent with the historical limits of the common carrier doctrine, the practical mismatch between traditional rate regulation and modern platform economics, and the judiciary's proper role in deferring complex policy choices involving speech and technology to the legislative branch. The court began with a broad historical outline; an excerpt: The common carrier doctrine is one of the oldest bodies of Anglo-American law. Its roots lie in medieval English "public callings" i.e., occupations whose very nature required service to all members of the public without discrimination. The first reported case involved a ferryman in 1348. By the seventeenth century, the obligation extended to innkeepers, farriers, and carriers. In Munn v. Illinois (1876), the Supreme Court upheld an Illinois statute fixing maximum rates for grain storage in Chicago warehouses, holding that when private property is devoted to a use in which the public has an interest, the owner may be forced to submit to regulation. The Court rejected the argument that such regulation violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, affirming the state's broad police power to regulate businesses "affected with a public interest." "Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large." "Common carriers exercise a sort of public office, and have duties to perform in which the public is interested." The Court went on to conclude that since every bushel of grain "pays a toll" that is a common charge, then it ought to be subject to public regulation that only a reasonable toll is to be extracted. Although the legislature intervened rather than the judiciary, the Court found that to be without consequence; the doctrine applied the same. Thus, after Munn , the doctrine had both established its constitutional blessing and had arguably expanded its reach, allowing for more legislative intervention. As this doctrine was applied in a myriad of contexts and to emerging technologies, the principle of non-discrimination emerged as a frequent judicial explanation for intervention; these courts usually held that common carriers must "serve the public without partiality and without unreasonable discrimination." But it is fair to say that legislation intervention has become more common. As new technologies and market conditions emerged, the doctrine adapted, primarily through legislative action. Railroads prompted the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887; telegraph and telephone companies were regulated under the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 and the Communications Act of 1934 (Title II). Consumer protection concerns, particularly the need to curb monopoly power and combination that drove rates to excessive levels, supplied an important justification for rate regulation. It then laid out and applied the Ohio law of common carriers: Ohio's common law definition of a common carrier is well-established. A common carrier is one who, as a regular business, undertakes for hire to transport persons or property from place to place and holds itself out to the public as ready and willing to serve all members of the public indifferently. Two distinct elements must be satisfied: (1) the carrier element - actual transportation of the property (or persons) of others; and (2) the common element - holding out to serve the public indiscriminately. [A.] Google Does Not "Transport" the Property of Others (The Carrier Prong) Typically, when we are considering the carrier prong, we are asked to review the transportation of property or people. That is not the case here. As discussed in several of the cases cited above, a carrier handles the property akin to a bailment. It is simply moving it from one place to another. At its most general, the core concern of this prong is receiving the property of another and returning it unaltered after transporting it or transporting a person from one point to another. Based on the facts before us, we conclude that Google does not transport the unaltered property of others. It affirmatively creates a new expressive product, the SRP, through discretionary crawling, indexing, ranking, filtering, and formatting. This is curation and synthesis, not carriage. The trial court correctly rejected the State's attempt to treat underlying "information" as the transported property. See Richards v. Google LLC (W.D.Va. 2026); Zhang v. Baidu.Com Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The State's analogy to telephone service breaks down when one examines the actual flow of data. A user sends a query to Google; that query is a simple request consisting of the user's own words or terms. Even assuming arguendo that Google has some common law duty to transmit the incoming query fairly and unaltered, the State's complaint centers on the return leg - the SRP Google delivers back to the user. That return data is not the user's property, nor is it third-party content transmitted unaltered. Google receives the query, consults its own proprietary indices, applies its own ranking algorithms, makes relevance and quality judgments, filters results, and assembles a new, curated response that did not previously exist in that form. The SRP is Google's own expressive product, not the user's or any third party's property being carried back unaltered. Traditional common carriers do not create the cargo they transport; they accept the shipper's or speaker's existing goods or message and deliver them substantially as received. Google does neither on the return leg. {Google fails the carrier prong on the undisputed facts.} We acknowledge the test announced in Munn [as to legislative regulation] is plainly broader than how Ohio courts have looked at the question of judicially regulating a common carrier. But here there is [no] statute for us to consider . Moreover, we observe that the Ninth Circuit questioned the application of the common carrier doctrine to Google Gmail, which appears to function more like a common carrier than Google's search function. [B.] Google Does Not Hold Itself Out to Serve the Public Indifferently (The Common Prong) Perhaps the most defining characteristic of common carrier status, in all its forms, has been the obligation to serve the public without unjust discrimination, or stated in the affirmative: to provide the service on indifferent terms. Historically, the primary remedy associated with this obligation was judicial or regulatory oversight to ensure that rates were reasonable, properly differentiated according to cost and competitive conditions, and free from unjust or arbitrary discrimination. We turn now to that consideration. Google's pervasive presence in modern life is undeniable. For many Ohioans, Google Search is the de facto gateway to information. Even assuming for the sake of argument that Google's Terms of Service would not, by themselves, justify refusing certain user inputs (queries), the Attorney General's concern lies primarily with outputs - the ranking, presentation, and curation of search results. At this point the common carrier doctrine encounters a fundamental mismatch. Traditional common carrier regulation centers on the relationship between price and service. Courts and regulators assess whether rates are just and reasonable. Google, however, provides its core search service to users at no direct charge. Its revenue comes overwhelmingly from advertising, not from the users whose results the State seeks to regulate. There is no traditional "rate" for the court to review or adjust. Scholarship in this area often concludes classic common carrier rate regulation is poorly suited to two-sided, zero-price-to-user, innovation-driven markets; any nondiscrimination obligation imposed here would necessarily target the content and ordering of outputs rather than prices, raising a distinct and more constitutionally sensitive set of issues. Thus, even if one were to accept the State's position that Google qualifies as a common carrier, fashioning an appropriate remedy would take this Court far outside the traditional judicial role in common carrier cases. The common law of common carriers does not supply a ready template for regulating the editorial output of a free service whose business model does not depend on user payments. The trial court concluded correctly that Google does not hold itself out to serve the public indifferently in the sense required by the common carrier doctrine. [C.] Ubiquity, Monopoly Power, and the "Affected with a Public Interest" Doctrine The State argues that Google's search engine has become so ubiquitous and central to modern life that its business is "affected with a public interest" in the sense articulated by Lord Chief Justice Hale and the Supreme Court in Munn . There is no question that Google Search exerts enormous influence over the flow of information. Consumer protection and monopoly concerns have historically justified regulation of true common carriers. However, the "affected with a public interest" principle supplies a constitutional justification for legislation and regulation; it does not dispense with the common carrier doctrine's two core requirements for judicial intervention. The essence of the judiciary is to resolve disputes between the parties and not to engage in extensive, top-level policy making that the legislative branch is better equipped to handle. [U]biquity and market share do not justify novel judicial intervention here. Munn supplied a constitutional justification for legislative intervention in a natural-monopoly setting; it did not authorize courts to judicially impose common carrier status on new technologies whose core function is editorial curation rather than neutral transport. The court also suggested that any common carrier finding might be federally preempted, because "Congress and the FCC have long distinguished 'information services' (a category that includes search engines) from traditional telecommunications services subject to common carrier regulation." And it noted that any common carrier conclusion might violate the First Amendment: [T]he core concern underlying this litigation is the regulation of Google's editorial judgments in curating, ranking, and presenting information. This is, at bottom, an attempt to regulate speech. We do not discount the legitimate policy concerns that animate the State's position. Google's dominant market position gives it outsized influence over the modern public square. Congressional investigations and disclosures regarding government-platform communications have raised serious questions about content moderation practices, viewpoint discrimination, and the influence of dominant technology platforms. These issues may indeed support a compelling governmental interest in narrowly tailored legislation designed to promote transparency or address demonstrable harms. But the ancient common carrier doctrine is not the proper vehicle for addressing these concerns. Imposing common carrier obligations on Google's search functions would necessarily compel the company to carry, rank, or display speech it would otherwise choose to de-emphasize or exclude precisely the type of editorial discretion the First Amendment protects when exercised by private entities compiling and presenting third-party speech Extending common carrier status here would not avoid First Amendment scrutiny; it would trigger it. Because Google's search results are its own expressive product rather than neutral carriage, the common carrier doctrine does not fit this business model. Any broader regulatory response belongs to the legislative branch. Michael R. Gladman, Justin E. Herdman, Molly M. Dengler, John E. Schmidtlein, Kenneth C. Smurzynski, and Gloria K. Maier represent Google. Note that Don Falk and I argued in a 2012 paper commissioned by Google that Google indeed has a First Amendment right to pick and choose what goes in search results; that article was cited in Zhang v. Baidu.com , which the Ohio court cited in turn. The post Google Isn't a Common Carrier, Ohio Court of Appeals Rules appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/prof-michael-broyde-emory-on-when-judges-stop-behaving-well/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 18:19:29 +0000 I'm delighted to pass along this item from Prof. Broyde, who teaches legal ethics at Emory and who has written about judicial ethics in particular: A federal judge does not lose life tenure merely by becoming embarrassing. Nor should Congress threaten judges because it dislikes their opinions, their interpretive methods, or their politics. Judicial independence is one of the central achievements of the Constitution. But independence is not impunity. The Constitution does not say that federal judges hold office for life no matter what they do. It says they "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour." That phrase is not an ornament. It is the condition attached to the extraordinary protection of life tenure. The recent Eleventh Circuit judicial misconduct matter shows why that condition still matters. According to the judicial misconduct materials, an unnamed district judge engaged in an extramarital relationship with a high-ranking law-enforcement officer, including sexual activity in chambers during business hours and within hearing distance of court staff. The judge initially denied the relationship to judicial investigators, later admitted it, created a deeply uncomfortable workplace, and generated serious concerns about conflicts of interest and vulnerability to blackmail. The judge also attended a partisan political event. The sanction was a private reprimand, apology letters to former law clerks, and commitments not to seek certain leadership roles. News organizations have identified the unnamed judge as U.S. District Court Judge Eleanor Ross of the Northern District of Georgia. Resolutions of impeachment was introduced by two Georgia Members of Congress. That identification, and the resulting calls for impeachment, should not obscure the underlying constitutional issue. Some commentators have treated the case mainly as a question of criminal law: whether the judge's initial denials constituted a federal false-statement offense, or whether the misconduct fits neatly within the familiar impeachment phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Those questions are not trivial. But they are too narrow. The deeper question is whether a judge who uses chambers this way has continued to satisfy the constitutional condition on which judicial tenure rests for good behavior. I do not think so. Article II and Article III speak in different but related registers. Article II Section 4 identifies the grounds on which civil officers may be impeached and removed: "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors ." Article III Section 1 explains why federal judges receive their special tenure protection: they serve during " good Behaviour ." Article II supplies the constitutional grounds for impeachment and removal; Article I supplies the House-and-Senate mechanism. Article III supplies the tenure condition: good behavior. Federal judges are not simply employees who may be disciplined only when they commit crimes. They occupy constitutional offices premised on public trust, impartiality, restraint, and self-command. To say this is not to create a shortcut around impeachment. Congress may not evade the Constitution's impeachment process by inventing an administrative process to remove judges outside the Constitution. Removal still requires impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate. But it does not follow that Congress may act only when a judge has committed an indictable offense. The constitutional question for judges includes fitness for the judicial office, and "good Behaviour" has to mean more than "not yet convicted of a crime." Nor is the point prudery. Judges have private lives, and not every personal failing is a constitutional matter. The problem here is the connection between private misconduct and public office. Judicial chambers are not private bedrooms. Law clerks and court staff are not unwilling witnesses to a judge's private life. Chambers are part of the federal workplace and part of the machinery of justice. The people who work there are entitled to professional boundaries, dignity, and a judge who does not make the workplace serve the judge's personal desires. That is why candor alone would not cure the problem. Imagine a judge announcing that chambers would be unavailable during lunch because the judge was conducting an extramarital affair there with a police commander. The announcement would be honest and would avoid any problem of false statement. It would also be intolerable. The misconduct is not merely the lie to the Chief Judges. It is the use of judicial space, judicial time, and judicial authority in a way incompatible with the office. The conflict concern is equally serious. A secret relationship between a federal judge and a senior law-enforcement officer in the same community is not a harmless private indiscretion. Federal courts hear criminal cases, civil-rights actions, suppression motions, warrant challenges, police-witness credibility questions, and cases involving government agencies. The judicial materials may not establish that the judge actually ruled in a case involving that officer or that officer's department. But the public should not have to rely on luck to preserve the appearance of impartial justice. A judge has an obligation to avoid not only actual conflicts, but also circumstances that reasonably call the court's neutrality into question. The judiciary's response exposes the limits of self-policing and as Gabe Roth of Fix the Court observed is "underwhelming" and "looks more like judges protecting their own than serious remediation or punishment." A private reprimand may be appropriate for ordinary misconduct. It is inadequate for conduct that used chambers for sexual activity, compromised staff, misled a misconduct inquiry, created conflict-of-interest risks, and damaged public confidence in the courts—conduct that is clearly not "good behavior". The judiciary can admonish, discipline, and—as it sought to do in this case—conceal the violator's identity. But only Congress can decide whether misconduct this grave warrants removal from a life-tenured office. That congressional role must be exercised with great caution. The failed impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase remains an essential warning. Judges must not face removal because legislators dislike their rulings. "good Behaviour" cannot become a partisan trapdoor through which Congress threatens judicial independence whenever the political branches are angry at the courts. But this case is not Chase. It is not about a controversial opinion, statutory interpretation, constitutional methodology, or ideological disagreement. It is about personal misconduct in chambers, treatment of court staff, dishonesty in a judicial misconduct inquiry, attendance at a partisan event, and the misuse of the judicial workplace. If Congress cannot even consider impeachment in a case like this, then the phrase "good Behaviour" has been drained of most of its practical meaning. The House should therefore do what the judiciary has not done publicly. The House should open an expedited impeachment inquiry , first confirming whether the judge described in the misconduct orders is Judge Ross, and then deciding whether articles of impeachment are warranted. No facts need to determined other than confirming the identity of the judge. It need not reinvestigate the facts, since they were already determined in a Judicial Council order. Articles of impeachment should be framed carefully, not sensationally and they should focus on the good behavior standard. The conduct recited in this case certainly seems to be grounds for impeachment in the House. The Senate, which must hold a trial, should then decide whether the conduct justifies conviction and removal. That decision should be sober, institutional, and constitutional. It should not be a partisan spectacle. It should ask whether life tenure can survive as a public trust if the good-behavior condition is treated as a dead letter. Life tenure is one of the Constitution's greatest protections for the rule of law. It enables judges to decide cases without fearing presidents, senators, mobs, donors, or editorial pages. But the price of that independence is conduct worthy of confidence. A judicial robe is not a nightgown and chambers are not bedrooms. And "good Behaviour" is not an empty phrase. When a federal judge stops behaving well in the performance and setting of judicial office, Congress should be willing to say so. The post Prof. Michael Broyde (Emory) on "When Judges Stop Behaving Well" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/prof-michael-broyde-emory-on-when-judges-stop-behaving-well/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 18:19:29 +0000 I'm delighted to pass along this item from Prof. Broyde, who teaches legal ethics at Emory and who has written about judicial ethics in particular: A federal judge does not lose life tenure merely by becoming embarrassing. Nor should Congress threaten judges because it dislikes their opinions, their interpretive methods, or their politics. Judicial independence is one of the central achievements of the Constitution. But independence is not impunity. The Constitution does not say that federal judges hold office for life no matter what they do. It says they "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour." That phrase is not an ornament. It is the condition attached to the extraordinary protection of life tenure. The recent Eleventh Circuit judicial misconduct matter shows why that condition still matters. According to the judicial misconduct materials, an unnamed district judge engaged in an extramarital relationship with a high-ranking law-enforcement officer, including sexual activity in chambers during business hours and within hearing distance of court staff. The judge initially denied the relationship to judicial investigators, later admitted it, created a deeply uncomfortable workplace, and generated serious concerns about conflicts of interest and vulnerability to blackmail. The judge also attended a partisan political event. The sanction was a private reprimand, apology letters to former law clerks, and commitments not to seek certain leadership roles. News organizations have identified the unnamed judge as U.S. District Court Judge Eleanor Ross of the Northern District of Georgia. Resolutions of impeachment was introduced by two Georgia Members of Congress. That identification, and the resulting calls for impeachment, should not obscure the underlying constitutional issue. Some commentators have treated the case mainly as a question of criminal law: whether the judge's initial denials constituted a federal false-statement offense, or whether the misconduct fits neatly within the familiar impeachment phrase "high Crimes and Misdemeanors." Those questions are not trivial. But they are too narrow. The deeper question is whether a judge who uses chambers this way has continued to satisfy the constitutional condition on which judicial tenure rests for good behavior. I do not think so. Article II and Article III speak in different but related registers. Article II Section 4 identifies the grounds on which civil officers may be impeached and removed: "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors ." Article III Section 1 explains why federal judges receive their special tenure protection: they serve during " good Behaviour ." Article II supplies the constitutional grounds for impeachment and removal; Article I supplies the House-and-Senate mechanism. Article III supplies the tenure condition: good behavior. Federal judges are not simply employees who may be disciplined only when they commit crimes. They occupy constitutional offices premised on public trust, impartiality, restraint, and self-command. To say this is not to create a shortcut around impeachment. Congress may not evade the Constitution's impeachment process by inventing an administrative process to remove judges outside the Constitution. Removal still requires impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate. But it does not follow that Congress may act only when a judge has committed an indictable offense. The constitutional question for judges includes fitness for the judicial office, and "good Behaviour" has to mean more than "not yet convicted of a crime." Nor is the point prudery. Judges have private lives, and not every personal failing is a constitutional matter. The problem here is the connection between private misconduct and public office. Judicial chambers are not private bedrooms. Law clerks and court staff are not unwilling witnesses to a judge's private life. Chambers are part of the federal workplace and part of the machinery of justice. The people who work there are entitled to professional boundaries, dignity, and a judge who does not make the workplace serve the judge's personal desires. That is why candor alone would not cure the problem. Imagine a judge announcing that chambers would be unavailable during lunch because the judge was conducting an extramarital affair there with a police commander. The announcement would be honest and would avoid any problem of false statement. It would also be intolerable. The misconduct is not merely the lie to the Chief Judges. It is the use of judicial space, judicial time, and judicial authority in a way incompatible with the office. The conflict concern is equally serious. A secret relationship between a federal judge and a senior law-enforcement officer in the same community is not a harmless private indiscretion. Federal courts hear criminal cases, civil-rights actions, suppression motions, warrant challenges, police-witness credibility questions, and cases involving government agencies. The judicial materials may not establish that the judge actually ruled in a case involving that officer or that officer's department. But the public should not have to rely on luck to preserve the appearance of impartial justice. A judge has an obligation to avoid not only actual conflicts, but also circumstances that reasonably call the court's neutrality into question. The judiciary's response exposes the limits of self-policing and as Gabe Roth of Fix the Court observed is "underwhelming" and "looks more like judges protecting their own than serious remediation or punishment." A private reprimand may be appropriate for ordinary misconduct. It is inadequate for conduct that used chambers for sexual activity, compromised staff, misled a misconduct inquiry, created conflict-of-interest risks, and damaged public confidence in the courtsconduct that is clearly not "good behavior". The judiciary can admonish, discipline, andas it sought to do in this caseconceal the violator's identity. But only Congress can decide whether misconduct this grave warrants removal from a life-tenured office. That congressional role must be exercised with great caution. The failed impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase remains an essential warning. Judges must not face removal because legislators dislike their rulings. "good Behaviour" cannot become a partisan trapdoor through which Congress threatens judicial independence whenever the political branches are angry at the courts. But this case is not Chase. It is not about a controversial opinion, statutory interpretation, constitutional methodology, or ideological disagreement. It is about personal misconduct in chambers, treatment of court staff, dishonesty in a judicial misconduct inquiry, attendance at a partisan event, and the misuse of the judicial workplace. If Congress cannot even consider impeachment in a case like this, then the phrase "good Behaviour" has been drained of most of its practical meaning. The House should therefore do what the judiciary has not done publicly. The House should open an expedited impeachment inquiry , first confirming whether the judge described in the misconduct orders is Judge Ross, and then deciding whether articles of impeachment are warranted. No facts need to determined other than confirming the identity of the judge. It need not reinvestigate the facts, since they were already determined in a Judicial Council order. Articles of impeachment should be framed carefully, not sensationally and they should focus on the good behavior standard. The conduct recited in this case certainly seems to be grounds for impeachment in the House. The Senate, which must hold a trial, should then decide whether the conduct justifies conviction and removal. That decision should be sober, institutional, and constitutional. It should not be a partisan spectacle. It should ask whether life tenure can survive as a public trust if the good-behavior condition is treated as a dead letter. Life tenure is one of the Constitution's greatest protections for the rule of law. It enables judges to decide cases without fearing presidents, senators, mobs, donors, or editorial pages. But the price of that independence is conduct worthy of confidence. A judicial robe is not a nightgown and chambers are not bedrooms. And "good Behaviour" is not an empty phrase. When a federal judge stops behaving well in the performance and setting of judicial office, Congress should be willing to say so. The post Prof. Michael Broyde (Emory) on "When Judges Stop Behaving Well" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/magistrate-judge-declines-to-recuse-herself-in-trump-v-bbc-libel-lawsuit/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 18:03:52 +0000 From today's opinion by Magistrate Judge Enjoliqué A. Lett (S.D. Fla.) in Trump v. BBC : On December 15, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action, and the Clerk of Court assigned the matter to Judge Roy K. Altman stating, "U.S. Magistrate Judge Enjolique A. Lett is available to handle any or all proceedings in this case." Shortly thereafter, on January 12, 2026, the parties voluntarily elected to have the Undersigned preside over discovery matters in this action. On February 11, 2026, Judge Altman referred this case to the Undersigned for all pretrial non-dispositive and discovery matters…. Plaintiff now seeks—over 160 days after the Undersigned's involvement in this case—the Undersigned's recusal, on the eve of the Undersigned setting a discovery hearing. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the Undersigned's prior representation of Orbis Business Intelligence, Ltd. in Trump v Clinton (S.D. Fla. filed March 24, 2022), warrants recusal and a stay of discovery…. Under the catch-all provision of the federal recusal statute on which Plaintiff relies, "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." "[W]hat matters under § 455(a) 'is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.'" "This inquiry is an objective one, made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances." … As an initial matter, Plaintiff's failure to raise the issue of recusal at the first available opportunity constitutes a waiver. Plaintiff failed to move for recusal from the outset of this action and has only done so when a disputed discovery issue arose. Plaintiff's counsel suggests that this delay was because "[he] was not Plaintiff's counsel in the Adverse Matter, and was not immediately aware of Magistrate Judge Lett's participation in that litigation." However, Plaintiff's counsel did appear on behalf of President Trump, the plaintiff/appellant in the "Adverse Matter," during the appellate phase of the "Adverse Matter." The Undersigned represented Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd. in those proceedings…. Since, as appellate counsel, Plaintiff's counsel would have been familiar with the underlying proceeding and the appellate docket, counsel knew or should have known of the Undersigned's prior representation of Orbis Business Intelligence, Even assuming there was not a waiver, the Motion nonetheless fails. The Undersigned's past representation of an unrelated, non-party in this action does not, without more, constitute a circumstance where, objectively, the Undersigned's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See Rice v. Chief Exam'r of Ala. Dept. of Exam'rs of Pub. Accts. (11th Cir. 2025) (affirming district court's denial of recusal motion because a judge's "former representation of [the defendant] had nothing to do with th[e] [current] action"); see also U.S. v. Page (11th Cir. 2025) (affirming district court's denial of recusal motion because the judge's prior representation of a party related to the current action was unrelated to the current case); Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Law Co., Inc. (5th Cir. 1982) (stating "the fact that [the judge] once represented [a defendant] in unrelated matters does not forever prevent him from sitting in a case in which [the former client] is a party")…. Plaintiff fails to cite a single case where recusal was required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) where the jurist, while in private practice, represented an adverse party…. Trump v. Clinton— an alleged RICO action—was dismissed at the pleadings stage, and the dismissal was upheld. And since Trump v. Clinton never progressed to discovery, any discovery issues raised by the parties in this case—a defamation action—would not have been issues argued by the Undersigned in the "Adverse Matter." In short, simply representing a party who was once adverse to a party currently before the court does not "objectively speaking, [make] 'the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker [] too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'" The post Magistrate Judge Declines to Recuse Herself in Trump v. BBC Libel Lawsuit appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/magistrate-judge-declines-to-recuse-herself-in-trump-v-bbc-libel-lawsuit/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 18:03:52 +0000 From today's opinion by Magistrate Judge Enjoliqué A. Lett (S.D. Fla.) in Trump v. BBC : On December 15, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action, and the Clerk of Court assigned the matter to Judge Roy K. Altman stating, "U.S. Magistrate Judge Enjolique A. Lett is available to handle any or all proceedings in this case." Shortly thereafter, on January 12, 2026, the parties voluntarily elected to have the Undersigned preside over discovery matters in this action. On February 11, 2026, Judge Altman referred this case to the Undersigned for all pretrial non-dispositive and discovery matters. Plaintiff now seeksover 160 days after the Undersigned's involvement in this casethe Undersigned's recusal, on the eve of the Undersigned setting a discovery hearing. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts the Undersigned's prior representation of Orbis Business Intelligence, Ltd. in Trump v Clinton (S.D. Fla. filed March 24, 2022), warrants recusal and a stay of discovery. Under the catch-all provision of the federal recusal statute on which Plaintiff relies, "[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." "[W]hat matters under 455(a) 'is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.'" "This inquiry is an objective one, made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and circumstances." As an initial matter, Plaintiff's failure to raise the issue of recusal at the first available opportunity constitutes a waiver. Plaintiff failed to move for recusal from the outset of this action and has only done so when a disputed discovery issue arose. Plaintiff's counsel suggests that this delay was because "[he] was not Plaintiff's counsel in the Adverse Matter, and was not immediately aware of Magistrate Judge Lett's participation in that litigation." However, Plaintiff's counsel did appear on behalf of President Trump, the plaintiff/appellant in the "Adverse Matter," during the appellate phase of the "Adverse Matter." The Undersigned represented Orbis Business Intelligence Ltd. in those proceedings. Since, as appellate counsel, Plaintiff's counsel would have been familiar with the underlying proceeding and the appellate docket, counsel knew or should have known of the Undersigned's prior representation of Orbis Business Intelligence, Even assuming there was not a waiver, the Motion nonetheless fails. The Undersigned's past representation of an unrelated, non-party in this action does not, without more, constitute a circumstance where, objectively, the Undersigned's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See Rice v. Chief Exam'r of Ala. Dept. of Exam'rs of Pub. Accts. (11th Cir. 2025) (affirming district court's denial of recusal motion because a judge's "former representation of [the defendant] had nothing to do with th[e] [current] action"); see also U.S. v. Page (11th Cir. 2025) (affirming district court's denial of recusal motion because the judge's prior representation of a party related to the current action was unrelated to the current case); Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Law Co., Inc. (5th Cir. 1982) (stating "the fact that [the judge] once represented [a defendant] in unrelated matters does not forever prevent him from sitting in a case in which [the former client] is a party"). Plaintiff fails to cite a single case where recusal was required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(a) where the jurist, while in private practice, represented an adverse party. Trump v. Clinton an alleged RICO actionwas dismissed at the pleadings stage, and the dismissal was upheld. And since Trump v. Clinton never progressed to discovery, any discovery issues raised by the parties in this casea defamation actionwould not have been issues argued by the Undersigned in the "Adverse Matter." In short, simply representing a party who was once adverse to a party currently before the court does not "objectively speaking, [make] 'the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker [] too high to be constitutionally tolerable.'" The post Magistrate Judge Declines to Recuse Herself in Trump v. BBC Libel Lawsuit appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/no-pseudonymity-for-accountant-challenging-public-company-accounting-oversight-board-disciplinary-proceedings/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 15:46:58 +0000 From yesterday's D.C. Circuit decision in Doe v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (Judges Karen LeCraft Henderson, Justin Walker, and Bradley Garcia): Plaintiff John Doe—an accountant facing disciplinary proceedings before the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board—brought suit in district court, raising wide-ranging challenges to the Board's structure and operations. As part of that action, Doe sought leave to proceed under a pseudonym. The district court denied the motion. We affirm…. Doe asserts a privacy interest in the fact that he is the subject of a Board disciplinary proceeding because disclosure of that fact would harm his professional reputation by "brand[ing] him an outlier—'damaged goods'—among accounting professionals." Doe's privacy concerns are different in kind from those that "traditionally warrant pseudonymity," which typically involve " 'intimate issues such as sexual activities, reproductive rights, bodily autonomy, medical concerns, or the identity of abused minors.'" … [And, a]s the district court explained, Doe relied only on general statements about the potential harms of public charges, and he did not submit any declarations to support those claims. The district court's approach is consistent with our precedents, which underscore that movants must make a "colorable showing of injury to a privacy interest" by offering something "concrete to establish that revealing [their] identity would cause" some "cognizable harm." That showing could take the form, for instance, of a declaration explaining the "substantial risk" that a "privacy injury" " would occur." The district court reasonably concluded that Doe's motion was insufficient on this front, as Doe "merely asserted" he would suffer a privacy injury without "specifically explain[ing] why harm was likely to result." … [Courts should also] "look[] to the identity of the opposing party"—whether the defendant is a private or governmental actor—"as a tool for measuring the public interest in transparent litigation." Both sides agree that the Board should be considered a governmental actor for purposes of the pseudonymity analysis, and the district court in turn found this factor to cut against Doe because the presence of a governmental defendant "favor[s] pseudonymity only when plaintiffs request individualized relief." Doe contends that he seeks only "modest, individualized, and self-protective relief" because he requests an injunction preventing the Board from proceeding against him. The district court correctly explained, however, that Doe's arguments would clearly apply beyond this case: Doe raises sweeping challenges to the Board's operations and existence that are "not grounded in his specific circumstances." … [P]seudonymity is less likely to be appropriate where "the party asking to proceed anonymously seeks to alter the operation of public law both as applied to it and, by virtue of the legal arguments presented, to other parties going forward." … {Doe argues that pseudonymity is proper because disclosure of his identity could "chill or discourage people from exercising their core First Amendment rights" to challenge government actions in court. The district court reasonably rejected that argument, as it would "make just about any plaintiff entitled to pseudonym status." We have similarly not been swayed by suggestions that the fourth factor should favor pseudonymity where disclosure could "chill litigants from suing the government for constitutional violations."} … Next, Doe argues that the district court erred in declining to weigh his likelihood of success on the merits in the pseudonymity analysis…. [But o]ur published opinions on the subject have never suggested that merits questions are relevant to the pseudonymity issue. Privacy concerns—not the underlying merits—drive the pseudonymity analysis, and requiring courts to delve into the merits to resolve a pseudonymity motion would be exceedingly burdensome…. Finally, Doe points to provisions of the Board's organic statute that, in his view, guarantee the confidentiality of Board investigations and disciplinary proceedings. On Doe's theory, those provisions "weigh heavily in favor" of pseudonymity because they reflect a congressional judgment that the subjects of Board adjudications face "irreparable reputational and career damage" if their identities are publicly disclosed. See Doe v. MIT (1st Cir. 2022) (observing that pseudonymity is "ordinarily" appropriate in "suits that are bound up with a prior proceeding made confidential by law"). Several provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 7215—which governs Board investigations and adjudications—address confidentiality. Section 7215(c)(2) provides that "[h]earings under this section shall not be public, unless otherwise ordered by the Board for good cause shown, with the consent of the parties to such hearing." Section 7215(b)(5)(A) further directs that all documents and information prepared or received by or specifically for the Board, and deliberations of the Board and its employees and agents, in connection with … an investigation under this section, shall be confidential and privileged as an evidentiary matter (and shall not be subject to civil discovery or other legal process) in any proceeding in any Federal or State court or administrative agency, and shall be exempt from disclosure, in the hands of an agency or establishment of the Federal Government, under [FOIA], or otherwise, unless and until presented in connection with a public proceeding or released in accordance with subsection (c). Last, Section 7215(d)(1) explains that if the Board "imposes a disciplinary sanction," it "shall report the sanction to" "the public." {If the target of a Board proceeding seeks SEC review, the sanction is automatically stayed, so there is no public disclosure of the sanction unless and until the SEC affirms the Board's decision.} We conclude, however, that these provisions do not cover the identities of subjects of Board proceedings but instead the documents and information generated in the Board's investigations and the contents of Board hearings. As noted, Section 7215(c)(2) makes Board "[h]earings" presumptively confidential, while Section 7215(b)(5)(A) extends confidentiality protections to certain "documents and information." It is hardly natural to regard a person's name and the fact of a Board proceeding against him as "documents and information prepared or received by or specifically for the Board." And although in the abstract a name might fall within the "dictionary definition" of "information," "the context"—Section 7215(b)(5)(A)'s focus on information "prepared or received by" the Board "in connection with … an investigation"—"tugs strongly in favor of a narrower reading." The title of Section 7215(b)(5)—"Use of documents"—also fits that narrower reading. And our conclusion is reinforced by the contrast between Section 7215(b)(5)(A) and other statutory confidentiality protections—such as those in the SEC whistleblower scheme, which Doe suggests is analogous—that explicitly refer to protecting individual identities. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A) (providing that "the Commission shall not disclose any information … which could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower"). The text and context of Section 7215 thus demonstrate that parties like Doe do not enjoy a statutory right to pseudonymity…. Jeffrey A. Lamken and Robert K. Kry (MoloLamken LLP) and Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Elaine J. Goldenberg, Ginger D. Anders, and Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler (Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP) represent PCAOB. The post No Pseudonymity for Accountant Challenging Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Disciplinary Proceedings appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/no-pseudonymity-for-accountant-challenging-public-company-accounting-oversight-board-disciplinary-proceedings/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 15:46:58 +0000 From yesterday's D.C. Circuit decision in Doe v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (Judges Karen LeCraft Henderson, Justin Walker, and Bradley Garcia): Plaintiff John Doean accountant facing disciplinary proceedings before the Public Company Accounting Oversight Boardbrought suit in district court, raising wide-ranging challenges to the Board's structure and operations. As part of that action, Doe sought leave to proceed under a pseudonym. The district court denied the motion. We affirm. Doe asserts a privacy interest in the fact that he is the subject of a Board disciplinary proceeding because disclosure of that fact would harm his professional reputation by "brand[ing] him an outlier'damaged goods'among accounting professionals." Doe's privacy concerns are different in kind from those that "traditionally warrant pseudonymity," which typically involve " 'intimate issues such as sexual activities, reproductive rights, bodily autonomy, medical concerns, or the identity of abused minors.'" [And, a]s the district court explained, Doe relied only on general statements about the potential harms of public charges, and he did not submit any declarations to support those claims. The district court's approach is consistent with our precedents, which underscore that movants must make a "colorable showing of injury to a privacy interest" by offering something "concrete to establish that revealing [their] identity would cause" some "cognizable harm." That showing could take the form, for instance, of a declaration explaining the "substantial risk" that a "privacy injury" " would occur." The district court reasonably concluded that Doe's motion was insufficient on this front, as Doe "merely asserted" he would suffer a privacy injury without "specifically explain[ing] why harm was likely to result." [Courts should also] "look[] to the identity of the opposing party"whether the defendant is a private or governmental actor"as a tool for measuring the public interest in transparent litigation." Both sides agree that the Board should be considered a governmental actor for purposes of the pseudonymity analysis, and the district court in turn found this factor to cut against Doe because the presence of a governmental defendant "favor[s] pseudonymity only when plaintiffs request individualized relief." Doe contends that he seeks only "modest, individualized, and self-protective relief" because he requests an injunction preventing the Board from proceeding against him. The district court correctly explained, however, that Doe's arguments would clearly apply beyond this case: Doe raises sweeping challenges to the Board's operations and existence that are "not grounded in his specific circumstances." [P]seudonymity is less likely to be appropriate where "the party asking to proceed anonymously seeks to alter the operation of public law both as applied to it and, by virtue of the legal arguments presented, to other parties going forward." {Doe argues that pseudonymity is proper because disclosure of his identity could "chill or discourage people from exercising their core First Amendment rights" to challenge government actions in court. The district court reasonably rejected that argument, as it would "make just about any plaintiff entitled to pseudonym status." We have similarly not been swayed by suggestions that the fourth factor should favor pseudonymity where disclosure could "chill litigants from suing the government for constitutional violations."} Next, Doe argues that the district court erred in declining to weigh his likelihood of success on the merits in the pseudonymity analysis. [But o]ur published opinions on the subject have never suggested that merits questions are relevant to the pseudonymity issue. Privacy concernsnot the underlying meritsdrive the pseudonymity analysis, and requiring courts to delve into the merits to resolve a pseudonymity motion would be exceedingly burdensome. Finally, Doe points to provisions of the Board's organic statute that, in his view, guarantee the confidentiality of Board investigations and disciplinary proceedings. On Doe's theory, those provisions "weigh heavily in favor" of pseudonymity because they reflect a congressional judgment that the subjects of Board adjudications face "irreparable reputational and career damage" if their identities are publicly disclosed. See Doe v. MIT (1st Cir. 2022) (observing that pseudonymity is "ordinarily" appropriate in "suits that are bound up with a prior proceeding made confidential by law"). Several provisions of 15 U.S.C. 7215which governs Board investigations and adjudicationsaddress confidentiality. Section 7215(c)(2) provides that "[h]earings under this section shall not be public, unless otherwise ordered by the Board for good cause shown, with the consent of the parties to such hearing." Section 7215(b)(5)(A) further directs that all documents and information prepared or received by or specifically for the Board, and deliberations of the Board and its employees and agents, in connection with an investigation under this section, shall be confidential and privileged as an evidentiary matter (and shall not be subject to civil discovery or other legal process) in any proceeding in any Federal or State court or administrative agency, and shall be exempt from disclosure, in the hands of an agency or establishment of the Federal Government, under [FOIA], or otherwise, unless and until presented in connection with a public proceeding or released in accordance with subsection (c). Last, Section 7215(d)(1) explains that if the Board "imposes a disciplinary sanction," it "shall report the sanction to" "the public." {If the target of a Board proceeding seeks SEC review, the sanction is automatically stayed, so there is no public disclosure of the sanction unless and until the SEC affirms the Board's decision.} We conclude, however, that these provisions do not cover the identities of subjects of Board proceedings but instead the documents and information generated in the Board's investigations and the contents of Board hearings. As noted, Section 7215(c)(2) makes Board "[h]earings" presumptively confidential, while Section 7215(b)(5)(A) extends confidentiality protections to certain "documents and information." It is hardly natural to regard a person's name and the fact of a Board proceeding against him as "documents and information prepared or received by or specifically for the Board." And although in the abstract a name might fall within the "dictionary definition" of "information," "the context"Section 7215(b)(5)(A)'s focus on information "prepared or received by" the Board "in connection with an investigation""tugs strongly in favor of a narrower reading." The title of Section 7215(b)(5)"Use of documents"also fits that narrower reading. And our conclusion is reinforced by the contrast between Section 7215(b)(5)(A) and other statutory confidentiality protectionssuch as those in the SEC whistleblower scheme, which Doe suggests is analogousthat explicitly refer to protecting individual identities. See 15 U.S.C. 78u-6(h)(2)(A) (providing that "the Commission shall not disclose any information which could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower"). The text and context of Section 7215 thus demonstrate that parties like Doe do not enjoy a statutory right to pseudonymity. Jeffrey A. Lamken and Robert K. Kry (MoloLamken LLP) and Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Elaine J. Goldenberg, Ginger D. Anders, and Rachel G. Miller-Ziegler (Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP) represent PCAOB. The post No Pseudonymity for Accountant Challenging Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Disciplinary Proceedings appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/my-new-lawfare-article-on-why-callais-doesnt-justify-court-packing/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 15:22:48 +0000 Today, Lawfare published my article " Callais Doesn't Justify Court-Packing ." Here is an excerpt summarizing key points: The Supreme Court's recent decision in Louisiana v. Callais —barring nearly all use of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to create majority-minority congressional districts—has been met with outrage by many on the political left and led to renewed calls for court-packing . For example Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) has said that "[w]e need to expand this morally bankrupt court from nine to 13." House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.) has said that "everything should be on the table," presumably including court-packing. Former vice president and 2024 Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris has expressed similar sentiments . A number of other Democrats advanced court-packing plans even before Callais . The Callais decision has some flaws. And the conservative majority on the Supreme Court has made some serious errors in other cases, such as the Trump presidential immunity decision . But court-packing remains a dangerous idea that Americans across the political spectrum should reject. Callais is not without merit, and—at the very least—not as bad as its most strident critics claim. More generally, the Supreme Court is far from being a pure "MAGA" Court and has, in fact, constrained the Trump administration's abuses on several important fronts, and has allowed lower courts to constrain it elsewhere. Court-packing would create a slippery slope to the destruction of judicial review, thereby benefiting power-grabbing presidents like Trump, and imperiling constitutional rights, particularly those of minority groups. To the extent Callais is a problem, it can be better addressed by steps such as banning gerrymandering. There are also better remedies for various other shortcomings of the Court, such as enacting term limits and imposing an ethics code. The rest of the article covers these issues in greater detail. By coincidence, this is my second popular media article this week that is likely to annoy the left more than the right (along with yesterday's Washington Post article critiquing NYC Mayor Zohran Mamdani's badly flawed and unconstitutional housing policy). I'm sure I will get back to the business of annoying the right soon enough! The post My New Lawfare Article on "Why Callais Doesn't Justify Court-Packing" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/my-new-lawfare-article-on-why-callais-doesnt-justify-court-packing/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 15:22:48 +0000 Today, Lawfare published my article " Callais Doesn't Justify Court-Packing ." Here is an excerpt summarizing key points: The Supreme Court's recent decision in Louisiana v. Callais barring nearly all use of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to create majority-minority congressional districtshas been met with outrage by many on the political left and led to renewed calls for court-packing . For example Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) has said that "[w]e need to expand this morally bankrupt court from nine to 13." House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.) has said that "everything should be on the table," presumably including court-packing. Former vice president and 2024 Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris has expressed similar sentiments . A number of other Democrats advanced court-packing plans even before Callais . The Callais decision has some flaws. And the conservative majority on the Supreme Court has made some serious errors in other cases, such as the Trump presidential immunity decision . But court-packing remains a dangerous idea that Americans across the political spectrum should reject. Callais is not without merit, andat the very leastnot as bad as its most strident critics claim. More generally, the Supreme Court is far from being a pure "MAGA" Court and has, in fact, constrained the Trump administration's abuses on several important fronts, and has allowed lower courts to constrain it elsewhere. Court-packing would create a slippery slope to the destruction of judicial review, thereby benefiting power-grabbing presidents like Trump, and imperiling constitutional rights, particularly those of minority groups. To the extent Callais is a problem, it can be better addressed by steps such as banning gerrymandering. There are also better remedies for various other shortcomings of the Court, such as enacting term limits and imposing an ethics code. The rest of the article covers these issues in greater detail. By coincidence, this is my second popular media article this week that is likely to annoy the left more than the right (along with yesterday's Washington Post article critiquing NYC Mayor Zohran Mamdani's badly flawed and unconstitutional housing policy). I'm sure I will get back to the business of annoying the right soon enough! The post My New Lawfare Article on "Why Callais Doesn't Justify Court-Packing" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/141830/third-country-deportations-immigrants-risk/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=third-country-deportations-immigrants-risk Wed, 10 Jun 2026 14:33:05 +0000 Congress should demand transparency and require the U.S. government to publicly release third-country deportation agreements, including with the Central African Republic. The post US-Central African Republic Deportation Agreement Escalates Attack on Immigrants and Puts Lives at Risk appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/141830/third-country-deportations-immigrants-risk/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=third-country-deportations-immigrants-risk Wed, 10 Jun 2026 14:33:05 +0000 Congress should demand transparency and require the U.S. government to publicly release third-country deportation agreements, including with the Central African Republic. The post US-Central African Republic Deportation Agreement Escalates Attack on Immigrants and Puts Lives at Risk appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/serbian-state-entity-launches-claim-against-lithuania Wed, 10 Jun 2026 15:06:56 +0100 Serbia’s state-owned gas company has filed an investment treaty claim against Lithuania, alleging that lengthy court delays rendered arbitral awards it had been assigned worthless. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/serbian-state-entity-launches-claim-against-lithuania Wed, 10 Jun 2026 15:06:56 +0100 Serbias state-owned gas company has filed an investment treaty claim against Lithuania, alleging that lengthy court delays rendered arbitral awards it had been assigned worthless. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-supreme-courts-confusing-use-of-principles/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 14:00:00 +0000 (Amy Howe) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-supreme-courts-confusing-use-of-principles/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 14:00:00 +0000 (Amy Howe) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/when-must-justices-recuse-themselves-over-family-members-acts/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000 Justice Tom Clark is shown swearing in his son, Ramsey Clark as assistant attorney general, Lands Division, in 1961. (Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/when-must-justices-recuse-themselves-over-family-members-acts/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000 Justice Tom Clark is shown swearing in his son, Ramsey Clark as assistant attorney general, Lands Division, in 1961. (Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-latest-on-tariff-refunds/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-latest-on-tariff-refunds/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.justsecurity.org/139916/ai-coercion-climate-dividend/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=ai-coercion-climate-dividend Wed, 10 Jun 2026 12:50:19 +0000 Globally, AI infrastructure is consolidating faster than governments are moving. Governments need to build resilience through diplomatic initiatives and AI partnerships. The post Combatting AI Coercion and the Unexpected Climate Dividend appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/139916/ai-coercion-climate-dividend/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=ai-coercion-climate-dividend Wed, 10 Jun 2026 12:50:19 +0000 Globally, AI infrastructure is consolidating faster than governments are moving. Governments need to build resilience through diplomatic initiatives and AI partnerships. The post Combatting AI Coercion and the Unexpected Climate Dividend appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/premier-league-panel-fines-everton-over-breach-of-financial-rules Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:14:24 +0100 A tribunal has ordered Everton to pay more than £35 million to Burnley for breaching the Premier League’s financial rules – potentially paving the way for other English football clubs to sue their rivals for losses caused by breaches of the competition’s rules. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/premier-league-panel-fines-everton-over-breach-of-financial-rules Wed, 10 Jun 2026 13:14:24 +0100 A tribunal has ordered Everton to pay more than 35 million to Burnley for breaching the Premier Leagues financial rules potentially paving the way for other English football clubs to sue their rivals for losses caused by breaches of the competitions rules. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167689 Wed, 10 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Nearly four months after the latest Middle East crisis erupted and despite a fragile ceasefire between the United States and Iran, tensions continue to reverberate across the region and beyond. The UN Security Council is holding a high-level debate on advancing political solutions in the Middle East, amid continuing conflicts, humanitarian emergencies and concerns over regional stability. Follow live in-depth meetings coverage here. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167689 Wed, 10 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Nearly four months after the latest Middle East crisis erupted and despite a fragile ceasefire between the United States and Iran, tensions continue to reverberate across the region and beyond. The UN Security Council is holding a high-level debate on advancing political solutions in the Middle East, amid continuing conflicts, humanitarian emergencies and concerns over regional stability. Follow live in-depth meetings coverage here. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://www.justsecurity.org/141921/early-edition-june-10-2026/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=early-edition-june-10-2026 Wed, 10 Jun 2026 11:58:06 +0000 Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here. A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news: IRAN WAR – CEASEFIRE U.S. forces yesterday launched retaliatory strikes against Iran following the downing of an Army Apache helicopter near the Strait of Hormuz, U.S. Central Command said […] The post Early Edition: June 10, 2026 appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/141921/early-edition-june-10-2026/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=early-edition-june-10-2026 Wed, 10 Jun 2026 11:58:06 +0000 Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here. A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Heres todays news: IRAN WAR CEASEFIRE U.S. forces yesterday launched retaliatory strikes against Iran following the downing of an Army Apache helicopter near the Strait of Hormuz, U.S. Central Command said [] The post Early Edition: June 10, 2026 appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/clodfelter-joins-arnall-golden-gregory Wed, 10 Jun 2026 12:30:31 +0100 Mark Clodfelter, a former US State Department lawyer and retired Foley Hoag partner, has joined Arnall Golden Gregory – where he is reunited with his former Foley colleague Diana Tsutieva, the Atlanta-headquartered firm’s newly arrived disputes head. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/clodfelter-joins-arnall-golden-gregory Wed, 10 Jun 2026 12:30:31 +0100 Mark Clodfelter, a former US State Department lawyer and retired Foley Hoag partner, has joined Arnall Golden Gregory where he is reunited with his former Foley colleague Diana Tsutieva, the Atlanta-headquartered firms newly arrived disputes head. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-10-1916-7/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 11:00:55 +0000 6/10/1916: Justice Charles Evans Hughes resigns. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 10, 1916 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-10-1916-7/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 11:00:55 +0000 6/10/1916: Justice Charles Evans Hughes resigns. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 10, 1916 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/stephenson-harwood-opens-in-madrid Wed, 10 Jun 2026 10:22:10 +0100 Stephenson Harwood has opened an office in Madrid, hiring a team including former partners from local disputes boutique J Almoguera Abogados. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/french-court-affirms-it-lacks-power-review-icsid-awards Wed, 10 Jun 2026 09:53:30 +0100 The Paris Court of Appeal has confirmed that it has no power to entertain Albania’s application to annul a €110 million ICSID award, saying that the fact that the arbitration hearings took place in Paris did not give it jurisdiction. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/french-court-affirms-it-lacks-power-review-icsid-awards Wed, 10 Jun 2026 09:53:30 +0100 The Paris Court of Appeal has confirmed that it has no power to entertain Albanias application to annul a 110 million ICSID award, saying that the fact that the arbitration hearings took place in Paris did not give it jurisdiction. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/open-thread-231/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/10/open-thread-231/ Wed, 10 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/desire-to-undo-the-past-cant-justify-libel-claim-over-indisputably-truthful-articles-about-criminal-charges-expungement/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 21:40:21 +0000 An excerpt from Sunar v. Gray Local Media, Inc. , decided today by Judge Kenneth Bell (W.D.N.C.): Defendants Gray Local Media, Inc. and Gray Media, Inc., (together, "WBTV") accurately reported on Dr. Sunar's arrest and then, at the request (and with the approval) of his lawyer, on the dismissal and expungement. WBTV declined, however, to delete its reporting, preserving the historical record. Claiming that he has been defamed by WBTV's coverage, Dr. Sunar filed this action seeking tens of millions of dollars in damages and removal of the WBTV articles from its archives…. While Dr. Sunar's desire to undo the past is understandable, his legal claims against WBTV fail … because the articles are indisputably truthful and well within the long-established privilege of the media to accurately report on criminal proceedings….. On September 11, 2024, Dr. Sunar, who has been practicing dentistry in Charlotte since 2002, was arrested and charged with misdemeanor child abuse and communicating threats. The next day, WBTV published an article to its website regarding the arrest titled "Charlotte dentist charged with child abuse, records show." In relevant part, the text of the article read: A Charlotte dentist is facing child abuse charges after he was arrested last week, court records show. Jail records revealed 61-year-old Ramesh Kumar Sunar was arrested on Tuesday, Sept. 10, and was charged with misdemeanor child abuse and communicating threats. An arrest warrant said Sunar 'inflicted physical injury' on a child younger than 16 years old. The injury allegedly caused bruising on the child's torso and neck, and was not caused by 'accidental means.' The warrant further stated that Sunar told a man 'he would beat the [expletive] out of him.' According to the warrant, both incidents happened on Sept. 2…. Sunar is listed as the lead doctor on Charlotte Dental Implant Center's website. WBTV also aired a broadcast about the arrest, which included similar information and Dr. Sunar's mugshot. Dr. Sunar's mugshot was also posted on WBTV's social media pages alongside a link to the First Report . Dr. Sunar acknowledges that the First Report was accurate at the time of publication. Over a year later, in October 2025, Dr. Sunar's attorney notified WBTV that the charges had been dismissed and expunged from Sunar's record. Counsel requested that either a) the First Report be removed or b) that an addendum be posted disclosing the dismissal and expungement of the charges. WBTV responded that it could "offer [Dr. Sunar] a new article that states the outcome of the case," but that they would not remove or otherwise alter the original post due to its accuracy. Dr. Sunar's attorney's response to WBTV's offer was "Yes please." On November 11, 2025, WBTV published the requested second article with the title "Charges dropped against Charlotte dentist accused of child abuse in 2024," and the subheading "Charges expunged in October 2025, officials confirm." The Second Report summarized Dr. Sunar's charges and confirmed that the charges had "been expunged on Oct. 10, 2025," explaining that the expungement of Dr. Sunar's charges meant he "was cleared of the charges, and they were dropped from his public record entirely." WBTV provided Dr. Sunar's attorney with a link to the Second Report. Dr. Sunar's attorney replied, "Thank you!" Nonetheless, the following month Sunar sued for defamation and related claims. The court held that any claims arising from the First Report and related social media posts were barred by North Carolina's one-year statute of limitations in defamation claims. As to the Second Report, the court held, Dr. Sunar does not contend, nor could he, that any statement in the Second Report is inaccurate. Moreover, the substance of the report is not even defamatory, stating that Dr. Sunar had been cleared of the charges against him and his public record expunged. And finally, the Second Report was prepared at the request of Dr. Sunar's attorney, who responded positively to its publication. In other words, Dr. Sunar seeks to recover on a defamation claim for a truthful publication put out at his request. The law cannot support such a result. {Also, the media's fair report privilege would support dismissal of Dr. Sunar's defamation claim. The privilege flows from "the absolute privilege which attaches to statements made in the due course of a judicial proceeding." Thus, with respect to reporting on Court proceedings, "[p]laintiff must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the statement was materially false. If a statement is substantially true, it is not materially false. It is not required that the statement was literally true in every respect. Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided that the statement was substantially true." Again, here there is no claim of falsity.} The post "Desire to Undo the Past" Can't Justify Libel Claim Over "Indisputably Truthful" Articles About Criminal Charges + Expungement appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/desire-to-undo-the-past-cant-justify-libel-claim-over-indisputably-truthful-articles-about-criminal-charges-expungement/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 21:40:21 +0000 An excerpt from Sunar v. Gray Local Media, Inc. , decided today by Judge Kenneth Bell (W.D.N.C.): Defendants Gray Local Media, Inc. and Gray Media, Inc., (together, "WBTV") accurately reported on Dr. Sunar's arrest and then, at the request (and with the approval) of his lawyer, on the dismissal and expungement. WBTV declined, however, to delete its reporting, preserving the historical record. Claiming that he has been defamed by WBTV's coverage, Dr. Sunar filed this action seeking tens of millions of dollars in damages and removal of the WBTV articles from its archives. While Dr. Sunar's desire to undo the past is understandable, his legal claims against WBTV fail because the articles are indisputably truthful and well within the long-established privilege of the media to accurately report on criminal proceedings.. On September 11, 2024, Dr. Sunar, who has been practicing dentistry in Charlotte since 2002, was arrested and charged with misdemeanor child abuse and communicating threats. The next day, WBTV published an article to its website regarding the arrest titled "Charlotte dentist charged with child abuse, records show." In relevant part, the text of the article read: A Charlotte dentist is facing child abuse charges after he was arrested last week, court records show. Jail records revealed 61-year-old Ramesh Kumar Sunar was arrested on Tuesday, Sept. 10, and was charged with misdemeanor child abuse and communicating threats. An arrest warrant said Sunar 'inflicted physical injury' on a child younger than 16 years old. The injury allegedly caused bruising on the child's torso and neck, and was not caused by 'accidental means.' The warrant further stated that Sunar told a man 'he would beat the [expletive] out of him.' According to the warrant, both incidents happened on Sept. 2. Sunar is listed as the lead doctor on Charlotte Dental Implant Center's website. WBTV also aired a broadcast about the arrest, which included similar information and Dr. Sunar's mugshot. Dr. Sunar's mugshot was also posted on WBTV's social media pages alongside a link to the First Report . Dr. Sunar acknowledges that the First Report was accurate at the time of publication. Over a year later, in October 2025, Dr. Sunar's attorney notified WBTV that the charges had been dismissed and expunged from Sunar's record. Counsel requested that either a) the First Report be removed or b) that an addendum be posted disclosing the dismissal and expungement of the charges. WBTV responded that it could "offer [Dr. Sunar] a new article that states the outcome of the case," but that they would not remove or otherwise alter the original post due to its accuracy. Dr. Sunar's attorney's response to WBTV's offer was "Yes please." On November 11, 2025, WBTV published the requested second article with the title "Charges dropped against Charlotte dentist accused of child abuse in 2024," and the subheading "Charges expunged in October 2025, officials confirm." The Second Report summarized Dr. Sunar's charges and confirmed that the charges had "been expunged on Oct. 10, 2025," explaining that the expungement of Dr. Sunar's charges meant he "was cleared of the charges, and they were dropped from his public record entirely." WBTV provided Dr. Sunar's attorney with a link to the Second Report. Dr. Sunar's attorney replied, "Thank you!" Nonetheless, the following month Sunar sued for defamation and related claims. The court held that any claims arising from the First Report and related social media posts were barred by North Carolina's one-year statute of limitations in defamation claims. As to the Second Report, the court held, Dr. Sunar does not contend, nor could he, that any statement in the Second Report is inaccurate. Moreover, the substance of the report is not even defamatory, stating that Dr. Sunar had been cleared of the charges against him and his public record expunged. And finally, the Second Report was prepared at the request of Dr. Sunar's attorney, who responded positively to its publication. In other words, Dr. Sunar seeks to recover on a defamation claim for a truthful publication put out at his request. The law cannot support such a result. {Also, the media's fair report privilege would support dismissal of Dr. Sunar's defamation claim. The privilege flows from "the absolute privilege which attaches to statements made in the due course of a judicial proceeding." Thus, with respect to reporting on Court proceedings, "[p]laintiff must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that the statement was materially false. If a statement is substantially true, it is not materially false. It is not required that the statement was literally true in every respect. Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided that the statement was substantially true." Again, here there is no claim of falsity.} The post "Desire to Undo the Past" Can't Justify Libel Claim Over "Indisputably Truthful" Articles About Criminal Charges + Expungement appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/sorry-associates-but-those-knicks-seats-were-always-going-to-clients/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 20:44:00 +0000 Elite firms turned a playoff game into a business development opportunity. The post Sorry, Associates, But Those Knicks Seats Were Always Going To Clients appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/office-of-legal-counsel-concludes-that-disparate-impact-liability-under-title-vii-is-unconstitutional/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 20:02:15 +0000 In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Ricci v. DeStefano . The Justices reversed Judge Sonia Sotomayor's indefensible ruling against the Frank Ricci and the other firefighters. But the Court stopped short of deciding whether New Haven's attempt to avoid liability for disparate impact violated the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Scalia concurred to explain the Court was merely postponing the inevitable question: But the war between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about how—and on what terms—to make peace between them. Nearly two decades later, with a very different Supreme Court, this question is now primed for resolution. Today the Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion finding that the EEOC's Title VII guidelines are unconstitutional. EEOC's existing interpretations, including the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures ("Guidelines"), embrace an unconstitutional reading of Title VII. Rather than treating disparate impact as an evidentiary mechanism to smoke out intentional discrimination—imposing liability only when disproportionate adverse effects give rise to a strong inference of intentional discrimination—EEOC's historic interpretations contemplate liability based on disproportionately adverse effects alone, without regard to an employer's likely intent. Because EEOC's historic approach divorces liability from circumstances giving rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred, it functions as a qualified racial-proportionality mandate and spurs employers to engage in race-based decisionmaking to avoid liability. That approach is unlawful and unconstitutional. The opinion relies on Allen v. Milligan , which declared for the first time that our Constitution is "color-blind." Three corrections to that approach are necessary "to resolve the ten-sion between [disparate-impact] claims under [Title VII] and our color-blind Constitution." Allen v. Milligan, No. 25A1314, 2026 WL 1552756, at *1 (U.S. June 2, 2026) (per curiam). As I observed , this emergency docket opinion may become more significant than Callais, a theme that the Wall Street Journal picked up . Allen made clear that Callais applies to the Equal Protection context. Indeed, the Opinion links Callais back to the Justice Alito's TJ dissental. Even facially race-neutral actions, when mo-tivated by the purpose of altering racial balance, constitute intentional discrimination against the members of the racial group who are balanced down. After all, "if race played a role in a decision made by a govern-ment actor," or at the behest of a government actor, then race discrimi-nation has occurred and "strict scrutiny applie[s]." Louisiana v. Callais, 146 S. Ct. 1131, 1146 (2026); see also Coal. for TJ v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 146 S. Ct. 541, 545 (2024) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). This opinion is earth-shattering. The Department of Justice ruled that disparate-impact compels employers to engage in unconstitutional race discrimination. Just as "the Federal Government is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race," so too is it "prohibited from enacting laws mandating that third parties—e.g., employers, whether private, State, or munici-pal—discriminate on the basis of race," unless those laws survive strict scrutiny. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring) (first citing Bol-ling, 347 U.S. at 500; and then citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78–82 (1917)). And just as it is unconstitutional for the federal govern-ment to "force[] States to engage in the very race-based discrimination that the Constitution forbids," Callais, 146 S. Ct. at 1142; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926–27 (1995), so too it is unconstitutional for the federal government to coerce employers to adopt employment policies or make employment decisions motivated by race. Disparate-impact liability does not just raise constitutional doubt in occasional cases; unless narrowly circumscribed, it structurally compels the very racial discrimination that the Constitution forbids. In the same way that Callais "updated" Gingles , this opinion calls on the Court to "update" Griggs : Reading Griggs in context and together with the Supreme Court's more recent precedent requires "updat[ing] the framework" for dispar-ate-impact liability "to ensure a constitutional reading and application of" Title VII. Callais , 146 S. Ct. at 1157, 1161 (updating the framework for claims under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). As Justice Scalia suggested in Ricci , a properly tailored disparate-impact scheme might constitutionally operate as "an evidentiary tool" to "smoke out" practices that present a significant likelihood of intentional discrimination. 557 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also City of Rome v. United States , 446 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1980). This is a similar approach to the one that the Supreme Court took in Callais , which held that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, "imposes liability only when the circum-stances give rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred." . . . Applying Griggs, Wards Cove, Inclusive Communities, and Callais, we identify three limiting principles on disparate-impact liability that prevent a constitutional collision under current Supreme Court prece-dent. We emphasize, as the Supreme Court has, that no single limiting principle is wholly sufficient; rather, each caveat is essential to avoid the conclusion I suspect the EEOC will bring suit against firms that have made race-conscious decisions to avoid disparate impact suits (or more likely because they agree with separating people based on race). At that point, the constitutionality of disparate-impact is squarely teed up. Kudos to Assistant Attorney General Elliot Gaiser and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Josh Craddock for putting forth this remarkable opinion. I also have to give credit to my Manhattan Institute colleague, Gail Heriot, who is cited throughout the opinion. Gail has been beating this sometimes-lonely drum for decades. And she has been right for decades. The post Office of Legal Counsel Concludes That Disparate Impact Liability Under Title VII Is Unconstitutional appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/office-of-legal-counsel-concludes-that-disparate-impact-liability-under-title-vii-is-unconstitutional/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 20:02:15 +0000 In 2009, the Supreme Court decided Ricci v. DeStefano . The Justices reversed Judge Sonia Sotomayor's indefensible ruling against the Frank Ricci and the other firefighters. But the Court stopped short of deciding whether New Haven's attempt to avoid liability for disparate impact violated the Equal Protection Clause. Justice Scalia concurred to explain the Court was merely postponing the inevitable question: But the war between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about howand on what termsto make peace between them. Nearly two decades later, with a very different Supreme Court, this question is now primed for resolution. Today the Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion finding that the EEOC's Title VII guidelines are unconstitutional. EEOC's existing interpretations, including the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures ("Guidelines"), embrace an unconstitutional reading of Title VII. Rather than treating disparate impact as an evidentiary mechanism to smoke out intentional discriminationimposing liability only when disproportionate adverse effects give rise to a strong inference of intentional discriminationEEOC's historic interpretations contemplate liability based on disproportionately adverse effects alone, without regard to an employer's likely intent. Because EEOC's historic approach divorces liability from circumstances giving rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred, it functions as a qualified racial-proportionality mandate and spurs employers to engage in race-based decisionmaking to avoid liability. That approach is unlawful and unconstitutional. The opinion relies on Allen v. Milligan , which declared for the first time that our Constitution is "color-blind." Three corrections to that approach are necessary "to resolve the ten-sion between [disparate-impact] claims under [Title VII] and our color-blind Constitution." Allen v. Milligan, No. 25A1314, 2026 WL 1552756, at *1 (U.S. June 2, 2026) (per curiam). As I observed , this emergency docket opinion may become more significant than Callais, a theme that the Wall Street Journal picked up . Allen made clear that Callais applies to the Equal Protection context. Indeed, the Opinion links Callais back to the Justice Alito's TJ dissental. Even facially race-neutral actions, when mo-tivated by the purpose of altering racial balance, constitute intentional discrimination against the members of the racial group who are balanced down. After all, "if race played a role in a decision made by a govern-ment actor," or at the behest of a government actor, then race discrimi-nation has occurred and "strict scrutiny applie[s]." Louisiana v. Callais, 146 S. Ct. 1131, 1146 (2026); see also Coal. for TJ v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 146 S. Ct. 541, 545 (2024) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). This opinion is earth-shattering. The Department of Justice ruled that disparate-impact compels employers to engage in unconstitutional race discrimination. Just as "the Federal Government is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of race," so too is it "prohibited from enacting laws mandating that third partiese.g., employers, whether private, State, or munici-paldiscriminate on the basis of race," unless those laws survive strict scrutiny. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring) (first citing Bol-ling, 347 U.S. at 500; and then citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 7882 (1917)). And just as it is unconstitutional for the federal govern-ment to "force[] States to engage in the very race-based discrimination that the Constitution forbids," Callais, 146 S. Ct. at 1142; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 92627 (1995), so too it is unconstitutional for the federal government to coerce employers to adopt employment policies or make employment decisions motivated by race. Disparate-impact liability does not just raise constitutional doubt in occasional cases; unless narrowly circumscribed, it structurally compels the very racial discrimination that the Constitution forbids. In the same way that Callais "updated" Gingles , this opinion calls on the Court to "update" Griggs : Reading Griggs in context and together with the Supreme Court's more recent precedent requires "updat[ing] the framework" for dispar-ate-impact liability "to ensure a constitutional reading and application of" Title VII. Callais , 146 S. Ct. at 1157, 1161 (updating the framework for claims under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). As Justice Scalia suggested in Ricci , a properly tailored disparate-impact scheme might constitutionally operate as "an evidentiary tool" to "smoke out" practices that present a significant likelihood of intentional discrimination. 557 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also City of Rome v. United States , 446 U.S. 156, 17778 (1980). This is a similar approach to the one that the Supreme Court took in Callais , which held that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, "imposes liability only when the circum-stances give rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred." . . . Applying Griggs, Wards Cove, Inclusive Communities, and Callais, we identify three limiting principles on disparate-impact liability that prevent a constitutional collision under current Supreme Court prece-dent. We emphasize, as the Supreme Court has, that no single limiting principle is wholly sufficient; rather, each caveat is essential to avoid the conclusion I suspect the EEOC will bring suit against firms that have made race-conscious decisions to avoid disparate impact suits (or more likely because they agree with separating people based on race). At that point, the constitutionality of disparate-impact is squarely teed up. Kudos to Assistant Attorney General Elliot Gaiser and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Josh Craddock for putting forth this remarkable opinion. I also have to give credit to my Manhattan Institute colleague, Gail Heriot, who is cited throughout the opinion. Gail has been beating this sometimes-lonely drum for decades. And she has been right for decades. The post Office of Legal Counsel Concludes That Disparate Impact Liability Under Title VII Is Unconstitutional appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/gay-law-school-dean-sues-for-discrimination-alleging-he-was-fired-because-he-married-his-husband/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 20:00:00 +0000 ‘This is outright homophobia,’ said a faculty member after the termination. The post Gay Law School Dean Sues For Discrimination, Alleging He Was Fired Because He Married His Husband appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/gay-law-school-dean-sues-for-discrimination-alleging-he-was-fired-because-he-married-his-husband/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 20:00:00 +0000 This is outright homophobia, said a faculty member after the termination. The post Gay Law School Dean Sues For Discrimination, Alleging He Was Fired Because He Married His Husband appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/dead-lawyering-theory-too-much-of-litigation-is-fake/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 19:15:00 +0000 Will most legal arguments be written by LLMs? The post Dead Lawyering Theory: Too Much Of Litigation Is Fake appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/my-new-washington-post-op-ed-on-nyc-mayor-mamdanis-unconstitutional-housing-policy/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 19:08:09 +0000 The Washington Post just published my article " Build Homes, Don't Seize Them, Mayor Mamdani ." Here is an excerpt: "Block by Block," Zohran Mamdani's " sweeping blueprint " to reduce housing prices in New York City, comes with a dangerous promise. "When necessary," the mayor said on May 26 , "we will take aggressive legal action to remove negligent owners and property managers" and transfer ownership to "responsible stewards." The problem: The proposal is an unconstitutional power grab that would exacerbate the city's housing crisis. The Fifth Amendment's takings clause stipulates that the government may not take "private property" for public use without "just compensation." There is a long-standing debate over the extent to which regulations that constrain the use of property but don't seize it outright qualify as takings. Virtually all jurists and legal scholars, however, agree that outright confiscation does…. If the government could expropriate property at will, it could pursue widespread seizure from anyone using property in ways the party in power disapproves of, or for purposes of transferring it to cronies and favored constituencies. Such abuses are common in authoritarian states, which is one reason the founders inserted the clause into the Bill of Rights in 1791. James Madison and others supported it in part because of arbitrary confiscation by British authorities. The mayor's proposal doesn't just violate the federal and state constitutions, which have nearly identical restrictions on takings. It would also make the city's shortages worse. Faced with the prospect of potential expropriation, many owners would likely withdraw properties from the market or not list them in the first place. New York's rent-stabilization laws have already induced owners to abandon thousands of apartments that can't be profitably maintained or upgraded. The mayor seeks to make city policy more severe by "freezing" rents for hundreds of thousands of units, preventing even the modest increases permitted under current law…. The mayor often decries the city's "systemic inequities" that have made living there more onerous. A great opportunity to make good on that rhetoric would be to target the real barriers to access: the exclusionary zoning rules that severely limit the amount and types of housing that can be built on most of the city's residential land…. Mamdani has rightly praised cities like Austin , Minneapolis and Auckland, New Zealand , which have seen the virtue in empowering private owners to build new housing. Such YIMBY — or "yes in my backyard" — zoning deregulation reliably increases supply and reduces prices. The "Block by Block" plan includes a few steps in this direction…. But the effect of such measures would be muted by expropriation and expanded rent control….. The political right has its own snake-oil housing policies. Tariffs and mass deportation of immigrants make housing more expensive by increasing the price of building materials and the costs of construction, respectively…. But counterproductive right-wing policies don't justify Mamdani's. To alleviate the "deepening housing crisis," stop digging a hole with more government control of the kind that caused it in the first place. The post My New Washington Post Op ed on NYC Mayor Mamdani's Unconstitutional Housing Policy appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/my-new-washington-post-op-ed-on-nyc-mayor-mamdanis-unconstitutional-housing-policy/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 19:08:09 +0000 The Washington Post just published my article " Build Homes, Don't Seize Them, Mayor Mamdani ." Here is an excerpt: "Block by Block," Zohran Mamdani's " sweeping blueprint " to reduce housing prices in New York City, comes with a dangerous promise. "When necessary," the mayor said on May 26 , "we will take aggressive legal action to remove negligent owners and property managers" and transfer ownership to "responsible stewards." The problem: The proposal is an unconstitutional power grab that would exacerbate the city's housing crisis. The Fifth Amendment's takings clause stipulates that the government may not take "private property" for public use without "just compensation." There is a long-standing debate over the extent to which regulations that constrain the use of property but don't seize it outright qualify as takings. Virtually all jurists and legal scholars, however, agree that outright confiscation does. If the government could expropriate property at will, it could pursue widespread seizure from anyone using property in ways the party in power disapproves of, or for purposes of transferring it to cronies and favored constituencies. Such abuses are common in authoritarian states, which is one reason the founders inserted the clause into the Bill of Rights in 1791. James Madison and others supported it in part because of arbitrary confiscation by British authorities. The mayor's proposal doesn't just violate the federal and state constitutions, which have nearly identical restrictions on takings. It would also make the city's shortages worse. Faced with the prospect of potential expropriation, many owners would likely withdraw properties from the market or not list them in the first place. New York's rent-stabilization laws have already induced owners to abandon thousands of apartments that can't be profitably maintained or upgraded. The mayor seeks to make city policy more severe by "freezing" rents for hundreds of thousands of units, preventing even the modest increases permitted under current law. The mayor often decries the city's "systemic inequities" that have made living there more onerous. A great opportunity to make good on that rhetoric would be to target the real barriers to access: the exclusionary zoning rules that severely limit the amount and types of housing that can be built on most of the city's residential land. Mamdani has rightly praised cities like Austin , Minneapolis and Auckland, New Zealand , which have seen the virtue in empowering private owners to build new housing. Such YIMBY or "yes in my backyard" zoning deregulation reliably increases supply and reduces prices. The "Block by Block" plan includes a few steps in this direction. But the effect of such measures would be muted by expropriation and expanded rent control.. The political right has its own snake-oil housing policies. Tariffs and mass deportation of immigrants make housing more expensive by increasing the price of building materials and the costs of construction, respectively. But counterproductive right-wing policies don't justify Mamdani's. To alleviate the "deepening housing crisis," stop digging a hole with more government control of the kind that caused it in the first place. The post My New Washington Post Op ed on NYC Mayor Mamdani's Unconstitutional Housing Policy appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/indian-court-denies-asset-freeze-based-russian-judgment-debt Tue, 09 Jun 2026 19:55:02 +0100 A judge in Mumbai has rejected a Russian entitys bid to freeze assets belonging to Italian engineering group Tecnimont while it seeks to enforce a US$2 billion Moscow court judgment rendered under Russias Lugovoy Law. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-legal-tech-to-english-dictionary-2-0-artificial-intelligence-in-legal-tech/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 18:32:00 +0000 [Sponsored] There are lawyers out there right now, using ChatGPT and still answering emails in an AOL account and not just because theyre hipsters! The post The Legal Tech-To-English Dictionary (2.0): Artificial Intelligence In Legal Tech appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/seabed-authority-faces-unclos-claims-over-exploration-contracts Tue, 09 Jun 2026 18:50:07 +0100 Mining companies sponsored by Nauru and Tonga have filed UNCLOS claims against the International Seabed Authority after it identified them as possibly non-compliant with their contracts for deep-sea exploration in the Pacific Ocean. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/seabed-authority-faces-unclos-claims-over-exploration-contracts Tue, 09 Jun 2026 18:50:07 +0100 Mining companies sponsored by Nauru and Tonga have filed UNCLOS claims against the International Seabed Authority after it identified them as possibly non-compliant with their contracts for deep-sea exploration in the Pacific Ocean. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/todd-blanche-got-the-attorney-general-nomination-getting-confirmed-is-another-matter/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 17:48:00 +0000 Epstein files, a slush fund, and a missing bullet walk into a confirmation hearing. The post Todd Blanche Got The Attorney General Nomination. Getting Confirmed Is Another Matter. appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/todd-blanche-got-the-attorney-general-nomination-getting-confirmed-is-another-matter/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 17:48:00 +0000 Epstein files, a slush fund, and a missing bullet walk into a confirmation hearing. The post Todd Blanche Got The Attorney General Nomination. Getting Confirmed Is Another Matter. appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/new-leadership-team-addleshaw-goddard-practice Tue, 09 Jun 2026 18:36:33 +0100 Addleshaw Goddard has announced a new cross-border leadership team for its international arbitration practice, composed of Jon Tweedale in London, who has been practice head for the past seven years, and new co-heads Ioana Knoll-Tudor and Markus Perkams, based in Paris and Munich respectively. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/new-leadership-team-addleshaw-goddard-practice Tue, 09 Jun 2026 18:36:33 +0100 Addleshaw Goddard has announced a new cross-border leadership team for its international arbitration practice, composed of Jon Tweedale in London, who has been practice head for the past seven years, and new co-heads Ioana Knoll-Tudor and Markus Perkams, based in Paris and Munich respectively. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/trump-lawyers-keep-missing-easy-filing-deadlines-how-is-this-hard-for-them/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 17:03:00 +0000 Both in his private and public capacity, his lawyers don't seem to care much about the details. The post Trump Lawyers Keep Missing Easy Filing Deadlines… How Is This Hard For Them? appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/trump-lawyers-keep-missing-easy-filing-deadlines-how-is-this-hard-for-them/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 17:03:00 +0000 Both in his private and public capacity, his lawyers don't seem to care much about the details. The post Trump Lawyers Keep Missing Easy Filing Deadlines How Is This Hard For Them? appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/diac-appoints-new-leaders-case-management-team Tue, 09 Jun 2026 17:50:54 +0100 The Dubai International Arbitration Centre has announced changes to the leadership of its case management team, including the appointment of two new deputy registrars to replace Christoffer Coello Hedberg, who has returned to private practice in Sweden. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/diac-appoints-new-leaders-case-management-team Tue, 09 Jun 2026 17:50:54 +0100 The Dubai International Arbitration Centre has announced changes to the leadership of its case management team, including the appointment of two new deputy registrars to replace Christoffer Coello Hedberg, who has returned to private practice in Sweden. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/naftogaz-seizes-more-russian-assets-in-finland Tue, 09 Jun 2026 17:47:32 +0100 Ukraine’s Naftogaz has obtained the temporary seizure of Russian state funds held in Finland as it seeks to enforce a US$5 billion investment treaty award. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/naftogaz-seizes-more-russian-assets-in-finland Tue, 09 Jun 2026 17:47:32 +0100 Ukraines Naftogaz has obtained the temporary seizure of Russian state funds held in Finland as it seeks to enforce a US$5 billion investment treaty award. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/al-ghashiyah-testified-that-as-head-of-the-family-he-has-decided-that-islamic-law-is-the-law-that-applies-to-the-family/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 16:28:39 +0000 From al Ghashiyah v. Oster , decided last Thursday by Wisconsin Court of Appeals Judges JoAnne Kloppenburg, Jennifer Nashold, and Chris Taylor: Al Ghashiyah is the only brother of James C. Charles Casteel. Casteel died in October 2024. Thomas Oster, a longtime friend of Casteel, filed a petition for the formal administration of Casteel's estate and filed Casteel's will with the circuit court. Casteel's will bequeaths the contents of his estate to certain friends and family members. The will does not bequeath any of Casteel's estate to al Ghashiyah. Al Ghashiyah filed a motion requesting that the court apply Islamic law to the administration of the estate. Al Ghashiyah asserted that, under Islamic law, Casteel's estate must be distributed among Casteel's surviving siblings, with any surviving male siblings receiving twice the share of any surviving female siblings. At an evidentiary hearing on Oster's petition and al Ghashiyah's motion, al Ghashiyah confirmed that his motion was a request that the circuit court apply Islamic law instead of the laws of the State of Wisconsin, and instead of following Casteel's will. Al Ghashiyah testified that, with his brother's death, al Ghashiyah became the head of the Casteel family, and as head of the family, he has decided that Islamic law is the law that applies to the family. Al Ghashiyah also testified that he and Casteel did not discuss whether or not Casteel's property should be distributed according to Islamic law, and that, to al Ghashiyah's knowledge, Casteel did not practice the Islamic faith. The court denied al Ghashiyah's motion requesting that the court apply Islamic law. Al Ghashiyah argues that the circuit court's denial of his motion to apply Islamic law is discriminatory and violates fundamental rights protected under the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." [A]l Ghashiyah does not develop this argument with citation to relevant legal authority that illustrates court error. Rather, al Ghashiyah asserts that "human rights principles are universally applicable" and cites to Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2003) in support of that assertion. However, in that case, current and former residents of the Republic of Sudan brought suit alleging that an oil company in that country committed "gross human rights violations, including extrajudicial killing, forcible displacement, war crimes, confiscation and destruction of property, kidnapping, rape, and enslavement." Al Ghashiyah does not explain how the Presbyterian Church of Sudan case supports his argument that the court here violated al Ghashiyah's rights when it declined to apply Islamic law to the administration of the estate of Casteel, who the court found expressed no desire that Islamic law should apply. In his reply brief, al Ghashiyah asserts that courts "routinely consider religious doctrine in cases where relevant and voluntarily invoked by the parties." He also states that the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the right of religious communities to arrange their affairs in accordance with their beliefs. It may be true that in certain circumstances courts may apply and consider international or human rights law, and the rights of religious communities. However, al Ghashiyah does not develop an argument as to how his right to practice Islamic law is relevant to the administration of Casteel's estate, he does not assert any evidence that Casteel invoked Islamic law, and he does not explain his conclusion that the court should recognize the religious beliefs of al Ghashiyah in deciding Casteel's will. Rather, al Ghashiyah's argument amounts to the conclusory assertion that, because he asked the court to follow Islamic law, it was discrimination and a human rights violation for the court to decline the request. We do not further address this argument as it is undeveloped. The post "Al Ghashiyah Testified That as Head of the Family, He Has Decided that Islamic Law Is the Law that Applies to the Family" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/ai-is-killing-legals-billable-hour-its-also-repeating-its-worst-mistake/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 16:12:00 +0000 [Sponsored] Law firms and legal departments are writing the future of the profession in separate rooms. What happens when they actually work together? The post AI Is Killing Legal’s Billable Hour. It’s Also Repeating Its Worst Mistake. appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/ai-is-killing-legals-billable-hour-its-also-repeating-its-worst-mistake/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 16:12:00 +0000 [Sponsored] Law firms and legal departments are writing the future of the profession in separate rooms. What happens when they actually work together? The post AI Is Killing Legals Billable Hour. Its Also Repeating Its Worst Mistake. appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/nonexistent-case-citations-on-both-sides-rubberstamping-by-local-counsel/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 15:56:23 +0000 In Withers v. City of Aberdeen , decided yesterday by Judge Sharion Aycock (N.D. Miss.), both sides had filed briefs containing citations to nonexistent cases; the briefs were drafted by out-of-state counsel, each of whom had local counsel (as the rules generally require). Withers was represented by Wilson with Ridgeway as local counsel; the City was represented by Williams with McClinton as local counsel. I focus here just on the sanctions imposed on local counsel: Ridgeway is a Mississippi licensed attorney who works for Christian & Small, LLP. She sponsored Wilson's pro hac vice admission in this case and serves as local counsel for Withers. As noted, Ridgeway appears as a signatory to Withers' Opposition to Defendant City of Aberdeen's Motion for Summary Judgment [105], which contained two citations to nonexistent cases. Though she was not the drafter of that document, she admitted to failing to review and verify the accuracy of the legal authority cited therein. In other words, she did not check the cases after authorizing her signature on the filing. At the hearing, Ridgeway explained that she was unaware of Wilson's AI use but did not attempt to excuse herself on that basis. She explained that she does not personally use AI and that her firm has a policy in place pertaining to AI use. In essence, Wilson would present Ridgeway with a copy of proposed filings drafted by Wilson, and the two would discuss the substance of the same. Despite this communication between the two, Ridgeway admitted to not reviewing the legal citations in those drafts before they were filed, including Withers' Response [105]. Ridgeway accepted responsibility for her role in the violation stemming from the fake cases cited in that filing as well as in others. {Following the show cause hearing, Ridgeway informed the Court that she had self-reported to the Mississippi Bar. The Court finds that this act demonstrates her acceptance of accountability.} As briefly discussed above, Ridgeway conducted a thorough analysis of all filings submitted on behalf of Withers in this case after entry of the Court's show cause order. The Court appreciates her efforts in attempting to remediate the issue and her acceptance of responsibility but finds that those factors do not shield her from being sanctioned. In addition to admitting her violation of Rule 11, Ridgeway also conceded that her omissions violated this Court's Local Rules. Local Rule 83.1 provides in pertinent part: Association and Duties of a Resident Attorney. No eligible non-resident attorney may appear pro hac vice unless and until a resident attorney has been associated. The resident attorney remains responsible to the client and responsible for the conduct of the proceeding before the court . Certainly, resident attorneys are responsible for providing guidance and oversight of non-resident attorneys to ensure that they are complying with procedural and ethical rules. After all, resident attorneys are basically the gateway for out-of-state attorneys to have access to Mississippi's court system. The Court does not take a violation of that core duty lightly. At the same time, taking into account the specific circumstances of this case, it does not find that Ridgeway acted in bad faith. Her omissions were negligent and careless but not purposeful…. McClinton … was a signatory to the two filings submitted on behalf of the City, which contained hallucinatory citations. At the hearing, McClinton explained that he was not aware that the motions at issue were being filed but acknowledged that he had previously given Williams permission to affix his signature on prior filings without reading the documents. Though he was not provided the filings for his review prior to their filing, McClinton did not attempt to use that as an excuse and explained that it was not unreasonable for Williams to have done so based on their course of practice. In other words, he had impliedly given permission for her to do so. McClinton also explained that only two attorneys practice at his law firm, that he does not use AI in his practice, and therefore does not have an AI policy in place. Much like Ridgeway, McClinton was unaware that his co-counsel, Williams, had used an AI research tool to conduct legal research in the case. McClinton also acknowledged that he should have reviewed the filings when he received the automatic notification of electronic filing and expressed his remorse for having failed to do so. Again, he does not contest his Rule 11 violation. For the same reasons provided above concerning Ridgeway, the Court finds that he too violated his duties as a sponsoring resident attorney pursuant to this Court's Local Rules. Because he was not the drafter of the filings at issue and did not use AI in this case, the Court has no reason to believe that he acted in bad faith. Like Ridgeway, the Court finds that McClinton acted negligently and carelessly. However, he accepted responsibility for his role in the violation and, like Ridgeway, informed the Court that he had self-reported to the Mississippi Bar following the show cause hearing. The Court credits his candor and steps taken towards holding himself accountable. In an era of rampant unverified AI usage within the legal field, this case presents a prime example of the risk associated with serving as a rubberstamp when acting as local counsel. Local counsel were therefore disqualified from the case, ordered to pay $1000 each in fines, and referred to bar authorities. Wilson and Williams, the lawyers who drafted the filings, were fined $2500 and $3500 and otherwise disciplined as well. The post Nonexistent Case Citations on Both Sides + "Rubberstamp[ing]" by "Local Counsel" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/nonexistent-case-citations-on-both-sides-rubberstamping-by-local-counsel/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 15:56:23 +0000 In Withers v. City of Aberdeen , decided yesterday by Judge Sharion Aycock (N.D. Miss.), both sides had filed briefs containing citations to nonexistent cases; the briefs were drafted by out-of-state counsel, each of whom had local counsel (as the rules generally require). Withers was represented by Wilson with Ridgeway as local counsel; the City was represented by Williams with McClinton as local counsel. I focus here just on the sanctions imposed on local counsel: Ridgeway is a Mississippi licensed attorney who works for Christian & Small, LLP. She sponsored Wilson's pro hac vice admission in this case and serves as local counsel for Withers. As noted, Ridgeway appears as a signatory to Withers' Opposition to Defendant City of Aberdeen's Motion for Summary Judgment [105], which contained two citations to nonexistent cases. Though she was not the drafter of that document, she admitted to failing to review and verify the accuracy of the legal authority cited therein. In other words, she did not check the cases after authorizing her signature on the filing. At the hearing, Ridgeway explained that she was unaware of Wilson's AI use but did not attempt to excuse herself on that basis. She explained that she does not personally use AI and that her firm has a policy in place pertaining to AI use. In essence, Wilson would present Ridgeway with a copy of proposed filings drafted by Wilson, and the two would discuss the substance of the same. Despite this communication between the two, Ridgeway admitted to not reviewing the legal citations in those drafts before they were filed, including Withers' Response [105]. Ridgeway accepted responsibility for her role in the violation stemming from the fake cases cited in that filing as well as in others. {Following the show cause hearing, Ridgeway informed the Court that she had self-reported to the Mississippi Bar. The Court finds that this act demonstrates her acceptance of accountability.} As briefly discussed above, Ridgeway conducted a thorough analysis of all filings submitted on behalf of Withers in this case after entry of the Court's show cause order. The Court appreciates her efforts in attempting to remediate the issue and her acceptance of responsibility but finds that those factors do not shield her from being sanctioned. In addition to admitting her violation of Rule 11, Ridgeway also conceded that her omissions violated this Court's Local Rules. Local Rule 83.1 provides in pertinent part: Association and Duties of a Resident Attorney. No eligible non-resident attorney may appear pro hac vice unless and until a resident attorney has been associated. The resident attorney remains responsible to the client and responsible for the conduct of the proceeding before the court . Certainly, resident attorneys are responsible for providing guidance and oversight of non-resident attorneys to ensure that they are complying with procedural and ethical rules. After all, resident attorneys are basically the gateway for out-of-state attorneys to have access to Mississippi's court system. The Court does not take a violation of that core duty lightly. At the same time, taking into account the specific circumstances of this case, it does not find that Ridgeway acted in bad faith. Her omissions were negligent and careless but not purposeful. McClinton was a signatory to the two filings submitted on behalf of the City, which contained hallucinatory citations. At the hearing, McClinton explained that he was not aware that the motions at issue were being filed but acknowledged that he had previously given Williams permission to affix his signature on prior filings without reading the documents. Though he was not provided the filings for his review prior to their filing, McClinton did not attempt to use that as an excuse and explained that it was not unreasonable for Williams to have done so based on their course of practice. In other words, he had impliedly given permission for her to do so. McClinton also explained that only two attorneys practice at his law firm, that he does not use AI in his practice, and therefore does not have an AI policy in place. Much like Ridgeway, McClinton was unaware that his co-counsel, Williams, had used an AI research tool to conduct legal research in the case. McClinton also acknowledged that he should have reviewed the filings when he received the automatic notification of electronic filing and expressed his remorse for having failed to do so. Again, he does not contest his Rule 11 violation. For the same reasons provided above concerning Ridgeway, the Court finds that he too violated his duties as a sponsoring resident attorney pursuant to this Court's Local Rules. Because he was not the drafter of the filings at issue and did not use AI in this case, the Court has no reason to believe that he acted in bad faith. Like Ridgeway, the Court finds that McClinton acted negligently and carelessly. However, he accepted responsibility for his role in the violation and, like Ridgeway, informed the Court that he had self-reported to the Mississippi Bar following the show cause hearing. The Court credits his candor and steps taken towards holding himself accountable. In an era of rampant unverified AI usage within the legal field, this case presents a prime example of the risk associated with serving as a rubberstamp when acting as local counsel. Local counsel were therefore disqualified from the case, ordered to pay $1000 each in fines, and referred to bar authorities. Wilson and Williams, the lawyers who drafted the filings, were fined $2500 and $3500 and otherwise disciplined as well. The post Nonexistent Case Citations on Both Sides + "Rubberstamp[ing]" by "Local Counsel" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/boutique-firm-one-ups-milbanks-new-salary-scale-raises-starting-pay-to-245k/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 15:08:44 +0000 This boutique is moving the goalposts yet again. The post Boutique Firm Matches Milbanks New Salary Scale appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.lawnext.com/2026/06/less-hype-more-application-is-the-promise-of-this-june-17-legal-ai-conference-live-in-l-a-or-virtual.html Tue, 09 Jun 2026 14:49:27 +0000 Masters AI x TechnoCat Los Angeles is a full-day program that will include an AI crash course and a variety of panels and hands-on workshops. The post Less Hype, More Application Is The Promise Of This June 17 Legal AI Conference, Live In L.A. Or Virtual appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-supreme-court-and-the-right-to-bear-arms-an-explainer/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000 (Charly Triballeau/AFP via Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-supreme-court-and-the-right-to-bear-arms-an-explainer/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000 (Charly Triballeau/AFP via Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.justsecurity.org/141453/protecting-environmental-rights-defenders/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=protecting-environmental-rights-defenders Tue, 09 Jun 2026 13:22:47 +0000 Environmental human rights defenders must be empowered to design and implement their own forms of collective protection to shift the power imbalance. The post Protecting Environmental Rights Defenders Is Key to Giving Communities a Voice appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/141453/protecting-environmental-rights-defenders/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=protecting-environmental-rights-defenders Tue, 09 Jun 2026 13:22:47 +0000 Environmental human rights defenders must be empowered to design and implement their own forms of collective protection to shift the power imbalance. The post Protecting Environmental Rights Defenders Is Key to Giving Communities a Voice appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/138217/gendered-governance-digital-economies-asean/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=gendered-governance-digital-economies-asean Tue, 09 Jun 2026 13:05:35 +0000 The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women is quietly becoming a normative force in the governance of digital economies. The post Beyond Tech-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence: The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Gender, and the Governance of Digital Economies in ASEAN appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/attempt-to-seal-court-filing-and-to-order-members-of-the-public-to-destroy-their-copies-withdrawn/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 13:05:34 +0000 A couple of weeks ago, the litigants in the Social Media Adolescent Addiction/Personal Injury Products Liability Litigation multi-district case tried to seal a court filing that had apparently been inadequately redacted when it had been filed. That is sometimes allowed, but what was striking is that they proposed an order (ECF 3048) that would have provided that, Any party, counsel, or member of the public who may have obtained copies of ECF 3009-1 during the time that it was publicly available, including through ECF Court alerts that automatically generate PDF copies filed in the case, shall immediately delete and destroy them. That, my friend and longtime Internet lawyer Megan Gray and I thought, was unconstitutional as to "member[s] of the public." So Megan and I asked the court for leave to file an amicus brief, on behalf of the Free Law Project (the CourtListener / RECAP people) and the First Amendment Coalition, urging the court to reject the proposed order. We argued that the proposal violates Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because "[a]n injunction … binds a non-party only if it … either abets the enjoined party in violating the injunction, or is legally identified with the enjoined party," CFPB v. Howard Law, P.C. , 671 F. App'x 954, 955 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (emphasis added), and Proposed Amici have no relationship with the original parties; the Due Process Clause, under which restraints on Proposed Amici could not be imposed without "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill , 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quotations omitted); the First Amendment, because "[o]nce true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it," Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn , 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975), and this principle extends to public information sites such as Free Law Project as well as to advocacy groups such as the First Amendment Coalition; 47 U.S.C. § 230, because CourtListener is an "interactive computer service" that cannot be ordered to remove material posted at the direction of a user (which is how court filings are hosted by Free Law Project). We're glad to report that, shortly after we filed the proposed amicus brief, Meta said it would withdraw the sealing request, and with it the request for the public-must-delete-and-destroy-its-copies order. Here were the details of our argument: [* * *] [I.] The ECF 3048 Proposed Order Would Violate Rule 65 "Consistent with historical practice, a federal court exercising its equitable authority may enjoin named defendants from taking specified unlawful actions. But under traditional equitable principles, no court may 'lawfully enjoin the world at large' …." Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson , 595 U.S. 30, 44 (2021) (quoting Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff , 42 F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 65 applies this principle. Lynch v. Rank , 639 F. Supp. 69, 72 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (citing Rule 65 and Alemite ). "The law is clear that a court may not enforce an injunction against a nonparty who acts independently of the enjoined party." Blockow­icz v. Williams , 630 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). "It is firmly established that 'a court may not enter an injunction against a person who has not been made a party to the case before it.'" LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC , No. 11-cv-04494-WHO, 2013 WL 4604746, at (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2013) (citing Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc. , 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Rule 65(d)(2) provides the only exceptions to this rule: The order binds only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise: (A) the parties; (B) the parties' officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B). An injunction thus binds a non-party only if it "either 'abets the enjoined party' in violating the injunction, or is 'legally identified' with the enjoined party." CFPB v. Howard Law, P.C. , 671 F. App'x 954, 955 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (citing NLRB v. Sequoia Dist. Council of Carpenters, AFL-CIO , 568 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1997)). And "the fact that [a third party] is technologically capable of removing the postings does not render its failure to do so aiding and abetting." Blockowicz , 630 F.3d at 568. Proposed amici have no relationship with any of the parties in this case (other than being users of defendants' products and services), nor any connection to the underlying litigation. Thus, under Rule 65, this Court may not order proposed amici as non-parties to delete or destroy any documents in their possession. [II.] The ECF 3048 Proposed Order Would Violate the Due Process Clause Nonparties to a lawsuit, who received "neither notice of, nor sufficient representation in" the proceedings, cannot be bound by the court's decision "as a matter of federal due process." Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala. , 517 U.S. 793, 805 (1996). "Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa , 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010) (cleaned up). And the notice must be coupled with service of process: Actual notice "does not alone meet the formal requirements for obtaining personal jurisdiction" over someone whom a party seeks to bind to a court order. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver , 171 F.3d 943, 958 (4th Cir. 1999). A federal court may not issue without "personal jurisdiction over the parties"; "it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court." Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. , 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam resulting from litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process. The consistent constitutional rule has been that a court has no power to adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc ., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969) (citations omitted). "Injunctive relief, by its very nature, can only be granted in an in personam action commenced by one party against another in accordance with established process. Consequently, a party cannot obtain injunctive relief against another without first obtaining in personam jurisdiction over that person or someone in legal privity with that person." R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. , 171 F.3d at 957. Due process principles are especially applicable to restrictions on speech. In Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne , the Supreme Court held that even a "10-day restraining order …, issued ex parte , without formal or informal notice to the petitioners or any effort to advise them of the proceeding, cannot be sustained." 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968). Here, the ECF 3048 proposed order would require members of the public to permanently delete and destroy their copies of the relevant document, without their having been given notice and the opportunity to be heard, and thus would violate both the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. And though proposed amici learned of this proposed injunction by happenstance and seek to proactively oppose it, the injunction would nonetheless violate the Due Process Clause as to all other third parties that it might cover. [III.] The ECF 3048 Proposed Order Would Violate the First Amendment The proposed order compelling members of the public to delete or destroy information they lawfully obtained from court records would result in an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. "Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions— i.e. , court orders that actually forbid speech activities—are classic examples of prior restraints." Alexander v. United States , 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). An order to delete or destroy court records that are lawfully obtained, which is inherently a "takedown order" for material that has been distributed or published, "is a classic prior restraint of speech." Garcia v. Google, Inc ., 786 F.3d 733, 747 (9th Cir. 2015). A "prior re­straint on publication" is "one of the most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence" and "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart , 427 U.S. 539, 559, 562 (1976). "Once the government has placed … information in the public domain, reliance must rest upon the judgment of those who decide what to publish …." Florida Star v. B.J.F. , 491 U.S. 524, 538 (1989) (cleaned up). Where "true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it." Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn , 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975). In Florida Star , a newspaper was sued by a sexual assault victim for publishing her name after lawfully obtaining it from a publicly released police report. 491 U.S. at 526. The police improperly released the report with the victim's name. Id. at 526-27. Yet the Supreme Court held that the newspaper still had a right to publish the released information, despite this error on the part of the police. Id. at 538. Therefore, even if the court record at issue was mistakenly filed on the public docket, the press and public cannot be restrained from retaining or publishing it. See Neb. Press Ass'n , 427 U.S. at 568 (holding that even if a preliminary hearing could have been closed, "once a public hearing had been held, what transpired there could not be subject to prior restraint"). Indeed, as the Supreme Court held in Bartnicki v. Vopper , even if a document on matters of public concern (and public court records would surely qualify) was originally illegally leaked, people who innocently obtained it are free to publish it. 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001). "The First Amendment privileges the publication of facts contained in lawfully obtained judicial records, even if reasonable people would want them concealed." Nieman v. VersusLaw, Inc. , 512 F. App'x 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a legal research website that published "links to information and documents in the public record" was protected by the First Amendment). And this extends to all publishers of information, not just traditional mainstream media. "We have consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers." Citizens United v. FEC , 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court "has repeatedly refused in non-defamation contexts to accord greater First Amendment protection to the institutional media than to other speakers." Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox , 740 F.3d 1284, 1290 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying this principle to defamation contexts as well, id. at 1291). And in Bartnicki , the Court expressly made clear that it drew "no distinction between the media respondents" and a nonmedia defendant. 532 U.S. at 525 n.8. Like the restriction on the newspapers in Florida Star , the Proposed Order would require proposed amici to conceal information that was lawfully accessed from the public record. The First Amendment continues to protect their right to distribute the information they legally obtained directly or indirectly from PACER. [IV.] The ECF 3048 Proposed Order Would Violate 47 U.S.C. § 230 as to Free Law Project Documents are made available on the CourtListener website when CourtListener users download the documents from PACER and use the RECAP browser plugin to automatically upload them to CourtListener. (Lissner Decl. ¶ 4.) Some users presumably did that with regard to Doc. 3009-1, which the Proposed Order would require Free Law Project to delete. CourtListener is therefore an "interactive computer service" under 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), much as Yahoo! or Yelp are interactive computer services. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. , 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (Yahoo!); Hassell v. Bird , 5 Cal. 5th 522, 540 (2018) (plurality opin.) (Yelp). And, just as Yelp could not be ordered to remove material posted at the direction of a user, Hassell , 5 Cal. 5th at 547; id. at 548 (Kruger, J., concurring in the judgment), so Free Law Project cannot be ordered to remove material posted at the direction of a user. See also Weitsman v. Levesque , No. 19-CV-461 JLS (AHG), 2020 WL 6825687, at (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2020) (stating that "the Court has concerns about ordering third parties, including Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube, to take action against Defendant should he fail to remove the material in accordance with the injunction" against Defendant, given § 230, and therefore declining to issue such an injunction against the third parties); Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc. , 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003) (likewise concluding that § 230 precludes orders requiring a hosting service to remove user-posted material); Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, Inc. , No. 02-1964, 2002 WL 31844907 (E.D. La. Dec. 17, 2002) (same); Medytox Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc. , 152 So.3d 727 (Fla. Ct. App. 2014) (same). The post Attempt to Seal Court Filing, and to Order Members of the Public to Destroy Their Copies, Withdrawn appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/attempt-to-seal-court-filing-and-to-order-members-of-the-public-to-destroy-their-copies-withdrawn/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 13:05:34 +0000 A couple of weeks ago, the litigants in the Social Media Adolescent Addiction/Personal Injury Products Liability Litigation multi-district case tried to seal a court filing that had apparently been inadequately redacted when it had been filed. That is sometimes allowed, but what was striking is that they proposed an order (ECF 3048) that would have provided that, Any party, counsel, or member of the public who may have obtained copies of ECF 3009-1 during the time that it was publicly available, including through ECF Court alerts that automatically generate PDF copies filed in the case, shall immediately delete and destroy them. That, my friend and longtime Internet lawyer Megan Gray and I thought, was unconstitutional as to "member[s] of the public." So Megan and I asked the court for leave to file an amicus brief, on behalf of the Free Law Project (the CourtListener / RECAP people) and the First Amendment Coalition, urging the court to reject the proposed order. We argued that the proposal violates Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, because "[a]n injunction binds a non-party only if it either abets the enjoined party in violating the injunction, or is legally identified with the enjoined party," CFPB v. Howard Law, P.C. , 671 F. App'x 954, 955 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (emphasis added), and Proposed Amici have no relationship with the original parties; the Due Process Clause, under which restraints on Proposed Amici could not be imposed without "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill , 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quotations omitted); the First Amendment, because "[o]nce true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it," Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn , 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975), and this principle extends to public information sites such as Free Law Project as well as to advocacy groups such as the First Amendment Coalition; 47 U.S.C. 230, because CourtListener is an "interactive computer service" that cannot be ordered to remove material posted at the direction of a user (which is how court filings are hosted by Free Law Project). We're glad to report that, shortly after we filed the proposed amicus brief, Meta said it would withdraw the sealing request, and with it the request for the public-must-delete-and-destroy-its-copies order. Here were the details of our argument: [* * *] [I.] The ECF 3048 Proposed Order Would Violate Rule 65 "Consistent with historical practice, a federal court exercising its equitable authority may enjoin named defendants from taking specified unlawful actions. But under traditional equitable principles, no court may 'lawfully enjoin the world at large' ." Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson , 595 U.S. 30, 44 (2021) (quoting Alemite Mfg. Corp. v. Staff , 42 F.2d 832, 832 (2d Cir. 1930) (L. Hand, J.)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 65 applies this principle. Lynch v. Rank , 639 F. Supp. 69, 72 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (citing Rule 65 and Alemite ). "The law is clear that a court may not enforce an injunction against a nonparty who acts independently of the enjoined party." Blockowicz v. Williams , 630 F.3d 563, 568 (7th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). "It is firmly established that 'a court may not enter an injunction against a person who has not been made a party to the case before it.'" LifeScan Scotland, Ltd. v. Shasta Technologies, LLC , No. 11-cv-04494-WHO, 2013 WL 4604746, at (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2013) (citing Additive Controls & Measurement Sys., Inc. v. Flowdata, Inc. , 96 F.3d 1390, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). Rule 65(d)(2) provides the only exceptions to this rule: The order binds only the following who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise: (A) the parties; (B) the parties' officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (C) other persons who are in active concert or participation with anyone described in Rule 65(d)(2)(A) or (B). An injunction thus binds a non-party only if it "either 'abets the enjoined party' in violating the injunction, or is 'legally identified' with the enjoined party." CFPB v. Howard Law, P.C. , 671 F. App'x 954, 955 (9th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up) (citing NLRB v. Sequoia Dist. Council of Carpenters, AFL-CIO , 568 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1997)). And "the fact that [a third party] is technologically capable of removing the postings does not render its failure to do so aiding and abetting." Blockowicz , 630 F.3d at 568. Proposed amici have no relationship with any of the parties in this case (other than being users of defendants' products and services), nor any connection to the underlying litigation. Thus, under Rule 65, this Court may not order proposed amici as non-parties to delete or destroy any documents in their possession. [II.] The ECF 3048 Proposed Order Would Violate the Due Process Clause Nonparties to a lawsuit, who received "neither notice of, nor sufficient representation in" the proceedings, cannot be bound by the court's decision "as a matter of federal due process." Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala. , 517 U.S. 793, 805 (1996). "Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa , 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010) (cleaned up). And the notice must be coupled with service of process: Actual notice "does not alone meet the formal requirements for obtaining personal jurisdiction" over someone whom a party seeks to bind to a court order. R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver , 171 F.3d 943, 958 (4th Cir. 1999). A federal court may not issue without "personal jurisdiction over the parties"; "it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court." Zepeda v. U.S. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. , 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983). It is elementary that one is not bound by a judgment in personam resulting from litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process. The consistent constitutional rule has been that a court has no power to adjudicate a personal claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Rsch., Inc ., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969) (citations omitted). "Injunctive relief, by its very nature, can only be granted in an in personam action commenced by one party against another in accordance with established process. Consequently, a party cannot obtain injunctive relief against another without first obtaining in personam jurisdiction over that person or someone in legal privity with that person." R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. , 171 F.3d at 957. Due process principles are especially applicable to restrictions on speech. In Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne , the Supreme Court held that even a "10-day restraining order , issued ex parte , without formal or informal notice to the petitioners or any effort to advise them of the proceeding, cannot be sustained." 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968). Here, the ECF 3048 proposed order would require members of the public to permanently delete and destroy their copies of the relevant document, without their having been given notice and the opportunity to be heard, and thus would violate both the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. And though proposed amici learned of this proposed injunction by happenstance and seek to proactively oppose it, the injunction would nonetheless violate the Due Process Clause as to all other third parties that it might cover. [III.] The ECF 3048 Proposed Order Would Violate the First Amendment The proposed order compelling members of the public to delete or destroy information they lawfully obtained from court records would result in an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. "Temporary restraining orders and permanent injunctions i.e. , court orders that actually forbid speech activitiesare classic examples of prior restraints." Alexander v. United States , 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993). An order to delete or destroy court records that are lawfully obtained, which is inherently a "takedown order" for material that has been distributed or published, "is a classic prior restraint of speech." Garcia v. Google, Inc ., 786 F.3d 733, 747 (9th Cir. 2015). A "prior restraint on publication" is "one of the most extraordinary remedies known to our jurisprudence" and "the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart , 427 U.S. 539, 559, 562 (1976). "Once the government has placed information in the public domain, reliance must rest upon the judgment of those who decide what to publish ." Florida Star v. B.J.F. , 491 U.S. 524, 538 (1989) (cleaned up). Where "true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it." Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn , 420 U.S. 469, 496-97 (1975). In Florida Star , a newspaper was sued by a sexual assault victim for publishing her name after lawfully obtaining it from a publicly released police report. 491 U.S. at 526. The police improperly released the report with the victim's name. Id. at 526-27. Yet the Supreme Court held that the newspaper still had a right to publish the released information, despite this error on the part of the police. Id. at 538. Therefore, even if the court record at issue was mistakenly filed on the public docket, the press and public cannot be restrained from retaining or publishing it. See Neb. Press Ass'n , 427 U.S. at 568 (holding that even if a preliminary hearing could have been closed, "once a public hearing had been held, what transpired there could not be subject to prior restraint"). Indeed, as the Supreme Court held in Bartnicki v. Vopper , even if a document on matters of public concern (and public court records would surely qualify) was originally illegally leaked, people who innocently obtained it are free to publish it. 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001). "The First Amendment privileges the publication of facts contained in lawfully obtained judicial records, even if reasonable people would want them concealed." Nieman v. VersusLaw, Inc. , 512 F. App'x 635, 637 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that a legal research website that published "links to information and documents in the public record" was protected by the First Amendment). And this extends to all publishers of information, not just traditional mainstream media. "We have consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers." Citizens United v. FEC , 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (cleaned up). The Supreme Court "has repeatedly refused in non-defamation contexts to accord greater First Amendment protection to the institutional media than to other speakers." Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox , 740 F.3d 1284, 1290 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying this principle to defamation contexts as well, id. at 1291). And in Bartnicki , the Court expressly made clear that it drew "no distinction between the media respondents" and a nonmedia defendant. 532 U.S. at 525 n.8. Like the restriction on the newspapers in Florida Star , the Proposed Order would require proposed amici to conceal information that was lawfully accessed from the public record. The First Amendment continues to protect their right to distribute the information they legally obtained directly or indirectly from PACER. [IV.] The ECF 3048 Proposed Order Would Violate 47 U.S.C. 230 as to Free Law Project Documents are made available on the CourtListener website when CourtListener users download the documents from PACER and use the RECAP browser plugin to automatically upload them to CourtListener. (Lissner Decl. 4.) Some users presumably did that with regard to Doc. 3009-1, which the Proposed Order would require Free Law Project to delete. CourtListener is therefore an "interactive computer service" under 47 U.S.C. 230(f)(2), much as Yahoo! or Yelp are interactive computer services. See, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. , 570 F.3d 1096, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (Yahoo!); Hassell v. Bird , 5 Cal. 5th 522, 540 (2018) (plurality opin.) (Yelp). And, just as Yelp could not be ordered to remove material posted at the direction of a user, Hassell , 5 Cal. 5th at 547; id. at 548 (Kruger, J., concurring in the judgment), so Free Law Project cannot be ordered to remove material posted at the direction of a user. See also Weitsman v. Levesque , No. 19-CV-461 JLS (AHG), 2020 WL 6825687, at (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2020) (stating that "the Court has concerns about ordering third parties, including Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube, to take action against Defendant should he fail to remove the material in accordance with the injunction" against Defendant, given 230, and therefore declining to issue such an injunction against the third parties); Noah v. AOL Time Warner Inc. , 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003) (likewise concluding that 230 precludes orders requiring a hosting service to remove user-posted material); Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, Inc. , No. 02-1964, 2002 WL 31844907 (E.D. La. Dec. 17, 2002) (same); Medytox Solutions, Inc. v. Investorshub.com, Inc. , 152 So.3d 727 (Fla. Ct. App. 2014) (same). The post Attempt to Seal Court Filing, and to Order Members of the Public to Destroy Their Copies, Withdrawn appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/trump-to-ask-justices-to-review-his-suit-against-cnn/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/trump-to-ask-justices-to-review-his-suit-against-cnn/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.justsecurity.org/139693/october-7-tribunal-legitimacy-challenge/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=october-7-tribunal-legitimacy-challenge Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:52:27 +0000 The tribunal will be judged not only by the verdicts it produces, but by the institutional model of accountability it leaves behind. The post The New October 7 Tribunal and the Legitimacy Challenge of Atrocity Adjudication appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/139693/october-7-tribunal-legitimacy-challenge/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=october-7-tribunal-legitimacy-challenge Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:52:27 +0000 The tribunal will be judged not only by the verdicts it produces, but by the institutional model of accountability it leaves behind. The post The New October 7 Tribunal and the Legitimacy Challenge of Atrocity Adjudication appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/morning-docket-06-09-26/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:45:00 +0000 * Todd Blanche officially nominated as Attorney General and all it will cost him is, eventually, his license to practice law. [ Reuters ] * Lockstep is on its way out. [ American Lawyer ] * OpenAI follows Anthropic in filing IPO docs. [ Law360 ] * Gibson Dunn won charity raffle with million dollar bid, earning courtside seats to watch an exhibition of the worst basketball officiating in the world. [ Bloomberg Law News ] * Federal judge strikes down Trump's $100K H-1B fee as an illegal tax on businesses without congressional approval. [ AP News ] * Lawyer quits practice to help open restaurant. [ ABA Journal ] * Ken Paxton's own lawyer endorses his opponent. [ NOTUS ] The post Morning Docket: 06.09.26 appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/obligation-to-cite-check-the-cases-cited-by-the-other-side-and-report-errors-to-court-2/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:34:11 +0000 It's hardly news that you shouldn't file briefs with AI-hallucinated cases. But should you check all of your opponent's citations to see if they're hallucinated, so that you can alert the court to that? I at first thought not. Naturally, if a citation is critical to the opponent's argument, you'll want to read the case the opponent is citing, and alert the court if the case doesn't actually exist. But many citations are on tangential points, cited for uncontroversial matters; there isn't much reason to try to track them down. Indeed, even using a tool such as Westlaw's document analysis tool, which can do a good job checking citations in bulk takes at least some time and therefore client money: One needs to not just run the tool but closely analyze any errors it claims to find. And then one would have to spent time and money confirming that they are genuine errors and not typos, since one doesn't want to seem to be making a mountain out of a molehill, and writing up the analysis. But it now seems clear that quite a few judges do get annoyed not just at the lawyers whose briefs contain hallucinations, but also at opposing counsel who don't warn the court about those hallucinations. I saw this most recently in Landberg v. City of N.Y. , where appellate court judges admonished the opposing counsel (to be sure, much less harshly than they admonished the directly offending lawyer); see this video , starting roughly at the 19-minute mark. Here's an excerpt from an article at 404 Media (Samantha Cole) : [T]he attorney [Friscia] representing the owner of the property that faces the sidewalk, stood up before the judges next. He started to speak, but [Presiding Justice Hector] LaSalle wasn't finished with the dressing-down. "He's raising a court of appeal standard that doesn't exist," LaSalle said, interrupting Friscia. "He was using it as a component of his argument, and you didn't think you should bring it to our attention?" "I didn't notice in particular that the principle of law that he was citing was incorrect," Friscia said. "I'm sorry, I'm going to give you every opportunity to make your argument," LaSalle said. "But I'm befuddled. I honestly am. I'm absolutely—and I'm not here to—lawyers make mistakes. It's not an easy profession. I don't want to sit here beating up on lawyers, but we rely on the bar so much in what we do. So the first thing that I did, I don't want to speak for my colleagues, but after seeing what he wrote, when I went to your papers, I expected to see something referencing […] It wasn't one case, counsel, it was several cases, and you didn't see fit to bring it to our attention either. It's just striking to me." Friscia, now with the fear of the bar in him, apologized profusely. "Your honor, I apologize to the court. I will do further due diligence going forward from this point on." "I hope so," LaSalle said. "You should apologize to your client, not to me." "Yes, I apologize for that," Friscia said. "And I will, going forward, check every single case, even if it stands for, you know, general principles of law, like the construed liberally to effectuate remedial purpose, and things like that. I will bring them to the court's attention." … And the judges then turned to the lawyer (Freedman) representing the City of New York: She got the same questioning from [Justice] Nelson: "So, how do you explain your failure to bring to the attention of this court that a brief was filed with this court by appellant's counsel with apparent fabrications and misrepresentations?" Freedman tried to explain. "I certainly read the briefs," she said. "I certainly read all of the briefs here, but I certainly didn't focus on it, because it was not our issue. And I do apologize to the court for not catching that, but I tended to focus more on the issue of prior written notice." In January, I noted three trial court cases taking the same view: [1.] From Nuvola, LLC v. Wright , decided Nov. 21 by Hennepin County (Minn.) Judge Laurie Miller: For the reasons the Court has outlined above, the Court finds Mr. Knaak's failure to check the legal authority cited in his brief and his reliance on non-existent case law in his advocacy before this Court raises a question as to whether he breached his duty of competence to Ms. Wright. The Court will refer Mr. Knaak to the Office of Lawyer's Professional Responsibility (OLPR) for appropriate action. Any mitigating factors proffered by Mr. Knaak, including his compliance with his obligation to educate other lawyers about this issue under this Order, may be relevant to a future ethics investigation and any subsequent recommendations by the OLPR, but the Court will not analyze them here as the Court does not make explicit findings on or enforce ethics rules. The Court also finds troubling Mr. Braun's [i.e., opposing counsel's] failure to identify or bring the non-existent case citations to the Court's attention before the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration. TheCourt should not be left as the last line of defense against citations to fictional cases in briefs filed with the court. While Mr. Braun did not create or rely on the fake citations, he also did not detect them. Instead, he admitted he did not review the cases cited by his opponent. If he had checked out the citations in the brief to which he was responding, he no doubt would have brought the issue to the Court's attention by the time of the motion hearing, and that would have allowed the Court to take the non-existence of the cited cases into consideration as it heard the argument on the merits of Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, instead of leaving the Court to discover that issue on its own, after the hearing was concluded. The Court does not find Mr. Braun's conduct to be sanctionable, as he did not cite any non-existent cases to the Court. [Nonetheless], the Court reminds counsel that it is the obligation of counsel on both sides to respond to each other's arguments, including completing a basic cite-check of the cases cited by the other side. The Court urges all lawyers to take seriously their obligation to ensure that the legal arguments being made and considered by theCourt rest upon good law, not fictional cases dreamed up by a computer. The development of the common law relies upon the accurate citation of existing caselaw, as lawyers and courts analyze new disputes. Infection of the body of caselaw by fake Al-generated citations threatens the integrity of the common law. The court earlier in the opinion noted (focusing Mr. Knaak's failure to check his own work) that: Westlaw now provides a tool called "Quick Check" that allows a user to upload a lawyer's own work or the work of an adverse party and quickly identify a list of authorities cited. The Court did not use this tool to discover the non-existent citations, and does not endorse it as a substitute for traditional citation checks. The Court followed the old-fashioned process of looking up the key cases cited by the lawyers, to read them and decide whether it agreed with the parties' reading of pertinent caselaw. However, to the extent a lawyer may wish to conduct a faster citation-check process, the availability of the "Quick Check" tool demonstrates that the investigation required of a lawyer by Rule 11 can be accomplished efficiently through readily available methods. [2.] Judge Sharion Aycock (N.D. Miss.) reached a similar conclusion in Billups v. Louisville Municipal School Dist. : The Court also observes that the Defendant … could have flagged the fictious citation and misrepresentation of case law [by Plaintiff's counsel] in a reply brief or supplemental filing. The Court takes this opportunity to issue a charge. Going forward, the Court expects all parties to assist in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process and to be diligent in flagging AI misuse. "[O]therwise, the risk is too great that such errors will persist undetected, potentially leading to an outcome unsupported by law." Elizondo v. City of Laredo (S.D. Tex. 2025). [3.] And Judge Marina Garcia Marmolejo's order in Elizondo did indeed take the same view: The Court also observes that Defendant, the City of Laredo, could have flagged these fictitious citations in a reply brief or supplemental filing. Although this oversight does not rise to the level of sanctionable conduct, the Court expects all parties to assist in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process by alerting the Court to such errors. The Court encourages greater diligence in flagging citation errors in the future—otherwise, the risk is too great that such errors will persist undetected, potentially leading to an outcome unsupported by law. I doubt you'll get sanctioned for not spotting hallucinations in your opponent's work. But it looks like you might get the judge annoyed at you, which is not what you want. So if you have Westlaw, use its Litigation Document Analyzer tool on opponents' filings and not just on your own. The post Obligation to Cite-Check the Cases Cited by the Other Side and Report Errors to Court appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/obligation-to-cite-check-the-cases-cited-by-the-other-side-and-report-errors-to-court-2/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:34:11 +0000 It's hardly news that you shouldn't file briefs with AI-hallucinated cases. But should you check all of your opponent's citations to see if they're hallucinated, so that you can alert the court to that? I at first thought not. Naturally, if a citation is critical to the opponent's argument, you'll want to read the case the opponent is citing, and alert the court if the case doesn't actually exist. But many citations are on tangential points, cited for uncontroversial matters; there isn't much reason to try to track them down. Indeed, even using a tool such as Westlaw's document analysis tool, which can do a good job checking citations in bulk takes at least some time and therefore client money: One needs to not just run the tool but closely analyze any errors it claims to find. And then one would have to spent time and money confirming that they are genuine errors and not typos, since one doesn't want to seem to be making a mountain out of a molehill, and writing up the analysis. But it now seems clear that quite a few judges do get annoyed not just at the lawyers whose briefs contain hallucinations, but also at opposing counsel who don't warn the court about those hallucinations. I saw this most recently in Landberg v. City of N.Y. , where appellate court judges admonished the opposing counsel (to be sure, much less harshly than they admonished the directly offending lawyer); see this video , starting roughly at the 19-minute mark. Here's an excerpt from an article at 404 Media (Samantha Cole) : [T]he attorney [Friscia] representing the owner of the property that faces the sidewalk, stood up before the judges next. He started to speak, but [Presiding Justice Hector] LaSalle wasn't finished with the dressing-down. "He's raising a court of appeal standard that doesn't exist," LaSalle said, interrupting Friscia. "He was using it as a component of his argument, and you didn't think you should bring it to our attention?" "I didn't notice in particular that the principle of law that he was citing was incorrect," Friscia said. "I'm sorry, I'm going to give you every opportunity to make your argument," LaSalle said. "But I'm befuddled. I honestly am. I'm absolutelyand I'm not here tolawyers make mistakes. It's not an easy profession. I don't want to sit here beating up on lawyers, but we rely on the bar so much in what we do. So the first thing that I did, I don't want to speak for my colleagues, but after seeing what he wrote, when I went to your papers, I expected to see something referencing [] It wasn't one case, counsel, it was several cases, and you didn't see fit to bring it to our attention either. It's just striking to me." Friscia, now with the fear of the bar in him, apologized profusely. "Your honor, I apologize to the court. I will do further due diligence going forward from this point on." "I hope so," LaSalle said. "You should apologize to your client, not to me." "Yes, I apologize for that," Friscia said. "And I will, going forward, check every single case, even if it stands for, you know, general principles of law, like the construed liberally to effectuate remedial purpose, and things like that. I will bring them to the court's attention." And the judges then turned to the lawyer (Freedman) representing the City of New York: She got the same questioning from [Justice] Nelson: "So, how do you explain your failure to bring to the attention of this court that a brief was filed with this court by appellant's counsel with apparent fabrications and misrepresentations?" Freedman tried to explain. "I certainly read the briefs," she said. "I certainly read all of the briefs here, but I certainly didn't focus on it, because it was not our issue. And I do apologize to the court for not catching that, but I tended to focus more on the issue of prior written notice." In January, I noted three trial court cases taking the same view: [1.] From Nuvola, LLC v. Wright , decided Nov. 21 by Hennepin County (Minn.) Judge Laurie Miller: For the reasons the Court has outlined above, the Court finds Mr. Knaak's failure to check the legal authority cited in his brief and his reliance on non-existent case law in his advocacy before this Court raises a question as to whether he breached his duty of competence to Ms. Wright. The Court will refer Mr. Knaak to the Office of Lawyer's Professional Responsibility (OLPR) for appropriate action. Any mitigating factors proffered by Mr. Knaak, including his compliance with his obligation to educate other lawyers about this issue under this Order, may be relevant to a future ethics investigation and any subsequent recommendations by the OLPR, but the Court will not analyze them here as the Court does not make explicit findings on or enforce ethics rules. The Court also finds troubling Mr. Braun's [i.e., opposing counsel's] failure to identify or bring the non-existent case citations to the Court's attention before the hearing on the motion to compel arbitration. TheCourt should not be left as the last line of defense against citations to fictional cases in briefs filed with the court. While Mr. Braun did not create or rely on the fake citations, he also did not detect them. Instead, he admitted he did not review the cases cited by his opponent. If he had checked out the citations in the brief to which he was responding, he no doubt would have brought the issue to the Court's attention by the time of the motion hearing, and that would have allowed the Court to take the non-existence of the cited cases into consideration as it heard the argument on the merits of Defendant's motion to compel arbitration, instead of leaving the Court to discover that issue on its own, after the hearing was concluded. The Court does not find Mr. Braun's conduct to be sanctionable, as he did not cite any non-existent cases to the Court. [Nonetheless], the Court reminds counsel that it is the obligation of counsel on both sides to respond to each other's arguments, including completing a basic cite-check of the cases cited by the other side. The Court urges all lawyers to take seriously their obligation to ensure that the legal arguments being made and considered by theCourt rest upon good law, not fictional cases dreamed up by a computer. The development of the common law relies upon the accurate citation of existing caselaw, as lawyers and courts analyze new disputes. Infection of the body of caselaw by fake Al-generated citations threatens the integrity of the common law. The court earlier in the opinion noted (focusing Mr. Knaak's failure to check his own work) that: Westlaw now provides a tool called "Quick Check" that allows a user to upload a lawyer's own work or the work of an adverse party and quickly identify a list of authorities cited. The Court did not use this tool to discover the non-existent citations, and does not endorse it as a substitute for traditional citation checks. The Court followed the old-fashioned process of looking up the key cases cited by the lawyers, to read them and decide whether it agreed with the parties' reading of pertinent caselaw. However, to the extent a lawyer may wish to conduct a faster citation-check process, the availability of the "Quick Check" tool demonstrates that the investigation required of a lawyer by Rule 11 can be accomplished efficiently through readily available methods. [2.] Judge Sharion Aycock (N.D. Miss.) reached a similar conclusion in Billups v. Louisville Municipal School Dist. : The Court also observes that the Defendant could have flagged the fictious citation and misrepresentation of case law [by Plaintiff's counsel] in a reply brief or supplemental filing. The Court takes this opportunity to issue a charge. Going forward, the Court expects all parties to assist in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process and to be diligent in flagging AI misuse. "[O]therwise, the risk is too great that such errors will persist undetected, potentially leading to an outcome unsupported by law." Elizondo v. City of Laredo (S.D. Tex. 2025). [3.] And Judge Marina Garcia Marmolejo's order in Elizondo did indeed take the same view: The Court also observes that Defendant, the City of Laredo, could have flagged these fictitious citations in a reply brief or supplemental filing. Although this oversight does not rise to the level of sanctionable conduct, the Court expects all parties to assist in maintaining the integrity of the judicial process by alerting the Court to such errors. The Court encourages greater diligence in flagging citation errors in the futureotherwise, the risk is too great that such errors will persist undetected, potentially leading to an outcome unsupported by law. I doubt you'll get sanctioned for not spotting hallucinations in your opponent's work. But it looks like you might get the judge annoyed at you, which is not what you want. So if you have Westlaw, use its Litigation Document Analyzer tool on opponents' filings and not just on your own. The post Obligation to Cite-Check the Cases Cited by the Other Side and Report Errors to Court appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/141133/russia-drones-europe/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=russia-drones-europe Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:32:39 +0000 Russia’s drone incursions into E.U. territory raise important questions about how unintended engagements are regulated under international law. The post Drones Over Europe: The Prohibition on the Use of Force and Unintended Harm appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/141133/russia-drones-europe/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=russia-drones-europe Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:32:39 +0000 Russias drone incursions into E.U. territory raise important questions about how unintended engagements are regulated under international law. The post Drones Over Europe: The Prohibition on the Use of Force and Unintended Harm appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/archaeologists-libel-claim-over-allegations-of-trafficking-in-stolen-native-american-human-remains-can-go-forward/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:01:44 +0000 From Judge Robert Hinkle (N.D. Fla.) May 27 in Shanks v. Schwadron : Shanks was an archaeologist employed at the National Park Service. His supervisor {Mr. Russo}, also an archaeologist, … and Mr. Shanks were the subject of an inspector general's investigation …. After an investigation, the inspector general issued a report that included the following facts, which are largely undisputed. A collector approached Mr. Russo with an offer to sell the Park Service items retrieved from burial mounds on Tyndall Air Force Base. The report refers to these as potsherds, defined as pottery fragments found at archaeological sites. Items placed with human remains as part of a death rite are known as funerary objects. Mr. Russo concluded the Park Service could not purchase the collector's items because if, as the collector said, they had been obtained at Tyndall, they would be considered funerary objects, whose purchase would be illegal. For convenience, this order sometimes refers to these items as potsherds, not funerary objects, without noting each time any uncertainty about their actual nature. To avoid the perceived legal obstacle to purchasing these items, Mr. Russo enlisted a straw purchaser, who provided Mr. Russo a $1,000 check payable to the collector. Mr. Russo apparently intended to obtain the items to donate them to the State of Florida for preservation. Mr. Russo, accompanied by his subordinate Mr. Shanks, traveled to the collector's location, delivered the check to the collector, and took possession of the items, together with two Native American skulls. The skulls found their way to the State of Florida, which, at the time of the inspector general's report, was in the process of repatriating them. But the potsherds wound up on a shelf in Mr. Russo's office. The inspector general concluded Mr. Russo's and Mr. Shanks's actions did not violate the most closely implicated federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1170, which is entitled "Illegal trafficking in Native American human remains and cultural items." Under § 1170(a), it is a crime to sell or purchase Native American human remains or to use or transport them "for sale or profit." Mr. Russo apparently purchased only the potsherds, not the skulls, and the skulls were not used or transported for sale or profit. On those facts, there was no violation of this statute. Under § 1170(b), it is a crime to sell or purchase Native American cultural objects "obtained in violation of the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act" or to use or transport such objects "for sale or profit." Mr. Russo purchased the potsherds—the straw buyer does not change this—but the inspector general was unable to establish that the collector obtained the potsherds after NAGPRA's 1990 enactment. If the collector obtained them earlier, there was no violation of § 1170(b). Moreover, the collector purportedly had a permit to excavate at Tyndall, and while the absence of a record at Tyndall verifying this would ordinarily refute the claim, many of Tyndall's records were destroyed in Hurricane Michael. If the collector legally obtained the items, even after NAGPRA's enactment, their purchase by Mr. Russo was not a violation of § 1170(b). And in any event, the inspector general's report directly implicated only Mr. Russo, not Mr. Shanks, in purchasing the items. Neither Mr. Russo nor Mr. Shanks used or transported the objects for sale or profit…. [Defendant] Ms. Schwadron … is an archaeologist who worked for the National Parks Service and may have provided the information that triggered the inspector general's investigation. The second defendant, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility ("PEER"), is a nonprofit corporation that, according to the complaint, "supports current and former public employees who seek a higher standard of environmental ethics and scientific integrity within their agencies … by defending whistleblowers, shining the light on improper or illegal government actions, working to improve laws and regulations, and supporting the work of other organizations." … Shanks alleged that defendants stated that he "trafficked stolen Native American human remains" and implied that he "committed criminal acts involving Native American human remains." … Shanks also claims : Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of Defendants' actions including, but not limited to: (a) Loss of a sixteen-year federal career, including pension and benefits, valued at approximately $2 million. (b) Loss of a university press book contract when other contributors pulled out of the project due to defamatory statements from Defendant SCHWADRON. (c) Removal from professional panels and working groups, causing reputational harm and lost opportunities. (d) Severe emotional distress and humiliation. The court allowed Shanks' claim to go forward: The critical question … [is] whether the defendants' allegedly false statement that he trafficked stolen Native American human remains, or a collection of statements that in context imply he did so, could be found to be defamatory. "Trafficking" can be defined as "[t]he act of transporting, trading, or dealing, esp. in illegal goods or people." But a law enforcement officer does not traffic in drugs when seizing them for legitimate purposes, and a federal archaeologist does not traffic in human remains when obtaining them by proper means to have them repatriated. It is not clear the means used here were proper, and the defendants had every right to criticize the process. That does not mean, however, that the defendants were entitled to accuse Mr. Shanks of trafficking in "stolen" human remains. Even if acquiring the remains in connection with a straw purchase of the potsherds could be labeled trafficking, and even if Mr. Shanks could be deemed a participant in that trafficking, the assertion that the remains were "stolen" adds a defamatory element. Mr. Russo acquired the remains from a collector—PEER called him a "known looter"—and delivered them free of charge to the State of Florida for repatriation. Without more, that falls well short of trafficking in stolen human remains. {[And] Florida's fair-report privilege does not apply if, as the complaint alleges, the defendants' statements were not a fair description of the inspector general's report.} … The court noted, though, that another of PEER's statements mentioned in the Complaint, "the reference to 'blatant desecrations,'" "was a nonactionable opinion." Jamie Marie Ito (Ito Law PLLC) represents Shanks. The post Archaeologist's Libel Claim Over Allegations of "Trafficking in Stolen Native American Human Remains" Can Go Forward appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/archaeologists-libel-claim-over-allegations-of-trafficking-in-stolen-native-american-human-remains-can-go-forward/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:01:44 +0000 From Judge Robert Hinkle (N.D. Fla.) May 27 in Shanks v. Schwadron : Shanks was an archaeologist employed at the National Park Service. His supervisor {Mr. Russo}, also an archaeologist, and Mr. Shanks were the subject of an inspector general's investigation . After an investigation, the inspector general issued a report that included the following facts, which are largely undisputed. A collector approached Mr. Russo with an offer to sell the Park Service items retrieved from burial mounds on Tyndall Air Force Base. The report refers to these as potsherds, defined as pottery fragments found at archaeological sites. Items placed with human remains as part of a death rite are known as funerary objects. Mr. Russo concluded the Park Service could not purchase the collector's items because if, as the collector said, they had been obtained at Tyndall, they would be considered funerary objects, whose purchase would be illegal. For convenience, this order sometimes refers to these items as potsherds, not funerary objects, without noting each time any uncertainty about their actual nature. To avoid the perceived legal obstacle to purchasing these items, Mr. Russo enlisted a straw purchaser, who provided Mr. Russo a $1,000 check payable to the collector. Mr. Russo apparently intended to obtain the items to donate them to the State of Florida for preservation. Mr. Russo, accompanied by his subordinate Mr. Shanks, traveled to the collector's location, delivered the check to the collector, and took possession of the items, together with two Native American skulls. The skulls found their way to the State of Florida, which, at the time of the inspector general's report, was in the process of repatriating them. But the potsherds wound up on a shelf in Mr. Russo's office. The inspector general concluded Mr. Russo's and Mr. Shanks's actions did not violate the most closely implicated federal criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. 1170, which is entitled "Illegal trafficking in Native American human remains and cultural items." Under 1170(a), it is a crime to sell or purchase Native American human remains or to use or transport them "for sale or profit." Mr. Russo apparently purchased only the potsherds, not the skulls, and the skulls were not used or transported for sale or profit. On those facts, there was no violation of this statute. Under 1170(b), it is a crime to sell or purchase Native American cultural objects "obtained in violation of the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act" or to use or transport such objects "for sale or profit." Mr. Russo purchased the potsherdsthe straw buyer does not change thisbut the inspector general was unable to establish that the collector obtained the potsherds after NAGPRA's 1990 enactment. If the collector obtained them earlier, there was no violation of 1170(b). Moreover, the collector purportedly had a permit to excavate at Tyndall, and while the absence of a record at Tyndall verifying this would ordinarily refute the claim, many of Tyndall's records were destroyed in Hurricane Michael. If the collector legally obtained the items, even after NAGPRA's enactment, their purchase by Mr. Russo was not a violation of 1170(b). And in any event, the inspector general's report directly implicated only Mr. Russo, not Mr. Shanks, in purchasing the items. Neither Mr. Russo nor Mr. Shanks used or transported the objects for sale or profit. [Defendant] Ms. Schwadron is an archaeologist who worked for the National Parks Service and may have provided the information that triggered the inspector general's investigation. The second defendant, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility ("PEER"), is a nonprofit corporation that, according to the complaint, "supports current and former public employees who seek a higher standard of environmental ethics and scientific integrity within their agencies by defending whistleblowers, shining the light on improper or illegal government actions, working to improve laws and regulations, and supporting the work of other organizations." Shanks alleged that defendants stated that he "trafficked stolen Native American human remains" and implied that he "committed criminal acts involving Native American human remains." Shanks also claims : Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of Defendants' actions including, but not limited to: (a) Loss of a sixteen-year federal career, including pension and benefits, valued at approximately $2 million. (b) Loss of a university press book contract when other contributors pulled out of the project due to defamatory statements from Defendant SCHWADRON. (c) Removal from professional panels and working groups, causing reputational harm and lost opportunities. (d) Severe emotional distress and humiliation. The court allowed Shanks' claim to go forward: The critical question [is] whether the defendants' allegedly false statement that he trafficked stolen Native American human remains, or a collection of statements that in context imply he did so, could be found to be defamatory. "Trafficking" can be defined as "[t]he act of transporting, trading, or dealing, esp. in illegal goods or people." But a law enforcement officer does not traffic in drugs when seizing them for legitimate purposes, and a federal archaeologist does not traffic in human remains when obtaining them by proper means to have them repatriated. It is not clear the means used here were proper, and the defendants had every right to criticize the process. That does not mean, however, that the defendants were entitled to accuse Mr. Shanks of trafficking in "stolen" human remains. Even if acquiring the remains in connection with a straw purchase of the potsherds could be labeled trafficking, and even if Mr. Shanks could be deemed a participant in that trafficking, the assertion that the remains were "stolen" adds a defamatory element. Mr. Russo acquired the remains from a collectorPEER called him a "known looter"and delivered them free of charge to the State of Florida for repatriation. Without more, that falls well short of trafficking in stolen human remains. {[And] Florida's fair-report privilege does not apply if, as the complaint alleges, the defendants' statements were not a fair description of the inspector general's report.} The court noted, though, that another of PEER's statements mentioned in the Complaint, "the reference to 'blatant desecrations,'" "was a nonactionable opinion." Jamie Marie Ito (Ito Law PLLC) represents Shanks. The post Archaeologist's Libel Claim Over Allegations of "Trafficking in Stolen Native American Human Remains" Can Go Forward appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/141773/early-edition-june-9-2026/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=early-edition-june-9-2026 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:30 +0000 Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here. A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Here’s today’s news: IRAN WAR A U.S. Army helicopter went down near the coast of Oman on Monday night but President Donald Trump said the pilots were “fine.” It is not clear […] The post Early Edition: June 9, 2026 appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/141773/early-edition-june-9-2026/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=early-edition-june-9-2026 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:30 +0000 Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here. A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Heres todays news: IRAN WAR A U.S. Army helicopter went down near the coast of Oman on Monday night but President Donald Trump said the pilots were fine. It is not clear [] The post Early Edition: June 9, 2026 appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167680 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The Security Council meets this morning to discuss the situation in Central Africa, including efforts to combat the so-called Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), one of the region’s longest-running security threats, responsible for over 100,000 deaths, the UN estimates. Ambassadors have been briefed by the regional office (UNOCA) and its strategy for improving civilian protection, humanitarian access and cross-border cooperation. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167682 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Palestinian civilians are trapped between escalating settler violence in the occupied West Bank and fear-based Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip, investigators appointed by the UN Human Rights Council said on Tuesday in a new report. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167683 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Historical gains have been hard-won, but much more needs to be done to advance progress in realising promises made two decades ago, said the UN chief at the opening on Tuesday of the 19th global meeting on the rights of persons with disabilities at UN Headquarters. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167685 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Lebanon has suffered more than $365 million in damage to buildings across Beirut and Mount Lebanon since the latest escalation, according to a new UN-led assessment released on Tuesday, as fresh strikes in Tyre underscored the fragility of a ceasefire that has failed to stop the fighting. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167687 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Ahead of World Day Against Child Labour on 12 June, the UN is urging governments and communities to accelerate efforts to end a crisis that still affects millions of children worldwide. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167688 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Escalating attacks on bridges, roads and other civilian infrastructure in Sudan are disrupting humanitarian access and putting civilians at further risk, the United Nations said on Tuesday. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167680 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The Security Council meets this morning to discuss the situation in Central Africa, including efforts to combat the so-called Lords Resistance Army (LRA), one of the regions longest-running security threats, responsible for over 100,000 deaths, the UN estimates. Ambassadors have been briefed by the regional office (UNOCA) and its strategy for improving civilian protection, humanitarian access and cross-border cooperation. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167682 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Palestinian civilians are trapped between escalating settler violence in the occupied West Bank and fear-based Hamas rule in the Gaza Strip, investigators appointed by the UN Human Rights Council said on Tuesday in a new report. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167683 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Historical gains have been hard-won, but much more needs to be done to advance progress in realising promises made two decades ago, said the UN chief at the opening on Tuesday of the 19th global meeting on the rights of persons with disabilities at UN Headquarters. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167685 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Lebanon has suffered more than $365 million in damage to buildings across Beirut and Mount Lebanon since the latest escalation, according to a new UN-led assessment released on Tuesday, as fresh strikes in Tyre underscored the fragility of a ceasefire that has failed to stop the fighting. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167687 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Ahead of World Day Against Child Labour on 12 June, the UN is urging governments and communities to accelerate efforts to end a crisis that still affects millions of children worldwide. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167688 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Escalating attacks on bridges, roads and other civilian infrastructure in Sudan are disrupting humanitarian access and putting civilians at further risk, the United Nations said on Tuesday. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167679 Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 In Ebola-stricken eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) a massive push for early testing and contact tracing is helping to contain the virus, the UN World Health Organization (WHO) said on Tuesday. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-9-1970-7/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 11:00:51 +0000 6/9/1970: Justice Harry Blackmun (no relation) takes oath. Justice Harry Blackmun The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 9, 1970 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-9-1970-7/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 11:00:51 +0000 6/9/1970: Justice Harry Blackmun (no relation) takes oath. Justice Harry Blackmun The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 9, 1970 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/open-thread-230/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/09/open-thread-230/ Tue, 09 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/ffm_09jun26_410_e.htm Tue, 09 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 The WTO Fish Fund has marked an important milestone with the submission to the WTO of the first-ever fisheries subsidy notification made possible through support from the Fund. The submission on 3 June by Tonga under the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies has additional significance given the developing Pacific region's exposure to the effects of harmful fisheries subsidies. The notification was prepared during a workshop held from 20 to 22 May in Nuku'alofa, Tonga, as part of a project funded by the Fish Fund, and contributes to Tonga’s implementation of the Agreement. Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/ffm_09jun26_410_e.htm Tue, 09 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 The WTO Fish Fund has marked an important milestone with the submission to the WTO of the first-ever fisheries subsidy notification made possible through support from the Fund. The submission on 3 June by Tonga under the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies has additional significance given the developing Pacific region's exposure to the effects of harmful fisheries subsidies. The notification was prepared during a workshop held from 20 to 22 May in Nuku'alofa, Tonga, as part of a project funded by the Fish Fund, and contributes to Tongas implementation of the Agreement. Law/World Trade Organization https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/giving-the-kennedy-center-a-bad-name-see-also/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 23:30:00 +0000 Trump's Kennedy Center Benchslapped Over Loser Of A Lawsuit : You think they'd point to an actual contract in a breach of contract suit ! Groom Law Adopts The Milbank Scale : Setting their associates up for success ! Zealous Advocacy Has Its Limits : Ken Paxton's own lawyer didn't vote for him . Todd Blanche Is A Joke : John Oliver didn't have to work too hard for these punchlines . Ninth Circuit Judge Charged With Battery Over Parking Attempt Turned Violent : You'd think a judge would be better at staying in the lines . Law School Gifted $5M To Study The Rule Of Law : Huge win for Temple ! The post Giving The Kennedy Center A Bad Name See Also appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/biglaws-lockstep-partner-compensation-is-dying/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 23:02:00 +0000 It's a victim of the hopping lateral partner market. The post Biglaws Lockstep Partner Compensation Is Dying appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/ex-doge-staffer-ex-pete-hegseth-advisor-justin-fulcher-sues-the-guardian-for-libel/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 22:32:23 +0000 From today's Complaint in Fulcher v. Guardian News & Media LLC (D.D.C.); of course, these are just plaintiff's allegations: On June 9, 2025, The Guardian published an Article on its website at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/jun/09/hegseth-wiretap-inquiry-justin-fulcher . The Article contains numerous false and defamatory statements of and concerning Mr. Fulcher that are attributed to four unnamed sources. These statements include: "Hegseth aide upended Pentagon leak inquiry with false wiretap claims". "ex-Doge staffer Justin Fulcher suggested he had evidence of wiretap that would help investigation". "Days before Pete Hegseth fired three top aides last month over a Pentagon leak investigation into the disclosure of classified materials, according to four people familiar with the episode, a recently hired senior advisor said he could help with the inquiry." "The advisor, Justin Fulcher, suggested to Hegseth's then chief of staff, Joe Kasper, and Hegseth's personal lawyer, Tim Parlatore, that he knew of warrantless surveillance conducted by the National Security Agency (NSA) that had identified the leakers." "Fulcher offered to share the supposed evidence as long as he could help run the investigation, three of the people said. But when he eventually sat down with officials, it became clear he had no evidence of a wiretap, and the Pentagon had been duped." "The problem was that development was not communicated to the White Houseso several Trump advisors who were told of the NSA wiretap claim believed that was part of the 'smoking gun' evidence against the three aides fired by Hegseth, until they developed their own doubts." "The Guardian revealed last month that there were unsubstantiated NSA warrantless wiretap claims underpinning the leak investigation, but its origin story and the involvement of Fulcher in the controversy has not been previously reported." "It was not immediately clear why Fulcher chose to become involved in the investigation, but several days after he was replaced as a Doge lead, he went to Kasper and expressed a willingness to help with the investigation, which Kasper attributed to him wanting to prove his worth, two of the people said." "Kasper told Fulcher to go to Parlatore, who had been tasked with supervising and managing the investigation. When Fulcher approached Parlatore, he suggested that he knew of NSA intercepts supposedly showing that Caldwell had leaked using his personal phone, the two people said." "Looking back on the chain of events, three people familiar with the conversations described Fulcher's claims as conveniently dovetailing with prevailing suspicions at the time about Caldwell printing lots of documents and his efforts to have the leak investigation shut down." "Still, a cursory check at that stage into the NSA claims [by Mr. Fulcher] would have shown them to be false." "The claims [by Mr. Fulcher] were relayed to Hegseth and the White House as being accurate." In truth, Mr. Fulcher never suggested, stated or otherwise communicated to Joe Kasper, Tim Parlatore, or anyone else that the NSA had conducted warrantless surveillance that identified the source(s) of the leak alleged in the Article, or that Mr. Fulcher had access to such surveillance. Further, Mr. Fulcher never asked Joe Kasper, Tim Parlatore, or anyone else if he could join or assist with an investigation into the leak alleged by the Article, nor did he tell anyone that he could "help run" it. The Guardian acted with at least reckless disregard for the truth, by consciously disregarding readily available information that showed that the false statements were at least highly likely to be false. Among other things, the NSA is prohibited by law from intentionally targeting United States citizens, persons known to be located within the United States and communications in which the sender and recipients are known to be located within the United States. See 50 U.S.C. 1881a. Further, the NSA is only authorized to conduct electronic surveillance without a court order for the purpose of acquiring "foreign intelligence" that consists of communications exclusively between foreign powers. See 50 U.S.C. 1802; see also United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div. , 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (compliance with Fourth Amendment required for domestic national security matters). The subjects of the purported warrantless wiretaps alleged by the Article, were, at all relevant times, United States citizens and the leak alleged in the Article was to one or more media outlets located within the United States. As such, the NSA could not have conducted the warrantless searches described in the Article. Moreover, Joe Kasper and Tim Parlatore, as senior officials of the Department of War, and the referenced advisors for President Trump, at all relevant times, had full knowledge of the prohibition on targeting United States citizens and those located within the country, and thus the Article's allegations that Mr. Fulcher had informed Kasper (who was terminated from his position with the Department of War before Mr. Fulcher even began working there) and Parlatore of the existence of purported warrantless wiretaps of United States citizens, and that Kasper, Parlatore and advisors for President Trump believed Mr. Fulcher's alleged statements or had been "duped," are implausible. Further, had the false statements of and concerning Mr. Fulcher been true (which they are not), it is reasonably expected that Mr. Fulcher would have been disqualified from a position with the government, instead of being brought on as senior advisor for the Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, as acknowledged in the Article. In addition, in relying on the four unidentified sources for the false statements, The Guardian knew, or should have known, that these sources had an obvious bias against Mr. Fulcher because, among other things, and on information and belief, Mr. Fulcher replaced, at least in part, the role(s) occupied by one or more of the sources, rendering these sources and their statements inherently unreliable. The Guardian, in making the false statements, also unreasonably believed the accounts provided by the four unnamed sources, who, on information and belief, had been terminated from their government positions, over the express denials of Mr. Fulcher, who at all relevant times, remained in good standing with the United States Government, and who spoke to Hugo Lowell, the author of the Article who resides in Washington, D.C., over the telephone prior to publication and provided a detailed explanation (in addition to the statement published in the Article) as to why the statements at issue were false. Fulcher claims that the article's publication interfered with three business deals that could have yielded up to about $20M in income. Note that Fulcher is represented by Ryan Stonerock, Steven Frackman, and Dilan Esper (Harder Stonerock LLP). The firm is a prominent libel law firm, and the one lawyer of the three whom I know in some measure, Dilan Esper, is a serious lawyer: He's been cited in various VC posts , and also has often been seen in the comments, where I've generally found his posts to be quite substantive. Of course, the quality of the lawyers is no guarantee that the lawsuit will prove successful. The post Ex-DOGE Staffer, Ex-Pete-Hegseth Advisor Justin Fulcher Sues the Guardian for Libel appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/trump-and-the-day-after/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 22:30:00 +0000 The day after the elections, restraint evaporates. The post Trump And The Day After appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/legal-ethics-roundup-supervising-clerks-scrutinized-in-wake-of-sex-scandal-high-profile-discipline-gifts-for-judges-lack-of-candor-from-doj-lawyer-reprimanded-for-faking-dementia-more/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 22:17:00 +0000 Your tour of all things related to lawyer and judicial ethics, with University of Houston law professor Renee Knake Jefferson. The post Legal Ethics Roundup: Supervising Clerks Scrutinized In Wake Of Sex Scandal, High-Profile Discipline, Gifts For Judges, Lack Of Candor From DOJ, Lawyer Reprimanded For Faking Dementia & More appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/plaintiff-also-alleges-that-the-grammy-awards-have-become-a-public-nuisance-and-are-committing-industrial-espionage/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 21:47:37 +0000 From a decision by Judge Fernando Olguin (C.D. Cal.) in Satish Dat Beast v. [Sabrina] Carpenter , filed May 8 but just posted on Westlaw: On April 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Complaint and a Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. Plaintiff brings this suit because certain recording artists allegedly "are committing defamation (libel and slander) and/or the dignitary tort of the invasion of privacy by talking about President Donald John [T]rump in a negative manner which could be perceived as violation of the Alien and Sedition Acts." Plaintiff also alleges that the Grammy Awards "have become a public nuisance" and are "committing industrial espionage" with television networks through their programming selections. Plaintiff seeks, among other things, an order precluding Defendants from advertising to him on cable television broadcasts. No dice, says the court, which had to screen the case because plaintiff sought to sue with a waiver of filing fees. The court notes that plaintiff (who "often uses the name Ronald Satish Emrit") is a frequent and frivolous litigant, and that the particular complaint's allegations are 'clearly baseless,' 'fanciful,' and 'delusional.'" The post "Plaintiff Also Alleges That the Grammy Awards 'Have Become a Public Nuisance' and Are 'Committing Industrial Espionage'" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/ai-governance-isnt-failing-its-just-in-the-wrong-place/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 21:43:00 +0000 Contracts are not simply documenting AI relationships. They are structuring them. The post AI Governance Isnt Failing. Its Just In The Wrong Place. appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/judge-eleanor-ross-impeachment-arrives-right-on-schedule-managing-to-yet-again-botch-the-standard/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 21:13:08 +0000 Trying to recast Judge Ross's bad behavior as a high crime is as exhausting as it is unnecessary. The post Judge Eleanor Ross Impeachment Arrives Right On Schedule, Managing To Yet Again Botch The Standard appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/federal-court-invalidates-trumps-100000-h-1b-visa-fee-as-ilegal-usurpation-of-congress-power-to-tax/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 20:55:39 +0000 NA Earlier today, in the case of California v. Mullin , the US District Court for the District of Massachusetts issued a decision striking down the Trump Administration's $100,000 fee on applications for H-1B visas (which are used by tech firms, research institutions, and other organizations to hire immigrant workers and researchers with a variety of specialized skills). Judge Leo Sorokin ruled that the plan is illegal because it usurps Congress's power to tax. He relies in part on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump , the tariff case I helped litigate: The Court begins with Plaintiffs' assertion that the Policy intrudes upon Congress's taxing power. The first inquiry is whether the $100,000 payment requirement constitutes a tax. The parties quibble about whether the requirement resembles a tax or a "penalty," as characterized by two Supreme Court precedents: Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company and National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius . Here, the $100,000 payment requirement for all H-1B petitions does not aim to establish that hiring H-1B workers is illegal. The payment is not a penalty, just as the IRS fee in Sebelius was not, because it is not "punishment for an unlawful act or omission." Id. at 567. Hiring workers pursuant to the H-1B program is plainly lawful. Of course, rendering the hiring of H-1B workers "unlawful" would eliminate the program established by Congress through the statute, which would raise a different separation-of-powers concern Furthermore, Defendants claim that the $100,000 payment requirement is "a regulatory payment," which is "not the same as a tax" This is mere ipse dixit. Defendants offer no definition for what constitutes "a regulatory payment," cite no cases or statutes employing the term, and advance no reasoned argument explaining how this term encompasses something different than a tax or a penalty. That does not end the Court's analysis. While the Constitution exclusively vests Congress with the "Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises," U.S. Const. art. 1, 8, cl. 1, Congress can delegate the taxing power to the executive branch so long as it "clearly" indicates "its intention to delegate." Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co. , 490 U.S. 212, 224 (1989). Thus, the relevant inquiry here is whether the provisions of the INA granting the President discretionary powers to regulate the entry of noncitizens reflect a delegation of Congress's taxing power. Under INA 212(f), the President has the authority to "impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate." 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). INA 215(a) additionally grants the President the power to impose "reasonable rules, regulations, and orders" as well as "limitations and exceptions" to the entry of noncitizens. Id. 1185(a)(1). Plaintiffs argue that these provisions do not confer the power to impose taxes, relying on the Supreme Court's recent guidance in Learning Resources . That case involved a challenge to the President's imposition of tariffs under the IEEPA.. The IEEPA permits the President to "investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any . . . importation or exploration of . . . any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest" when responding to a national emergency. Id. at 636. The Court found that the IEEPA does not delegate taxing powers to the President, noting that the specific powers listed in the IEEPA do not include "any mention of tariffs or duties." Id. at 642. The Court further noted that the power to "regulate . . . importation" does not encompass the power to tax, because the term "regulate" "means to 'fix, establish, or control; to adjust by rule, method, or established mode; to direct by rule to restriction; to subject to governing principles or laws'"none of which captures the power to tax. Id. at 642-43 Applying Learning Resources to the case at hand, the Court finds that INA 212(f) and 215(a) do not delegate taxing power to the President. These sections allow the President to impose "restrictions," "rules," "regulations," "orders," "limitations," and "exceptions" to the entry of noncitizens to the United States. Like the powers delineated in the IEEPA, none of these terms, by their ordinary meaning, include the power to tax. I agree with the court's analysis, and am glad the tariff case turned out be a useful precedent here. The court also ruled the imposition of the $100,000 fee violates the Administrative Procedure Act. I have previously criticized the $100,000 H-1B fee on both legal and policy grounds here , here , and here . Obviously, today's decision will almost certainly be appealed, and the legal battle will continue. But, especially after Learning Resources , I am guardedly hopeful the various groups challenging the fee will prevail. NOTE: In the original version of this post, I misidentified Judge Leo Sorokin as the late Judge H. Lee Sarokin. I apologize for the error, which has now been fixed. The post Federal Court Invalidates Trump's $100,000 H-1B Visa Fee as Illegal Usurpation of Congress' Power to Tax appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/biglaws-talent-wars-are-getting-more-expensive/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 20:47:42 +0000 Elite firms are battling over the same rainmakers -- and the price tag keeps climbing. The post Biglaws Talent Wars Are Getting More Expensive appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/temple-law-gifted-5m-to-study-the-rule-of-law/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 20:08:35 +0000 Woop woop! The post Temple Law Gifted $5M To Study The Rule Of Law appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/ninth-circuit-judge-ryan-nelson-charged-with-battery-over-parking-lot-rumble/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 19:12:00 +0000 Misdemeanor battery charges are bad, but the real reason he's unfit for his office is this parking job. The post Ninth Circuit Judge Ryan Nelson Charged With Battery Over Parking Lot Rumble appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/french-advertiser-loses-icsid-claim-against-czech-republic Mon, 08 Jun 2026 19:53:10 +0100 The Czech Republic has defeated a €22.7 million intra-EU BIT claim filed by French multinational JCDecaux over a terminated agreement for advertising space on Prague public transport. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/french-advertiser-loses-icsid-claim-against-czech-republic Mon, 08 Jun 2026 19:53:10 +0100 The Czech Republic has defeated a 22.7 million intra-EU BIT claim filed by French multinational JCDecaux over a terminated agreement for advertising space on Prague public transport. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/what-judge-wood-did-not-say-about-judge-rosss-misconduct/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 18:19:30 +0000 Bloomberg Law published an unusual Op-Ed by retired Judge Diane Wood of the Seventh Circuit. Judge Wood discusses the Judge Ross situation, but leaves much out. I think what Wood did not say is far more important than what she did say. First, here is how Judge Wood describes the facts: The misconduct was of a personal nature: Judge Ross was engaged in a sexual relationship with a law-enforcement officer whose department regularly appeared before that judge. If a student at the University of Chicago offered that summary of the case, she would be failed. Judge Ross's sexual activity was appalling, but the most severe transgression was lying to the Chief Judge of the Circuit and the Chief Judge of the District. The closest Judge Wood got to acknowledging the dishonesty was this sentence: Because Ross ultimately confessed everything and expressed what the committee regarded as genuine remorse This is a very roundabout way of saying she confessed to the sex and confessed to lying. Second, Judge Wood offers no comment about the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council's decision to issue a private reprimand. The most she will say is that the Judicial Conduct & Disability Committee did not err in affirming that decision. The JC&D Committee had to decide what would most likely produce the desired resultpermanent cessation of that kind of behavior. It also had to decide whether it believed that the judge's remorse and willingness to mend her ways were genuine. Others may have decided differently, but I see nothing here that casts doubt on the genuineness or integrity of the decisions the JC&D Committee made. Why wouldn't the decision be genuine or have integrity? The relevant question is whether it is correct as a matter of law. But even this question is constrained, as the JC&D Committee's review was limited to a deferential standard. Here is the entirety of the analysis: In light of our review for errors of law, clear errors of fact, or abuse of discretion , and in deference to the Circuit Judicial Council's consideration of the special committee's review of the evidence, we affirm the Circuit Judicial Council's unanimous decision concluding that the subject judge's actions constituted judicial misconduct. The special committee conducted a thorough investigation and afforded the subject judge all the process that was due under the JC&D Act and the Rules. Accordingly, we find no error of law or abuse of discretion in the special committee's investigatory process. And we conclude that the remedial measures ordered by the Judicial Council under 28 U.S.C. 354(a)(2)(A) are appropriate and proportionate to the Judicial Council's findings in relation to the seriousness of the misconduct, balanced against the subject judge's correction of the prior false statements and subsequent candor with the special committee, the special committee's assessment that the subject judge is unlikely to engage in similar misconduct in the future, and the subject judge's otherwise exemplary service to the court. The finding was affirmed based on no "abuse of discretion" or "error of law." This is not exactly a ringing endorsement of the Eleventh Circuit's ruling, which I'll note had no noted dissents--the only name on the document was Chief Judge Pryor. Does Judge Wood think the Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council made the right decision in the first instance? We don't know. Third, Judge Wood suggested that there are limits on how judges can be reprimanded. She suggests that taking away cases from a judge amounts may be unconstitutional: Some have argued that this system is unduly solicitous of judges who engage in behavior so obviously unbecoming a federal judge. They contend that, at a minimum, this kind of misbehavior should always be made public. But there is only so far that the Conduct Act can go before it bumps into the constitutional protections for a judge's tenure in office. Indeed, some think that depriving the judge of her caseload is a de facto temporary removal from office and thus beyond the power of the judiciary. Critically, however, the judge is actually not removed and continues to receive her salary. Where has Diane Wood been on the Pauline Newman case? Has she published any op-eds criticizing Chief Judge Kimberly Moore? Why did she not join former-Judge Paul Cassell's amicus brief in support of Judge Newman's cert petition? Fourth, Judge Wood makes it seem like no other punishments were possible. She doesn't state the obvious: the reprimand should have been made public. Judge Ross could have kept her cases, but she would have faced litigants who perceive a plausible conflict of interest. That act would have been punishment by itself. Fifth, Judge Wood reflects on her own tenure: As chief judge of the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for nearly seven years, I well appreciate the constitutional tight-rope that these cases present. Chief Judge Wood helmed the Seventh Circuit during the final years of Richard Posner's decline. I think an entire book could be written about how Judge Posner flouted the rules of judicial conduct, yet his colleagues took no actions against him. Maybe he should have been given the Pauline Newman treatment so he could spend all of his efforts on writing books. Indeed, Judge Posner's final act before resigning was to publish a bizarre book that attacked his colleagues based on confidential information. I do not think Judge Wood was the right person to comment on failing to take adequate action against a misbehaving judge. Finally, I mention one last point, with some hesitation. Arthur, Gabe, and I pitched our essay to Bloomberg Law. The editor promptly got back to us and wrote "I don't think this fits into our coverage." Apparently, Judge Wood's non-defense of the courts does fit into the coverage. Go figure. This entire piece feels forced. I think someone in the judicial apparatus asked a well-regarded, retired judge to defend the handiwork of the Eleventh Circuit. But she couldn't quite do that. She said very little, and reinforced how indefensible the Eleventh Circuit's private reprimand was. I'm not buying it. I've yet to talk to an actual judge who thinks the Eleventh Circuit got it right. If someone wants to defend what the Eleventh Circuit did here, they will actually have to discuss in detail. I would hope that one of the law clerks who initially blew the whistle opts to appeal this matter to the full Judicial Conference. Chief Justice Roberts cannot simply turn this matter over like a couch cushion. Update : A colleague wrote, "I just read Judge Wood's op-ed again, and I realized what it reads like: the hostage statement of someone who has been kidnapped." Yes, I agree. Also, how can Judge Wood say with certainty the subject judge was Eleanor Ross, and not even mention the reprimand was private. This situation seems like a fix. The post What Judge Wood Did Not Say About Judge Ross's Misconduct appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/court-turns-down-appeals-by-elementary-school-student-on-ar-15-hat-death-row-inmate-claiming-rac/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 18:16:34 +0000 (Bonnie Jo Mount/The Washington Post via Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/court-turns-down-appeals-by-elementary-school-student-on-ar-15-hat-death-row-inmate-claiming-rac/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 18:16:34 +0000 (Bonnie Jo Mount/The Washington Post via Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/legal-geek-2026-we-caught-the-car-now-what-do-we-do-with-it/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 17:47:00 +0000 Legal Geek is one of the few conferences that actually stops and tries to holistically figure out what the impact of AI will be. The post Legal Geek 2026: We Caught The Car, Now What Do We Do With It? appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/kyrgyzstan-avoids-bulk-of-damages-in-uranium-dispute Mon, 08 Jun 2026 18:40:38 +0100 A US company has been awarded only sunk costs plus interest in an ICSID claim against Kyrgyzstan over the country’s ban on uranium mining. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/kyrgyzstan-avoids-bulk-of-damages-in-uranium-dispute Mon, 08 Jun 2026 18:40:38 +0100 A US company has been awarded only sunk costs plus interest in an ICSID claim against Kyrgyzstan over the countrys ban on uranium mining. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/difc-court-confirms-injunction-against-russia-in-wintershall-case Mon, 08 Jun 2026 18:19:41 +0100 The Dubai International Financial Centre court overseeing German energy group Wintershall Dea's Energy Charter Treaty claim against Russia has ordered the state to end court proceedings in Moscow that target the claimant, arbitrators and claimant's counsel, including recently filed proceedings seeking a life ban on Charles Poncet serving as arbitrator. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/difc-court-confirms-injunction-against-russia-in-wintershall-case Mon, 08 Jun 2026 18:19:41 +0100 The Dubai International Financial Centre court overseeing German energy group Wintershall Dea's Energy Charter Treaty claim against Russia has ordered the state to end court proceedings in Moscow that target the claimant, arbitrators and claimant's counsel, including recently filed proceedings seeking a life ban on Charles Poncet serving as arbitrator. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/trump-kennedy-center-gets-slapp-ed/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 17:01:35 +0000 Bravo! The post Trump Kennedy Center Gets SLAPP-ed appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/the-pentagons-new-war-canceling-american-religion-and-american-history/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 17:00:08 +0000 Professor Paul Finkelman has asked me to post the following guest post, and I am more than happy to do so. Prof. Finkelman is a leading legal scholar and legal historian, and is the President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy, emeritus at Albany Law School. For my part, I will note that I agree with most of his analysis. As a general rule, the government should not be in the business of promoting or discouraging religious observances. But the military presents a special case, because the lives of members of the armed forces (while on duty) are under government control to such an extent, that - in many situations - there is no way for them to practice their faiths unless the government facilitates it in various ways. When the government does that, it should not discriminate between adherents of different religions. What follows is written by Prof. Finkelman, and not me (Ilya Somin): The Trump administration recently announced that it is removing about 180 religions from those recognized by the Pentagon. This is an obvious violation of the First Amendment's protection of religious liberty. In essence, the Administration has "established" 31 religions as acceptable to the U.S. government and denied religious freedom to members of many other faiths. Plausibly, the Pentagon could decide not to have military chaplains, and not to have religious symbols on military graves, and no longer provide a color guard for veterans buried in cemeteries tied to particular faiths. It could prohibit military personnel from giving last rites to when those in the military die in combat or a military hospital. Members of the armed services would no longer have their religion on the dog tags. This would presumably not violate the First Amendment because the government would be taking a complete "hands off" policy to religion. Such a policy would run counter to the history of the American military starting with the Revolution. It would also undermine the morale of those who put their lives on the line for the nation. In our 250 years as a nation, we have increasingly expanded the range of religions recognized by the military. Initially, all chaplains were Protestant ministers. During the Mexican-American War President James K. Polk appointed two Catholic chaplains, reflecting the changing demographics of the nation. During the Civil War, the Lincoln administration intervened to allow rabbis to serve as chaplains. Today chaplains, whatever their background, are trained to serve members of all faiths. But, with this new rule, policies will change. Dog tags will no longer recognize the faiths of many service personnel. Chaplains may not respect the religious concerns of those who serve. Chaplains, trained to serve people of all faiths, may no longer be able to do so. The message of the administration is that some faiths matter, and many do not. There seems to be some politics involved here. The "liberal" Unitarian/Universalist Church, which is as old as the nation itself, is no longer officially a church. Nor are churches tied to minorities, such as the Native American Church or the African Methodist Episcopal Church (AME). This policy is in conflict with the First Amendment, because the President and Secretary of Defense have in fact "established" 31 religions as being legitimate and worthy of government support, and asserted that about 180 are not either "real" religions or worthy of support. Ironically, the Pentagon announced this on the anniversary of the D-Day invasion in World War II, when about 2,500 American men (and another 2,000 allies from Canada, Great Britain, and other allies) died. Some of those who died were probably members of faiths that the Pentagon no longer recognizes as "real" religions. This slap in the face to Americans of minority faiths (and their families) who have died for our country is a direct assault on the Constitution. Among those religions that have now been cancelled by the administration (making it the leader of cancel culture in America,) are some of our most venerable faiths including Congregational Churches, the United Church of Christ, Unitarian/Universalist, Disciples of Christ, Mennonite, Moravian, Dutch Reformed, Adventist churches (other than Seventh Day Adventists), African Methodist Episcopal (AME), AME-Zion, the Native American Church, traditional tribal religions, and Deists In addition, religions practiced by many people who landed on our shores from the mid-Nineteenth to the present, such as Confucianism, Coptic, Druze, Zoroastrianism, and Santeria, which are no longer recognized as religions. Some of the designations on the list seem utterly weird and arbitrary. The list of acceptable faiths includes many that are designated "Christian," with the name of a denomination after that term. However, the list does not designate the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) as Christian. That would probably come as a great surprise to the more than six-and-a-half million members of the Utah based Church. As the Church notes on its website : "Members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints unequivocally affirm themselves to be Christians." By denying that members of the LDS Church are Christians, the administration is taking sides in a complicated theological debate between some Christian theologians and LDS theologians. This is emphatically not a debate in which the Pentagon, the President, or the federal government should take sides. This decision has also infuriated political leaders and LDS Church leaders in Utah. However, even as it recognizes the LDS Church based in Utah, the list does not include the Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, which for last quarter century has called itself Community of Christ, based in Missouri. Thus, Secretary Hegseth and President Trump have not only declared that Mormons are not Christians but have also decided which is the "real" Mormon Church. This is a type of establishment determination that the First Amendment prohibits. This new policy is being implemented while the President and his administration are gearing up to celebrate the 250th anniversary of the Declaration of Independence. The policy is a direct refutation of the American Founding and insult to the memory of many of the most important Founders of our nation. At least a dozen of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, including its most important co-authors, practiced faiths that the Secretary of Defense and the President have decided are not "real" religions, or at least religions worth of respect. In 1776 the Continental Congress appointed a five person committee to write the Declaration of Independence. Three were members of faiths that Donald Trump and his minion, Pete Hegseth, have just cancelled. John Adams was a Unitarian and Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin were Deists. The President and his Secretary of Defense want to cancel other signers as well. Benjamin Rush was a Deist, like Franklin and Jefferson. John Bartlett, a signer from New Hampshire, is buried in a Universalist graveyard. At least seven signers were members of Congregational Churches, including such significant founders as Roger Sherman, Oliver Wolcott, and Robert Treat Paine. These denominations can still be found in the United States, but not in the new Trump/Hegseth military. Most Congregational Churches morphed into the United Church of Christ (UCC) in the late twentieth century which today has more than 4,600 churches, but the President and Secretary of Defense have also canceled that. [Secretary Hegseth does list the "Church of Christ" as an acceptable religion, but that is a different denomination from the UCC.] After the Declaration of Independence was signed, Americans of all faiths fought for the cause. The current administration has cancelled the faith of Major General Philip Schuyler, the commanding officer of the New York militia (and the father-in-law of Alexander Hamilton), because he was Dutch Reformed. Major General Israel Putnam, a New Englander, could not have a dog tag that states his faith, because he was a Congregationalist. Trump and Hegseth want to cancel numerous presidents because of their faith. In addition to John Adams and his son John Quincy Adams, Millard Fillmore and William Howard Taft were also Unitarians. Taft, a conservative Republican, was Secretary of War (when that was actually the real name of the department) and then President. He later served as Chief Justice of the United States. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery. It is not clear if that could happen today since the military no longer recognizes the Unitarian faith. Nor does it recognize the Dutch Reformed faith of Presidents Martin Van Buren and Theodore Roosevelt. Col. Roosevelt is remembered for leading a regiment he organized, the Rough Riders, in the Spanish American War. Today Secretary Hegseth might let him command troops, but the Army would not recognize his faith as a "real" religion. President James A. Garfield, who was also a major general in the Civil War (and led troops at Shiloh and Chickamauga) was a member of the Disciples of Christ. Lyndon B. Johnson, who was a Commander in the Navy in World War II and a reserve officer for more than two decades after the War, was also a member of the Disciples of Christ. But you won't find a minister from that faith in today's Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard. Trump and Hegseth have cancelled it. During World War II the Navajo Code Talkers risked their lives as Marines, providing real time intelligence of Japanese troop movements, while speaking on radios in Navajo. Many code talkers were members of the Native American Church or a traditional Navajo faith. In Europe, about 10,000 American soldiers of Japanese ancestry served the Nisei Brigade, the most decorated unit in American military history. More than 4,000 of these Japanese-American soldiers were awarded purple hearts for their combat wounds and more than 4,000 also earned a bronze star and other medals for valor, including the Congressional Medal of Honor. Some of these courageous soldiers followed the Shinto faith. At the same time, the separate unites of the Tuskegee airmen earned three Distinguished Unit Citations while individual Tuskegee airmen earned more ninety-five distinguished Flying Crosses, many purple hearts, and more than 750 other medals for their heroism. The Tuskegee fighter escorts lost, on average, about half as many bombers as other escort units. Many of these airmen were members AME and AME-Z churches. But, the faiths of the code talkers, the Nisei Brigade and the Tuskegee airmen are now verboten by orders of Trump and Hegseth. The Hegseth/Trump announcement on the anniversary of D-Day loops us back to the insult to followers of religions that the United States no longer honors or recognizes. Among those landing at Normandy was 56 year old Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., the son of the President Teddy Roosevelt. He was the oldest soldier, and the only general, to land at Normandy on D-Day. Although suffering from arthritis and heart disease he led his troops with distinction until he died of heart failure in July. He received the Congressional Medal Honor, posthumously, for his incredible leadership at Normandy. But today, the historic religion of his familythe Dutch Reformed Churchalong with the faiths of tens of thousands of other veterans, has been removed from our military. We honor Ben Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson, Presidents John Quincy Adams, Van Buren, Fillmore, Garfield, Teddy Roosevent, and Taft, the Navajo Code talkers, the Niese Brigade, the Tuskegee Airmen, and General Teddy Roosevelt, Jr., for their patriotism and courage. It is a sad day that the President and his Secretary of Defense dishonor their religions and their faith. The post The Pentagon's New War - Canceling American Religion and American History appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/gordon-wood-rip/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 16:34:15 +0000 Gordon Wood. (Brown University.) Media reports indicate that Brown University Professor Gordon Wood passed away at the age of 92 yesterday, apparently killed by a passing car while walking. Wood was the greatest historian of the Founding era and the ideology of the American Revolution, author of such seminal works as The Creation of the American Republic and The Radicalism of the American Revolution , among many other important works. He had an enormous influence on generations of historians, legal scholars and many others. In addition, his work on the universalist Enlightenment liberal political ideals of the Revolution and the Founding is a compelling antidote to both right-wing ethno-nationalists (who envision the US as a nation based on ties of race, ethnicity, and culture), and far-left claims that the Founding was primarily about promoting slavery and white supremacy. I had a slight acquaintance with Wood, whom I met at a couple of academic conferences. I wish I had known him better. He will be greatly missed. In Prof. Wood's honor, I repost an excerpt from one of his last public speeches , a talk he gave at the American Enterprise Institute last fall (I previously wrote about the speech and its significance here ). Wood's message is vitally needed today, as much as ever: I want to say something about the Declaration of Independence and why it is so important to us Americans. There has been some talk recently that we are not and should not be a credo nation, that beliefs in a creed are too permissive, too weak a basis for citizenship and that we need to realize that citizens who have ancestors that go back several generations have a stronger stake in the country than more recent immigrants. This is a position that I reject as passionately as I can. We have had these blood-and soil-efforts before, in the 1890s when we also had a crisis over immigration. Some Americans tried to claim that because they had ancestors who fought in the Revolution or who came here on the Mayflower, they were more American than the recent immigrants. The United States is not a nation like other nations, and it never has been. There is at present no American ethnicity to back up the state called the United States, and there was no such distinctive ethnicity even in 1776 when the United States was created. Because of extensive immigration, America already had a diverse society. In addition to seven hundred thousand people of African descent and tens of thousands of native Indians, nearly all the peoples of Western Europe were present in the country. In the census of 1790 only sixty percent of the white population of well over three million remained English in ancestry When Lincoln declared in 1858 "all honor to Jefferson," he paid homage to the Founder who he knew could explain why the United States was one nation, and why it should remain so. Half the American people, said Lincoln, had no direct blood connection to the revolutionaries of 1776. These German, Irish, French, and Scandinavian citizens either had come from Europe themselves or their ancestors had, and they had settled in America, "finding themselves our equals in all things." Although these immigrants may have had no actual connection in blood with the revolutionary generation that could make them feel part of the rest of the nation, they had, said Lincoln, "that old Declaration of Independence" with its expression of the moral principle of equality to draw upon. This moral principle, which was "applicable to all men and all times," made all these different peoples one with the Founders, "as though they were blood of the blood and flesh of the flesh of the men who wrote that Declaration." This emphasis on liberty and equality, Lincoln said, shifting images, was "the electric cord. . . that links the hearts of patriotic and liberty-loving men together, that will link those patriotic hearts as long as the love of freedom exists in the minds of men throughout the world." In Jefferson's Declaration Lincoln found a solution to the great problem of American identity: how the great variety of individuals in America with all their diverse ethnicities, races, and religions could be brought together into a single nation. As Lincoln grasped better than anyone ever has, the Revolution and its Declaration of Independence offered us a set of beliefs that through the generations has supplied a bond that holds together the most diverse nation that history has ever known. Since now the whole world is in the United States, nothing but the ideals coming out of the Revolution and their subsequent rich and contentious history can turn such an assortment of different individuals into the "one people" that the Declaration says we are. To be an American is not to be someone, but to believe in something. That is why we are at heart a [creedal] nation, and that is why the 250th anniversary of the Declaration next year is so important. I extend my condolences to such of Professor Wood's family, friends, and colleagues as may read this post. His passing is a terrible loss. The post Gordon Wood, RIP appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/stop-calling-it-an-immunity-theres-no-immunity/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 16:22:21 +0000 Yesterday's lead story in the NY Times is headlined: Trump Keeps Immunity from I.R.S., a Victory in a Long-Running Feud Subhead: "Even as they rebelled against a $1.8 billion fund for President Trump's allies, Republicans looked the other way as his administration granted him potentially lucrative tax protections." The article notes that plans for the Trump-Blanche $1.776 billion Slush Fund were abandoned due to "Republican anger," but: "Not so for the sweeping protections from I.R.S. audits that Mr. Blanche also ordered up for Mr. Trump and his family. On that front, Republican reaction has been much more muted, and Mr. Blanche said the audit shield would stay in place . . . . The result is that an apparently unprecedented and enormously valuable public benefit for the president has, so far, flown under the radar in Congress and passed into Mr. Trump's hands without much protest from members of his own party." It is indeed a shame that the Republicans have not spoken out against this part of the Trump-Blanche deal. But we should not fall into the trap of talking as though Blanche has already conferred some kind of "immunity" or an "audit shield" on Trump. He has not. He's certainly been trying to do so, but because he is not authorized to do so, his attempt is of no force and effect. Take a close look at the document that purports to give Trump and his family a shield against IRS actions . It is dated (and was publicly posted) on May 19th the day after the parties in Trump v IRS executed their so-called " Settlement Agreement, " which contains no mention of any waiver of IRS claims, or immunity, or "audit shield," or anything remotely similar. The May 19th document, signed by Todd Blanche, the Acting A.G., states two facts in the first paragraph: that the May 18th Settlement Agreement (1) "has created the Anti-Weaponization Fund," and (2) has "directed the Attorney General to issue an order establishing funding and any other relevant requirements for the Fund." Both are correct; the May 18th Settlement Agreement, by its express terms, did both of those things. Then, after declaring that capitalized terms in the May 19th order have the same meaning as in the Settlement Agreement, the entirety of the document reads as follows (I have broken up the single sentence of the waiver provision into its component parts, just for ease of comprehension; any omitted text is marked by ellipses): The United States RELEASES, WAIVES, ACQUITS, and FOREVER DISCHARGES each of the Plaintiffs [i.e., President Trump, his sons, and the Trump Organization] from, and is hereby FOREVER BARRED AND PRECLUDED from prosecuting or pursuing, any and all claims . . . or requests for any relief . . . whether presently known or unknown, that . . . have been or could have been asserted by [the IRS] against any of the plaintiffs . . . by reason of, in connection with, or which arise out of any matters currently pending or that could be pending (including tax returns filed before the Effective Date) before [the I.R.S.] or other agencies or departments . [Emphases added] Well! Where does Todd Blanche get the authorization to grant a waiver like this?! To anyone , let alone to his boss, the President of the United States? The May 19th document itself is strangely silent about the answer to that question unusually so, for an AG Order. It implies though, oddly, and rather suspiciously, it does not come out and actually say that it represents the "order" contemplated in the May 18 Settlement Agreement. You remember the one that the AG is directed to issue in order to "establish funding and any other relevant requirements" of the Anti-Weaponization Fund. Even Blanche must recognize how ridiculous that argument is. A waiver of claims against Trump has absolutely nothing to do with establishing or funding or operating the Anti-Weaponization Fund. And besides -- isn't the Fund being abandoned? So the May 19th document is an Order establishing a Fund that we're not establishing? That's absurd and confusing. So the May 19 document isn't that order. What is it, then? It could be part of the settlement terms, which falls within Blanche's inherent authority to conduct litigation on behalf of the United States, and to settle claims where it is in the interest of the United States to do so. The waiver, then, is part of the "settlement terms." Blanche himself seems confused about that. He is adamant in his testimony before the House Appropriations Committee: the May 19th document is not an "Addendum" to the Settlement Agreement. "It is a separate Attorney General Order." [see the video starting at around 44:30]. But a minute or so later he describes the May 19th document this way: "There's a settlement. Part of the Settlement includes the [May 19th ] Order. There's a Settlement the IRS entered into with President Trump and others, his family and his companies. As part of that Settlement, as is customary in IRS Settlements, there's a separate AG Order." Damned if I can figure out what he is talking about. If the May 19 waiver order is not part of the Settlement, what is it? If he's not issuing that in order to settle Trump's claims, where does he get the power to waive, forever, claims the United States may possess? It's like the power to issue pardons except, of course, the Attorney General doesn't have the power to issue pardons. He can say "The United States waives . . ."; he can even put it on DOJ stationery and post it on the DOJ website, and he can sign it as the Acting AG none of that gives it any legal effect whatsoever unless he has been authorized to take such action on behalf of the United States. If he has not been authorized to take such action, the "order" has the same legal effect as an entry in his private diary. And if it is part of the "Settlement"? That deal doesn't pass the hoo-haw test. Trump gives up his time-barred claims worth $0.00, in exchange for a $1.776 billion fund under his control PLUS a waiver of all tax or other claims against him, his sons, and his companies? My guess is that Acting AG Blanche doesn't want to have to defend that deal when he comes before the Senate. Nor does he relish the opportunity to explain to a waiting world why the very significant waiver clause was omitted from the actual Settlement Agreement signed by the parties. Had the parties - and their lawyers, including the DOJ lawyers - just forgotten about it? Slipped their collective mind? That's laughingstock stuff. Trump v. IRS wasn't an actual case, because an actual case requires parties who are adverse to one another. There's a docket entry somewhere labeled " Trump v. IRS ," of course, but that doesn't make it a valid or viable case. The case can't be "settled," because it never actually existed as a case. Whatever legal effect the document labeled "Settlement Agreement" may have, it doesn't "settle" any case because there was never any case to settle. So what about this thing that Todd Blanche posted on May 19th? What is it? and What legal effect does it have? I don't know. It's not part of a case settlement, and if it's not part of a case settlement Blanche has no authority to issue it. So it's nothing. A nullity. It's not an immunity, or a waiver of the IRS's rights, or an audit shield. It is just a figment of Todd Blanche's imagination, and we should treat it and speak of it accordingly. The post Stop Calling it an Immunity! There's No Immunity! appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/singapore-court-rejects-bid-recover-funding-costs Mon, 08 Jun 2026 17:20:09 +0100 The Singapore International Commercial Court has upheld a tribunal’s decision not to allow the successful parties in a SIAC arbitration to recover US$14 million in third-party funding costs. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/singapore-court-rejects-bid-recover-funding-costs Mon, 08 Jun 2026 17:20:09 +0100 The Singapore International Commercial Court has upheld a tribunals decision not to allow the successful parties in a SIAC arbitration to recover US$14 million in third-party funding costs. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-legal-professions-yankee-stadium-moment/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 16:19:05 +0000 Baseball is as timeless as the law, and it looks different than it did just a few years ago too. The post The Legal Professions Yankee Stadium Moment appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/john-oliver-turned-todd-blanches-groveling-into-a-dr-seuss-book/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 15:32:00 +0000 'Brown Nose Goes H.A.M.' is not a real book, but it really should be. The post John Oliver Turned Todd Blanches Groveling Into A Dr. Seuss Book appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/london-boutique-hires-king-spalding Mon, 08 Jun 2026 16:22:05 +0100 Egishe Dzhazoyan has left King & Spalding, where he advised on investment treaty cases against states in the CIS region, to join the partnership at London disputes boutique Gresham Legal. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/london-boutique-hires-king-spalding Mon, 08 Jun 2026 16:22:05 +0100 Egishe Dzhazoyan has left King & Spalding, where he advised on investment treaty cases against states in the CIS region, to join the partnership at London disputes boutique Gresham Legal. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/another-firm-says-all-aboard-to-higher-associate-salaries/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 14:42:00 +0000 The list of firms matching Milbank keeps growing, and associates are loving every minute of it. The post Another Firm Says All Aboard To Higher Associate Salaries appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://medcitynews.com/2026/06/what-the-one-nation-overcharged-campaign-aims-to-achieve/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 14:03:00 +0000 One Nation, Overcharged, a campaign backed by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, launched to raise awareness of rising healthcare costs. The post What The One Nation, Overcharged Campaign Aims To Achieve appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/government-may-not-demand-divorce-as-a-precondition-for-maintaining-parental-rights/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 13:36:50 +0000 From Texas Supreme Court Justice Evan Young's majority opinion Friday in In the Interest of H.S. : Few principles in our history and traditions are as deeply rooted as the sanctity of the family. Fit parents, and not the government or anyone else, have the right and the corresponding responsibility to direct their children's upbringing and to be their children's primary source of protection and guidance. At the same time, a parent's inability or unwillingness to satisfy basic, minimum standards of care can lead to abuse or neglect, which justifies governmental intervention to protect the children. The desired outcome of that intervention is a family's rehabilitation, the restoration of wayward parents to their proper roles, and the government's exit from the family's affairs. In extreme cases, however, parents can forfeit their parental status altogether. When that happens, the government invokes the judicial process to pursue the termination of parental rights, after which parents and their children become strangers in the eyes of the law. The strong presumption is that termination is not in a child's best interest, so a parental-termination order must always be a last resort and never a first impulse. Such an order risks offending the laws of nature and is impermissible under the laws of the United States and of Texas absent clear and convincing evidence both that the parent failed to discharge his obligations to his child and that the termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest. These heightened standards are required because termination affects the fundamental rights of all involvednot just of parents to their children but also of children to their parents. This case requires us to apply these principles with respect to a married couple with three children. The government sought termination of both parents' rights to each child. A jury determined that the requisite grounds for termination had been proven as to both parents, and the trial court rendered judgment accordingly. The court of appeals affirmed. We likewise affirm as to Father, but we hold as a matter of law that the government has failed to establish that termination of Mother's rights is in the children's best interest. As to Mother, therefore, we reverse and render. There's a lot going on in the opinion, which is nearly 10K words long, but here's a quick summary of the argument as to mother, with an interesting discussion related to divorce: In this case, there were no allegations that Mother directly harmed any of the children or failed to care for them. Rather, the focus at trial was on Father's violence and Mother's ability or inability to protect the children from him. But when a parent's rights may be terminated based on a spouse's violence, the department should proceed with particular cautionespecially when the spouse's violence is not directed at the children. The principle from Lewelling [an earlier precedent] that a woman should not lose her child just because her husband abused her points to a grim realitythe dilemma faced by battered mothers who must choose between enduring the abuse or risk losing their children by seeking help. [T]he record before us does indeed reveal that Mother is in this predicament primarily because of Father's actions, not because of her own faults. True, in the early days after the removal of her children, Mother was reluctant to cooperate with the department and was defensive of Father. She believed that the department made "false accusations" and "like[d] to distort things that come out of your mouth to where it fits them." And Mother would not agree, at first, to prevent Father from contacting the children when only she was supervising. By the time of trial, though, the situation was markedly different. Mother now understood that Father's self-harm and domestic violence posed risks to the children, as voluminous undisputed testimony, most prominently from the department's own counselors and providers, made clear. The evidence showed that she understood her obligation to ensure that the children were not subjected to danger from Father going forward, that she was committed to complying with that obligation, and that she was capable of doing so even though she obviously hoped that Father's own progress would greatly diminish the likelihood that she would need to undertake protective actions. All this evidence directly addresses the legally relevant question: not whether Mother is a victim of abuse herself, or whether Mother is unwilling to sever a relationship with her own husband despite departmental disapproval of such a choice, but whether Mother can and will protect her children , including from her husband and their father if necessary. Moreover, to the extent that Mother did not demonstrate her willingness to prioritize her children as persuasively or as quickly as she might have, that was at least in part due to the lack of clarity in what the department intended to achieve and what it required of her. At an earlier hearing, the department's specialist unequivocally agreed that her goal was "to preserve the family unit and let the kiddos remain in the care and custody of at least one parent." The attorney ad litem had also urged the parents to "get the help that they need so that these children can return home." And the parents participated in couples counseling aimed at reconciliation and family reunification as part of their mandatory, court-ordered services. In other words, the department was signaling to Mother that she needed to work on her relationships with her husband and her children so that they could all be reunited. At the same time, however, the department's case against Mother was premised on her alleged unwillingness to separate from Father. For example, in its closing argument, the department condemned Mother because she "did not kick [Father] out" and because "she's still with him." And Mother's connection to Father was the lead point in the attorney ad litem's closing argument: "[Mother], she's going to choose her husband above all. How do we know this? Well, we know this because, for one, you've seen no affirmative action from her to do anything else. They're still together. " The department's brief in this Court repeatedly refers to concerns about "Mother's and Father's enmeshed relationship." Married people typically have "enmeshed" relationships, which is in fact close to the very definition of marriage and what it requires. To be clear, and as the department acknowledged during oral argument, this Court's precedent forecloses the department from demanding that Mother (or any parent) choose between divorcing her husband or losing her children. But the department's arguments come perilously close to that line. They may well have crossed it at trial, and it appears that a major reason the court of appeals affirmed the best-interest determination as to Mother was that she had not permanently left Father and divorced him. We reiterate that neither the department nor any court of this State may, in the name of the People of Texas and their laws, demand divorce as a precondition for maintaining parental rights. A mother unfortunate enough to have a husband from whom their children must be protected cannot invoke the marriage to exempt herself from the duty of protecting the children, of course, and that may sometimes even leave her with little option but to see her husband only when the children are not present. But the government may never condition her status as a parent on her willingness to pursue divorce. Imposing a demand for divorce is unlawful, and imposing such an unlawful demand sub silentio is even worse than demanding it overtly. This case reflects the problem that can arise if the real goalto separate a married coupleis communicated only indirectly, while a demand for the couple to reunite and thrive is made overtly. Generating such cognitive dissonance creates independent problems related to due process because parties cannot be expected to comply with orders that they cannot reasonably understand. There is every indication here that Mother never understood exactly what the department wanted. The testimony of one of the parents' counselors exemplifies this point with particular clarity. The counselor testified that he firmly believed that the children would not be endangered if they were returned to Mother. When the attorney ad litem asked him whether Mother had taken any actions to show that she would choose her children over Father, the counselor responded, "She hasn't been put in that position yet to make a choice." When asked to clarify, the counselor explained, She's trying to work it out with her husband, and then, you know, she wants to know what the CPS wants to dothat y'all make a choice and she'll choose her children. I guess she was waiting to see what y'all wanteddo y'all want them to split up? Do you want them to stay together? If she had a choice of either, A, getting the kids back or, B, staying with [Father] and not getting the kids back, she would leave. So if even the counselor whom the department paid to work with Mother could not ascertain what the department's position really was, it is hardly surprising that Mother did not. Indeed, it is possible that even the department itself did not really know which of two opposing directions it expected Mother to choose. Our judgment in Mother's favor does not mean that the department must immediately return the children to Mother and have no further contact with her or the children. The record before us does not indicate what has happened since trial. It is at least possible, for example, that Mother is currently in no position to care for the children. If restoring them to her physical custody does not pose any such risk, however, that restoration should proceed; if material risks exist, the department has the legal tools it needs to ensure the children's protection with the least amount of invasion into the family as possible. In any event, in light of our disposition of Father's appeal, Mother will be the children's sole legal parent. That means that once the children are restored to her custody it will be up to Mother, and not Father, to determine whether and to what extent he plays a role in the children's lives. She will have the same authority as all other parents concerning interactions that her children have with others. And she will have the same solemn responsibility as all other parents, too, so if Mother endangers the children in the future, the department may assess whether it would be appropriate to seek reliefpotentially including terminationbased on that future behavior. But the department must now recognize Mother as the children's parent, with all the rights and obligations that status entails. Justice Debra Lehrmann, joined by Justices Jane Bland and Rebeca Aizpuru Huddle dissented , and would have accepted the jury's verdict as to the mother. For those who count such things, here all five male Justices who participated voted to restore the mother's parental rights, and all three female Justices voted to uphold the terminate of the mother's rights. (One of the nine Justices didn't participate in the decision.) The post Government May Not "Demand Divorce as a Precondition for Maintaining Parental Rights" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-campaign-to-overrule-obergefell/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000 (Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-campaign-to-overrule-obergefell/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000 (Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.justsecurity.org/141479/year-later-military-personnel-police-american-streets/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=year-later-military-personnel-police-american-streets Mon, 08 Jun 2026 13:15:27 +0000 One year since Trump sent the National Guard to LA, a new report warns military deployments for domestic policing produce escalation, disillusionment, and politicization. The post A Year Later: The Stakes of Ordering Military Personnel to Police American Streets appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/141479/year-later-military-personnel-police-american-streets/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=year-later-military-personnel-police-american-streets Mon, 08 Jun 2026 13:15:27 +0000 One year since Trump sent the National Guard to LA, a new report warns military deployments for domestic policing produce escalation, disillusionment, and politicization. The post A Year Later: The Stakes of Ordering Military Personnel to Police American Streets appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/141306/ai-eo-regulation-chokepoint-state/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=ai-eo-regulation-chokepoint-state Mon, 08 Jun 2026 13:05:04 +0000 President Trumps new executive order on AI regulation rests on broad executive discretion and seeks to bypass judicial accountability. The post AI Regulation in the Chokepoint State appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/white-house-ballroom-battle-may-soon-arrive-at-the-supreme-court/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/white-house-ballroom-battle-may-soon-arrive-at-the-supreme-court/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/how-do-you-know-she-is-a-witch-or-satans-soldier/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:57:18 +0000 From Life Mastery Network LLC v. Haygarth , decided May 22 by Judge Jill Otake (D. Haw.), but just posted on Westlaw: Liane, who goes by Liana Shanti, founded her company, LMN, which is used to operate online educational courses that aim to improve students' businesses, lifestyles, and overall wellness. On Plaintiffs' website, Liane markets herself as a "world renowned thought leader in quantum energy healing, spiritual psychology, nutrition, emotional transformation, and feminine wealth[.]" She has more than 35,000 social media followers and more than 100,000 customers in 90 countries. Defamatory statements about Plaintiffs started surfacing online around April 2022 after Haley began to speak out on her own social media accounts about abuse she allegedly experienced. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have made false and damaging factual statements about Plaintiffs, including accusations of running a cult, human trafficking, extortion, fraud, and other misconduct. The statements that Plaintiffs claim are defamatory can be organized into three categories as described below. Specific statements will be included within the Court's analysis. There's a lot going on in the opinion, which is >15K words long. But here's one particular item that's a bit out of the ordinary for a libel case; it's about defendant Paula Haygarth's counterclaims against plaintiff, on which Haygarth sought summary judgment: [A]n Instagram account username, @lianashanti, posted the following statements, verbatim {emphases added}: "MEET PAULA HAYGARTH. WE HAVEN'T FORGOTTEN ABOUT HER. SHE'S ONE OF THE LEAD PEOPLE TRACED DIRECTLY THROUGH IP ADDRESES AND KNOWN EMAILS TO REDDIT AND THE OTHER FRAUD WEBSITES IN THE 30+ PAGE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT. SHE IS A DARK REIKI PRACTITIONER WHO HAS PRACTICED EXTENSIVE BLACK WITCHCRAFT ON MALIE'S DAUGHTHER'S SHE NOT SURPRISINGLY HAS THE SAME ATTORNEY AS BYRON HORVATH. THEY ARE NOT FRIENDS, JUST AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE." " Jesus, we ask you to DELETE AND DESTROY all toxic lies from this satan servant PAULA HAYGARTH who is campaigning to invalidate truths of #childabuse to cover up her own misery. She is hateful and envious, and in her hatred and envy, she cannot bring herself to acknowledge the pain of all the children who have been harmed by their parents. She abandoned her own son Austin , and her guilt and shame have turned her into a soldier of satan ." "What WE are doing this JESUS LED community calling out THESE people Paula Haygarth This vile group of PEDOS[;] PEDO SUPPORTERS [;] PEDO ALIGNERS[;] VICTIM BLAMERS Paula Haygarth." [i.] Dark Reiki Practitioner/Witch First, describing Paula as a dark reiki practitioner and witch is not susceptible to defamatory meaning. Like Liane, Paula is also a spiritual leader. Although Paula denies being either a "dark reiki practitioner" or practicing black witchcraft, she does not deny generally practicing reiki andthough not explicitly argued by Plaintiffsthere is context to believe Paula used to practice reiki. Thus, Liane's characterization of Paula's reiki practice as "dark" can be interpreted as opinion, at least for purposes of the instant motion. Her rhetoric is more figurative and there is no real way to prove whether Paula's reiki practice is "dark." Similarly, Liane likens reiki to witchcraft, so accusing Paula of practicing "black witchcraft" is also an opinion. Summary judgment is DENIED on these statements. [ii.] Manipulative and Dishonest Second, being called "manipulative and dishonest" is an opinion statement that supposedly explains why Paula loses friends. That statement is further unable to be proven true or false because it speculates on why other unidentified people may have ended friendships with Paula. Thus, summary judgment is DENIED on this statement. [iii.] Pedo/Pedo Supporter Third, the statement that Paula is a pedo/pedo supporter presents a more difficult challenge. In context, the Instagram post lists a group of about 25 names, including Byron and Stefanie, who are allegedly "pedos/pedo supporters/pedo aligners/victim blamers." Paula, of course, denies being any of these. And Plaintiffs' arguments regarding these statements are a moving target. On the one hand, Plaintiffs appear to suggest that the statement is substantially true: The subject social media post is a prayer and religiously framed condemnation of a collective "Silencing Group" describing them as "PEDOS PEDO SUPPORTERS PEDO ALIGNERS VICTIM BLAMERS" which included a convicted pedophile, Anton Hein, persons who support pedophiles .. and family members and allies like Paula Hagarth who align with the accused abusers and attack those who disclose abuse. But in the next breath, they say that this "prayer concerning Paula Haygarth reflects negative feelings towards her but it should not be construed as a statement that Ms. Shanti believes that Paula Haygarth is a "PEDO" or "PEDO SUPPORTER." To the extent that Plaintiffs attempt to argue that the statement is not defamatory, the Court disagrees. A reasonable person is likely to read the statement for what it isan accusation that the people on the list are pedophiles or support pedophiles. This is not just a matter of hyperbolic rhetoric that is totally unrelated to the contextual conflict. Here, the post is literal and Plaintiffs even state that at least one person on the list is a pedophile. On the other hand, there is at least some, albeit spare, evidence in the record that Paula may have associated herself with pedophiles through her involvement with the anonymous Liana Shanti Cult Recovery group, particularly because Plaintiffs have accused Byron of abusing his child. While associating with a pedophile wouldn't necessarily suggest support for him, because the Liana Shanti Cult Recovery group disputes the abuse accusations, participating in the group's efforts arguably means supporting alleged pedophiles within it. Thus, there is a triable issue as to whether the statement is substantially true and not defamatory. The Court therefore DENIES summary judgment on this statement. [iv.] Abandoned Child Next, Plaintiffs have accused Paula of abandoning her child. Plaintiffs do not contest that the statement is defamatory, which the Court considers a concession. Indeed, the Court finds that this statement is verifiable because Paula either did or did not abandon her child and such accusation would subject Paula to ridicule or scorn. Paula unsurprisingly denies that she abandoned her son. Although the claimant bears the burden of proving falsity and thereby must show "evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it," the Court is satisfied Paula has met this burden, particularly because Plaintiffs offer no evidence of its truth. Plaintiffs do not dispute making the statement and have not even bothered to justify or explain why it was made, let alone provide facts that create a triable issue here. Furthermore, without being able to provide facts to establish whether Paula abandoned her child is substantially true, Plaintiffs were at the very least negligent in publishing that statement. In sum, Paula has established defamation per se and Plaintiffs have not countered this with any triable facts. The Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of [Paula] on this statement. The question of damages will be left for trial. [v.] Satan's Soldier Although Plaintiffs don't squarely address Defendants' argument that the comments characterizing Paula as "Satan's soldier" were made maliciously, it is not totally clear from the Counterclaim MSJ that Defendants argue the statement is verifiable. At the Hearing, counsel for Defendants contended that Satan worshippers are real, and that, as such, the statements are capable of being proved true or false. But the Court finds that the figurative and hyperbolic nature of the post negates the impression that Liane was asserting an objective fact that Paula (or the rest of Defendants) were Satan's soldiers, particularly when the Court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary Judgment is DENIED as to this statement. Because, as outlined above, the Court finds that some of the statements Defendants sought summary judgment on are not susceptible to defamatory meaning as a matter of law, the Court denies Defendants' Counterclaims Motion in part. However, Plaintiffs did not move for summary judgment, so they have not met their burden to obtain summary judgment in their favor for counterclaims related to those statements. Thus, those statements for which the Court denied Defendants' Counterclaim MSJ shall still proceed to trial. The post How Do You Know She Is a Witch? Or Satan's Soldier? appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/141439/nba-genocide-problem-uae-sudan/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=nba-genocide-problem-uae-sudan Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:50:18 +0000 The NBAs partnership with the United Arab Emirates is laundering the reputation of a regime that supports a militia responsible for committing genocide in Sudan. The post The NBAs Genocide Problem appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/morning-docket-06-08-26/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:50:00 +0000 * Goldman's David Solomon asks Kathy Ruemmler to unresign. [ Bloomberg Law News ] * DOJ lawyers are getting a lot of heat for telling the DC Circuit that Trump could unilaterally tear down the Statue of Liberty if he wanted to, but honestly the only way his ballroom argument works is if the court accepts that premise. [ Politico ] * AI presents new risks in insurance. [ Law.com ] * Legal sector added jobs last month. [ Law360 ] * Morgan & Morgan considers selling a billion-dollar stake to private equity in hopes of one day going public. [ Reuters ] * Law school merger approved by ABA, to the extent states still listen to the ABA. [ ABA Journal ] * An argument against granting AI legal personhood. [ Financial Times ] The post Morning Docket: 06.08.26 appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/the-12-cases-consolidated-as-chatgpt-product-liability-cases-in-s-f-superior-court/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:33:39 +0000 For those following litigation over AI output, here's the consolidation order, together with the motion that led to it . (The motion, in the nature of things, is a partisan presentation, but still seems potentially helpful.) Of the eight cases discussed in the motion, the motion says, 5 of the cases involve wrongful death claims, as follows, Raine (age 16), Lacey (age 17), Shamblin (age 23), Enneking (age 26), Ceccanti (age 48). 2 of the cases involve minors, as follows, Raine (age 16) and Lacey (age 17). 4 of the cases involve negligence claims based on negligence per se theories. All of these (Lacey, Shamblin, Enneking, and Ceccanti) allege violation of California Penal Code 401(a) (deliberate aid and encouragement of suicide); and 1 of these (Shamblin) alleges violation of California Penal Code 192(b) (manslaughter). The motion lays out some of the general theories, and gives more details on each of the eight cases. (Presumably the other four cases were added on separately; the motion was filed Nov. 14, 2025, and the coordination hearing was on Jan. 30, 2026.) The post The 12 Cases Consolidated as ChatGPT Product Liability Cases in S.F. Superior Court appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/texas-court-orders-google-to-remove-information-posted-by-user-regarding-xai-linked-data-center/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:01:17 +0000 Excerpts from an order issued May 19 by Tarrant County District Court Judge Megan Fahey, in CTC Property LLC v. Shulgin : On August 15, 2025, this Court entered a Temporary Injunction Order enjoining Mr. Shulgin from using, uploading, disclosing, or transferring CTC Confidential Informationdefined as photographs or videos of, or other information describing, the construction or design of any of CTC's artificial-intelligence data facilitiesand ordering him to submit his devices for forensic imaging. The Court finds that CTC will suffer ongoing, irreparable harm as long as CTC Confidential Information remains publicly accessible on the internet, as such disclosure deprives CTC of a competitive advantage regarding the construction of its artificial-intelligence data facilities, for which no adequate remedy at law exists. Based on the foregoing findings, IT IS ORDERED that any and all photographs, videos, or other CTC Confidential Information posted by or at the direction of Defendant to Google Maps, or to any other publicly accessible internet platform, shall be removed. Plaintiff CTC Property LLC is authorized to serve a certified copy of this Order on Google LLC and/or any other internet service provider or platform hosting CTC Confidential Information posted by or at the direction of Defendant, and such entities shall comply with this Order. Google LLC, its subsidiaries and affiliates, and any other person or entity with notice of this Order who is in possession of, or has the ability to remove, the CTC Confidential Information identified herein, are directed to remove such materials upon service of this Order and identification of the specific content by Plaintiff within 72 hours of service of this Order. The Complaint alleges that "Shulgin with both a Russian and U.S. online presence used his former position as a technician subcontractor to misappropriate CTC's confidential information to take photos of the inside workings of a data center CTC is building in Memphis, Tennessee." Seems pretty clearly unconstitutional and otherwise improper as to Google, who wasn't made a party to the case (see here for more on the general legal questions raised by such orders aimed at third parties). But in any event, it struck me as worth noting. The post Texas Court Orders Google to Remove Information Posted by User Regarding xAI-Linked Data Center appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167671 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Children are dying because doctors cannot access essential medicines, UN human rights chief Volker Türk said in a stark warning on Monday, calling for the immediate lifting of United States sanctions against the Caribbean nation that were causing “widespread harm”. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167670 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Plastic pollution is choking the ocean, but sustainable alternatives - including seaweed - remain held back by tariffs, fragmented regulations and the overwhelming market advantage enjoyed by fossil fuel-based plastics. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167672 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 A powerful earthquake struck the southern Philippine island of Mindanao on Monday morning just as millions of children were returning to school after the summer break. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167669 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 From peacekeepers to math teachers, 136 UN personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty in 2025 were commemorated on Monday morning in an annual service hosted by the Secretary-General. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167673 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The United Nations climate chief called on Monday for countries to step up action to implement existing commitments, warning that fossil fuel dependency is deepening economic instability and exposing vulnerable communities to worsening climate impacts. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167674 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The Security Council met on Monday amid a sharp escalation in hostilities across Ukraine, where UN officials warned that the war has reached its deadliest point since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. Briefing members, Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for political affairs, said recent months had seen some of the most extensive aerial attacks of the conflict, while the humanitarian toll on civilians continued to mount on both sides of the front line. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167677 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 As the Security Council met on Afghanistan, senior officials and civil society representatives delivered a clear warning Monday: despite relative security under the Taliban, worsening humanitarian conditions, restrictions on women and growing economic pressures are creating a fragile and uncertain future. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167678 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The top UN aid official in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is in Ituri province – the epicentre of the country's Ebola outbreak – for a three-day assessment visit, as the confirmed case count reaches 515 across three eastern provinces. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167671 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Children are dying because doctors cannot access essential medicines, UN human rights chief Volker Türk said in a stark warning on Monday, calling for the immediate lifting of United States sanctions against the Caribbean nation that were causing widespread harm. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167670 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Plastic pollution is choking the ocean, but sustainable alternatives - including seaweed - remain held back by tariffs, fragmented regulations and the overwhelming market advantage enjoyed by fossil fuel-based plastics. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167672 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 A powerful earthquake struck the southern Philippine island of Mindanao on Monday morning just as millions of children were returning to school after the summer break. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167669 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 From peacekeepers to math teachers, 136 UN personnel who lost their lives in the line of duty in 2025 were commemorated on Monday morning in an annual service hosted by the Secretary-General. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167673 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The United Nations climate chief called on Monday for countries to step up action to implement existing commitments, warning that fossil fuel dependency is deepening economic instability and exposing vulnerable communities to worsening climate impacts. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167674 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The Security Council met on Monday amid a sharp escalation in hostilities across Ukraine, where UN officials warned that the war has reached its deadliest point since Russias full-scale invasion in 2022. Briefing members, Rosemary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for political affairs, said recent months had seen some of the most extensive aerial attacks of the conflict, while the humanitarian toll on civilians continued to mount on both sides of the front line. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167677 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 As the Security Council met on Afghanistan, senior officials and civil society representatives delivered a clear warning Monday: despite relative security under the Taliban, worsening humanitarian conditions, restrictions on women and growing economic pressures are creating a fragile and uncertain future. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167678 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The top UN aid official in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is in Ituri province the epicentre of the country's Ebola outbreak for a three-day assessment visit, as the confirmed case count reaches 515 across three eastern provinces. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://www.justsecurity.org/141615/early-edition-june-8-2026/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=early-edition-june-8-2026 Mon, 08 Jun 2026 11:51:41 +0000 Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here. A curated guide to major news and developments over the weekend. Heres todays news: IRAN WAR CEASEFIRE Israel struck Beiruts southern suburbs yesterday, in retaliation for a Hezbollah missile attack on northern Israel, Israeli officials said, adding that the strike targeted a Hezbollah command center [] The post Early Edition: June 8, 2026 appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-8-1925-7/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 11:00:50 +0000 6/8/1925: Gitlow v. People of the State of New York decided. The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 8, 1925 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/106653/collection-trump-administration-executive-actions/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=collection-trump-administration-executive-actions Mon, 08 Jun 2026 10:00:41 +0000 Coverage of key developments, including in concise What Just Happened expert explainers, legal and policy analysis, and more. Check back frequently for updates. The post Collection: Just Securitys Coverage of Trump Administration Executive Actions appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/08/open-thread-229/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/07/second-amendment-roundup-no-protection-for-heroin-trafficker/ Mon, 08 Jun 2026 02:27:39 +0000 On June 2, the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Squire , which posed "a novel question about whether the Second Amendment protects a convicted drug trafficker from being dispossessed of a firearm inside his home based on our Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." As Senior Judge Edith Brown Clement wrote in the opinion, "our historical tradition supports disarming drug traffickers based on their dangerousness." Suspecting him of involvement in a shooting in New Orleans, police secured a warrant to search the home of Curtis Squire, where they found a handgun. While the handgun was not found to have been used in the shooting, Squire was charged with felon-in-possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), based on his prior convictions of conspiracy and substantive counts of possession with the intent to distribute heroin, possession of a firearm with a controlled dangerous substance, and obstruction of justice. In the same case, he had been convicted of a conspiracy count to possess stolen things, and in another case, burglary and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Fifth Circuit precedent recognized 922(g)(1) to be unconstitutional as applied to some felons, as "[s]imply classifying a crime as a felony does not meet the level of historical rigor required by Bruen and its progeny." Non-violent felonies such as marijuana possession without evidence of present intoxication were subject to as-applied challenges. As the court wisely wrote, "If Congress could escape Bruen 's reach by simply classifying a crime as a felony, we would be confined to uncritically rubber-stamping class-based determinations, subjecting disarmament laws to a form of rational-basis, government-always-wins, type of review." Those words are worth their weight in gold. By contrast, predicate offenses involving a dangerous or violent crime justified disarmament. For that proposition, the court saw no need to make out an empirical case for the fact that heroin trafficking while armed is dangerous and involves violence. Drug gangs wage war with each other and with law enforcement. Drug traffickers use threats of violence and violence to enforce their illegal dealings as well as to protect their turf. And heroin is a type of poison on which users often overdose and die. One who traffics in heroin poses a physical danger to others. Instead, the Squire court conducted the usual Bruen analysis of looking at historical analogues, having already concluded that Mr. Squire's ability to have a firearm in his home was covered by the Second Amendment's plain text. The English Militia Act of 1662 directed the disarming of "dangerous and disaffected persons," even though, as Rahimi notes, the Glorious Revolution reduced the Crown's power to do so. Catholics were disarmed as not having loyalty to the government. In the American Revolution, persons refusing to swear an oath of allegiance were disarmed. Native Americans and African Americans were also disarmed. While use of these analogues is problematic, the court explains: "Granted, these repugnant laws classifying people as dangerous simply on the basis of their race or religion are wrong and unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, these laws give us a glimpse into how early Americans understood their right to bear arms, how the legislature could determine classes of people to be dangerous, and the scope of their disarmament." The Supreme Court should use the opportunity in Wolford , which concerns Hawaii's "vampire rule" banning exercise of Second Amendment rights in most public places, to disown the use of racist historical analogues. My amicus brief in Wolford on behalf of the African American Gun Association makes that point in detail about an 1865 Louisiana black code provision. And as Justice Kavanaugh wrote in his Rahimi concurrence: "Ratified in 1868, [the Equal Protection] Clause sought to reject the Nation's history of racial discrimination, not to backdoor incorporate racially discriminatory and oppressive historical practices and laws into the Constitution." Squire sought to distinguish his situation by the fact that he possessed the handgun at home, but the court found that argument to be "mugged by the reality that our historical laws support his disarmament, even in the special confines of his home." (I guess "mugged" is a term Squire would readily understand.) As the court concluded, " 922(g)(1) as applied to drug traffickers permits arms dispossession based on dangerousness, not location." That is a narrow holding, as "We do not decide whether the Second Amendment allows Congress to disarm individuals in the home based on convictions lacking a relevantly similar historical analogue to dangerousness, violence, or threats to public order." The panel distinguished other courts that have refused to recognize any as-applied challenge to the felon-in-possession ban by postulating the basic difference between dangerous and violent crimes from mala prohibita, victimless crimes such as mere possession of marijuana. We'll see what the Supreme Court says about that when it decides Hemani , which presents the question, "Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), the federal statute that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who 'is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,' violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent." See my post here . * * * In footnote 1 of Squire , Judge Clement rejected the argument that the ban exceeds Congress's power under the Commerce Clause as foreclosed by circuit precedent. Unsuccessful attempts to rein in Congress on the issue included U.S. v. McFarland (2002), in which the evenly-divided, en banc Fifth Circuit left a district court decision in place upholding the constitutionality of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951, to a defendant who robbed local convenience stores with utterly no interstate-commerce nexus. Based on the Supreme Court's decisions in Lopez and Morrison , Judge Clement joined with half of the other judges in dissent. Query whether the Supreme Court will ever return to the premise that local crime is not interstate commerce. The post Second Amendment Roundup: No Protection for Heroin Trafficker appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/val_08jun26_412_e.htm Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 WTO members examined a number of questions related to preshipment inspection (PSI) at an 8 June meeting of the Committee on Customs Valuation. Drawing on recent private sector input and member experiences, the discussions focused on future Committee work related to PSI and how PSI issues should continue to be addressed. The Committee also examined 34 customs valuation notifications submitted by members for review and a trade concern raised by one member. Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/stdf_08jun26_408_e.htm Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 Following World Food Safety Day on 7 June, the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) has launched its 2025 Annual Report, Accelerating Safe Trade: From Innovation to Scale. The report showcases how investments in strengthening sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) systems are improving food safety, facilitating trade and supporting sustainable development. Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/safe_sacu_08jun26_411_e.htm Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 On 8 June 2026, South Africa notified the WTO’s Committee on Safeguards regarding the initiation on 5 June 2026 of a safeguard investigation on A3 and A4 office paper imported into the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/val_08jun26_412_e.htm Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 WTO members examined a number of questions related to preshipment inspection (PSI) at an 8 June meeting of the Committee on Customs Valuation. Drawing on recent private sector input and member experiences, the discussions focused on future Committee work related to PSI and how PSI issues should continue to be addressed. The Committee also examined 34 customs valuation notifications submitted by members for review and a trade concern raised by one member. Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/stdf_08jun26_408_e.htm Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 Following World Food Safety Day on 7 June, the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF) has launched its 2025 Annual Report, Accelerating Safe Trade: From Innovation to Scale. The report showcases how investments in strengthening sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) systems are improving food safety, facilitating trade and supporting sustainable development. Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/safe_sacu_08jun26_411_e.htm Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 On 8 June 2026, South Africa notified the WTOs Committee on Safeguards regarding the initiation on 5 June 2026 of a safeguard investigation on A3 and A4 office paper imported into the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). Law/World Trade Organization https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/raises-see-generally/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 23:35:00 +0000 Milbank Shocks The Market: Everyone had settled into the old associate pay scale, when Milbank decided to yet again respond to the rise in the cost of living. Scoreboard : Follow all the matching salary moves with this scorecard. That's The Price Of A Checked Bag: Davis Polk's Spirit Airlines bankruptcy filing shows second-year associates billing $1,410 an hour. Send In The Clones: Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease built AI "personas" of 19 of its partners so associates can consult a low-resolution map of the partner's brain without bothering the actual partner. You Got Mossed: A federal judge gutted the DOJ's theory that "86 47" reads as a threat, holding in a separate protest case that the phrase is protected speech weeks before James Comey's seashell trial. DOJ Lawyers Either Very Dumb Or Working As Moles: The superseding indictment against the Southern Poverty Law Center managed to make the government's already flimsy case even worse. Never Never Land: A federal judge ruled Trump's handpicked board can't rename the Kennedy Center after him and found the president lied about the renovation study, prompting Trump to rage-quit. Calvinball With A Twist: Supreme Court Republicans used the shadow docket to let Alabama install new, racist maps... because they don't want to even try to pen an opinion explaining this one. Regularity Is A Virtue: Supreme Court reform is almost inevitable. The latest installment in this spirited debate explains why term limits are the right answer. The post RAISES!!! See Generally appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/07/the-criminal-charges-against-judge-ryan-nelson-how-should-the-judiciary-respond/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 21:49:04 +0000 I am happy to pass along this post from Professor Arthur Hellman, concerning Judge Ryan Nelson's parking lot altercation, which I wrote about here : Over the weekend, Bloomberg Law reported that Judge Ryan D. Nelson of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has been charged with misdemeanor battery for his actions in an April 2 altercation with a man in a parking lot in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Judge Nelson has also been charged with malicious injury to property the "property" being the glasses of the other man, which Judge Nelson allegedly knocked off and stomped on. The altercation apparently began when the other man said (twice) to Judge Nelson: "Learn how to park." The Idaho State Journal published video of the incident and also a more detailed account of the episode. A pretrial conference is scheduled for June 18. In the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 (JCDA), Congress established a process for dealing with complaints that a federal judge "has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts, or alleging that such judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or physical disability." Judge Nelson's alleged conduct would arguably support a finding of misconduct under the JCDA; it may also implicate the provision dealing with disability. How should the judiciary respond to this report? Under the Act, complaints against judges may be filed by "any person" and thereafter reviewed by the Chief Judge of the Circuit. But the Chief Judge need not wait for the filing of a complaint before initiating the process. She may "identify" a complaint with the same effect. I have argued that "when reports of possible misconduct have become public, the chief judge should be required to identify a complaint." This will reassure the public that the judiciary is truly committed to policing misconduct within its ranks. And if the judge is exonerated, the process will help to remove the cloud that would otherwise hang over the judge's reputation. So the first step is for Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Mary Murguia to identify a complaint. What next? The law allows Judge Murguia to conduct a "limited inquiry," but not to "make findings of fact about any matter that is reasonably in dispute." If there are disputed facts relevant to the complaint, she must appoint a Special Committee similar to the one that recently investigated the allegations against Judge Eleanor Ross of Atlanta. I'll skip now to the question: does Judge Nelson's conduct fall within the statutory definition of misconduct quoted above? After all, in contrast to Judge Ross, all of Judge Nelson's conduct took place outside the court and was unrelated to his judicial role. The most extensive discussion of that question in the decisions under the Act is found in a misconduct order issued by Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs of the Second Circuit almost 20 years ago. The proceeding involved an altercation at a campfire on a beach. The principal allegation of the complaint was that the subject judge engaged in misconduct by intentionally striking the complainant without justification and, as a result, was charged with a criminal offense. The similarity to the allegations against Judge Nelson is striking. Chief Judge Jacobs assumed that extrajudicial conduct could fall within the Act, but after careful analysis (which should be read in full), he concluded that the alleged assault at the beach did not. He summed up by saying that "this was a one-time private dispute between private citizens, one of whom happens to be a judge. At worst, the Judge used physical force to terminate a private confrontation in which the Complainant was using obscenities in the presence of the Judge's small children." As the second quoted sentence indicates, there were mitigating circumstances in the case before Judge Jacobs that appear to have no close counterpart in the episode involving Judge Nelson. But there may be other mitigating circumstances here. Josh Blackman has ascertained that the parking lot adjoins a hospice center; it is possible that something was going on in Judge Nelson's life that caused him to "snap." If this was an isolated episode related to a serious medical concern, that might be reason to conclude that the conduct was not misconduct under the Act. Indeed, if Judge Nelson apologizes to the individual involved (which I hope he will do in any event), the Chief Judge or the Judicial Council might "conclude the proceeding" (as the Act authorizes) upon finding that "appropriate corrective action has been taken." That would avoid the need to determine whether Judge Nelson's actions constituted misconduct. The hospice center setting also raises the possibility that Judge Nelson's conduct reflects a disability or the effect of medications. That too is something that the Chief Judge and the Judicial Council should investigate and take into account. On the other side of the ledger, shortly after Judge Nelson's confirmation in 2018, the Wall Street Journal reported that in the two decades before his appointment, he had compiled an extensive record of traffic citations. "He's gotten tickets for speeding, disobeying traffic lights and signs, illegal turns, seat-belt violations, not carrying proof of insurance, skipping an auto inspection and not registering his vehicle. He's been cited on his boat as well." If that behavior stopped after his appointment as a judge, it should not preclude a finding that the parking lot altercation was an isolated event in his life. But if it has continued, that would raise questions about whether the altercation reflects a temperament inconsistent with the judicial temperament. And that might even raise questions about his fitness for judicial office, parallel to those that have been raised with respect to Judge Ross. (My own view is that the most serious finding of misconduct by Judge Ross is the one that involves false statements to the judges who were investigating her misconduct. That finding corresponds closely to conduct that was one basis for impeaching District Judge Samuel B. Kent in 2009. No such conduct has been alleged here.) But it is far too early to condemn Judge Nelson. The criminal proceeding should take its course; so should the processes under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act and the rules that the judiciary has promulgated to implement it. When all of those investigations have concluded, there will be time enough to make judgments about Judge Nelson's future as a federal judge. The post The Criminal Charges Against Judge Ryan Nelson: How Should the Judiciary Respond? appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/07/a-few-preliminary-thoughts-about-judge-ryan-nelsons-parking-lot-incident/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 21:48:29 +0000 There are different ways we learn about judges who misbehave. In some cases, we learn about the misconduct after all of the proceeding are complete, and a public reprimand is issued. In other cases, we learn about the misconduct but not the judge who committed the misconduct, following a private reprimand. Such was the case with Judge Ross, although we figured out her identity pretty quickly. And then there are the cases where we learn about the misconduct before the proceedings were completed, or even began. Such is the case with Judge Ryan Nelson of the Ninth Circuit. Eugene blogged about the incident last night. Bloomberg Law had additional coverage. (As an aside, Bloomberg Law has some of the most thorough coverage of the lower courts today; they consistently outperform other outlets.) Here, I'll offer a few preliminary thoughts. First, while I have never met Judge Ross, I do know Judge Nelson. All of my interactions with him over the years have been very cordial. The person I saw in that video was not the person I have come to know and like. As a general rule, we should not be judged at our worst moment, though in life and law, sometimes we are. Second, I was able to figure out where the incident happened. The surveillance footage was labeled "Front Parking F Street." And the State Journal article referenced the location was on Memorial Drive. Google Maps quickly allowed me to find the intersection in Idaho Falls, Idaho. That parking lot belongs to a Home & Hospice Center. You can see the same blue column that appears in the video. Third, this location may be relevant. One can imagine that attending to a loved one in hospice may be an emotional experience that could have put Judge Nelson, and the other person, in difficult emotional stages. Also, rushing to a hospice center may explain the judge's failure to pull into a single spot, though the lot was wide open. Fourth, both Judge Nelson and the other person behaved poorly. Again, the lot had many empty spots. Why did the guy in the white truck pull up right next to Judge Nelson's car? And it wasn't necessary to say anything about the parking job. But then Judge Nelson lost his temper and behaved in an awful fashion. The situation escalated so quickly, it might seem there was history between these two men. Fifth, Judge Nelson, like all criminal defendants, is entitled to the presumption of innocence. Yet, his attorney does not seem to dispute the underlying conduct--how could he, it is on camera. Here, unlike Judge Ross, Judge Nelson seems to have been truthful during the investigation. The ethical issues here are complex. I have asked Professor Arthur Hellman to share a guest post on this matter, which I will post after mine. This video just seems relevant. Update : David Lat offers this update at Original Jurisdiction : On the subject of a bad day, the first clerk shared with me that Judge Nelson has been going through a difficult time personally right now: "His father recently had a heart attack (which he thankfully survived), and other family members have been dealing with cancer. I haven't spoken to him about the incident, so I don't know if any of this played into it, but I can certainly imagine it." Josh Blackman did some sleuthing, and based on the surveillance footage and Google Maps, he concluded that the parking lot where the incident transpired belongs to a Home and Hospice Center. So it certainly seems at least possible that Judge Nelson wasn't in a good state of mind when he had the parking argument. The post A Few Preliminary Thoughts About Judge Ryan Nelson's Parking Lot Incident appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/07/a-few-preliminary-thoughts-about-judge-ryan-nelsons-parking-lot-incident/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 21:48:29 +0000 There are different ways we learn about judges who misbehave. In some cases, we learn about the misconduct after all of the proceeding are complete, and a public reprimand is issued. In other cases, we learn about the misconduct but not the judge who committed the misconduct, following a private reprimand. Such was the case with Judge Ross, although we figured out her identity pretty quickly. And then there are the cases where we learn about the misconduct before the proceedings were completed, or even began. Such is the case with Judge Ryan Nelson of the Ninth Circuit. Eugene blogged about the incident last night. Bloomberg Law had additional coverage. (As an aside, Bloomberg Law has some of the most thorough coverage of the lower courts today; they consistently outperform other outlets.) Here, I'll offer a few preliminary thoughts. First, while I have never met Judge Ross, I do know Judge Nelson. All of my interactions with him over the years have been very cordial. The person I saw in that video was not the person I have come to know and like. As a general rule, we should not be judged at our worst moment, though in life and law, sometimes we are. Second, I was able to figure out where the incident happened. The surveillance footage was labeled "Front Parking F Street." And the State Journal article referenced the location was on Memorial Drive. Google Maps quickly allowed me to find the intersection in Idaho Falls, Idaho. That parking lot belongs to a Home & Hospice Center. You can see the same blue column that appears in the video. Third, this location may be relevant. One can imagine that attending to a loved one in hospice may be an emotional experience that could have put Judge Nelson, and the other person, in difficult emotional stages. Also, rushing to a hospice center may explain the judge's failure to pull into a single spot, though the lot was wide open. Fourth, both Judge Nelson and the other person behaved poorly. Again, the lot had many empty spots. Why did the guy in the white truck pull up right next to Judge Nelson's car? And it wasn't necessary to say anything about the parking job. But then Judge Nelson lost his temper and behaved in an awful fashion. The situation escalated so quickly, it might seem there was history between these two men. Fifth, Judge Nelson, like all criminal defendants, is entitled to the presumption of innocence. Yet, his attorney does not seem to dispute the underlying conduct--how could he, it is on camera. Here, unlike Judge Ross, Judge Nelson seems to have been truthful during the investigation. The ethical issues here are complex. I have asked Professor Arthur Hellman to share a guest post on this matter, which I will post after mine. This video just seems relevant. Update : David Lat offers this update at Original Jurisdiction : On the subject of a bad day, the first clerk shared with me that Judge Nelson has been going through a difficult time personally right now: "His father recently had a heart attack (which he thankfully survived), and other family members have been dealing with cancer. I haven't spoken to him about the incident, so I don't know if any of this played into it, but I can certainly imagine it." Josh Blackman did some sleuthing, and based on the surveillance footage and Google Maps, he concluded that the parking lot where the incident transpired belongs to a Home and Hospice Center. So it certainly seems at least possible that Judge Nelson wasn't in a good state of mind when he had the parking argument. The post A Few Preliminary Thoughts About Judge Ryan Nelson's Parking Lot Incident appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/07/law-students-interested-in-helping-with-cite-checking-on-the-journal-of-free-speech-law/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 21:44:59 +0000 Our Journal of Free Speech Law is faculty-edited, and we have a part-time professional proofreader and bluebooker. Also, because most of our authors are full-time American law professors, they generally have research assistants who do the cite-checking. But some of the time we do need students to help with cite-checking. We've been fortunate to have such people helping us over the years, but we'd like to add a couple more as well. I realize that this is not like a normal law review: It will likely involve both less work and less responsibility. On the other hand, you'll get to read what we hope will be very interesting scholarship, participate in the process of publishing it (plus see your name in print on the masthead; the title is "Production Editor"), and further practice your cite-checking skills. If you're interested, please e-mail me at volokh@stanford.edu . Just to be clear, as with other law reviews, we're looking for volunteers, though we hope that the students who participate will find this professionally valuable. By the way, if some of you have already done this in past years, but would like to continue even while you're practicing lawyers, we'd of course be happy to have you back. I'm reluctant, though, to impose on people who have graduated and have paying jobs that take up their time unless they've affirmatively made clear that they'd enjoy doing this sort of task as well. The post Law Students: Interested in Helping With Cite-Checking on the Journal of Free Speech Law ? appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/07/keep-the-blockade-of-iran-in-place/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 21:02:19 +0000 New Iranian attacks in the Persian Gulf are being easily and successfully countered by U.S. Armed Forces. Those attacks should not obscure the fact that President Trump is pursuing a brilliant foreign policy with respect to Iran that he should absolutely stick to. President Trump is succeeding where Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden all failed. The blockade of Iran will likely produce real regime change if it is left in place for another six to eight weeks, and the new Government of Iran will surrender its nuclear stockpile and will reopen the Strait of Hormuz unconditionally. Iran is losing $500 million a day and 90% of its trade passing through the Strait of Hormuz as a result of the blockade. No government can continue to govern and escape a revolution on the streets in this situation. Tellingly, no U.S. soldiers are dying, and President Trump is on track to win the United States' biggest foreign policy victory since the peaceful collapse of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union because of the policies of President Ronald Reagan. President Trump has very wisely let two conditions shape his negotiations with Iran over the last two months. First, he has insisted that Iran surrender its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium and end its efforts to develop a nuclear bomb. Second, he has rebuffed Iranian demands that Iran be allowed to charge a toll on any ship passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Both demands are eminently reasonable. Yet the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is now the effective de facto government of Iran, is flatly rejecting both demands. The IRGC is in a position of extreme weakness right now. It has been unable to pay its soldiers for weeks, and they are defecting in droves. The IRGC has filled all the storage tanks with oil, which it can store, and Iran may soon have to permanently shut down some oil wells, which will permanently damage them. Inflation is at record highs , especially for food; the currency has plunged to the point of being worthless; and even before the war , a super-majority of the Iranian public was furious with the regime. In six to eight weeks, the Iranian people will likely revolt in the streets, and the IRGC will have no troops to put down the popular uprising. The result will be real regime change in Iran, one of the United States' most dangerous enemies, with an end to the IRGC's existence and to its funding of Hezbollah in Lebanon, of Hamas in the Gaza strip, and of the Houthis in Yemen. If we win the peace in Iran, the way President Truman won the peace after the end of World War II in Germany, Japan, and Italy, Iran will emerge as a potential U.S. ally, or at least as a likely peaceful regional partner. This means that we will be able to end sanctions in Iran and help restore its full oil and gas production. That production, plus the resumption of oil and gas production in Venezuela, thanks again to President Trump, seems likely to cause oil prices to drop to about $40 a barrel, which will in turn likely bankrupt Vladimir Putin and end the Ukraine War on terms favorable to Ukraine. President Putin may even be overthrown as a result, eliminating another longtime U.S. enemy. The message sent to China not to invade Taiwan will be clear and unmistakable. President Trump has the chance if he keeps the Iran blockade in place to emerge as the United States greatest foreign policy president since Ronald Reagan, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry S. Truman. All that is required for this to happen is for him to have the patience to leave the U.S. blockade on Iran in place for another 6 to 8 weeks. The post Keep the Blockade of Iran in Place appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/07/keep-the-blockade-of-iran-in-place/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 21:02:19 +0000 New Iranian attacks in the Persian Gulf are being easily and successfully countered by U.S. Armed Forces. Those attacks should not obscure the fact that President Trump is pursuing a brilliant foreign policy with respect to Iran that he should absolutely stick to. President Trump is succeeding where Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Joe Biden all failed. The blockade of Iran will likely produce real regime change if it is left in place for another six to eight weeks, and the new Government of Iran will surrender its nuclear stockpile and will reopen the Strait of Hormuz unconditionally. Iran is losing $500 million a day and 90% of its trade passing through the Strait of Hormuz as a result of the blockade. No government can continue to govern and escape a revolution on the streets in this situation. Tellingly, no U.S. soldiers are dying, and President Trump is on track to win the United States' biggest foreign policy victory since the peaceful collapse of the Warsaw Pact and of the Soviet Union because of the policies of President Ronald Reagan. President Trump has very wisely let two conditions shape his negotiations with Iran over the last two months. First, he has insisted that Iran surrender its stockpile of 60% enriched uranium and end its efforts to develop a nuclear bomb. Second, he has rebuffed Iranian demands that Iran be allowed to charge a toll on any ship passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Both demands are eminently reasonable. Yet the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is now the effective de facto government of Iran, is flatly rejecting both demands. The IRGC is in a position of extreme weakness right now. It has been unable to pay its soldiers for weeks, and they are defecting in droves. The IRGC has filled all the storage tanks with oil, which it can store, and Iran may soon have to permanently shut down some oil wells, which will permanently damage them. Inflation is at record highs , especially for food; the currency has plunged to the point of being worthless; and even before the war , a super-majority of the Iranian public was furious with the regime. In six to eight weeks, the Iranian people will likely revolt in the streets, and the IRGC will have no troops to put down the popular uprising. The result will be real regime change in Iran, one of the United States' most dangerous enemies, with an end to the IRGC's existence and to its funding of Hezbollah in Lebanon, of Hamas in the Gaza strip, and of the Houthis in Yemen. If we win the peace in Iran, the way President Truman won the peace after the end of World War II in Germany, Japan, and Italy, Iran will emerge as a potential U.S. ally, or at least as a likely peaceful regional partner. This means that we will be able to end sanctions in Iran and help restore its full oil and gas production. That production, plus the resumption of oil and gas production in Venezuela, thanks again to President Trump, seems likely to cause oil prices to drop to about $40 a barrel, which will in turn likely bankrupt Vladimir Putin and end the Ukraine War on terms favorable to Ukraine. President Putin may even be overthrown as a result, eliminating another longtime U.S. enemy. The message sent to China not to invade Taiwan will be clear and unmistakable. President Trump has the chance if he keeps the Iran blockade in place to emerge as the United States greatest foreign policy president since Ronald Reagan, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Harry S. Truman. All that is required for this to happen is for him to have the patience to leave the U.S. blockade on Iran in place for another 6 to 8 weeks. The post Keep the Blockade of Iran in Place appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/07/why-cant-california-count/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 18:32:21 +0000 Eli McKown-Dawson (Silver Bulletin) writes (introduced by Nate Silver): California is notoriously slow at counting its ballots. In 2024, it took California until November 8 (three days after Election Day) to get just 70 percent of its ballots counted . Across all 50 states, the average share of the vote counted by that date was more than 95 percent, putting California squarely in last place. Rest assured, The Golden State did eventually hit that 95 percent mark … a full 10 days later…. Florida now manages to count 99 percent of its ballots within a few hours of polls closing, in part because election officials can process ballots before the polls close . And they are able to accomplish this feat of incredible speed with a sizable proportion of mail votes — about 27 percent in 2024 …. Colombia held a presidential election on Sunday , and 99.98 percent of the result was in on Monday morning. Japan also counts most of its votes overnight . And in the UK (not exactly a poster child for state capacity), you can generally expect to have calls for all 650 parliamentary seats the morning after the election …. Nor is the problem inherent in California's choice to promote mail voting: Mail-voting states such as Oregon, Washington, and Colorado count slowly relative to the US average, but they're all faster than California…. [And y]ou can make voting accessible without bending over backward to accommodate the tiny share of people affected by extending the mail ballot receipt deadline [to one week after the election, as California has]…. And slowness doesn't seem to be the price one needs to pay for accuracy: There's no evidence that voter fraud or other election administration issues are any less prevalent in California than in faster counting states. Based on the Elections Performance Index — a project that compares election administration quality across states — California ranked 41st in 2024. So the state isn't slower and better: it's slower and (often) worse…. If you want people to be confident in your electoral system, a good first step is to build one that works properly instead of adding yet another example to the "California is a failed state" pile. The post "Why Can't California Count?" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/07/why-cant-california-count/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 18:32:21 +0000 Eli McKown-Dawson (Silver Bulletin) writes (introduced by Nate Silver): California is notoriously slow at counting its ballots. In 2024, it took California until November 8 (three days after Election Day) to get just 70 percent of its ballots counted . Across all 50 states, the average share of the vote counted by that date was more than 95 percent, putting California squarely in last place. Rest assured, The Golden State did eventually hit that 95 percent mark a full 10 days later. Florida now manages to count 99 percent of its ballots within a few hours of polls closing, in part because election officials can process ballots before the polls close . And they are able to accomplish this feat of incredible speed with a sizable proportion of mail votes about 27 percent in 2024 . Colombia held a presidential election on Sunday , and 99.98 percent of the result was in on Monday morning. Japan also counts most of its votes overnight . And in the UK (not exactly a poster child for state capacity), you can generally expect to have calls for all 650 parliamentary seats the morning after the election . Nor is the problem inherent in California's choice to promote mail voting: Mail-voting states such as Oregon, Washington, and Colorado count slowly relative to the US average, but they're all faster than California. [And y]ou can make voting accessible without bending over backward to accommodate the tiny share of people affected by extending the mail ballot receipt deadline [to one week after the election, as California has]. And slowness doesn't seem to be the price one needs to pay for accuracy: There's no evidence that voter fraud or other election administration issues are any less prevalent in California than in faster counting states. Based on the Elections Performance Index a project that compares election administration quality across states California ranked 41st in 2024. So the state isn't slower and better: it's slower and (often) worse. If you want people to be confident in your electoral system, a good first step is to build one that works properly instead of adding yet another example to the "California is a failed state" pile. The post "Why Can't California Count?" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/07/ai-remember-doing-the-time-warp/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 15:26:46 +0000 I asked Claude, "Under the federal law clerk hiring plan, when can a recommender e-mail or call a judge to recommend a student?" Claude responded, in part, Judges will not accept applications or recommendations before 12:00 pm EDT on Monday, June 8, 2026 . (That's today recommendations became permissible at noon Eastern today.) uscourts For those reading this post later, note that I wrote this and asked Claude this on Sunday, June 7, 2026 (shortly after 12 noon Eastern). AI is indeed the future. The post AI Remember Doing the Time Warp appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167654 Sun, 07 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The ocean covers more than 70 per cent of the planet and regulates climate, sustains biodiversity, and supports economies and cultures worldwide. It’s the foundation of life on Earth. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167666 Sun, 07 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Night has fallen over the town of Zémio, in the east of the Central African Republic. In a few hours, the December 2025 presidential election is due to take place, but the rebels of the “Azande Ani Kpi Gbe” (AAKG) militia have launched an offensive to seize the city and derail the polls. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167654 Sun, 07 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The ocean covers more than 70 per cent of the planet and regulates climate, sustains biodiversity, and supports economies and cultures worldwide. Its the foundation of life on Earth. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167666 Sun, 07 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Night has fallen over the town of Zémio, in the east of the Central African Republic. In a few hours, the December 2025 presidential election is due to take place, but the rebels of the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) militia have launched an offensive to seize the city and derail the polls. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/07/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-7-1965-7/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 11:00:48 +0000 6/7/1965: Griswold v. Connecticut is decided. The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 7, 1965 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/07/open-thread-228/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/06/judge-ryan-nelson-9th-cir-charged-with-battery-for-allegedly-knocking-off-mans-glasses-in-parking-space-dispute/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 02:50:37 +0000 Still from the surveillance video included in the Idaho State Journal article. Idaho State Journal (Jimmy Hancock) reports (including video): U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Ryan Douglas Nelson faces two criminal charges [for] {misdemeanor battery and malicious injury to property} after police say he battered a man by swiping the glasses from his face, tossing them across an asphalt lot and stomping on them during an April confrontation over a parking space in Idaho Falls. The alleged victim says Nelson's truck was angled into a parking space the bulk of his truck in one spot with the right front tire and bumper hanging over the right line and into the spot to the right and the left rear part of the truck hanging over the left line and into the parking space to the left, effectively blocking three parking spots in the lot directly in front of the nearby businesses. As the alleged victim was exiting his white pickup truck, Nelson started his truck to leave the parking space. That's when the alleged victim spoke. "I say 'learn how to park,'" the alleged victim said. "I said it twice. That's when he went crazy." "When I spoke with Nelson he admitted to knocking his glasses from (the alleged victim's) head but stated he did not touch him. He also admitted to stomping on his glasses," [a police officer's] affidavit states. See also Bloomberg Law (Jacqueline Thomsen & Suzanne Monyak) . UPDATE: I originally wrote that Nelson was arrested, but he was apparently charged without having been arrested; my apologies for the error, which I have corrected. UPDATE 6/7/26, 10:08 pm: David Lat (Original Jurisdiction) also covers the story, and adds that Judge Nelson's lawyer, Curtis Smith, provided this statement: Mr. Nelson is embarrassed by this incident. It is out of character and does not represent how he behaves. Immediately afterwards, Mr. Nelson reached out and offered an apology and full compensation for the sunglasses. He intends to work through the proper process. The post Judge Ryan Nelson (9th Cir.) Charged with Battery for Allegedly Knocking off Man's Glasses in Parking Space Dispute appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/06/judge-ryan-nelson-9th-cir-arrested-for-allegedly-knocking-off-mans-glasses-in-parking-space-dispute/ Sun, 07 Jun 2026 02:50:37 +0000 Still from the surveillance video included in the Idaho State Journal article. Idaho State Journal (Jimmy Hancock) reports (including video): U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Ryan Douglas Nelson faces two criminal charges [for] {misdemeanor battery and malicious injury to property} after police say he battered a man by swiping the glasses from his face, tossing them across an asphalt lot and stomping on them during an April confrontation over a parking space in Idaho Falls. The alleged victim says Nelson's truck was angled into a parking space the bulk of his truck in one spot with the right front tire and bumper hanging over the right line and into the spot to the right and the left rear part of the truck hanging over the left line and into the parking space to the left, effectively blocking three parking spots in the lot directly in front of the nearby businesses. As the alleged victim was exiting his white pickup truck, Nelson started his truck to leave the parking space. That's when the alleged victim spoke. "I say 'learn how to park,'" the alleged victim said. "I said it twice. That's when he went crazy." "When I spoke with Nelson he admitted to knocking his glasses from (the alleged victim's) head but stated he did not touch him. He also admitted to stomping on his glasses," [a police officer's] affidavit states. See also Bloomberg Law (Jacqueline Thomsen & Suzanne Monyak) . The post Judge Ryan Nelson (9th Cir.) Arrested for Allegedly Knocking off Man's Glasses in Parking Space Dispute appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/06/gordon-darby-prepares-to-renew-effort-to-commandeer-new-hampshire-in-order-to-maintain-emissions-testing-contract/ Sat, 06 Jun 2026 14:34:58 +0000 Gordon-Darby Holdings had a lucrative contract running New Hampshire's vehicle emissions testing program. Understandably, Gordon-Darby was disappointed when the New Hampshire state legislature repealed the program and canceled the contract. So Gordon-Darby did what many companies would do: It filed suit seeking a court order requiring New Hampshire to maintain the testing program. Lacking any contractual basis for its suit, Gordon-Darby claimed that New Hampshire was required to maintain its vehicle emission testing program under the federal Clean Air Act. The problem for Gordon-Darby is that the Clean Air Act does not actually require states to do anything, in that states are not forced to adopt or enforce any pollution control measures. Rather, the Act seeks to induce state cooperation by threatening various sanctions if states do not comply, such as a loss of federal funding and the imposition of federal regulations. The Act is structured this way because a direct imposition on the state would be unconstitutional, as the federal government conceded to the Supreme Court when these issues were litigated in the 1970s. Since then, the Supreme Court has made explicit that federal law cannot force states to adopt, implement, or enforce a federally desired regulatory program, as any such requirement would be unconstitutional commandeering. Gordon-Darby first suit foundered when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded the litigation was premature. As the district court had looked more favorably on the claims , Gordon-Darby announced its plans to try again. Accordingly, it filed a new notice of intent to sue, raising the same claims. In the first litigation, the state largely defended on narrow technical grounds, and largely failed to raise the commandeering defense. In my view, this was a mistake, as the anti-commandeering doctrine is quite clear and, in some respects, has its roots in a nearly identical conflict, when the EPA sought to force states to adopt vehicle emission inspection programs in the 1970s. Thus even if Gordon-Darby overcomes the various technical hurdles to filing suit, it has no claim, as it is asking for relief that federal courts cannot lawfully provide. As Gordon-Darby filed its new notice of intent to sue on May 8, I suspect this means we will see a suit filed in early July. Stay tuned. The post Gordon-Darby Prepares to Renew Effort to Commandeer New Hampshire in Order to Maintain Emissions Testing Contract appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/06/is-the-endangered-species-act-being-used-to-commandeer-state-governments/ Sat, 06 Jun 2026 13:57:18 +0000 Environmental organizations have filed citizen suits against state and local governments alleging that their failure to regulate more stringently, or their issuance of permits to particular activities, violate the Endangered Species Act (ESA). In effect, these suits seek to hold state and local governments vicariously liable for harms to listed species. There are questions about whether the ESA should be interpreted or applied in this fashion. There are also questions about whether the imposition of vicarious liability on state and local governments violates the anti-commandeering principle under New York v. United States , Printz v. United States , and NCAA v. Murphy . Last week I hosted a Federalist Society forum, "Commandeering for Conservation?" in which Jonathan Wood of PERC and William Snape of American University's Washington College of Law discussed and debated this question. For what it is worth, I am with Jonathan Wood on this question, for reasons I explained in this post (and will elaborate on in a forthcoming paper). The post Is the Endangered Species Act Being Used to Commandeer State Governments? appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167637 Sat, 06 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 From surgical gloves to water bottles, shopping bags and chewing gum, every part of our daily lives includes plastic. They epitomise convenience – their durability makes our dependence on them inextricable, but it also stifles the environment. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167637 Sat, 06 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 From surgical gloves to water bottles, shopping bags and chewing gum, every part of our daily lives includes plastic. They epitomise convenience their durability makes our dependence on them inextricable, but it also stifles the environment. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/06/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-6-2005-7/ Sat, 06 Jun 2026 11:00:47 +0000 6/6/2005: Gonzales v. Raich is decided. The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 6, 2005 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/06/open-thread-227/ Sat, 06 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/05/bernie-sanders-dangerous-and-unconstitutional-plan-to-expropriate-ai-firms/ Sat, 06 Jun 2026 00:44:19 +0000 Sen. Bernie Sanders. (Aaron Schwartz/CNP/SplashNews/Newscom) In a recent New York Times article , socialist Sen. Bernie Sanders presented a proposal to have the federal government expropriate 50% of the stock of major AI producers. If enacted by Congress, the plan would violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Sanders justifies this expropriation by claiming that AI was produced through the "collective knowledge of humanity": Artificial intelligence was not created out of thin air. The data and language used by generative A.I. tools didn't just pop into Sam Altman's head or Elon Musk's imagination. A.I. is built on our collective intelligence: our books, songs, artwork, journalism, computer code, scientific research, videos, conversations, images and ideas spanning generations. That is not just the opinion of Bernie Sanders. For the most part, tech oligarchs have fed this knowledge into their A.I. models without permission, without acknowledgment, without compensation. In other words, the creative work of millions of people writers, artists, musicians, journalists, teachers, scientists and ordinary citizens has essentially been stolen by some of the wealthiest people in the world. It's time for us to reclaim it. Since A.I. is built on the collective knowledge of humanity, the wealth it generates must benefit humanity. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that the government may not take "private property" without paying "just compensation."As Richard Epstein and Eduardo Penalver leading takings scholars with widely divergent views on most political and legal issues explain in a joint essay on the Takings Clause for the National Constitution Center, "the guarantee of just compensation must apply at the very least to cases in which the government engages in the outright confiscation of property." Stock is private property, and seizing 50% of the stock value of major firms is a pretty obvious case of confiscation. And it does not matter that Sanders proposes to take "only" 50% of the stock, rather than 100%. If the government seizes half your house or half of your business, that's still a taking. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that seizing a much smaller proportion of a property is a taking, as in the famous case of Loretto v. Teleprompter , where New York City required the owner of a building to give up a small portion of the roof to put a cable box there. The same principle applies here. Sanders refers to the seizure as a "one-time 50 percent tax." But that labeling doesn't matter. It's still obviously an expropriation of property, and not simply a tax on the income it generates or even a property tax. One of the key elements of property rights is control over its use. Sanders makes clear that seizing control for the government is a major objective of the proposal. There can be situations where the boundary between a tax and a taking is fuzzy. But this proposal is very obviously on the taking side of the line. If merely labeling an expropriation like this a tax could immunize the government from takings liability, they could use the same trick to expropriate virtually any property without compensation. Thus, they could take over your house by claiming that it's merely an in-kind tax payable in the form of land-use rights. They could take over any business or charitable organization by claiming that it's a one-time tax payable by turning over the right to control all the organization's activities. And so on. Sanders could potentially get around Takings Clause constraints by abandoning outright confiscation, and instead having the government pressure firms into giving up control by using regulatory pressure, offering subsidies, or imposing unconstitutional export taxes on those that refuse to comply. Donald Trump has actually used tools like these to acquire stakes in various firms, such as Intel. The Trump administration has recently been considering using such shenanigans to acquire stakes in major AI firms. The Trump-like approach is, I believe, also subject to a variety of legal objections. But it's less obviously unconstitutional than Sanders' plan for outright confiscation. In addition to being unconstitutional, the Sanders plan - like Trump's similar policies (which I have forcefully criticized ) - is awful on moral and policy grounds. Sanders justifies it on the basis that AI has been "built on the collective knowledge of humanity." That "reasoning" could justify confiscating virtually any property. Pretty much every productive activity relies, in part, on knowledge accumulated by other people previously. Your house, your cellphone, your car, and your refrigerator, are all based on previously developed scientific and other knowledge. Anyone who writes a book or an article is likely building accumulated knowledge, some of it accumulated over many centuries. My writings on democratic theory rely, in part on, ideas that go all the way to the origins of democracy in ancient Greece. AI producers, like almost everyone else, are building on accumulated knowledge. But they nonetheless make important new contributions, and the government has no right to expropriate them. Consumer choice and competition, not the government, should determine how much value to assign to the AI producers' products, not the state. To the extent that AI producers may have illegally used others' intellectual property (by using "stolen" creative work, as Sanders puts it), the proper solution is not confiscation by the government, but lawsuits seeking damages. There are, in fact, a number of such cases currently ongoing . Expropriation of AI firms by the federal government would do nothing to compensate people whose intellectual property may have been used without proper authorization. It would just transfer the illegal profit from AI firms to the feds. Sanders also argues that AI should be under the control of the government because it's an important technology that should not be left to the control of a few billionaires. But a century of experience with socialism shows that government control of major industries leads to horrific results: poverty, oppression, and even mass murder. And for reasons I outlined in detail in this piece , Sanders' brand of "democratic socialism" is unlikely to be much better than the authoritarian kind - nor is it likely to remain democratic for long. Similar problems arise when right-wing nationalists like Trump seek to impose government control over major industries. On that point, see my 2024 article " The Case Against Nationalism ," coauthored with my Cato Institute colleague Alex Nowrasteh. Indeed, the similarity between Trump's policies and Sanders' ideas is an example of how socialists and nationalists advocate similarly awful ideas . It's "Horseshoe theory" at work! Sanders' progressive supporters would do well to consider whether they want the AI industry - or any major industry - to be controlled by the likes of Trump. Trump isn't the first right-wing demagogue to win an election, and he's unlikely to be the last. Don't give government powers that you are unwilling to have wielded by your political opponents. It is not true that the only alternative is a few billionaires dominating everything. The AI market is in fact very competitive. Claude, ChatGPT, Grok, Perplexity, and others are rival products competing in this space, produced by different firms. New firms enter the market on a regular basis. And the firms' owners - including billionaires - know they can only make money by meeting consumer demand better than their rivals or at lower cost. That is, so long as they cannot instead rely on government handouts and cronyism of the kind likely to proliferate with greater state control. AI does pose some risks, and there are legitimate arguments for constraining some types of uses, particularly when it comes to warfare and government surveillance. But the right approach there is restricting dangerous uses, not wholesale expropriation by the government. To the extent that AI is potentially dangerous, government monopoly control over that industry actually exacerbates that danger, by concentrating power in the hands of politicians and their cronies and henchmen. In sum, Sanders' plan to expropriate a large part of the AI industry is unconstitutional. And it's terrible policy, to boot. On that score, it has much in common with Trump's economic policy agenda. The post Bernie Sanders' Dangerous and Unconstitutional Plan to Expropriate AI Firms appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/05/court-dismisses-fraud-claim-against-n-y-times-over-young-old-and-sick-starve-to-death-in-gaza-photo/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 23:38:50 +0000 An excerpt from the long (and, I think, basically correct) opinion in Hoffman v. N.Y. Times Co. , decided yesterday by Judge Evelyn Padin (D.N.J.): Pro se Plaintiff Harold Hoffman brings this action against Defendant the New York Times Company . Plaintiff's suit stems from an article published by the New York Times on July 25, 2025, titled "Young, Old, and Sick Starve to Death in Gaza: 'There Is Nothing'" along with the article's accompanying photo: According to Plaintiff, the New York Times deliberately and misleadingly omitted the fact that the infant in the photoan 18-month-old baby named Mohammed Zakaria al-Mutawaq (pictured with his mother, Hedaya al-Mutawaq)was born with cerebral palsy, hypoxemia, and serious genetic disorders in order to advance an untrue narrative about the impact of the war between Hamas and Israel on those living in Gaza. Plaintiff also claims that the New York Times's publication of the Article runs in contravention of its motto "All the News That's Fit to Print." Plaintiff brings five claims under the NJCFA [N.J. Consumer Fraud Act] as well as one claim for common law fraud. The NJCFA prohibits: The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice, deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate, or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice. Here, Plaintiff appears to bring claims based on two affirmative misrepresentations(1) publishing the Article and Photo knowing they were false/misleading and (2) the New York Times's Mottoas well as two knowing omissions related to the Article(1) failing to include Mohammad's full health history in the Article and (2) removing his allegedly healthier older brother from the Photo. [1.] Plaintiff's NJCFA claims based on the Article and Photo At the outset, the Court notes that "to state a claim within the scope of the [NJCFA], a plaintiff must allege facts that establish that the alleged fraudulent conduct induced or lured the plaintiff into purchasing merchandise or real estate." [T]he Article and the Photo were published long after Plaintiff subscribed to the New York Times. Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that the Article and Photo are not what induced him to purchase a subscription to the New York Times. As such, Plaintiff cannot show that the Article or Photo were made in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise or that any omission from either is what caused his loss. It necessarily follows that Plaintiff cannot state a NJCFA claim for any conduct arising from the publication of the Article or Photo. [ 2.] Plaintiff's NJCFA claim based on the New York Times's Motto While the New York Times makes several arguments why Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the NJCFA based on its Motto, the Court need only address one: the Motto is not an affirmative misrepresentation actionable under the NJCFA. The NJCFA "distinguishes between actionable misrepresentations of fact and 'puffery.'" "Advertising that amounts to 'mere' puffery is not actionable because no reasonable consumer relies on puffery. The distinguishing characteristics of puffery are vague, highly subjective claims as opposed to specific, detailed factual assertions." In Rodio , for instance, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that Allstate's slogan, "You're in good hands with Allstate," was "nothing more than puffery" and was therefore not "a deception, false promise, misrepresentation, or any other unlawful practice within the ambit of the [NJCFA]." The Court agrees with the New York Times that its Motto is not a false statement of fact. For one, the Court finds that the Motto is a highly vague and subjective statement that assures consumers nothing in particular. As the New York Times persuasively argues, "[w]hat is 'fit' and what is not 'fit' is by its very nature not a fact, but a subjective determination made by editors," and Plaintiff himself recognizes the New York Times "is entitled to editorial freedom to choose what news to emphasize." As such, the New York Times has the discretion to choose what news is fit to print. That Plaintiff does not like that newsor believes that the New York Times's reporting is not news but politically motivated liesdoes not change the fact that the New York Times's Motto is a highly subjective statement that affords it significant discretion choose what it deems fit to print. In addition, it is hard to even consider the Motto as reaching any level of puffery. It makes no specific claim of superiority (either a general claim of superiority or a claim of superiority by reference to any metric), nor does it assure consumers anything "specific and measurable." See, e.g. , In re Toshiba Am. (D.N.J. 2009) (holding that a statement that a product was for "Today, Tomorrow and Beyond" to be non-actionable puffery); Argabright v. Rheem Mfg. Co. (D.N.J. 2016) (finding that a manufacturer's statements claiming its products were "top-quality" and "dependable" could not support a misrepresentation claim); Peruto v. TimberTech Ltd. (D.N.J. 2015) (finding statements that a decking product was "designed to provide years of low-maintenance use and enjoyment," "dependable and attractive for years," and "[provided] years of outdoor living pleasure" constituted non-actionable puffery). The New York Times's Motto is even more vague than these statements, and in the Court's view, is one that no reasonable person would attach importance to when considering whether to purchase a New York Times subscription. [3.] Plaintiff's NJCFA claim based on the New York Times's Handbook of Practices for Ethical Journalism (the "Handbook") In his Opposition, Plaintiff changes course and asserts for the first time that what induced him to purchase a New York Times subscription was neither the Article, the Photo, nor the Motto, but rather, the New York Times's "written promise to deliver accurate news coverage in exchange for his subscription funds." The written promise Plaintiff is referring to is a statement within Chapter Two of the Handbook: "accuracy is the foundation of our credibility." "In reliance on this promise of accurate news reporting," which Plaintiff notes "is viewable on-line for all subscribers to see and to rely upon," Plaintiff "purchased and maintained the subscription." As noted above, to be actionable under the NJCFA, an affirmative misrepresentation must be made "in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real estate." [P]utting aside that Plaintiff does not plead with particularity when he first saw the Handbook or when he first subscribed to the New York Times, Plaintiff fails to show that this statement within the Handbook was made in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise. All Plaintiff offers is that the statement "is viewable on-line for all subscribers to see and to rely upon," which is meaningfully different from showing that the statement was made in connection with the sale or advertisement of merchandise. [T]he same deficiencies that doom Plaintiff's NJCFA claims also doom his common law fraud claims. David L. Cook (Sills Cummis & Gross) represents the Times . The post Court Dismisses Fraud Claim Against N.Y. Times Over "Young, Old, and Sick Starve to Death in Gaza" Photo appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/05/plaintiff-too-small-to-challenge-president-trumps-practice-of-targeting-law-firms-he-dislikes/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 23:05:48 +0000 From Judge Nathaniel Gorton (D. Mass.) today in Larrabee v. Trump : J. Whitfield Larrabee . alleges that since taking office, President Donald J. Trump has engaged in a course of unconstitutional conduct (collectively, "the Policy") by issuing executive orders that punish and threaten to punish lawyers and law firms that he dislikes. Larrabee asks the Court to declare the Policy unconstitutional and to enjoin President Trump and other named defendants from taking any such action against him. In March, 2025, President Trump issued a memorandum to the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security titled "Preventing Abuses of the Legal System and Federal Court." That Memo directed the Attorney General to seek sanctions against attorneys and law firms who engage in "frivolous, unreasonable, and vexatious litigation against the United States." It also directed the Attorney General to review conduct of attorneys and their law firms in litigation against the Federal Government over the past eight years and, if any misconduct were to be identified, to recommend additional steps to be taken, including reassessment of security clearances and federal contracts. Contemporaneously, President Trump began to issue Executive Orders ("EOs") that purported to address the conduct of and risks posed by specific law firms. Plaintiff alleges that such EOs targeted law firms based on their past representation of clients and causes disfavored by President Trump. The EOs restricted the access of those law firms to federal buildings and limited official interactions between federal government personnel and their attorneys. Several law firms agreed to provide substantial pro bono work favored by President Trump in order to avoid being subject to similar EOs. Plaintiff, an attorney and self-described adversary of President Trump, alleges that he has a history of engaging in litigation against President Trump and has represented causes disfavored by him. He says: [s]o long as Trump is President, [he] intend[s] to make additional legal complaints against Trump's businesses, family members and associates where there are good grounds to do so. He contends that he faces "a credible threat that the policy will be enforced against [him]" if he follows his intended course of conduct. He further claims that he has been deterred from representing particular clients and has been "engaged in self-censorship" out of fear of such enforcement. The government contends that plaintiff has not alleged actual or imminent injury traceable to the Policy [which is a requirement for having standing to sue -EV]. The Court agrees. [A.] Actual Injury Defendant submits that he is currently suffering actual and ongoing injuries resulting from the Policy. Specifically, he alleges that he has refrained from representing particular clients and causes that are adverse to or disfavored by President Trump. Such allegations are insufficient where plaintiff has failed to establish that any future harm is certainly impending. As discussed below, plaintiff has made no such showing and thus his attempt to establish standing is unavailing. [B.] Imminent Injury Plaintiff contends that he faces a credible threat of enforcement sufficient to confer standing because the Policy has been recently enforced against others and the government has not disclaimed enforcement against him. [P]laintiff must show that the enforcement is certainly impending or that there is a substantial risk that harm will occur. He has not met that burden here. First, the Court must give weight to the fact that there is no history of enforcement of the Policy with respect to like facts. The Policy has thus far been enforced against large, international law firms associated with attorneys who led investigations into President Trump or previously represented his political opponents. Plaintiff is not similarly situated to those individuals and provides no indication that the Policy has been applied to similar facts. Larrabee's reliance on Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (2014) is unavailing. The three factors supporting imminent enforcement in that case are inapplicable here. See Driehaus (noting that the challenged policy had previously been enforced against plaintiff, conferred broad authority on private citizens to instigate enforcement proceedings and its enforcement was "not a rare occurrence"). Here, the Policy can only be enforced by President Trump and a select few members of his Cabinet and it has not previously been enforced against Larrabee or similarly situated individuals. Indeed, enforcement of the Policy has been a rare, headline-making occurrence, and more than one year has elapsed since the most recent enforcement action. Furthermore, in Driehaus the Court declined to determine whether the civil enforcement proceedings, without the additional threat of criminal prosecution, was sufficient to confer standing. Larrabee does not allege any threat of criminal prosecution connected with the Policy. In sum, the Court finds that plaintiff does not face an imminent injury and thus lacks Article III standing. Having so decided, the Court declines to address the parties' other arguments. Michael Fitzgerald (D. Mass. U.S. Attorney's Office) represents the government. The post Plaintiff Too Small to Challenge President Trump's Practice of Targeting Law Firms He Dislikes appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/salaries-are-on-the-rise-see-also/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 23:00:00 +0000 Another Biglaw Firm Matches Milbank : Katten Muchin bumps up their salaries ! Keeping Up With The Milbanks : Check to see if your firm is on the scoreboard ! Here Lies Diversity Lab : The FTC successfully harassed the diversity initiative into shutting down . Alternative Facts And Alternative Histories : The Trump administration tries erasing proof of the failed Jan. 6th coup . Associate Prosecutor Disbarred Over Law School Stealing : Reminder of how important it is to police the police . Lawyers Worth Their Fee Know Silence Is Golden : Talking less could make you better at your job . The post Salaries Are On The Rise! See Also appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/law-firm-exploring-new-way-to-take-in-money/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 22:16:00 +0000 Making room for nonlawyers in law firms. The post Law Firm Exploring New Way To Take In Money appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://medcitynews.com/2026/06/fda-rick-pazdur-regulation-cber-cder-stat-asco/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 21:30:00 +0000 Rick Pazdur, formerly the FDAs top oncology official, said the FDA is at a critical juncture that could determine the direction of the worlds top regulator of medicines. The post Former FDA Officials: Theres Opportunity To Rebuild The Agency But Not The Way It Was appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/lawyers-should-sometimes-talk-less/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 20:44:00 +0000 Sometimes, silence is the best action. The post Lawyers Should Sometimes Talk Less appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/225k-law-school-theft-scheme-costs-attorney-his-license/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 20:02:00 +0000 Whatever grade he got in Trusts & Estates wasn't low enough. The post $225K Law School Theft Scheme Costs Attorney His License appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/justices-reject-holding-generic-pharmaceutical-manufacturers-liable-for-decisions-of-pharmacists/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 20:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/05/short-circuit-an-inexhaustive-weekly-compendium-of-rulings-from-the-federal-courts-of-appeal-62/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 19:30:39 +0000 Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit , a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice. New on the Short Circuit podcast : Our old friend Brian Morris rejoins the show for exoneration litigation. And Belmont picks. Shortly after beginning his second term, President Trump, and later Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, announce policy changes barring persons currently or previously afflicted with gender dysphoria from military service. Current and prospective servicemembers challenge the policy change, and the district court issues a preliminary injunction. D.C. Circuit : The injunction is proper for current service members, but improper for prospective applicants. Concurrence: The injunction is proper for both. Dissent: The injunction is proper for neither. In 2022, the feds seized the superyacht Amadea in Fiji as part of Task Force KleptoCapture, targeting Russian oligarchs. Second Circuit : Cool. Man dies after jumping from a highway overpass. Philadelphia police officer, in violation of department policy, uses his personal cell phone to photograph the dead man lying on the road. Then, in "a poor attempt at 'humor,'" he sends it to several colleagues, one of whom posts it to social media. It is forwarded to the bereaved mother, who sues the officer. Third Circuit (unpublished): Qualified immunity. There is no clearly established right to control dissemination and exploitation of one's close relatives' death scene images. Dissent: Our history and traditions establish that it was so obviously wrong that he was on notice. Virginia inmate is accused of indecent exposure; he insists prison officials view video that he says will exonerate him. They decline and convict him. He asks them to preserve the footage. They delete it. Spoliation sanctions? District court: Summary judgment to the prison officials without ruling on that motion. Fourth Circuit : There are three ways a district court can abuse its discretion, and this decision "appears to abuse discretion in all three ways." Children in the West Virginia foster care system file class action, alleging a variety of abuses and rights violations. Following extensive document discovery and 45 depositions, the district courtwithout briefing or even notice to the parties sua sponte dismisses the case with prejudice for lack of standing. Fourth Circuit : Undismissed. But we deny plaintiffs' request to reassign the case to a different judge (even though this is the district court's second erroneous dismissal of this case). Jackson, Miss.'s water system appears to be a disaster, and several residents sue over difficulties it's caused. Fifth Circuit (unpublished): The good news is that you have standing because you're seeking damages for the alleged injuries you suffered. The bad news is that you lose your due process claims on the merits because you prevailed in the city's administrative process for adjusting your water bills and you haven't meaningfully alleged anything more was wrong. New Orleans crime lab tech warns supervisors about safety and accuracy concerns with the lab's drug testing. Supervisors, officers show up at the tech's home to conduct a "wellness check" and insist that the tech accompany them to take a drug test (the very one whose accuracy he questioned). He demurs, the supervisors call their boss, who says the tech is "being ordered to come into work to take this test." He's searched, placed in the back of a cop car, and driven to take his blood test, where he resigns instead of being tested. Fourth Amendment violations? Fifth Circuit (2024): Qualified immunity for some, not all. Fifth Circuit (2026): No QI for the supervisors' boss, who ordered officers to bring the tech in without a warrant or exigent circumstances. (Both officers faced internal discipline : one suspended, one fired.) The Fifth Circuit gives an (unpublished) update on the matter alternatively known as "The Bleak House of arbitration," or, as one of the case's lawyers said on the Short Circuit 10th anniversary podcast , "A Final Arbitration to Rule Them All." Man struggles with, disarms suspect who'd broken into his house after a gunfight with Laredo, Tex. police. The man exits the house with one hand in the air and the suspect's AR-15 ( pointed at the ground ) in the other. An officer shoots him without warning or command. (He lives.) Fifth Circuit : As lamentable as that is What's the worst story so far about AI-hallucinations in court? Perhaps not wearing the green jacket but this Seventh Circuit story nevertheless commands attention wherein counsel submits a brief "replete with false quotations, erroneous statements of law, and factual representations contradicted by the record." Plus, watching the guilty lawyers throw each other under the bus is entertaining in a Homer Simpson kind of way . Potential prison informant alleges detectives put him at risk by being too open about his potential cooperation against a fellow inmate. Seventh Circuit : But there's no clearly established right against such risk if you weren't actually attacked by another inmate. Instead, "the tradeoff between investigation and safety has been left to law enforcement agencies and the political process." Qualified immunity. Member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary is admonished to remove controversial posts on LinkedIn, as well as photos of himself in uniform. He demurs, sending a letter to his Commodore stating, "I disagree with your fake Letter of Caution, and am going to file a complaint against you for your racist and bigoted action against me because I am White. I find your behavior reprehensible." Following further noncompliance and incendiary posting, he's kicked out. He sues for First Amendment retaliation. Seventh Circuit : The Coast Guard Auxiliary deserves deference on this. Kansas City, Mo. police receive an anonymous tip that a felon has a gun. A squad tails him and his wife, makes a routine traffic stop with guns drawn, finds a gun in his wife's purse, and charges him with felon-in-possession. He claims the gun was his wife's. The "tipper" is never identified but the fact there was a tip is introduced at trial. A jury convicts. Eighth Circuit : There's this thing in the Sixth Amendment about confronting your accuser. Conviction vacated! Wanna see another AI-hallucination car crash? Cool, but you'll also want to consider the business model exposed in this Ninth Circuit sanctions opinion where a couple of guys get law grads who haven't passed the bar to write their briefs and then just file them without checking anything. Gov't: We took a million dollars from this guy at a traffic stop and we're going to forfeit it unless he provides an extremely detailed written explanation of exactly where it came from and how he earned it. This guy: I don't want to write you, like, a novel. I just want to argue that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment and that you have to give my money back. Ninth Circuit (en banc): And he gets to do that. Children and young adults sue the president for executive orders they claim will exacerbate climate change. Ninth Circuit (unpublished): Big no from Article III, from the too-speculative link between the orders and alleged injuries to redressability issues and constitutional structure. The nonprofit Tallahassee Bail Fund posts bond for certain criminal pretrial detainees in Leon County, Fla., who, though eligible for bond, can't afford it. But even if detainees show up to trial and are acquitted, the county (per state law) can keep the bond to cover whatever outstanding fines and fees the detainee might otherwise owe. Tallahassee Bail Fund: This is crippling our mission, and it violates detainees' rights under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Bail Clause. Eleventh Circuit (2-1) (weirdly unpublished): It might be crippling your mission, but the detainees themselves are the right people to vindicate their excessive-bail rights, and there are lots of ways they could do it, including in federal court. (Look forward, presumably, to a Rule 23(b)(2) class action brought on behalf of current and future detainees who would be beneficiaries of the Tallahassee Bail Fund's bond-posting program but for Florida's bond-snatching statute.) And in en banc news, the Fifth Circuit , 9-8, will not reconsider its decision that Ex parte Young allows plaintiffs to sue the Texas Secretary of State and the Texas Attorney General to challenge various bits of the state's Election Protection and Integrity Act of 2021. Oldham, J., dissentaling, likewise will not reconsider his view that Ex parte Young is bad and the Fifth Circuit's Ex parte Young precedent is worse. Lightning victory! During the pandemic, botanist Laura Schaefer transformed her half-acre grass lot into an abundant garden with over 150 different kinds of vegetables, flowers, trees, and other plants, mostly all native to the area. Last week, however, Millstadt, Ill. officials issued her a bogus citation for "high grass or weeds" and gave her seven days to tear out the gardenor the village would do it and charge her for it. But after IJ sent a sternly worded letter and local news started to dig in, the village backed off. Illinois is one of three states that protects gardens specifically; indeed, the state's 2021 law is based on an IJ model bill , and we invite everyone else to have a gander. Click here to learn more. The post Short Circuit: An inexhaustive weekly compendium of rulings from the federal courts of appeal appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/05/texas-age-verification-parental-consent-requirements-for-app-stores-likely-constitutional-fifth-circuit-holds/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 19:29:28 +0000 From Students Engaged in Advancing Texas v. Paxton , decided yesterday by the Fifth Circuit (Judges Jerry Smith and Andrew Oldham): The Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 2420 , the App Store Accountability Act, with bipartisan support to help parents direct and supervise children's downloads of apps and in-app purchases. The Act accomplishes those goals by requiring age verification; parental consent; and age rating and content display. {[The law] requires app stores to provide certain information in obtaining parental consent, referring to ratings and content that are determined by the developer.} The district court issued universal preliminary injunctions against SB2420 after applying strict scrutiny. The State of Texas seeks a stay pending appeal. Texas has made a strong showing that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the district court committed several reversible errors. First , the district court likely erred in applying strict scrutiny to significant parts, if not all, of the Act. At most, SB2420 regulates speech that "proposes a commercial transaction," which is subject to intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980). {SB2420 may not regulate speech at all, given that it does not target any substantive content but instead regulates commercial conduct with an incidental relationship to speech.} App store transactions are commercial in nature. After all, users browsing an app store can see a catalog of applications, obtain additional information, and download or purchase an application. App listings propose commercial transactions, regardless of whether any monetary payment is made. In fact, the "payment" for apps that are purportedly "free" is access to user data and private information. Any minor who downloads an app must accept its terms of service, including agreements about how the minor's data is used. Some terms require minors to waive the right to sue by agreeing to "arbitration pr[o]visions that no child can understand." Detailed user data, including that of minors, is the life-blood of the app store monetization ecosystem. Second , Texas has likely shown that the SB2420 survives intermediate scrutiny because the Act "advances important governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those interests." Requiring age verification, parental consent, and app-related content ratings likely directly and materially advances Texas's substantial interest in protecting children's data, safety, and privacy in a digital world. Thus, there is likely a "reasonable fit" between SB2420's methods and goals allowing parents to direct and supervise children's downloads of apps and in-app purchases. That some works protected by the First Amendment may be the object of app downloads or in-app purchases does not categorically exempt them from ordinary regulations governing commercial transactions. Otherwise, any company involved in proposing a commercial transaction could trigger strict scrutiny by incidentally including speech as part of the transaction. Third , SB2420's emergency-services exception {likely does not run afoul of constitutional concerns}. [It] is not likely content-based but, instead, focuses on why the service is needed, not what is being communicated. "[E]mergency calls serve the vital purpose of protecting the safety and welfare of Americans." Section 121.022(h)(1) directly addresses data and privacy concerns by requiring that the emergency services app "limit[ ] data collection to information" that is "collected in compliance with" the Children's Online Privacy Protect Act ("COPPA") and "necessary for the provision of emergency services." Users do not need to create an account to access and use the emergency service app. We need not conclusively resolve the question of the other exception for an app that "is operated by or in partnership with" a regulated nonprofit organization that "develops, sponsors, or administers [ ] standardized test[s]." That standalone exception, which focuses on the identity of the speaker, does not necessarily reflect a content preference, but rather the reality that students often need to take tests "used for purposes of admission to or class placement in a postsecondary educational institution or a program within a postsecondary educational institution." The speaker-based distinction appears to be content-neutral, not content-based, in discriminating among ideas or viewpoints. And section 121.022(h)(2)(B) mitigates data-privacy concerns, requiring that the non-profit "is subject to" separate laws prohibiting certain uses of student information. In any event, that limited standalone exception can be severed consistently with SB2420's strong severability provision and severability principles, because the remainder of SB2420 is "capable of functioning independently" and is "fully operative as a law." The district court likely erred in failing faithfully to apply the severability clause. {We do not suggest that there are any problematic provisions of SB2420 and merely follow the law's unambiguous textual severability command.} {Insofar as there may be any unconstitutional application of SB2420, the district court failed to conduct a proper facial-invalidity analysis under Moody v. NetChoice (2024). Plaintiffs who bring facial challenges must demonstrate that "the ratio of unlawful-to-lawful applications is lopsided enough to justify the strong medicine of facial invalidation." Put another way, Plaintiffs must show that "the law's unconstitutional applications substantially outweigh its constitutional ones" to prevail in "a facial suit [ ] based on the First Amendment." It is highly unlikely that Plaintiffs have met this "rigorous standard."} [And t]hough we express great skepticism that Plaintiffs are entitled to relief, any such relief, if warranted, would be an injunction limited to enforcement against the Students Engaged in Advancing Texas ("SEAT") plaintiffs and any identified members of the Computer & Communications Industry Association ("CCIA"). In any event, a blanket prohibition on SB2420's enforcement is likely inappropriate. The need to protect children is intensified in the digital world, where app stores have violated existing consumer protection and child privacy laws for years, despite a federal consent decree. { See, e.g. ,ROA.26-50001.849 ("The consequences are substantial. As documented in public reports, thousands of children have been sextorted, targeted with illegal drugs, contacted by traffickers, exposed to dangerous viral challenges, or encouraged toward self-harm by chatbots, often inside apps that app stores present as appropriate and safe for young teenagers.").} Absent SB2420, parents' ability to protect their children is imperiled because app stores have encouraged minors to download applications and make in-app purchases without giving parents accurate content information or obtaining their informed consent. Any purported burden on app stores and developers is minimal because SB2420 requires only "commercially reasonable" verification methods and allows developers to use "widely adopted industry standards" in determining age ratings and those related to corresponding content. The balance of equities and public interest are clearcut in Texas's favor. Judge Catharina Haynes concurred in granting a stay pending appeal, but otherwise did not join the court's opinion and did not further explain her views. The post Texas Age Verification / Parental Consent Requirements for App Stores Likely Constitutional, Fifth Circuit Holds appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/why-milbank-decided-to-rewrite-the-biglaw-salary-scale-instead-of-writing-a-bonus-check/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 19:11:00 +0000 The firms salary increase is proving far more influential than a one-time payout ever could be. The post Why Milbank Decided To Rewrite The Biglaw Salary Scale Instead Of Writing A Bonus Check appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-real-ai-moment-in-litigation-is-data-organization-not-generative-output/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 18:32:00 +0000 Before AI can be transformative, firms must get serious about something far less glamorous: governance The post The Real AI Moment In Litigation Is Data Organization, Not Generative Output appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/05/the-tq-threat-to-lgb-rights/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 18:21:20 +0000 From Andrew Sullivan (The Weekly Dish) : Governor Kathy Hochul has a decision to make by June 12. The New York State legislature recently tackled the vital, pressing issue of whether the terms "mother" and "father" are cruel and oppressive. They concluded that these terms are indeed transphobic and need to be replaced in law by "gestating parent" and "non-gestating parent." "Paternity" is also bigoted and axed. Among the Democrats, the vote was, natch, a few shy of unanimous. And let's not kid ourselves: Hochul's signature is inevitable. On all questions gay and trans, the Dems are now entirely controlled by trans and "queer" extremists. Now take a look at this week's Senate hearings on sex changes for children. Again, the Dems were unanimous, and their position utterly unchanged: the "safety" and "effectiveness" of transing children is beyond any dispute; no one but Republican bigots oppose it; and any problems can be dealt with retroactively by malpractice suits. (The only slight concession to reality was an end to the lie that transing children was the only way to stop them killing themselves. But no apology for the lie, of course. Or for the human wreckage the lie caused.) The Cass Review never happened. Affirmation-only guidelines never existed. Gays and lesbians and feminists and liberals who oppose transing children and defend the fact of the sex binary? Senators Sanders, Markey, and Baldwin don't seem to know we even exist. Unsurprising. MS NOW, to take one example, has never had a single guest who's been critical of child sex changes. The Cass Review, when it has even been mentioned, has been instantly dismissed. The gay and lesbian press, such as it is, reports on all this as a trans genocide in full swing. You can read the whole thing here . I haven't followed all these issues closely, especially as to their political effects; but Sullivan certainly has. If readers can recommend sensible contrary views, I'd be glad to add links to them as well. The post "The TQ+ Threat To LGB Rights" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/its-official-the-trump-administration-finished-what-it-started-with-diversity-lab/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 17:48:00 +0000 The FTC never proved a thing... it didn't have to. The post Its Official: The Trump Administration Finished What It Started With Diversity Lab appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/associate-compensation-scorecard-the-2026-summer-of-salary-increases/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 17:00:00 +0000 The race to match is on. We'll keep track of every raise, bonus, and compensation move as law firms make their decisions. The post Associate Compensation Scorecard: The 2026 Summer Of Salary Increases appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/gina-passarellas-powerful-talk-at-legal-geek-law-firms-that-dont-face-change-may-soon-run-out-of-gas/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 16:20:25 +0000 More sophisticated in-house counsel are not waiting on outside providers to make changes in light of the efficiencies AI and automation can bring. The post Gina Passarellas Powerful Talk At Legal Geek: Law Firms That Dont Face Change May Soon Run Out Of Gas appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/05/congress-needs-to-investigate-judge-who-lied-about-having-sex-with-police-officer/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 16:04:09 +0000 [This essay is co-authored with Professor Arthur Hellman and Gabe Roth, Executive Director of Fix the Court. Their biographies are below.] The Constitution provides only one method to punish federal judges who misbehave: impeachment, which can lead to removal from office. But there is broad consensus that judicial impeachment should be reserved for only the most egregious cases. Instead, Congress crafted a middle ground. A judicial council within the regional circuit can review allegations of misconduct, impose reprimands, and where appropriate, make an impeachment referral to the House of Representatives. Of course, the House retains the power to impeach a judge regardless of what the judicial misconduct process determines. For the most part, this arrangement works well. But a recent case from the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, based in Atlanta, represents a complete breakdown of the process. A married judge repeatedly had sex in her chambers with a police officer who worked in her district and then lied in an attempt to cover up her compromising acts. Despite this brazen dishonesty, the judicial council slapped her on the wrist and refused to even publicly name her. Since the judiciary failed to live up to its end of the bargain, Congress needs to open an impeachment inquiry. Judge Eleanor Ross has served on the federal bench in Atlanta since 2014. As early as 2022, she began an affair with an Atlanta police department officer. Over the course of two years, Judge Ross had sex with the officer at least five times in her judicial chambers. In the abstract, no canon of judicial ethics prohibits adultery. Moreover, a judge could have a relationship with a police officer, so long as she recused from any cases that could create a conflict of interest. But life-tenured judges should avoid any compromising actions that could bring disrepute to the court or place them at risk for blackmail. Yet Judge Ross kept her trysts a secret. The district chief judge learned of her sexual activity only after Judge Ross's law clerk heard "kissing" and "moaning" sounds from chambers and blew the whistle. The in-chambers sexual conduct, by itself, may perhaps have been enough to warrant impeachment, but what happened next clearly crossed the line. The chief circuit judge, who by law is responsible for investigating allegations of judicial misconduct, asked Judge Ross about the allegations. Judge Ross lied. She insisted that "I have never engaged in sexual intercourse in my office." She denied knowing which police officer visited her chambers, even though he signed his name to enter. She charged that her law clerk was trying to retaliate against her. The judge may have even tried to clean a couch cushion that appeared to have been stained with bodily fluids. In sum, the judge repeatedly made false statements to her colleagues and attempted to obstruct the investigation. The judicial council that investigated this matter laid out the sordid details and concluded that Judge Ross lacked candor. But in the end, Judge Ross's colleagues gave her only the slightest reprimand. Judge Ross agreed to write vaguely-worded letters of apology to her law clerks. And the judge agreed to skip her turn as chief judge and not to serve on any judiciary-wide committee. Worst of all, the judicial council chose to make her reprimand private, finding that she was extremely apologetic and was unlikely to commit similar conduct in the future. The council report did not even name Judge Ross, although it included so many specific facts that it wasn't hard to figure out who she was. The council failed in its duty to police judicial misconduct. So did the national appellate committee that reviewed the council's decision. Both bodies did not even acknowledge precedent from a similar case. In 2007, Judge Samuel Kent of the Southern District of Texas sexually assaulted court employees, and lied to obstruct the investigation. The judicial council and the Judicial Conference of the United States, whose presiding officer is the Chief Justice of the United States, recommended that Kent should be impeached. The House agreed and unanimously impeached Kent. Kent resigned his judgeship to avoid a certain conviction in the Senate. To be sure, Judge Kent's sexual assaults were criminal, while Judge Ross's adultery was lawful. But several members of the House Judiciary Committee stated that lying to the judicial body investigating the misconduct is by itself an impeachable offense. On these grounds, there is strong reason to conclude that Judge Ross has also committed an impeachable offense. The House of Representatives should pick up the investigation of Judge Ross where the judicial council stopped. And this matter should not be a partisan affair. Much like with the Kent proceedings, members on both sides of the aisle should recognize that a judge who lies about having sex with a police officer within her district, and then attempts to obstruct the investigation, has disqualified herself from judicial service. This process also should not be rushed. One deliberative approach can be found in the impeachment inquiry of Judge Thomas Porteous in 2008. The House established a twelve-member task force with six Republicans and six Democrats to investigate the matter. This collaboration would allow the process continues regardless of who holds the gavel following the midterm elections. We continue to believe that judges should be the first line to investigate judicial misconduct. But if judges are unable to fairly sit in judgment of their peers, or worse, are seen as covering up misdeeds, Congress must exercise its constitutional prerogative. Serving as a life-tenured judge is a privilege and not a right. Judges who abuse that privilege must be willing to face public scrutiny, especially where they create conflicts of interest that could require recusals. Judge Ross should resign, but if she fails to, the impeachment process may help her see the light. -- Josh Blackman holds the Centennial Chair of Constitutional Law at the South Texas College of Law Houston and is an adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute. Arthur Hellman is an emeritus professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law; he helped to draft the current version of the judicial misconduct statute and testified as an expert witness at the impeachment hearing on Judge Kent. Gabe Roth is executive director of Fix the Court, which advocates for greater openness and accountability in the federal judiciary. The post Congress Needs To Investigate Judge Who Lied About Having Sex With Police Officer appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/how-appealing-weekly-roundup-173/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 15:39:44 +0000 The week in appellate news. The post How Appealing Weekly Roundup appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/casino-investors-file-second-claim-against-ecuador Fri, 05 Jun 2026 16:04:49 +0100 Two businessmen in the casino industry have lodged an ICSID claim against Ecuador after an earlier investment treaty claim that their holding company brought over a gambling ban was thrown out last year based on a denial of benefits clause. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/casino-investors-file-second-claim-against-ecuador Fri, 05 Jun 2026 16:04:49 +0100 Two businessmen in the casino industry have lodged an ICSID claim against Ecuador after an earlier investment treaty claim that their holding company brought over a gambling ban was thrown out last year based on a denial of benefits clause. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/05/youth-climate-plaintiffs-challenge-endangerment-repeal-on-religious-liberty-grounds/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 14:56:58 +0000 I am quite skeptical of the lawfulness of the Environmental Protection Agency's rescission of the endangerment finding upon which EPA regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act is based. It is an aggressive move that stretches administrative law norms and challenges Supreme Court precedent. While I am not convinced the endangerment rescission is lawful, I would hardly argue it is unconstitutional or impinges upon religious liberty. The folks at Our Children's Trust --the group behind the various kids climate suits--feels otherwise. They (along with Public Justice) have filed a challenge to the endangerment finding repeal making such claims. Last month, in Venner v. EPA , OCT and Public Justice filed a motion to stay the repeal of the endangerment finding alleging the EPA's action violates the youth plaintiffs' "fundamental free exercise rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act" and their "rights to life and liberties under the Fifth Amendment." Longtime readers know that I do not think much of the federal constitutional arguments advanced in the various kids climate cases. Even without recent decisions such as Dobbs I find the claims that the federal government's failure to control greenhouse gases is a constitutional violation to be outlandish . The idea that federal courts should superintend federal energy policy is hard to fathom--and would be quite hard to contain. Thus it should be no surprise that federal courts (with one exception ) have consistently concluded that they lack jurisdiction over these efforts to constitutionalize climate policy--most recently on Wednesday in Lighthiser v. Trump . The latest filing adds a new wrinkle in that it seeks to add religious liberty claims into the mix. Specifically, the claim is that a failure to mitigate climate change will burden the exercise of the plaintiffs' religious faith because rising temperatures will make it more difficult to practice their faiths. [I have posted excerpts from the brief below the jump.] I find this argument to be quite creative, but I am also quite confident that it will go nowhere. (The petition's claim that the EPA completely failed to respond to comments raising these concerns, on the other hand, does raise a serious administrative law issue, but I have not looked to see if the claim is correct.]) As for the endangerment finding itself, I will have a brief essay in the summer issue of Regulation expanding on some of my concerns about the lawfulness of the EPA's move. Rest assured, neither the Fifth Amendment nor RFRA is not among them. From the petitioners motion to stay the endangerment repeal in Venner v. EPA : The Repeal Rule substantially burdens Petitioners Elena, J.K., M.D., and E.S.'s sincerely held religious beliefs. "Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion" unless it can demonstrate the burden furthers "a compelling governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest." 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1. RFRA offers "broad protection for religious liberty" beyond that afforded by the First Amendment. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706 (2014); Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 356 (2015). Thus, Petitioners' showing of substantial burden under the First Amendment also satisfies RFRA. See id. . . . The Repeal Rule pressures E.S., J.K., and M.D. to modify their behavior in a way that seriously violates their sincerely held religious beliefs by forcing a choice between adherence to their religious tenets, and protecting their health and safety. Petitioners E.S. and J.K. are observant Jews whose religion requires them to walk to synagogue on the Sabbath. Declarations of L.K. 10 (Ex. 20); J.K. 5-6 (Ex. 21); E.S. 16-18 (Ex. 19). M.D. is an observant Muslim whose religion requires her to fast during Ramadan. M.D. 4-7 (Ex. 23); S.A. 12-13 (Ex. 22). Each Sabbath that is made too hot for E.S. and J.K. to walk safely to synagogue, and each day of Ramadan that is made too hot for M.D. to safely fast and wear hijab, is a day they are prevented from observing important requirements of their religions. E.S. 12, 22-24; L.K. 19; J.K. 7-9; M.D. 4-7; S.A. 14; Pinsky 41, 44-46, 58-59; see also L.K. 25-34 (Sukkot practice harmed); J.K. 12-14 (same). The Repeal Rule forces E.S., J.K., and M.D. to choose between religious practice and physical safety more frequently than they would otherwise because the Repeal Rule will cause an additional 8.81 gigatons of CO2 pollution to be emitted. Wilson 20. This staggering quantity is 1.85 times the United States' total CO2 emissions in 2024. Running 11. This quantity worsens local heat surrounding E.S.'s, J.K.'s, and M.D.'s homes, increasing the number of days that they are prevented from exercising their religious beliefs. Running 15-34; Wilson 6-13; Jacobson 9; E.S. 24, 22 ("If I'm not in a minyan, there are some prayers I can't say."); J.K. 11; M.D. 7. The burden is more substantial here than in Hobby Lobby because the pressure for youth to disobey their religion's requirements comes not from a fine that can be paid, but from physical hazards to bodily health and safety, other inalienable rights. E.S. 12; Pinsky 41-45. The Supreme Court's decision4 in Mahmoud v. Taylor confirms that the Repeal Rule substantially burdens E.S., J.K., and M.D.'s religious exercise because it poses "a very real threat of undermining the religious beliefs and practices that the parents wish to instill in their children" and thus is an "objective danger to the free exercise of religion." 606 U.S. 522, 543, 565 (2025) (holding requiring LGBTQ+inclusive storybooks in school curriculum substantially burdens parents wishing to instill contrary religious beliefs in children) (citation modified). The burden imposed here is more severe than in Mahmoud because the Repeal Rule hinders E.S.'s, J.K.'s, and M.D.'s religious development by preventing their ability to safely engage in core religious practices with their family in community. E.S. is "a young person who is actively trying to develop [his] religious practice[,]" and "losing a Shabbos [Sabbath] service" makes him "less capable of internalizing Jewish Law and integrating it into [his] life." E.S. 23. In J.K.'s family, "[e]ach additional hot Saturday diminishes the habit of attending synagogue regularly, thereby diminishing our closeness to God, our sense of community, and our ability to inspire our children to lead Jewish lives." L.K. 21. This "profoundly distress[es]" J.K.'s mother because it "could impact both [J.K.'s] ability to enjoy the service as well as his ability to transmit this essential knowledge to his future children." Id. 22. M.D.'s mother confirms that extreme heat and climate events have disrupted their religious rituals, and she worries about her daughter's safety wearing hijab in dangerous heat. S.A. 9-16. As a parent, she must weigh her children's immediate health against her obligation to pass down religious traditions and practices "at a crucial time in my children's religious development as they are entering adulthood." S.A. 8-17. The increased localized heat from the GHG emissions from the Repeal Rule will thus "substantially interfer[e] with [Petitioners'] religious development" during their "crucial adolescent stage of development" by limiting meaningful opportunities to learn, practice, and internalize their parents' religious values. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972). The Repeal Rule also imposes a substantial burden on Petitioner Elena, a Catholic youth, by forcing her to choose between two sincerely held beliefs: the obligation to procreate, and the obligation to protect the lives of children. Elena 9 14. Elena cannot do both because the worsening, rather than improving, air pollution and climate conditions created by the Repeal Rule limit the conditions which Elena sincerely believes are necessary for nurturing and protecting children. Elena 1314; Pinsky 10-16, 28, 37, 60-62; Wilson 4-34; Running 16, 25-50. "It violates my beliefs to bring someone into this world whose life would be burdened with hazardous air quality and increasing extreme and dangerous heat," because such conditions undermine "life, in utero, for newborns, for growing children, and for mothers[.]" Elena 13-14; Pinsky 61-62 ("More babies will be born early or at low weight . . . [a] small number of these babies will also die."); Wilson 4-34; Running 16, 25-50. The Repeal Rule thus substantially burdens Elena's exercise of her Catholic faith by forcing her to "engage in conduct that seriously violates" her beliefs by making it impossible for her personally to safely practice her faith's call to procreate and protect life. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 720. The post Youth Climate Plaintiffs Challenge Endangerment Repeal on Religious Liberty Grounds appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/trump-doj-proudly-rewrites-history-by-deleting-january-6-insurrection-press-releases/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 14:50:07 +0000 From the ministry-of-truth-back-on-its-bullshit dept The post Trump DOJ Proudly Rewrites History By Deleting January 6 Insurrection Press Releases appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/biglaws-raise-parade-rolls-on-with-another-match/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 14:02:00 +0000 Yet another Am Law 100 firm has increased associate salaries. The post Biglaws Raise Parade Rolls On With Another Match appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/justices-validate-secs-use-of-disgorgement-in-securities-enforcement/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 14:00:00 +0000 (Drew Angerer/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/justices-validate-secs-use-of-disgorgement-in-securities-enforcement/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 14:00:00 +0000 (Drew Angerer/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/on-d-day-did-fdr-violate-the-establishment-clause/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000 (Photo12/Universal Images Group via Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/on-d-day-did-fdr-violate-the-establishment-clause/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000 (Photo12/Universal Images Group via Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.justsecurity.org/140047/rightscon-cancellation-democracy-promotion/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=rightscon-cancellation-democracy-promotion Fri, 05 Jun 2026 13:15:50 +0000 The once-lauded Zambian president's nixing of a major digital rights conference shows the risks of lionizing individual leaders without a backup plan. The post The Lessons of Zambias RightsCon Cancellation for International Democracy Promotion appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.justsecurity.org/141315/what-trump-ai-eo-got-right/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=what-trump-ai-eo-got-right Fri, 05 Jun 2026 13:05:02 +0000 Trump's new AI executive order creates the scaffolding for a workable regulatory regime, especially for cybersecurity risks, but failed to make it mandatory. The post Trump Drew the Right Map for AI Oversight, but Stopped at the Trailhead appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/do-americans-support-expanding-the-court/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/do-americans-support-expanding-the-court/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/morning-docket-06-05-26/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:55:28 +0000 * Maduro adding Diddy's lawyer. [ Reuters ] * "Deepfake Mocks Judge Spearheading Judiciary Deepfake Rule" [ Law360 ] * John Bolton expected to plead guilty. [ CBS News ] * Law school deans call for professional independence. [ ABA Journal ] * Lawyers among the government workers who lost protections. [ Bloomberg Law News ] * The worst horrors rely on enablers. [ The Hill ] * Biglaw's junior classes are down, but it's not AI's fault yet. [ National Law Journal ] * Dentons partner on leave after cocaine test. [ Roll on Friday ] The post Morning Docket: 06.05.26 appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.justsecurity.org/141154/secretary-defense-promotions-navy/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=secretary-defense-promotions-navy Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:50:04 +0000 The legal questions raised by these removals ultimately extend far beyond the careers of the officers involved. The post Can the Secretary of Defense Remove Admirals from a Promotion List? appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/05/a-rare-summary-judgment-in-favor-of-plaintiff-in-libel-case/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:34:30 +0000 From Judge David Leibowitz (S.D. Fla.) in Mosler v. Wagner ; plaintiff Warren Mosler is a hedge fund executive, author on economics, luxury sports car developer, and former unsuccessful political candidate; defendant James Todd Wagner was a former Director of Engineering at Mosler's car company, and had tried to buy the company: Mosler brings this action against Wagner for defamation per se and unauthorized publication of name or likeness. The facts at summary judgment are as follows: Prior to the instant case, Wagner filed a twenty-count complaint against Mosler in the Circuit Court for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida (the "State Court Proceeding"). After the jury returned a verdict for Wagner, the Honorable Luis Delgado set aside the jury's verdict and entered final judgment in Mosler's favor. During that time, around September 2024, Wagner registered the website domains, titled "JudgeX.org," "warrenmosler.co.," and "ModernMonetaryTheory-Scam.org," all of which form the basis of the current action. Through these publicly available websites, Wagner published various statements claiming that Mosler bribed Judge Delgado when he overturned the jury's verdict. The websites also represent Mosler's name and likeness without Mosler's consent. In addition to the websites, Wagner continued to disparage Mosler through a YouTube channel he created, called "JudgeXO," once again accusing Mosler of bribing Judge Delgado in the State Court Proceeding. Wagner's basis for this allegation? A statistical analysis (the "Statistical Analysis") based on mathematical probabilities. This analysis concluded that it was 99.999999999% probable that Judge Delgado accepted a bribe from Mosler. It further informed that it would have taken "an honest judge" nearly thirty-seven billion years to make such a remarkable ruling overturning the jury's verdict in the State Court Proceeding. The Statistical Analysis, however, admits of the possibility that Judge Delgado was not bribed. Wagner, too, admits that possibility. Wagner does not know what Judge Delgado received as part of this alleged bribe nor who made this bribe. In fact, Wagner nor his counsel in the State Court Proceeding ever argue that bribery was the cause of Judge Delgado setting aside the jury verdict. At Wagner's counsel's deposition, counsel admitted that there was no evidence to support that Judge Delgado was bribed. The court granted plaintiff summary judgment as to defamation: To defeat summary judgment here, Wagner would need to show a dispute of fact that the bribery allegations were, in fact, true. He has not done so. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not bribe Judge Delgado. Defendant does not know how the alleged bribery occurred and what Judge Delgado purportedly received as part of the bribe. All he offers is a speculative statistical analysis based on mere probability. (The Statistical Analysis also admits the possibility that Judge Delgado was not bribed. That clearly won't carry the day. "Inferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture will not defeat a summary judgment motion."). Therefore, there is no dispute of material fact that Defendant's defamatory statements were false. Mosler is [also] entitled to summary judgment on the fault prong of his defamation per se claim. It is not clear from this record whether Mosler is considered a public figure such that he must meet the actual malice standard. But assuming he is, there is no dispute that Wagner acted with reckless disregard for the truth, amounting to actual malice. Again, Wagner puts forth no information concerning the bribery apart from the Statistical Analysis; he does not know who bribed Judge Delgado nor what Judge Delgado received in exchange. He also admits the possibility that Judge Delgado was not bribed. This evidence is sufficiently undisputed for the Court to find that Wagner acted with "a high degree of awareness of probably falsity" when he made the bribery allegations concerning Plaintiff. The court likewise granted summary judgment as to unauthorized publication of name or likeness: To demonstrate a prima facie case for an unauthorized publication of name or likeness pursuant to Section 540.08(2), Florida Statutes, a party must show that "the defendant (1) used [his] name or likeness to directly promote a product or service (2) without [his] consent." It is also required that the plaintiff's name or likeness be used "to directly promote a commercial product or service, separate and apart from the publication." Wagner used Mosler's name and likeness to directly promote his various websites, including the one with the domain JudgeX.org. These websites are replete with Mosler's name as well as pictures and descriptions of him cast in a negative light. This was all seemingly done to promote JudgeXincluding the use of the Statistical Analysis which Wagner claims to have inventedfor others to track bribes made in the judiciary. ("JudgeX.org will be a [] tool to allow anyone to perform a statistical analysis on a Judge to discern when he/she has taken a bribe.") The court therefore permanently enjoined Wagner "from using Plaintiff Warren B. Mosler's name and likeness on any website domain, including those referenced in the Amended Complaint"; there will still be a trial on damages. Steven Douglas Weber (Weber Law, P.A.) represents Mosler. The post A Rare Summary Judgment in Favor of Plaintiff in Libel Case appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/russian-court-refuses-enforce-lcia-awards-against-rusal Fri, 05 Jun 2026 13:16:24 +0100 A Russian court has ruled that LCIA awards worth more than €250 million won by a German bank against Russian aluminium group Rusal cannot be enforced. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/russian-court-refuses-enforce-lcia-awards-against-rusal Fri, 05 Jun 2026 13:16:24 +0100 A Russian court has ruled that LCIA awards worth more than 250 million won by a German bank against Russian aluminium group Rusal cannot be enforced. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://www.justsecurity.org/141400/early-edition-june-5-2026/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=early-edition-june-5-2026 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:07:39 +0000 Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here. A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Heres todays news: IRAN WAR LEBANON OPERATIONS Israeli airstrikes and Hezbollah rocket and drone attacks in southern Lebanon continued yesterday, despite the announcement of the latest ceasefire agreement. Hezbollahs leader, Naim [] The post Early Edition: June 5, 2026 appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/05/plaintiffs-lack-standing-to-sue-over-notre-dame-law-clinics-filing-amicus-brief-condemning-chinas-actions-towards-uyghurs/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:01:22 +0000 From Judge Gretchen Lund (N.D. Ind.) Monday in Chen v. Univ. of Notre Dame ; the plaintiffs' Complaint focuses on a Notre Dame Law School Religious Liberty Clinic amicus brief in an Argentine court that included allegedly false "website content and related activities accusing China of genocide and crimes against the human rights of Uyghurs in Xinjiang." Plaintiffs' Complaint contains very few allegations involving Plaintiffs themselves; largely, the Complaint references alleged harms to "mainland China" and Chinese people generally. There are only six paragraphs in which Plaintiffs identify harm they have suffered. Each are discussed below. Paragraph 71 alleges that "defendants deliberately fabricated or spread false information and spread lies that slander and demonise China and the Chinese people, The plaintiff is also deeply harmed by this." This appears to be more of a "wrong suffered by the public at large," rather than an actual harm to Plaintiff. This is especially true where Plaintiffs have not identified how they have been demonized, or how the slander has personally caused harm to them. This is not an injury sufficient to satisfy the requirements of standing under Article III. Paragraph 92 alleges that the defendant "made false statements that were believed by some Chinese children in the USA, causing them serious emotional distress and undermining their connection to their Chinese heritage. The plaintiffs encountered this problem." Here again, Plaintiffs' pleading appears to implicate the Chinese public at large, and does not identify how they specifically were impacted. Plaintiffs do not identify the concrete harm they suffered, as they are not children nor do they appear to believe the alleged false statements made by Defendant, so this is not an injury sufficient to satisfy the requirements of standing under Article III. Paragraph 96 alleges that Plaintiffs' reputations were directly harmed by "defendant's claim that alleged crimes of human rights violations, crimes against humanity, genocide, and forced labor against Uyghur and other ethnic minorities" were being committed in Xinjiang. The Court fails to see how Plaintiffs' reputations were in-fact harmed, nor have Plaintiffs provided any additional allegations or evidence in support of this assertion. This is not an injury sufficient to satisfy the requirements of standing under Article III. Paragraph 99 alleges that because of Defendant's amicus brief filed in the Court of Argentina, "plaintiffs becomes[sic] a victim of these false accusations, Social reputation is damaged, feeling angry and painful, Teaching children about racial identity becomes a problem. In the interest of truth and justice, our lawsuit is primarily for ourselves and also represents all Chinese Americans and mainland Chinese compatriots." First, much like the other allegations in their Complaint, this appears focused on the alleged harms suffered by Chinese people generally, not Plaintiffs. Second, Plaintiffs provide no evidence or further allegations supporting their assertion that they themselves have suffered false accusations and that their social reputations have been harmed. The same is true of paragraph 107, alleging that Plaintiffs' reputations have been damaged. For these reasons, these also are not injuries sufficient to satisfy the requirements of standing under Article III. Brian E Casey (Barnes & Thornburg LLP) represents the University. The post Plaintiffs Lack Standing to Sue over Notre Dame Law Clinic's Filing Amicus Brief Condemning China's Actions Towards Uyghurs appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167659 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The UN in Lebanon appealed for an additional $331.5 million on Friday to help 1.4 million people in crisis as already massive needs continue to grow, three months since deadly violence erupted between Hezbollah fighters and Israeli forces. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167661 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Escalating gang violence across Haiti has pushed displacement to record levels, deepening an already severe humanitarian crisis and leaving nearly 1.5 million people without a stable place to live, according to new figures released Friday by the UN migration agency, IOM. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167665 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The United Nations paused on Friday to pay tribute to the more than 4,500 peacekeepers who lost their lives in the line of duty over the past 78 years. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167667 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 In a village in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), health workers arrived a few days ago to help bury a person who had died from Ebola. Instead, they were threatened, told armed rebels would be called if they stayed, and forced to leave. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167668 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Months of fighting and insecurity have forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes in South Sudan’s eastern Jonglei State, triggering “one of the most severe conflict-related displacement emergencies in recent years”, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) said on Friday. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167648 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 When US and Israeli forces launched strikes on Iran on 28 February, triggering one of the most serious geopolitical crises in years, the Strait of Hormuz – a narrow channel just 34 kilometres wide at its narrowest point – became a global flashpoint overnight. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167659 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The UN in Lebanon appealed for an additional $331.5 million on Friday to help 1.4 million people in crisis as already massive needs continue to grow, three months since deadly violence erupted between Hezbollah fighters and Israeli forces. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167661 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Escalating gang violence across Haiti has pushed displacement to record levels, deepening an already severe humanitarian crisis and leaving nearly 1.5 million people without a stable place to live, according to new figures released Friday by the UN migration agency, IOM. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167665 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The United Nations paused on Friday to pay tribute to the more than 4,500 peacekeepers who lost their lives in the line of duty over the past 78 years. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167667 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 In a village in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), health workers arrived a few days ago to help bury a person who had died from Ebola. Instead, they were threatened, told armed rebels would be called if they stayed, and forced to leave. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167668 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Months of fighting and insecurity have forced hundreds of thousands of people to flee their homes in South Sudans eastern Jonglei State, triggering one of the most severe conflict-related displacement emergencies in recent years, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) said on Friday. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167648 Fri, 05 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 When US and Israeli forces launched strikes on Iran on 28 February, triggering one of the most serious geopolitical crises in years, the Strait of Hormuz a narrow channel just 34 kilometres wide at its narrowest point became a global flashpoint overnight. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/05/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-5-1916-7/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 11:00:45 +0000 6/5/1916: Justice Louis Brandeis takes the oath. Justice Louis Brandeis The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 5, 1916 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/05/open-thread-226/ Fri, 05 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/wtoi_05jun26_405_e.htm Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 Global merchandise trade appears to have remained resilient in the first half of 2026 despite headwinds from the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, which seem to have been partly offset by rising demand for electronic components related to investment in artificial intelligence, according to the latest WTO Goods Trade Barometer. Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/wtoi_05jun26_405_e.htm Fri, 05 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 Global merchandise trade appears to have remained resilient in the first half of 2026 despite headwinds from the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, which seem to have been partly offset by rising demand for electronic components related to investment in artificial intelligence, according to the latest WTO Goods Trade Barometer. Law/World Trade Organization https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/matching-is-easy-when-youre-raking-in-this-much-see-also/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 22:47:00 +0000 Quinn Emanuel Matches Milbank's Salary Scale : With $2.7 billion in revenue for 2025, they can afford it ! This Boutique Is Doling Out Milbank Money : Vartabedian Katz Hester Haynes is spreading the riches ! Spring Bonuses! : Dunn Isaacson Rhee announces special bonuses up to $25K ! S hia LeBeouf Pleads Guilty To Battery : He walked away with a slap on the wrist . Interested In IP? : These schools should be at the top of your list ! The post Matching Is Easy When Youre Raking In This Much See Also appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/judge-leans-into-the-dystopia-of-2026/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 22:03:00 +0000 Corporations voting? What can possibly go wrong? The post Judge Leans Into The Dystopia Of 2026 appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/do-investment-treaty-protections-need-rethink Thu, 04 Jun 2026 23:02:53 +0100 A panel at GAR Live ISDS heard that recently signed investment treaties show states are turning away from investor-state arbitration – and asked whether rethinking substantive protections would restore confidence in the system. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/do-investment-treaty-protections-need-rethink Thu, 04 Jun 2026 23:02:53 +0100 A panel at GAR Live ISDS heard that recently signed investment treaties show states are turning away from investor-state arbitration and asked whether rethinking substantive protections would restore confidence in the system. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/join-us-gar-live-shanghai-2026 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 23:00:00 +0100 Readers are invited to join us for GAR Live: Shanghai this June – where panellists will discuss key developments in arbitration, cross-border disputes, enforcement and China’s role in the global disputes landscape. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/join-us-gar-live-shanghai-2026 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 23:00:00 +0100 Readers are invited to join us for GAR Live: Shanghai this June where panellists will discuss key developments in arbitration, cross-border disputes, enforcement and Chinas role in the global disputes landscape. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://www.myshingle.com/2026/05/the-ai-consultant-problem-what-a-disgraced-immigration-lawyer-teaches-about-the-perils-of-an-unqualified-lawyer-coach/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 21:12:00 +0000 For lawyers and their clients, the risks of hiring an unqualified coach are substantial. The post The AI Consultant Problem: What A Disgraced Immigration Lawyer Teaches About The Perils Of An Unqualified Lawyer Coach appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://breakingdefense.com/2026/06/trump-executive-order-on-ai-gives-central-role-to-nsa/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 20:30:00 +0000 The EO creates a 'voluntary framework' for AI developers to give the government early access to their latest tech. The post Trump Executive Order On AI Gives Central Role To NSA appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/now-is-not-the-time/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 19:42:00 +0000 This new generation of lawyers needs all the intellectual firepower and commitment to the rule of law that it can muster. The post Now Is Not The Time appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/04/sam-brays-vc-post-cited-by-justice-thomass-opinion-today-in-sripetch-v-sec/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 19:11:19 +0000 Congratulations to Sam, for having a total of six of his works cited in the same opinion. Counting all American courts, posts on the blog have been cited by over 80 court opinions, including once before by Justice Thomas. The post Sam Bray's VC Post Cited by Justice Thomas's Opinion Today in Sripetch v. SEC appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.lawnext.com/2026/06/foundation-365-literas-ai-powered-crm-platform-for-law-firms-is-now-available-within-microsoft-365.html Thu, 04 Jun 2026 19:03:00 +0000 Litera says five of the Global Top 10 Law Firms and more than 4,000 firms worldwide use Foundation 365. The post Foundation 365, Literas AI-Powered CRM Platform For Law Firms, Is Now Available Within Microsoft 365 appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/boutique-firm-hands-out-spring-bonuses-as-compensation-fever-spreads/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 19:02:43 +0000 As firms continue raising pay, this boutique is adding spring bonuses of up to $25,000 to the mix. The post Boutique Firm Hands Out Spring Bonuses As Compensation Fever Spreads appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/bayer-seals-win-in-german-post-ma-saga Thu, 04 Jun 2026 19:40:37 +0100 UPDATED WITH JUDGMENT: German chemicals producer BASF has lost a final bid to revive a €1.7 billion ICC claim arising from its purchase of seed and crop science businesses from Bayer, a dispute that was complicated by an arbitrator's missing signature. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/bayer-seals-win-in-german-post-ma-saga Thu, 04 Jun 2026 19:40:37 +0100 UPDATED WITH JUDGMENT: German chemicals producer BASF has lost a final bid to revive a 1.7 billion ICC claim arising from its purchase of seed and crop science businesses from Bayer, a dispute that was complicated by an arbitrator's missing signature. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/court-rules-against-cell-service-providers-over-right-to-jury-trial-in-fcc-proceedings/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 18:34:05 +0000 (Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/court-rules-against-cell-service-providers-over-right-to-jury-trial-in-fcc-proceedings/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 18:34:05 +0000 (Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/shia-lebeouf-pleads-guilty-to-mardi-gras-battery-charges/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 18:17:00 +0000 I'd say don't make a habit of this, but it is already a little too late for that. The post Shia LeBeouf Pleads Guilty To Mardi Gras Battery Charges appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/arbitration-losing-its-advantages-over-due-process-paranoia-neuberger-tells-lidw Thu, 04 Jun 2026 19:02:38 +0100 In a keynote speech at London International Disputes Week, Lord Neuberger called on arbitrators to be more proactive with case management decisions rather than obsessing over due process as arbitration risks becoming less efficient and more costly than litigation. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/over-the-top-the-race-to-outdo-milbanks-new-salary-scale-has-officially-started/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 17:26:00 +0000 Industry insiders think a firm could soon top the market's latest salary increase. The post Over The Top: The Race To Outdo Milbanks New Salary Scale Has Officially Started appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/04/second-annual-aspiring-free-speech-scholars-workshop-2/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 17:10:09 +0000 Second Annual Aspiring Free Speech Scholars Workshop jointly sponsored by the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law (ASU) and the Hoover Institution (Stanford University) Because of a technical problem, any submissions before June 4, 2026 were lost; please resubmit (or submit for the first time) at the new URL listed below, https://tinyurl.com/aspiring-free-speech-scholars Are you a law student, judicial law clerk, lawyer, or beginning academic hoping to publish a journal article on free speech law? Would you like the opportunity to get advice about your draft from leading free speech scholars? If so, send us your draft by Sunday, August 16, 2026 . (This should still be a draft article, not an article that's already published or expected to be published within six months.) We plan to select the submissions that we think are particularly promising, and invite their authors to a workshop where they can present their papers and get helpful feedback on them. The workshop will be Saturday, October 24, 2026 (with dinner the night before) at the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law in Phoenix. We will inform the selected authors by Tuesday, September 8, 2026. We have funds to pay for transportation and lodging for the selected authors' trips. Eligibility is limited to people who have so far published three or fewer law-related journal articles . We also plan to officially recognize zero to three of the top articles among those we review. If the authors wish, they can also have their articles reviewed for publication in the Journal of Free Speech Law ( http://JournalOfFreeSpeechLaw.org ), presumably after they revise the articles in light of the workshop feedback. If you're interested, please submit your draft at http://tinyurl.com/aspiring-free-speech-scholars (Google logon required). Please single-space, and format the article nicely, so we can more easily read it. Please do not include your name or law school affiliation in the document or document filename, and please do not include an author's note thanking your advisors and others. Please make your filename be the title of your article (or some recognizable subset of the article title). We want to review the article drafts without knowing the authors' identities. If you have questions, please check http://tinyurl.com/aspiring-free-speech-faq ; if your question isn't answered there, please e-mail volokh@stanford.edu . Many thanks to the Stanton Foundation for its generous support. * * * James Weinstein, Dan Cracchiolo Chair in Constitutional Law and Professor of Law, Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law, Arizona State University Eugene Volokh, Thomas M. Siebel Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution (Stanford University), and Gary T. Schwartz Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law The post Second Annual Aspiring Free Speech Scholars Workshop appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/new-splc-indictment-has-us-wondering-if-the-doj-is-trying-to-lose/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 16:48:00 +0000 Or maybe they really are this stupid. The post New SPLC Indictment Has Us Wondering If The DOJ Is Trying To Lose appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/duty-probe-not-pursue-ferrari-the-arbitrators-evidentiary-role Thu, 04 Jun 2026 17:22:23 +0100 Italian arbitrator and academic Franco Ferrari used a keynote speech in Bucharest to argue that arbitrators have a duty of active evidentiary engagement that requires them to probe gaps in evidence without launching independent fact-finding missions. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/05/from-defending-spend-to-managing-it/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 16:18:00 +0000 How PERSUIT is changing the conversation between Legal and the business. The post From Defending Spend To Managing It appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/04/cj-roberts-agrees-with-att-and-verizon-but-rules-for-fcc/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 16:10:26 +0000 I often describe Chief Justice Roberts's decisions as "blue plate specials." If you read the bottom line, it seems like the liberal side win, but the mechanics of the decision helps the conservatives in the long run. In other words, the right might lose the battle, but they win the war. After more than two decades, the Chief Justice has made this balanced approach to jurisprudence into an art form. Today's decision in FCC v. AT&T is the latest example. The FCC alleged that AT&T and Verizon violated federal law, and assessed a forfeiture order of $57 million and $47 million, respectively. The order stated in capitalized bold letters the forfeiture was mandatory: " IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to section 503(b) of the Act, 47 U.S.C. 503(b), and section 1.80 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.80, AT&T, Inc., IS LIABLE FOR A MONETARY FORFEITURE in the amount of [$57,265,625] for willfully and repeatedly violating section 222 of the Act and section 64.2010 of the Commission's rules." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 25406, at 131a. The carriers argued that the government could not impose that fine without first providing a de novo trial in an Article III court under Jarkesy . But, following longstanding precedent, the carriers paid under protest, and brought suit to get their money back. The Fifth Circuit held that this regime, which required the mandatory payment of a fine before an Article III proceeding, violated the Seventh Amendment and Jarkesy . As the case was litigated below, the question presented was whether the requirement to pay the fine before the proceedings is an Article III problem. But then the government, as it often does, changed the case on appeal. It turns out all along that the forfeiture was voluntary. These sophisticated firms were just too stupid to read a statute, and they mistakenly paid $100 million under protest. On appeal, the Chief Justice whipped together a blue plate special. He agreed with AT&T and Verizon on the law, but ruled for the FCC. The Court stated, "The orders at issue . . . did not create an obligation to pay." Who knew? If only all lawyers were as smart as John Roberts. This case split 8-1. Only Justice Thomas in dissent was willing to say the quiet part out loud: The Court agrees with AT&T and Verizon that they were entitled to a jury trial de novo before an Article III court before they could be forced to pay. It agrees that they did not in fact receive such a jury trial de novo. But, it rules in favor of the Commission. The Court does so because the Commission, after AT&T and Verizon paid it over $100 million, took the position that its orders were not really binding after all. The Commission now agrees that AT&T and Verizon would have been entitled to a jury trial de novo in an Article III court had they declined to pay. Because its orders were not binding until after that jury trial, the Commission says, AT&T and Verizon in reality paid the Commission voluntarily. The Court accepts that account and does not grant the carriers any relief. Because I would give the parties an opportunity to proceed under a correct understanding of the law, I respectfully dissent. Justice Thomas would have decided the case that was actually presented to the Court. But as a court, we must resolve the cases before us. Regardless of what the Commission will do in the future, or what the Court believes it should have done all along, we granted certiorari in cases arising from two orders that theCommission addressed to AT&T and Verizon in 2024. At that time, neither the Commission nor the courts complied with the limits that the Court describes today. Whenever you see statistics about how often the Fifth Circuit is reversed, ignore those statistics. It happens all the time that the government switches position on appeals from the Fifth Circuit. You cannot fault lower court judges who decide a case on one grounds, and the Supreme Court reverses on entirely new arguments. I made this same point in 2024 about the mifepristone case, which was radically altered on appeal. The worst part of the majority opinion is Footnote 5. What happens to the $100 million that the carriers already paid. Do they get a refund? The Chief Justice refuses to answer the most obvious question that was necessitated by this "newfound account." The carriers also argue that the specific forfeiture orders in this case misled them into paying, and that a refund is therefore appropriate. See Reply Brief 1719; Tr. of Oral Arg. 75 (Government acknowledging thatit "cannot mislead someone into waiving his jury trial rights"); see also post, at 3, 67 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). We express no view on the merits of this argument, what relief may be available to the carriers, or in what proceeding. The emperor has no clothes. Now the case goes back to the lower court to determine if a refund is appropriate. Still, I don't think Verizon and AT&T will be too upset. The Supreme Court agreed with the SG, and effectively neutered this statutory scheme: And as explained above, the Commission is powerless to visit any adverse consequences on a regulated party who receives a forfeiture order. If the FCC issues a forfeiture order, carriers will simply decline to pay and wait to be sued. The FCC does not have the resources to bring all of these cases in federal court. The government may have won the battle but lost this war. I'm sure the career people at the FCC were infuriated by SG's position, but here we are. The post CJ Roberts Agrees with AT&T and Verizon, But Rules For FCC appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/scc-secretary-general-voices-doubts-about-investment-court Thu, 04 Jun 2026 16:52:12 +0100 In a fireside chat at GAR Live ISDS, secretary-general of the SCC Arbitration Institute Caroline Falconer said that the work of UNCITRAL Working Group III keeps her up at night and predicted its proposal to replace ISDS with a standing investment court was far from certain to succeed. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/when-your-partners-are-making-9-million-matching-milbank-is-the-easy-part/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:43:17 +0000 The litigation powerhouse matches the new Milbank scale, continuing a streak that goes back to the start of the modern salary wars. The post When Your Partners Are Making $9 Million, Matching Milbank Is The Easy Part appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-best-law-schools-for-intellectual-property-law-2026/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 15:27:00 +0000 If you're interested in working in IP law, you need to see this list. The post The Best Law Schools For Intellectual Property Law (2026) appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/colombian-maritime-law-firm-launches-ia-practice Thu, 04 Jun 2026 16:00:24 +0100 A Colombian law firm with over three decades of specialisation in maritime and port law has rebranded as Salas Law Group and launched an international arbitration and dispute resolution practice led by Guillermo Salcedo Salas, who has joined as partner after 15 years practising in Paris. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/becoming-ai-proof-in-a-profession-being-rebuilt-by-ai/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 14:42:00 +0000 How lawyers can stay relevant, valuable, and employed. The post Becoming AI-Proof In A Profession Being Rebuilt By AI appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-supreme-courts-long-history-of-shaping-race/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 14:41:42 +0000 (Mehmet Eser/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-supreme-courts-long-history-of-shaping-race/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 14:41:42 +0000 (Mehmet Eser/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/04/will-the-supreme-court-review-judge-newmans-stealth-impeachment/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 14:25:48 +0000 Judge Newman has been "temporarily" suspended from case assignments in the Federal Circuit by her fellow judges. She has filed a cert petition with the Supreme Court. Her "stealth impeachment" raises significant issues worthy of Supreme Court review. Since all the briefing on her cert petition is now completed -- and a decision on the petition is imminent -- this post will briefly recap the issues, with the most important briefs linked. As I've blogged about previously , recall that Judge Newman has challenged her suspension from new case assignments. (Fellow bloggers Josh Blackman and Jonathan Adle r have also followed the case closely.) But in the latest ruling, the D.C. Circuit held that the Judicial Council's Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 blocks any review of the lawfulness of this suspension. In March, Judge Newman filed a cert petition presenting the important constitutional question of whether she is entitled to her day in court to challenge the lengthy suspension, which has no end in sight. Her petition begins with this powerful introduction: This petition presents questions concerning crucial constitutional and statutory aspects of lifetime tenure and judicial independence, especially the availability of judicial review for intra-branch infringements on judicial service. These questions affect the very independence of Article III courts and potentially affect every member of the federal judiciary and every litigant who appears before them. For three years the Federal Circuit has been operating short-handed because the judges of that court have summarily removed its longest-serving and most storied jurist (its "Great Dissenter") from the bench. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 ("the Disability Act") bars review of the unlawful actions taken against Judge Pauline Newman. This administrative removal of a judge who is famous for dissenting from her colleagues, by those same colleagues, with judicial refusal to review the merits of the action, undermines the judicial independence that is a vital foundation of our constitutional design. Every judge who gets crosswise with her chief judge or her colleagues must now worry whether similar tactics could be used to remove them. Judge Newman has continued to speak and write before the legal community, and no finding of disability has been made concerning her in the years since the unlawful administrative orders began. She voluntarily underwent and passed three expert evaluations of her mental fitness and was reported as having the mental ability of someone decades younger. She now has been suspended longer than any federal judge in history. The length of the suspension, the apparent intention to keep her off the bench permanently, the same judges acting as complainant, witnesses and judges, and the refusal to transfer the matter to another circuit for neutral investigation are unprecedented. Since then, significant amicus briefs have been filed supporting Judge Newman. Last month, I filed one such supporting amicus brief, joined by former federal judges Janice Roger Brown, Paul R. Michel, Kent A. Jordan, Randall R. Rader, Thomas I. Vanaski, and Susan G Braden. Our brief argues that federal courts must be able to review constitutional claims of the type presented by Judge Newman: In its decision below, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed a 25-year-old precedent that prevents federal judges from seeking federal-court redress from Judicial Council actions that de facto remove them from the federal bench. That bar applies without regard to whetheras alleged herethe Judicial Council has acted in violation of the judge's rights under the U.S. Constitution. Particularly in light of the threat to judicial independence posed by the many recent attacks on the authority of federal judges, the Court should grant review to reaffirm the authority of federal courts to intervene to hear claims raising constitutional claims of the sort at issue here. Another supporting brief came from the District of Columbia Bar Association. Its brief highlights the importance of Judge Newman's independent voice on the Federal Circuit: The involuntary and indefinite suspension of Judge Newman from all judicial duties is an impeachment and deprives our legal community of an experienced and fiercely independent voice in the ongoing weaving of the tapestry of caselaw at the Federal Circuit. This ongoing suspension circumvents our Constitution because Judge Newman can only be impeached by Congress. See U.S. Const. art. II, 4. University of Houston law professor Andrew Michaels, a former law clerk to Judge Newman (2010 to 2012), also supports review in a strong amicus brief . He explains why Judge Newman's allegedly "temporary" suspension is tantament to impeachment: The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 expressly prohibits permanent removal.2 Administrative tribunals should not be permitted to circumvent this prohibition (as well as constitutional guarantees) merely by characterizing the removal as an indefinite series of consecutive "temporary" suspensions. Judge Newman has now been "suspended" for over three years, and counting. The Buckeye Institute, the Manhattan Institute, and the Committee for Justice also filed a supporting amicus brief , asking the Supreme Court to review the foundational principles at issue in the case: This de facto impeachment circumvents the Constitution's structural safeguards. Impeachment requires bicameral action, supermajority agreement in the Senate, and public, deliberative proceedings. These protections reflect the Framers' judgment that removing a federal judge demands broad political accountability and careful deliberation. The Federal Circuit's unilateral action evades those safeguards entirely, consolidating investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions within the judiciary itself. Some of Judge Newman's former law clerks also filed to support her, arguing that she deserves a day in court: Without judicial review of her suspension, Judge Newman is in limbo. To safeguard judicial independence and to provide due process, Judge Newman is entitled to meaningful review of her constitutional claims. The sole brief opposing review came from the Federal Circuit's Chief Judge, Kimberly A. Moore, and was filed by the Solicitor General. The SG's brief raises largely technical jurisdictional arguments, rather than disputing the merits of Judge Newman's claims. The brief argues: [Judge Newman's] contentions lack merit and implicate no circuit split. As the courts below correctly held, Congress directed challenges to judicial-council orders to the Article III judges serving on the Judicial Conference, not to federal district courts. That sensible policy decision ensures a mechanism for reviewing allegations of judicial misconduct or incapacity that comports with separationof-powers considerations, offers multiple layers of review, and prevents overburdening federal courts with complaints about judicial-council decisions. And petitioner identifies no plausible conflict among the circuit courts warranting this Court's review. Understandably, the SG's brief makes no attempt to discuss Judge Moore's bizarre AI cartoon about the Federal Circuit -- a cartoon that glaringly removed Judge Newman from her position on the court, as Josh Blackman discussed in detail here . Yesterday, Judge Newman replied to Judge Moore's legal arguments. Thus, the briefing is complete on the cert petion. The Court is scheduled to consider the petition at its June 11 conference. That means we may hear as soon as Monday, June 15, whether the Court has agreed to hear Judge Newman's important petition. I hope that the Supreme Court takes this case. The "stealth impeachment" launched against Judge Newman obviously has the potential to threaten judicial indpendent in many ways. The Supreme Court should speak definitively about whether this end-run around the Constitution's impeachment process is permitted. Update: I corrected a few small typos in the original post. The post Will the Supreme Court Review Judge Newman's Stealth Impeachment? appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/dont-mess-with-texas-boutiques-or-their-associate-salaries/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 14:03:00 +0000 The Texas boutique has been putting associates first since day one, and the new salary scale is just the latest proof. The post Dont Mess With Texas (Boutiques) Or Their Associate Salaries appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/04/if-judge-rosss-improper-sexual-activity-greatly-damages-her-credibility-as-a-judge-does-that-satisfy-the-standard-for-impeachment/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 13:16:38 +0000 The Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council may have thought Judge Eleanor Ross's apology was sufficient to keep the reprimand private, but those not wearing a robe continue to see a problem. Representative Jordan of the House Judiciary Committee is starting to discuss an investigation. The House Judiciary Committee's top Republican said his staff is looking at possible congressional action after a Georgia federal judge had an affair in her chambers, in earshot of clerks, and lied to judiciary officials about it. Judiciary Chairman Jim Jordan (R-Ohio) said Wednesday that his staff has "already put together a memo" on the facts involved in the misconduct findings against Judge Eleanor Ross of the Atlanta-based US District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The "key fact," he said in a brief interview, was that Ross lied to the judges investigating her misconduct. A judicial special committee report , released publicly in May, found the judge made "false statements" to the chief judges of her district and of the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which oversees federal courts in Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. "We're looking at it. We're going to run it by our members and see," Jordan said. Jordan also wouldn't rule out impeachment as a possible response, a rare process for judges historically. "Everything's on the table," Jordan said. "We don't take anything off the table." To keep this discourse going, I am happy to pass along another guest post from Professor Arthur Hellman about Judge Eleanor Ross's situation. If Judge Ross's "Improper Sexual Activity" "Greatly Damage[s] [Her] Credibility as a Judge," Does That Satisfy the Standard for Impeachment? In a recent guest post , I explained why one of the findings of judicial misconduct by Atlanta Federal District Judge Eleanor Ross making false statements to investigating judges corresponds closely to conduct that was one basis for impeaching Federal District Judge Samuel B. Kent in 2009. A second finding of misconduct by Judge Ross labelled "Improper Sexual Activity in Chambers with a Law Enforcement Officer" in the Special Committee report has no counterpart in any judicial impeachment proceeding that I'm aware of. But that does not mean that it could not be a possible basis for impeachment. My purpose here is not to develop the point in detail, but rather to call attention to a statement in the Special Committee report that bears on the question. The Eleventh Circuit Judicial Council unanimously adopted the "findings and recommendations" of that report. To provide complete context, I will copy a little more of the paragraph than is probably necessary. Here is what the Special Committee wrote (pp. 15-16): "For two years, the Subject Judge was a federal district judge who routinely heard criminal cases [and who] engaged in a secret extramarital relationship with a prominent officer of a large law enforcement agency in the judge's districtwith the affair consisting of sexual intercourse in the Subject Judge's chambers during working hours. Moreover, during this period, the Subject Judge's spouse was not aware of the affair. Undoubtedly, a bad actor could have used these facts to try to blackmail the Subject Judge. Even absent a blackmail attempt, the publication of these facts would have greatly damaged the Subject Judge's credibility as a judge and brought disrepute to the federal judiciary." The first quoted sentence summarizes the judge's conduct. The last sentence states that "the publication of these facts" i.e., the facts stated in the first quoted sentence "would have greatly damaged the Subject Judge's credibility as a judge and brought disrepute to the federal judiciary." Preliminarily, it seems odd to state that " publication of [the] facts" would "greatly damage[] [Judge Ross's] credibility as a judge," etc. If that is so, it must be because public knowledge of the underlying conduct would have that result. In any event, the facts have now been published, and (notwithstanding the Judicial Council's efforts), the identity of the judge is also public knowledge. (The Council apparently acted as it did because it believed, as stated on the last page of the Special Committee report, that Judge Ross had provided "otherwise exemplary service to the court" and that she should be allowed to continue that service.) Now let us consider the standard for judicial impeachment. Under the Constitution, an Article III judge like Judge Ross can be impeached and removed from office for "high crimes and misdemeanors." In my testimony at the House Judiciary Committee Task Force hearing on the proposed impeachment of Judge Kent, I sought to ascertain the meaning of that term as applied to judges. There were (and are) no judicial decisions to consult, because impeachment is not subject to judicial review. Instead, I looked to Founding Generation sources and to early commentators whose writings have been relied on by the Supreme Court to determine the meaning of other constitutional provisions. Two of the commentaries are particularly relevant here. (For background and citations, see the hearing statement linked above.) William Rawle, writing about the "system" of impeachment, stated: "We may perceive in this scheme one useful mode of removing from office him who is unworthy to fill it ." (Emphasis added.) The House Judiciary Committee, in its report recommending impeachment of Judge Kent, quoted this language from Rawle's treatise (p. 18). Justice Joseph Story, in his widely cited treatise on the Constitution, discussed the question whether impeachment is limited to "official acts." Story asked: "Suppose a judge or other officer to receive a bribe not connected with his judicial office; could he be entitled to any public confidence ? Would not these reasons for his removal be just as strong, as if it were a case of an official bribe?" (Emphasis added.) I cited this statement in response to a question from then-Rep. Adam Schiff, the chairman of the Task Force, at the Kent hearing . See pp. 215-16 of the hearing record. Judge Story's premise seems to be that a judge or other officer warrants impeachment and removal if she has engaged in behavior that results in a loss of "public confidence" in her ability to perform the functions of her office. (And that behavior is not limited to "official acts.") This is not quite the same thing as saying that the officer is not worthy to fill the office, but there is substantial overlap, and both formulations suggest a similar forward-looking perspective. It seems to me that the Special Committee's statement about Judge Ross's "improper sexual activity" corresponds closely to both delineations of the impeachment standard. The Committee said that public knowledge of Judge Ross's conduct would "greatly damage[] [her] credibility as a judge." If her credibility is greatly damaged, isn't that strong evidence that she is "unworthy to fill' the judicial position that she holds? And would she still be entitled to "any public confidence?" None of this is definitive; each case is different. But these views of the impeachment standard one of which was explicitly endorsed in the House Judiciary Committee report recommending the impeachment of Judge Kent are sufficient to warrant the House in opening an inquiry into the possible impeachment of Judge Ross, independent of her false statements to investigating judges. There is one aspect of the Eleventh Circuit's memorandum that I can't quite pin down. I agree that Judge Ross's sexual misconduct "damaged the Subject Judge's credibility." That is almost always true--a judge that engages in misconduct has diminished credibility. But did the Council seek to avoid further diminishing the judge's credibility by making the reprimand private? In other words, was the private reprimand an effort to ensure that Judge Ross could continue doing her job. She is already facing at least one recusal motion, and more will follow. Stated differently, once the Council determined that no meaningful punishment would be given, and that even the apology letters could be vague, the judges determined that the best path forward for Judge Ross's continued judicial service was to make the reprimand private. There is definitely some sort of coupling between the "diminished credibility" risk and the private reprimand, but I can't quite tease it out. The post If Judge Ross's "Improper Sexual Activity" "Greatly Damage[s] [Her] Credibility as a Judge," Does That Satisfy the Standard for Impeachment? appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/138646/sanctions-gaps-and-the-governance-of-corruption-risk/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=sanctions-gaps-and-the-governance-of-corruption-risk Thu, 04 Jun 2026 13:13:34 +0000 U.S. foreign policy expert examines how overlapping U.N., U.S., and EU sanctions regimes create legal gray zones and why that breeds corruption risk. The post Sanctions Gaps and the Governance of Corruption Risk appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/04/more-on-the-southern-poverty-law-center-allegedly-funding-the-american-nazi-party-and-other-racists/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 13:03:53 +0000 I wrote in April about the initial Indictment in U.S. v. Southern Poverty Law Center (M.D. Ala.). As I wrote, the indictment opens, The Southern Poverty Law Center's ("SPLC") stated mission included the dismantling of white supremacy and confronting hate across the country. However, unbeknownst to donors, some of their donated money was being used to fund the leaders and organizers of racist groups, including the Ku Klux Klan, the Aryan Nation, and the National Alliance. The SPLC's paid informants ("field sources") engaged in the active promotion of racist groups at the same time that the SPLC was denouncing the same groups on its website. [T]he SPLC explicitly sought donations under the auspices that donor money would be used to help "dismantle" violent extremist groups. In the SPLC's solicitations for donations as outlined herein, donors were not told that some of the donated funds were to be used by the SPLC to pay high-level leaders of violent extremist groups and others, nor were donors ever told that some of the donated funds were used for the benefit of the violent extremist groups or that some of the donated funds would be used in the commission of state and federal crimes. Tuesday's Superseding Indictment offers some more detail about the allegations, among other things elaborating on the activities of one of the people working for it (labeled F-30, with "F" being the SPLC term for "field source") and adding information about two others (F-31 and F-32): F-30 led the National Socialist Party of America, was a member of the Ku Klux Klan, and was the leader of a faction of the Aryan Nations that had chapters in approximately 17 states. In approximately 2010, out of money and seeking to get out of the white nationalist movement ("the movement"), F-30 reached out to the SPLC, unsolicited, and discussed a plan to leave the movement. Thereafter, the SPLC employee offered F-30 a monthly salary of approximately $2,500.00 in addition to payment of expenses to continue to lead and maintain the violent extremist organization F-30 told the SPLC employee he wanted to leave. From approximately 2010 through 2016, the SPLC secretly moved over $70,000.00 in donors' money from the SPLC operating account onto F-30's pay card. F-30 used donors' money to, among other things, travel to extremist rallies, host extremist rallies, donate money to leaders of other extremist organizations, recruit new members into his extremist organization, publish racist and extremist material for the purpose of recruiting new members, both inside and outside of prison, and create racist paraphernalia to sell at rallies to raise more money for his extremist organization. This was known to certain SPLC employees as they continued to secretly funnel donors' money to F-30. During the same period that SPLC was secretly using donors' money to fund F-30's extremist activities, the SPLC had an entire "Extremist File" webpage dedicated to F-30. The SPLC used this "Extremist File" webpage to solicit more public donations. At one point F-30 asked an SPLC employee to soften the language about him on his "Extremist File" webpage so that it would not scare off new members from joining his extremist organization. The SPLC employee agreed and changed the language on the SPLC's "Extremist Files" webpage for F-30. F-31 and F-32 were members of a Ku Klux Klan organization in their area. In or about 2010, F-31 and F-32 feared for their safety from other Klan members and wanted out of the movement. F-32 had seen media coverage about how the SPLC helped an individual leave an extremist organization and how the SPLC paid for this individual's tattoo removals. This media coverage prompted F-32 to reach out to the SPLC, unsolicited, and ask the SPLC for help to get F-31 and F-32 out of the movement. An SPLC employee invited F-31 and F-32 to Montgomery for a meeting. There, despite their requests for help getting out of the movement, an SPLC employee encouraged F-31 and F-32 to stay in the movement and offered to pay them a $1,200.00 monthly salary as well as to pay for expenses as incurred. Once they were financially backed by the SPLC to do so, F-31 and F-32 agreed to remain in the movement. Using donors' money, F-31 and F-32 attended extremist group rallies in multiple states. This led to F-31 rising from merely a group member to a leadership role within an extremist group. In the new leadership role, F-31 actively recruited new members using donors' money. F-32 also participated in recruiting new members using donors' money. In addition, an SPLC employee knew that F-32 used donors' money to purchase material to make Ku Klux Klan garments for others. F-31 and F-32 were reimbursed by the SPLC with donor money for all expenses they incurred for cross-burning events to include the wood and fuel used. As I noted in my original post, I take it that one defense argument as to the donor fraud claims may be that they were trying to dismantle violent extremist groups, both by paying money to get information about them and by causing the groups to do and say things that would discredit them. That may itself be discreditable, but the question will be whether it's a fraud on the donors. And I followed up with expressing some tentative skepticism about the government's theory. (The government is also accusing the SPLC of making false statements to banks about the accounts that were used to fund its activities; I didn't focus much on that.) But in any event, the indictment and now the superseding indictment are factually noteworthy, whatever one thinks of the legal theory. Of course, note that they are just indictments, which is to say the government's allegations; we'll see what emerges at trial. The post More on the Southern Poverty Law Center Allegedly Funding the American Nazi Party and Other Racists appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/141132/china-services-spread-authoritarianism/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=china-services-spread-authoritarianism Thu, 04 Jun 2026 13:00:12 +0000 China's intrusive military, economic, and diplomatic aid to Russia, Iran, and others spreads autocratic practices such as secrecy, censorship, surveillance, and corruption. The post Chinas Global Concierge Services to Strengthen Fellow Authoritarians appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/opinions-expected/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/opinions-expected/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/morning-docket-06-04-26/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:54:00 +0000 * More partners join the $40 million club. All the more reason for firms to embrace associate raises! [ ABA Journal ] * DOJ tells court "enough is enough!" And what they've had "enough" of is a rule that immigrant children seized by ICE be held in safe and sanitary conditions. [ National Law Journal ] * January 6 slush fund plan goes private. Keep an eye on taxpayer funds to see how those inevitably get indirectly funneled into this. [ New York Times ] * Prosecutors want 8 years for Tom Goldstein. [ Bloomberg Law News ] * Republicans advance constitutional amendment to ban Supreme Court expansion. [ Reuters ] * Superseding indictment in case against Southern Poverty Law Center as DOJ keeps trying to find a case. [ CBS News ] * Suit accuses Pillsbury of conspiring in fraud scheme. [ New York Law Journal ] * Trump strips federal workers of remaining job protections. [ Law360 ] The post Morning Docket: 06.04.26 appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.justsecurity.org/140980/callais-kills-voting-rights-act/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=callais-kills-voting-rights-act Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:50:27 +0000 To the extent that the Voting Rights Act served as at least a minimal constraint on political gerrymandering, that constraint is gone. The post Bang, Bang, Bang: Callais Kills Off the Voting Rights Act appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/04/court-refuses-to-release-auto-generated-transcript-in-justin-fairfax-child-custody-trial-citing-ai-transcription-errors/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:32:59 +0000 An interesting May 22 order from the court in the Justin Fairfax child custody trial, Fairfax v. Fairfax (Judge Timothy McEvoy, Fairfax County [Va.] Cir. Ct.) (the requestor is apparently an independent writer, at https://blackvirginianews.substack.com/ ): This Court recently began making uncertified transcripts of the audio recordings of Court proceedings (each such transcript, an "Uncertified Transcript") available to parties with a need for them. However, such Uncertified Transcripts are provided for informational purposes only. They are not checked, proofread, or corrected. They are not official Court records and may not be relied upon for any purpose absent agreement of all parties and further Court order; Uncertified Transcripts are machine-generated by natural language processing artificial intelligence software that, while improving, often produces meaningful inaccuracies, limiting the usefulness of such transcripts and creating a risk that a person reading them, and particularly a non-party, will misunderstand what actually happened during the transcribed proceedings; Certified transcripts, produced by qualified court reporters, are far more accurate and are, under Virginia law, the preferred method of recording and demonstrating what occurred in any Court proceeding. See, e.g., Code 8.01-420.3; This action involved matters of child custody, raising the best interests of the involved children as the paramount concern of the Court. See, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 259 Va. 410,413 (1995) (quoting Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96, 99 (1986)); On April 17, 2026, Lauren Burke ("Requestor") submitted three requests for the Uncertified Transcript of the Trial (such requests, the "Request"); Requestor was neither a party to this action nor a witness at the Trial; A qualified court reporter attended the Trial and would be able to produce a certified transcript of the proceedings; The Court has reviewed the Uncertified Transcript of the Trial and found it to be replete with errors, omissions, and other inaccuracies such that it does not constitute an accurate record of the testimony, argument, and rulings made during the Trial; Release of the Uncertified Transcript creates a substantial risk of misrepresenting the nature, details, and conduct of the Trial, which is contrary to the best interests of the children involved; A more accurate, certified transcript should be available to the parties from the court reporter who attended the Trial; Accordingly, declining to release the Uncertified Transcript of the Trial is in the best interests of the children and would result in no prejudice to any party; NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: The Request is DENIED ; The Uncertified Transcript of the Trial must not be released . A certificated transcript, as the court notes, would be available, but would presumably cost a considerable amount of money (at least in the hundreds of dollars, depending on the length of the proceeding). The post Court Refuses to Release Auto-Generated Transcript in Justin Fairfax Child Custody Trial, Citing AI Transcription Errors appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/141261/early-edition-june-4-2026/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=early-edition-june-4-2026 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:13:57 +0000 Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here. A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Heres todays news: IRAN WAR CEASEFIRE President Trump privately told aides he would consider ending the ceasefire with Iran if Tehran kills U.S. troops, U.S. officials said, insisting that the ceasefire [] The post Early Edition: June 4, 2026 appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/04/court-reverses-child-porn-convictions-finding-material-was-non-lewd-family-photos-and-videos/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:01:51 +0000 From People v. Nichols , decided Tuesday by Justice Mark Clarke, joined by Justices John Barberis and Barry Vaughan: [The] charges [in this case] were predicated on photographs and videos of the defendant's minor daughters taken between 2002 and 2016 and were found on a computer and an external hard drive in the defendant's home. The defendant's husband, Douglas Nichols, who is not a party to this appeal [but who reportedly has filed his own appeal -EV], was also charged with possession of the same images and videos. Some backstory on how the images were found, from a March article in the Decator Herald & Review (Tony Reid): Detectives with the Decatur Police Department had been looking for evidence on four counts of earlier criminal sexual assault charges against Douglas Nichols alone plus eight counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse involving a female teenage victim when they came across the pictures and video that led to the child sex abuse image charges. A December 2022 story in the same newspaper by the same reporter says: On May 20, 2021, the Decatur Police Department received a complaint from an individual alleging sexual assault that had occurred over 10 years ago by a subject known to them. The case was assigned to a detective and an investigation into the allegations immediately commenced. Back to the wife's appeal: [D]efendant had two daughters, Ky.N. (born November 4, 2000) and Ki.N. (born October 1, 2002). Ky.N. testified [at trial] that she was voluntarily testifying, and that she had always felt safe and felt that her mother was supportive growing up. She testified that the family's digital cameras were usually placed where anyone could access or use them, that she had used her mother's phone to take pictures whenever she had wanted to, even daily, and that her sister had done the same. She also testified that her mother took photos of her and her sister all the time. Additionally, Ky.N. testified that her parents never asked her to take her clothes off before taking photographs or videos of her, and that they had never asked her to pose in a sexually suggestive manner. Ky.N. testified that she didn't recognize the photos but did recognize the home. She testified that she recognized her sister and herself, but she did not remember the photographs being taken or the events being depicted. She stated that it looked like they were having fun playing horses or unicorns with the toilet paper tails, and that she and her sister commonly played with toilet paper. In regard to People's Exhibit 4, she testified that she did not recognize the video, but that it was her sister Ki.N. playing with a pogo stick, and that she recognized both her and the defendant's voice. In regard to People's Exhibit 5, Ky.N. testified that she did not recognize the video, but that it was of Ki.N. and her cousin in the shower. She testified that her sister commonly sang in the shower and that, growing up, she recorded her sister singing in the shower by pointing the phone at the floor. On cross-examination, Ky.N. testified that she did not remember her parents ever taking nude photographs of her, and that she did not remember anyone else ever taking nude photos of her, and further reiterated she did not know who took the photographs but that it could have been anyone. [D]efendant's husband testified that they left the children with babysitters on Tuesdays when both he and the defendant were at work. He testified that he took photos of his children all the time. He also testified that neither he nor the defendant had ever asked them to take their clothes off to take pictures, nor had they ever asked them to pose in suggestive ways. He testified that anyone could use any cameras at any time, but that he was the one who backed up all the photographs and videos from the family's devices to the computer. He testified that before he was charged, he had never seen any of the charged photographs, but that his children had been spontaneous, and that included doing the things seen in the charged exhibits. The defendant testified that she and Douglas would occasionally leave the children with babysitters every couple of weeks to go out together, and they left them with one every Tuesday while they both worked. She testified that the behavior seen in the photos was all in line with how Ky.N. and Ki.N. used to play. She testified that she took photos with her kids daily and that she took photos of them in both posed and spontaneous moments, but she never asked them to take their clothes off before doing so, nor did she ever pose them in sexually suggestive ways. [She testified] that she never reviewed the old photos and stated she did not recall ever taking the charged images, but she admitted she had taken photos of her children while they were nude. She also admitted there were times she had recorded Ki.N. topless while she was engaged in physical activity. [T]he defendant's other daughter testified that she was thankful for her parents and felt safe growing up. She testified that growing up, the family camera was typically kept in the kitchen and that everyone, including members of her extended family, and possibly even babysitters, had used it. She also testified that she used her mother's phone to take pictures daily and her sister had used it frequently as well. In regard to People's Exhibits 7 through 12, she testified that she did not recall the photographs being taken, but believed that they had come up with the idea of making and playing with toilet paper tails, and that such activity was representative of the sort of spontaneous things they would do. In regard to People's Exhibit 4, she testified that she was the girl on the pogo stick and that it was not uncommon for her to take off her shirt when she got hot as a kid. She also testified that she recognized defendant's voice, as well as her sister's voice in the video, but did not remember which one took the video. In regard to People's Exhibit 5, she testified that the girls in the shower were herself and her cousin, and that they were having fun showering and singing "Bop to the Top." She also testified that she did not know who took the video. Finally, Ki.N. testified that her parents had never asked her to take her clothes off for a photo or video, nor had they ever asked her to pose in a sexually suggestive manner. On cross-examination, she testified that she did not specifically remember if she took her top off in People's Exhibit 4 because she was hot, nor did she remember who took People's Exhibit 5, despite her claim on direct examination that she could see anyone who came in the bathroom due to its layout. She also testified that she didn't believe People's 7 through 12 were posed as she believed they were spontaneous. The court goes through the relevant photographs in detail, and concludes that, though they showed some nudity, they "were not lewd as a matter of law" (which is what would be required to find that the photographs were constitutionally unprotected child pornography). The analysis is long, but here's an excerpt: People's Exhibit 4 is a 17-second-long video of a partially nude adolescent female with partially developed breasts fully exposed. The video is filmed by a separate individual and appears to be taking place in a finished basement living room type area due to the placement of the window on the roofline of the wall and the presence of couches and a large television in the room,. As the video begins, the female's entire body is visible in the frame, and she is only wearing underwear, socks, and slippers, with no other clothing. She is holding the pogo stick handles in her hands, with one foot on the pogo stick and one foot on the floor. The female appears to know she is being recorded because she looks straight ahead, then at the camera, then back straight ahead. As the female begins jumping on the pogo stick, the video zooms in on her clothed pubic area, and then moves upwards, focusing on her head and unclothed torso, though much of her legs and arms remain visible as well. The female then falls off the pogo stick and out of frame. As the female steps back into frame, the video zooms out to show her whole body again, and she returns to her starting position. The video then ends. Turning to the first factor [of the test that the Illinois Supreme Court developed to determine whether material was child pornography], the focal point of the video, we note that the video begins with the female visible "head-to-toe"; but once she begins bouncing it does zoom in on the area of her clothed genitals, then moves upward to focus on her head and unclothed torso until she quickly falls out of frame and it zooms back out to capture her whole body. The zooming appears somewhat clumsy. Taken as a whole, we find that this factor weighs in favor of finding that the video was lewd. Turning to the second factor, the setting of the video appears to be a basement living room. There is nothing in the setting that would suggest or invite sexual activity. Therefore, we find that the video's setting does not weigh in favor of finding it lewd. Turning to the third factor, the adolescent female in the video is playing with a pogo stick, which is an age-appropriate activity. While she knows she is being recorded, she does not appear posed but instead appears to be actively playing in a moment of adolescent spontaneity. While the toplessness is inappropriate for the activity, we find it a minor factor here, as we note that we do not consider the nudity itself under this factor. Therefore, taken as a whole, we find that this factor does not weigh in favor of finding that the video was lewd. Turning to the fourth factor, we note that the adolescent female in this video appears partially clothed, wearing underwear on her genitals but not wearing any top. While the nudity is partial, we do find that this factor weighs in favor of finding that the video was lewd. Turning to the fifth factor, we note that there does not appear to be anything, including gestures, facial expressions, or the posing of the adolescent female, to suggest sexual coyness or willingness to engage in sexual activity. Therefore, we find that this factor does not weigh in favor of finding that the video was lewd. Turning to the sixth and final factor, we note that the video does not appear to suggest an intention to elicit a sexual response in an objective viewer. Neither does the video appear to invite the viewer to perceive the images from a sexualized or deviant point of view, such as that of a voyeur, as the adolescent female appears to know she is being recorded. Therefore, we find that this factor does not weigh in favor of finding that the video was lewd. In evaluating all of the factors together, we find that factors one and four are present while factors two, three, five, and six are not. While not all factors need to be present to support a finding that a video is lewd, we find that, taking into account the overall content of the image and the age of the minor, the video shows an adolescent engaged in nonsexual conduct that is not inappropriate for her age. While we find the video deplorable, it does not meet the standard required to deem it objectively lewd. Accordingly, we find that it does not constitute child pornography under Illinois law. The post Court Reverses Child Porn Convictions, Finding Material Was Non-Lewd Family Photos and Videos appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167656 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 From a police station in Germany to the UN Mission in South Sudan, Stephanie Königs has been talking to UN News about her journey to becoming a peacekeeper – and the importance of trust and empathy in the field. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167658 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Artificial Intelligence is not only responsible for worrying amounts of earth-warming greenhouse gases: the technology's environmental footprint is also expanding at a pace that could strain the planet’s natural resources. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167656 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 From a police station in Germany to the UN Mission in South Sudan, Stephanie Königs has been talking to UN News about her journey to becoming a peacekeeper and the importance of trust and empathy in the field. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167658 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Artificial Intelligence is not only responsible for worrying amounts of earth-warming greenhouse gases: the technology's environmental footprint is also expanding at a pace that could strain the planets natural resources. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167653 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 What began as a geopolitical crisis in the Middle East nearly 100 days ago is increasingly becoming a food security crisis elsewhere, with UN agencies warning of rising hunger in Africa and malnourished children being turned away from medical clinics in Afghanistan. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167655 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The UN and its partners are continuing efforts to contain Ebola outbreaks in both the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda, while warning that insecurity and misinformation remain major obstacles to the response. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167645 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 A Serbian peacekeeper serving in Lebanon died early Thursday after mortar fire on his position near Marjayoun in the countrys southeast, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has announced. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167646 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 In the wood-panelled rooms of New Yorks storied Explorers Club, where portraits of pioneering adventurers line the walls, diplomats, scientists and ocean advocates gathered on Tuesday evening with a shared sense of urgency and anticipation. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167647 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk called on Thursday for greater protection for environmental and land defenders, noting that hundreds worldwide have been killed or detained in recent years. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167651 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Across the Middle East, countries facing severe energy access challenges are turning to renewables to power essential infrastructure, from hospitals to schools and street lighting. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167652 Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Chemical weapons inspectors have uncovered a significant cache of previously undeclared chemical weapons in Syria including rockets of the same type used in the notorious 2013 Ghouta attack in what the UNs top disarmament official called a momentous discovery for international security. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/04/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-4-1923-7/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 11:00:44 +0000 6/4/1923: Meyer v. Nebraska decided. The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 4, 1923 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/138079/intersection-sanctions-corruption-symposium/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=intersection-sanctions-corruption-symposium Thu, 04 Jun 2026 10:00:45 +0000 Just Security and Perry World House bring together experts to examine how sanctions and anti-corruption policy interact and how to make accountability tools more effective. The post The Intersection of Sanctions and Corruption Symposium appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/04/open-thread-225/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/03/trumps-dubious-new-section-301-tariffs/ Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:17:16 +0000 NA Last night, the Trump Administration revealed plans to use Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose massive new tariffs on imports from some 60 countries around the world, under the pretext that this is necessary to combat their importation of goods that use forced labor: The Trump administration has taken a key step toward rebuilding a tariff wall around the U.S. economy, announcing new restrictions on goods from 60 trading partners that U.S. officials say lack sufficient prohibitions on the use of forced labor. Under the plan, goods from nations that the U.S. says have not banned forced labor, including China, India, Britain and Japan, will face 12.5 percent tariffs. Goods from the European Union, Canada, Mexico and other nations that the U.S. says have failed to enforce bans will face 10 percent levies, the administration said in a late-night announcement Tuesday. While he's relying on a different statute, the tariffs Trump plans to impose here seem very similar to the 10% Section 122 tariffs recently invalidated by the US Court of International Trade, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs s truck down by the Supreme Court in February, in a case I helped bring. The tariff rates (10-12.5%) are similar and so are the various exemptions outlined by the administration. In addition, I am extremely skeptical of the claim that all of these sixty countries - including numerous affluent liberal democracies - are actually more lax about importing goods produced by forced labor than the US is. And if forced labor were really the concern, there would be no reason to impose massive tariffs on virtually all imports from those nations, even though the vast majority of those goods have little or no connection to forced labor. It sure looks like the forced labor issue is just a pretext for large-scale protectionism of the same kind courts blocked earlier. This looks like yet another presidential power grab seeking to usurp Congress' authority over tariffs, granted by Article I of the Constitution. In an analysis on Twitter/X Georgetown University law Prof. Peter Harrell - a leading expert on international trade law - notes that the "p roposed tariffs are pretty clearly a straightforward attempt to recreate the IEEPA tariffs, and not the sort of detailed and precise country-by-country actions that 301 has been used for in the past." He adds that "while there is some country-by-country analysis of how individual investigated countries either do not have or do not enforce prohibitions on importers made by forced labor, there is not detailed country-by-country analysis about how those imports harm US commerce [as Section 301 requires]. Instead, USTR relies on the case studies and more general, global macroeconomic studies of forced labor in the global economy to argue harm." In a recent article on Just Security , legal scholars Gregory Shaffer and Jeremiah May argue that the use of Section 301 to impose sweeping tariffs on many nations and goods at once is vulnerable to the same types of nondelegation and "major questions" challenges as helped bring down the IEEPA tariffs. The major questions doctrine requires Congress to "speak clearly" when authorizing the executive to make "decisions of vast economic and political significance." I agree with most of their analysis, and would add that three of the six majority justices in the IEEPA Supreme Court case (Chief Justice Roberts, Barrett, and Gorsuch) relied in large part on the major questions doctrine in ruling against the IEEPA tariffs. The same is true of the Federal Circuit ruling against those tariffs; Federal Circuit precedent is binding on the US Court of International Trade, which would review any challenges to the Section 301 tariffs. The imposition of massive tariffs imports from 59 countries, plus all of the European Union, is undeniably a major question, just like the IEEPA tariffs were. And, like those tariffs, they will - if allowed to remain in place - raise prices for consumers and inflict massive damage on the US economy, while further poisoning relationships with our allies and trading partners. Furthermore, the Supreme Court majority in the IEEPA case emphasized that "the president does not have the power to "impose tariffs on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for any amount of time." Chief Justice Roberts went on to note that, while some statutes do grant the president tariff authority (among which they specifically cited Section 301), "[w]hen Congress has delegated its tariff powers, it has done so in explicit terms, and subject to strict limits," including "demanding procedural prerequisites." As Shaffer and May explain, Section 301 targets specific "unfair" trade "policies" and "practices" and is not a general grant of tariff authority to be used whenever the president wants. The proposed Section 301 tariffs, they emphasize, go far beyond anything done under Section 301 in the past. Ultimately, the new Section 301 tariffs appear to be yet another attempt to give the president a blank check to impose tariffs at will. The same is true of the administration's plans to use Section 301 to target "structural excess capacity," which rely on the absurd premise that it is somehow an unfair trade practice for countries to be able to produce more goods than they can use themselves. The new Section 301 tariffs cannot go into effect until there is a notice and comment period. Interested groups can submit comments until July 6. Peter Harrell urges stakeholders to submit comments opposing the tariffs, and I agree! They are unlikely to change the administration's position, but could potentially help plaintiffs in future litigation against the tariffs, when and if they are imposed. Should the administration go ahead with these plans, I urge industry groups, public interest organizations (like the Liberty Justice Center, which I worked with on the IEEPA case), and state governments to bring lawsuits challenging the Section 301 tariffs. The IEEPA and Section 122 cases show that courts are willing to strike down massive tariff power grabs, and will not give unlimited deference to the executive. That doesn't guarantee victory. But it is grounds at least for cautious optimism. The post Trump's Dubious New Section 301 Tariffs appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/impl_04jun26_406_e.htm Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 Public and private sector representatives joined the Committee on Import Licensing’s second experience-sharing session on 4 June, focusing on improving WTO members' transparency and notification compliance. Speakers from Cambodia, the European Union, Myanmar, Thailand and the United States shared practices on notifications, public-private cooperation, access to information and digitalization of licensing procedures. The Committee also reviewed recent notifications, addressed 12 specific trade concerns and heard an EU presentation on its Electronic System for Agricultural Non-Customs Formalities during its regular session. Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/impl_04jun26_406_e.htm Thu, 04 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 Public and private sector representatives joined the Committee on Import Licensings second experience-sharing session on 4 June, focusing on improving WTO members' transparency and notification compliance. Speakers from Cambodia, the European Union, Myanmar, Thailand and the United States shared practices on notifications, public-private cooperation, access to information and digitalization of licensing procedures. The Committee also reviewed recent notifications, addressed 12 specific trade concerns and heard an EU presentation on its Electronic System for Agricultural Non-Customs Formalities during its regular session. Law/World Trade Organization https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/todd-blanche-attorney-general-see-also/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 23:30:00 +0000 "I Think He Will, Yeah" : Trump thinks his former criminal defense attorney is doing a "very good job." Explaining Is For Lower Courts : SCOTUS opts out of justifying Alabama's use of racist election maps . I'm Busy, Go Talk To Me* : Biglaw firm launches AI partners for associates to interact with . The Biggest Of The Big : These are the country's 500 largest law firms ! This Week On Thinking Like A Lawyer : Judicial chambers hook ups and AI sleuthing ! The post Todd Blanche, Attorney General? See Also appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-real-difference-between-the-highest-and-lowest-paid-biglaw-equity-partners/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 22:30:00 +0000 Even Biglaw partnership has its haves and have nots. The post The Real Difference Between The Highest And Lowest Paid Biglaw Equity Partners appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/03/ninth-circuit-affirms-dismissal-of-lighthiser-v-trump-kids-climate-suit/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 22:21:12 +0000 Yesterday, a unanimous panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Lighthiser v. Trump , the latest in a series of lawsuits filed on behalf of youth plaintiffs alleging that the federal government's failure to take meaningful action to mitigate climate change--and, in particular, the Trump Administration's promotion of fossil fuels--violate the U.S. Constitution. The panel made quick work of the plaintiffs' claims in a brief, unpublished opinion . Despite the impressive roster of amici lined up to support their claims, the plaintiffs could not convince any of the three judges on the panel (Owens, Van Dyke, and Sung) that they had standing, or that the merits of their claims were worth discussing. A central argument in this appeal was whether the plaintiffs could distinguish their case sufficiently from the Juliana case , which the Ninth Circuit had also dismissed on standing grounds. Unsurprisingly, the court did not find the effort to distinguish the cases convincing. From the opinion: 1. Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged that their asserted injuries are "caused by the challenged" Executive Orders. Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2020).1 According to the complaint, Plaintiffs will be harmed by numerous agency actions which, Plaintiffs allege, will "implement" the Executive Orders over several years. But Plaintiffs can only speculate that the Executive Orders are the cause of the many agency actions they allege will exacerbate climate change. See G.B. ex rel. G.P. v. EPA, 172 F.4th 1042, 1060 (9th Cir. 2026) ("[A]gencies consider a great number of factors in determining when, what, and how to regulate or take agency action." (citation modified)); Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 41214 (2013) (rejecting traceability theory premised on speculation that government surveillance would occur, if at all, under challenged authority rather than another). Furthermore, Plaintiffs seek to enjoin any "implementing" agency action, including those not identified in the complaint. But we "cannot presume to predict how governing officials might exercise their discretion." G.B., 172 F.4th at 1059 (citation modified). Whether agencies will rely on the Executive Orders when taking future action "is mere conjecture." Id. at 1061 (citation modified). For these reasons, the link between the Executive Orders and Plaintiffs' alleged injuries is too speculative to support Article III standing. See FDA v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 383 (2024); G.B., 172 F.4th at 105862. 2. Plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief is also neither "substantially likely to redress their injuries" nor "within the district court's power to award." Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1170 (citation omitted). As to the first redressability prong, Plaintiffs' standing theory suffers from a defect that mirrors their traceability problems. See All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 38081 (noting that "causation and redressability are often flip sides of the same coin" (citation modified)). They have not plausibly alleged that enjoining federal agencies from implementing the Executive Orders is substantially likely to prevent agencies from taking similar emissions-inducing actions under other lawful authorities. Second, as in Juliana, Article III does not give federal courts the power to grant or enforce the injunctive relief Plaintiffs seek. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1171. The Executive Orders state the President's national security, energy, and economic policy in broad terms, then direct executive branch agencies to pursue these policy goals consistent with applicable law. Plaintiffs' requested injunction, by its terms, would prevent the President from concluding, among other things, that it is "in the national interest to unleash America's affordable and reliable energy and natural resources," Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. at 8353; that current energy infrastructure is "far too inadequate to meet our Nation's needs," Exec. Order No. 14156, 90 Fed. Reg. at 8433; and that "coal is essential to our national and economic security," Exec. Order No. 14261, 90 Fed. Reg. at 15517. The requested injunction would likewise bar agencies from effectuating the President's policies"consistent with applicable law"by reconsidering prior actions, "encourag[ing] energy exploration and production on Federal lands and waters," and "protect[ing] the United States's economic and national security by ensuring that an abundant supply of reliable energy is readily accessible in every State and territory of the Nation." Exec. Order No. 14154, 90 Fed. Reg. at 835354. Issuing such an injunction would effectively place one federal district court in charge of executive branch energy policy"an extraordinary and unprecedented role" for a member of the "unelected and politically unaccountable branch." Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1173 (citation omitted); see also id. at 117172 (crafting environmental policy involves "a host of complex policy decisions entrusted to the wisdom and discretion of the executive and legislative branches" (citation modified)). Plaintiffs argue that, unlike the Juliana plaintiffs, who sought a courtsupervised "remedial plan" requiring the federal government to "draw down harmful emissions," id. at 117072, they seek only "traditional prohibitory injunctive relief." But like the district court, we are not persuaded. Similar to the injunction requested in Juliana, the injunction Plaintiffs seek would require extensive judicial supervision of executive branch actions related to energy policy. Indeed, Plaintiffs explicitly seek to undo everything from staffing reductions, to the revocation of research grants, to anticipated rule changes, to the type of language the current administration has used on government websites. To assign such policy-laden choices to one district court would invert the "common understanding of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Moreover, as the district court recognized, enforcing such an injunction would require a court to determine whether "an untold number" of executive branch actions even "implement" the challenged Executive Orders. That task would present challenging questions that "necessarily would entail a broad range of policymaking." Juliana, 947 F.3d at 1172. For example, would the injunction prohibit agencies from advancing any policies like those expressed in the Executive Orderspromoting coal, oil, natural gas and hydropower; increasing domestic energy production; or expediting permitting and leasing timelines, to name a few? For every energy-policy action, would the court need to scrutinize agency officials' motives in search of any hidden reliance on the enjoined Executive Orders? And what if an agency were to rely on other authorities in addition to the Executive Orders? The district court correctly recognized that disputes over such questions would inevitably result in the court "spending a lot of time together" with the parties and holding hearings "until the expiration of [their] collective lifetimes." These unmanageable consequences, for which there are no judicially manageable standards, confirm that Plaintiffs' requested injunction is beyond Article III power. Juliana, 947 F.3d at 117375. After all, an injunction "is only as good as the court's power to enforce it." Id. at 1173. Further, by effectively challenging hundreds of current and anticipated agency actions in one lawsuit, Plaintiffs seek to circumvent the jurisdictional and procedural rules Congress has established for challenges to agency actions. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 702, 704, 706; 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). Such a sweeping injunction against hundreds of agency actions in one lawsuit is unprecedented. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 89294 (1990) (explaining that rather than "wholesale" challenges to "flaws in the entire program," a "case-by-case approach is the traditional, and remains the normal, mode of operation of the courts" (citation modified)); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) ("Where Congress has created a remedial scheme for the enforcement of a particular federal right, we have, in suits against federal officers, refused to supplement that scheme with one created by the judiciary."). This may not be the end of this suit, however. The plaintiffs may well file a petition for rehearing en banc or a petition for certiorari, as they have in prior climate suits. I also suspect they will file additional suits, raising equivalent claims about specific Trump Administration actions. Such suits may overcome the standing hurdle, but I doubt they will be any more successful. The underlying constitutional claims are an example of overreach . Current doctrine cuts against such constitutional claims quite decisively. The post Ninth Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Lighthiser v. Trump Kids' Climate Suit appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/141193/acting-dni-bill-pulte/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=acting-dni-bill-pulte Wed, 03 Jun 2026 21:55:44 +0000 Bill Pultes appointment as Acting Director of National Intelligence suggests that ODNI may now be serving a more political function than advising the president. The post The Acting DNI and the Intelligence Office Trump Wants appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/why-fewer-people-are-voting-for-judges-and-why-that-might-be-a-good-thing/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 21:42:00 +0000 Fewer people vote in judicial elections for good reason: most voters lack sufficient information about the candidates. The post Why Fewer People Are Voting For Judges And Why That Might Be A Good Thing appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/biglaw-firm-launches-ai-partner-doppelgangers-to-help-train-associates/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 21:00:00 +0000 This is probably the best way to get your partner's* opinion on a case at 4 a.m. The post Biglaw Firm Launches AI Partner Doppelgangers To Help Train Associates appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/03/slush-fund-we-hardly-knew-ye/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 20:32:51 +0000 Blanche: "We are not moving forward with the Fund. Period" Rep. Meng: "Not moving forward ever?" Blanche: "Correct." So there you go. That's good news, of course; the Fund was an outrage, the Settlement Agreement setting it up was laughably incoherent and never should have seen the light of day, and the lawyers responsible for the entire exercise should be ashamed of themselves and should probably be hit with Rule 11 sanctions. It's not the last we'll hear of this matter. District Judge Williams, you will recall, has re-opened the Trump v. IRS case (the one the parties ostensibly "settled") in order to investigate "grievous allegations that [Trump] voluntarily dismissed this litigation solely to avoid judicial scrutiny of a lawsuit that was collusive from the start and was only filed to provide the imprimatur of legality for an unlawful settlement." That inquiry is not going away just because Acting Attorney General Blanche promises that the DOJ isn't "moving forward" with setting up the Slush Fund. Briefs are due June 12. Another loose end: That bogus " Settlement Agreement ," signed by the Acting Deputy Attorney General "on behalf of the United States," says that within 30 days the Attorney General shall issue an Order setting up the Fund and providing it with money. It doesn't say "The Attorney General may set up the Fund if he feels like it," it obligates him to do so. Blanche is now the Attorney General. He doesn't get to pick and choose which obligations he will abide by and which he won't. If the "Settlement Agreement" is still in force, it obligates him to do certain things. Don't we need to do some of that fancy lawyer stuff here, to make it clear that this obligation no longer exists? A promise from Todd Blanche - who, as I've said before, is probably not going to be around for too much longer, as a result of having orchestrated this embarrassing fiasco) -- that the DOJ isn't "moving forward" with the Fund isn't really sufficient. It's just a small legal technicality, but you'd expect the Attorney General of the United States to be mindful of legal technicalities, no? And there's Loose End #3: The waiver of all claims the IRS may have against Trump. Blanche, in his testimony, went to great lengths to make clear that in his view, that grant of immunity is still valid. [See from about 43:00 onward in the video of his testimony ] Blanche's argument for its validity is that the Settlement Agreement had two parts: the Anti-Weaponization Fund and the waiver of IRS claims, and that the decision not to move forward on the former does not affect the validity of the latter. It's confused nonsense. Judge Williams, I trust, will get to the bottom of this. The Settlement Agreement is not only of no legal effect (because the "parties" were not truly adversaries), it also happens not to contain any waiver of IRS claims. [ See for yourself if you don't believe me] Blanche's May 19th Order , which was issued after the Settlement Agreement was signed, does contain the waiver clause, but it is of no legal effect whatsover. It does not purport to be a modification of the original Settlement Agreement (which, by its express terms, can only be modified "only with the written agreement of the Parties" [Art VIII]). And if its not part of the bogus Settlement Agreement, what is it? Does Blanche think he is authorized to grant immunity to anyone he wants to immunize, just by issuing an Order to that effect? Really?! Without receiving anything in return? The post Slush Fund, We Hardly Knew Ye appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/20-nonfiction-book-recommendations-to-jumpstart-your-summer-reading-season/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 20:32:00 +0000 Read. Your mind will thank you. Maybe not your clients, whose messages you're ignoring, but your mind, yes. The post 20 Nonfiction Book Recommendations To Jumpstart Your Summer Reading Season appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/whos-on-your-board-reflections-from-lma26/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 19:43:00 +0000 These insights offer a glimpse of what can shape the second half of the year for the LMA community. The post Whos On Your Board?: Reflections From LMA26 appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/supreme-court-republicans-refuse-to-explain-why-alabama-can-now-use-racist-election-maps/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 19:00:09 +0000 The shadow docket means never having to say you're basing this on any law. The post Supreme Court Republicans Refuse To Explain Why Alabama Can Now Use Racist Election Maps (But PLEASE Dont Think Theyre Just Being Political About It) appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/03/ninth-circuit-on-ai-hallucinations/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 18:36:00 +0000 Some excerpts from today's long opinion in LNU v. Blanche , decided by the Ninth Circuit by Judge Richard Paez, Carlos Bea, and Danielle Forrest: Attorneys Mike Singh Sethi and William Rounds filed briefs in this Court with multiple nonexistent cases, misattributed quotations, and gross misrepresentations of real cases. Sethi and Rounds claimed that the errors were the product of innocent typographical mistakes. And they repeatedly denied the possibility that generative artificial intelligence ("AI") might have produced the errors. Having identified other cases in which Sethi or Rounds filed briefs that presented similar problems, we ordered them to show cause why they should not be sanctioned, suspended, or disbarred from practice before this Court. We have considered their response, and we now impose discipline. We issue this disciplinary order, and explain our reasoning at some length, as a warning to the members of this Court's bar: be aware of the risks of overreliance on generative AI, read everything cited in a court filingwhether drafted by generative AI or notand disclose quickly and transparently generative AI hallucinations that are inadvertently included in court filings. There's a lot of factual detail in the opinion, but here are a few general observations from the court: Two types of [generative AI] mistakes, or "hallucinations," are most relevant: fabrications and inaccuracies. Fabrications are instances in which the generative AI tool provides cases or quotations that do not exist at all. Inaccuracies are more subtle. The generative AI tool might cite to real authorities but provide an answer that is legally or factually inaccurate or not supported by the citation. Fabrications are the most notorious hallucinations, but inaccuracies may prove more dangerous to our profession in the long run. Inaccuracies are more likely to go unnoticed by attorneys and judges because they are not always susceptible to facial checks. Rather, "[i]dentifying these misunderstandings often requires close analysis of cited sources." With close analysis, some inaccuracies might be clearfor instance, claiming that a case expressly stands for a proposition about a certain topic when the case does not discuss that topic at all. Others may be difficult to distinguish from poor legal reasoning. And inaccuracies are common, even in newer generation models that produce fewer fabrications. Including inaccuracies, legal-specific generative AI tools from Westlaw and Lexis hallucinated 17% and 33% of answers, respectively, to a representative set of queries run in 2024. [Citing Magesh et al., Hallucination-Free? Assessing the Reliability of Leading AI Legal Research Tools , 22 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 216 (2025).] { Popular legal AI tools have apparently adopted a definition of hallucination that only includes fabrications. We agree with Magesh et al. that this is "plainly irrational," as such a definition "would require us to conclude that a tool that links only to Brown v. Board of Education on every query has provided 'hallucination-free' citations."} The most common error modes of the latest generation tools include misunderstanding holdings, failing to distinguish between legal actors (e.g., presenting a rejected party argument as the holding of the court), and failing to respect the hierarchy of authorities. In other words, the sort of errors that we might expect a first-semester law student to make, but certainly not licensed attorneys appearing before this court. As we will explain, filing briefs with hallucinated fabrications and inaccuracies violates procedural and ethical rules. Lawyers using generative AI must thus be aware of the tendency of generative AI to make these mistakes and guard against them. However legal papers are prepared, and however legal technology develops, our procedural and ethical rules apply with equal force. Just as faithful adherence to those rules would prevent the submission of generative AI hallucinations, such adherence would also prevent the submission of similar human-generated errors. [A] competent and diligent attorney must do more than prompt generative AI, check that the citations provided by the AI are real and the subject matter roughly on point, and call it a day. A competent and diligent attorney must also read and reason . It is no excuse that Sethi entrusted substantive cite checking to subordinates, and it is no excuse that Sethi purportedly did not know his subordinates had used generative AI. It was Sethi's signature, and his alone, on the briefs. So, it was Sethi who "present[ed]" the unwarranted contentions. And Sethi's signature was an attestation that he personally reviewed the contents of the brief, including the cited authorities, and that they were accurate. Sethi did no such review, and his attestation was not conditional on the tools that his subordinates might have used to prepare the first draft, nor could it be. To the contrary, Sethi attests that he and Rounds "do not normally vet citations used by the Brief writer during our review." That is an extraordinary confession. A competent and diligent attorney cannot decline to "vet" citations, in a brief he signs, for substantive validityin other words, to read the cited authorities and ensure that they are on point. We do not suggest that every minor typographical error in a citation gives rise to a violation of the ethical and procedural rules. The errors we identify, however, are not plausibly typographical. We stress that when an attorney learns of any error in a filingincluding generative AI hallucinationshe should immediately alert the court and opposing counsel of the error and disclose its source. There is no upside to denying the use of generative AI or to passing off an AI hallucination as an innocent typographical error. The other rules discussed in this ordercompetence, diligence, meritorious arguments, citations to authority, attestations to accuracydo not turn on the source of the error. If, in the Motion to Correct, Sethi and Rounds had disclosed that AI was used in the opening brief against firm policy and apologized for failing to check the brief, lesser sanctions may have been warranted. But that is not what they did. The gravity of discipline we impose, including the temporary suspension of practice, is owed to this repeated failure of candor. And here are a few excerpts as to the factual details, though there's a lot more on this in the opinion: Sethi filed an opening brief in this case with multiple fabricated citations and quotations. Sethi cited two cases that do not exist and never existed: " Eduardo v. Garland , 28 F.4th 742 (9th Cir. 2022)," and " Lay v. Holder , 729 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2013)." And Sethi twice attributed quotations to real opinions in which the quoted language does not appear: Kamalthas v. INS , 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001), and Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch , 800 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2015). The Attorney General did not flag the fabricated citations in the answering brief. After we denied the parties' joint motion to submit Lnu on the briefs, Sethi filed a Motion to Correct the Record Re: Errata to Petitioner's Opening Brief ("Motion to Correct"). The Motion to Correct represented that the two nonexistent cases" Eduardo v. Garland " and " Lay v. Holder "were "typographical errors." Sethi sought to replace those cases with two cases that have similar names, different reporter numbers, and in the case of " Lay ," a different year: Udo v. Garland , 32 F.4th 1198 (9th Cir. 2022), and Lai v. Holder , 764 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). He also sought to "correct" the holding for which " Lay " was cited. Sethi did not explain how such significant typographical errors might have occurred. Nor did he address the quotations misattributed to Kamalthas and Avendano-Hernandez . Sethi did not appear for oral argument. Rounds appeared on behalf of Petitioners instead. At oral argument, we asked Rounds to explain the errors identified in the Motion to Correct. Rounds stated that the intended citations were "somewhat garbled" and reiterated the claim that Sethi had intended to cite real cases. Rounds claimed that the real cases "stand for the same proposition." As for the source of the errors, Rounds asserted that he was "not sure" but that "it looks like it was a copy and paste error or something like that." We then asked Rounds whether the errors might have been the product of generative AI, to which Rounds said that AI "was not used." Rounds explained that the quotation misattributed to Kamalthas appeared in a different case, but did not explain how the misattribution occurred. We again asked Rounds whether generative AI might have been used to supplement the briefs, to which Rounds again said: "No. AI was not used ." We raised the other quotation misattributed to Avendano-Hernandez and again asked whether the error was the product of generative AI, to which Rounds again said "No." After further questioning on the source of the errors, Rounds finally conceded that it was "possible" that AI might have been used by the individual who drafted the briefs. He clarified that although Sethi's name was on the briefs, Sethi did not draft the briefs, but only "reviewed" them. Rounds later revealed that the brief writer was not yet licensed to practice law, and that no licensed attorney read the cases cited by the unlicensed brief writer After oral argument, we ordered Sethi and Rounds to show cause ("Order to Show Cause") why they should not be sanctioned, suspended, or disbarred from practice before this court for "conduct unbecoming a member of [this] court's bar," and for "violating applicable rules of professional conduct." In the Order to Show Cause, we identified additional issues in the Lnu reply brief. We also identified similar issues in briefs filed by Sethi in other cases pending in this Court. The misconduct in this case did not end with the initial filing of the Lnu briefs. At every subsequent stepincluding the Motion to Correct, oral argument, the Response to our Order to Show Cause, and more recent filings in other casesSethi and Rounds have knowingly or recklessly made false statements to this Court. Instead of transparency, and despite our Order to Show Cause, Sethi has apparently chosen to engage in more subtle subterfuge. In one of the matters we identified in our Order to Show Cause, Contreras Pelayo v. Bondi , No. 24-5168, Sethi filed a "Notice of Errata" that identified two hallucinated citations and requested to replace them with real citations. The motion did not represent the errors as "typographical." But nowhere in that motion did Sethi disclose that the prior citations were hallucinations. Instead, Sethi merely said that the brief "contains errors in two of the case citations." He then simply listed the fabricated citations and said that each was "an error" or "incorrect," and then identified what the real citation "should be." This is not sufficient disclosure. By citing the hallucinations in the opening brief and signing the brief, Sethi previously attested to the accuracy, and thus the existence of , the hallucinated citations. Swapping a hallucination out for a real case does not correct the prior false claim that "this is a real case." By failing to notify the Court that Sethi previously cited cases that do not exist, Sethi "fail[ed] to correct false statements of law previously made to the tribunal." The court imposed the following disciplinary measures: Sethi and Rounds are hereby suspended from practice before this Court for a period of six months starting ten days after this Order is filed. Sethi and Rounds are ordered to provide a copy of this Order to their clients, opposing counsel, and the presiding judge in every pending state or federal case in which they are counsel of record. They shall also provide a copy of this Order to every attorney in their law firm. Sethi, Rounds, and all attorneys at the Firm are ordered to include in all future filings a statement, made under penalty of perjury, addressing whether generative AI was used, disclosing the name of the tool used, and certifying that the attorney signing the brief or other filing has personally reviewed the filing and that all citations and quotations therein refer to existing authority. The Court orders the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Order on the State Bar of California and any other applicable licensing authorities for further proceedings as appropriate. The post Ninth Circuit on AI Hallucinations appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/telefonica-seeks-enforce-award-against-colombia Wed, 03 Jun 2026 19:33:45 +0100 Spains Telefónica has asked a US court to enforce an ICSID award worth more than US$380 million against Colombia over the reversion of assets relating to a telecoms concession. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/a-random-assortment-of-relists-prolonged-detention-confessions-of-error-small-juries-and-new-rul/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 18:30:00 +0000 Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/a-random-assortment-of-relists-prolonged-detention-confessions-of-error-small-juries-and-new-rul/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 18:30:00 +0000 Law/SCOTUSblog https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/sex-in-chambers-met-with-slap-on-wrist/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 18:19:17 +0000 Ethics issues abound this week! The post Sex In Chambers Met With Slap On Wrist appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/todd-blanche-is-your-new-attorney-general-probably/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 17:34:57 +0000 The man who spent two months doing everything short of showing up at Mar-a-Lago with a headshot has reportedly passed his trial period. The post Todd Blanche Is Your New Attorney General. Probably. appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/03/the-supreme-court-for-the-first-time-refers-to-our-colorblind-constitution/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 17:04:35 +0000 As big as Callais was, I think Allen v. Milligan may prove to be more significant. The Court smacked down the notion that the government "defies" court order when it takes actions designed to be tested before the Supreme Court. The Court also signaled that the presumption of good faith for purposes of Section 2 should apply to other Fourteenth Amendment contexts. (Indeed, I wonder why prosecutors should not get the same presumption of good faith under Batson ; this is a topic I am developing.) But the very first sentence of Allen dropped a bomb that most people may have missed: In Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U. S. ___ (2026), to resolvethe tension between vote-dilution claims under 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and our colorblind Constitution, we updated the standards for 2 liability established by Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986). Did you see it? The Court referred to "our colorblind Constitution." Of course, Justice Alito was channelling Justice John Marshall Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896). [Update: The majority opinion was styled as per curiam, but I am reasonably confident that Justice Alito was the primary author.] But in view of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. These powerful words were read and re-read during the worst days of Jim Crow. Yet, the Supreme Court has never actually embraced Justice Harlan's conception of a color-blind constitution, not even in Brown . To the contrary, the Court has often found the Constitution prohibits a color-blind approach to equal protection. Justice O'Connor made this point expressly in Shaw v. Reno : Despite their invocation of the ideal of a "color-blind" Constitution, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 1146, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 1619. That concession is wise: This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824, 125 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1993). Query if Callais and now Allen have abrogated Shaw . Justice Thomas, for his part, routinely cites Harlan's dissent, but always in separate writings, including Adarand Constructors , Holder v. Hall , and other cases. Justice Thomas addressed the issue squarely in Parents Involved : Most of the dissent's criticisms of today's result can be traced to its rejection of the colorblind Constitution. The dissent attempts to marginalize the notion of a colorblind Constitution by consigning it to me and Members of today's plurality.[F19] But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlan's view in Plessy: "Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896) (dissenting opinion). And my view was the rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated Brown. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants in Nos. 1, 2, and 4, and for Respondents in No. 10 on Reargument in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T.1953, p. 65 ("That the Constitution is color blind is our dedicated belief"); Brief for Appellants in Brown v. Board of Education, O.T.1952, No. 8, p. 5 ("The Fourteenth Amendment precludes a state from imposing distinctions or classifications based upon race and color alone");20 see also In Memoriam: Honorable Thurgood Marshall, Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United States, p. X (1993) (remarks of Judge Motley) ("Marshall had a 'Bible' to which he turned during his most depressed moments. The 'Bible' would be known in the legal community as the first Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896). I do not know of any opinion which buoyed Marshall more in his pre-Brown days "). [FN19] The dissent halfheartedly attacks the historical underpinnings of the colorblind Constitution. Post, at 2815 2816. I have no quarrel with the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment sought to bring former slaves into American society as full members. Post, at 2815 (citing SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 7172, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873)). What the dissent fails to understand, however, is that the colorblind Constitution does not bar the government from taking measures to remedy past state-sponsored discriminationindeed, it requires that such measures be taken in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Part IB, supra. Race-based government measures during the 1860's and 1870's to remedy state-enforced slavery were therefore not inconsistent with the colorblind Constitution. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 77273, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 278283, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2007). Does the Supreme Court now agree with Justice Thomas's invocation of Parents Involved ? Did the other Justices, rushed on the emergency docket, miss this line? Who knows? 130 years later, Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent is now the "supreme law of the land." The post The Supreme Court For The First Time Refers To Our "Colorblind Constitution" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/top-10-things-to-know-about-the-administrations-new-adjustment-of-status-memo/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 16:48:00 +0000 This policy has the potential to affect nearly everyone pursuing a green card in the United States. The post Top 10 Things To Know About The Administrations New Adjustment Of Status Memo appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/meta-whistleblower-makes-silent-stand-literary-event Wed, 03 Jun 2026 17:22:36 +0100 The author of a whistleblowing memoir about her time working at Facebook sat in silence on stage at a literary festival in the UK, after lawyers told her not to speak because of an ICDR emergency arbitrator injunction obtained by Meta to restrain her from promoting the book. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/04/in-house-professionals-did-you-take-our-compensation-survey-yet/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 16:12:00 +0000 Tell us how much you make and help us share valuable benchmarking information. The post In-House Professionals: Did You Take Our Compensation Survey Yet? appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.justsecurity.org/107087/tracker-litigation-legal-challenges-trump-administration/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=tracker-litigation-legal-challenges-trump-administration Wed, 03 Jun 2026 16:00:19 +0000 A public resource tracking all the legal challenges to the Trump administration's executive orders and actions. The post Litigation Tracker: Legal Challenges to Trump Administration Actions appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-500-largest-law-firms-in-america-2026/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 15:27:00 +0000 Size matters in the legal profession. Which is America's largest law firm? The post The 500 Largest Law Firms In America (2026) appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-race-to-match-milbanks-new-235k-salary-scale-may-be-faster-than-anyone-expected/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 14:47:41 +0000 Recruiters predict a rapid wave of salary matches as firms invest in associates amid a strong financial outlook. The post The Race To Match Milbanks New $235K Salary Scale May Be Faster Than Anyone Expected appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/when-and-why-did-complying-with-the-voting-rights-act-become-unconstitutional/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 14:00:00 +0000 (Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/when-and-why-did-complying-with-the-voting-rights-act-become-unconstitutional/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 14:00:00 +0000 (Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.justsecurity.org/140365/ukraine-russia-tribunal-crime-of-aggression/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=ukraine-russia-tribunal-crime-of-aggression Wed, 03 Jun 2026 13:30:12 +0000 The tribunal to prosecute Russia's crime of aggression seeks to close one of the most enduring gaps in international criminal law and strengthen the U.N. Charter. The post Ukraine and the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression: Redefining International Justice appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-two-roberts-courts/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000 (William Hennessy) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-two-roberts-courts/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000 (William Hennessy) Law/SCOTUSblog https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/03/influencers-nondefamatory-service-review-could-be-aiding-and-abetting-of-defamatory-comments/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 13:08:18 +0000 From Auto Junction Inc v. Kaluzhin , 2024 WL 7050639, decided Oct. 8, 2024 by Arizona Superior Court (Maricopa County) Judge Melissa Iyer Julian, but just posted on Westlaw several days agoI'm skeptical about the aiding and abetting analysis, but wanted to flag the case in any event: In this case, the only alleged defamatory statements Defendant made were included in his YouTube video where he stated that Auto Junction "don't give me my money," "they don't give me my bucks." As Defendant's reply brief points out, these statements are not defamatory because they are not substantially false. Indeed, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint admits that the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant provided for a delivery price of $1,150.00. Because the vehicle was delivered late and with only one set of keys, Auto Junction paid what it considered to be the "reasonable value" of the delivery, but did not pay the full contract amount. Accordingly, Plaintiff's defamation claim fails as a matter of law. The crux of Plaintiff's Complaint, however, is not that Defendant made defamatory statements himself. Instead, the Complaint asserts that Plaintiff encouraged his many followers to post false, negative reviews about Plaintiff's business. The damage to Plaintiff's business was accomplished by those false negative reviews posted by Defendant's Youtube followers. As a result, Plaintiff also asserts a claim against Defendant for "aiding and abetting" defamation. In order for a plaintiff to prevail on an aiding and abetting claim, proof of the following elements is required: "(1) the primary tortfeasor must commit a tort causing injury to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant must know the primary tortfeasor's conduct constitutes a breach of duty; and (3) the defendant must substantially assist or encourage the primary tortfeasor in achieving the breach." "Advice or encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the same effect upon the liability of the adviser as participation or physical assistance." Restatement (Second) of Torts 876, cmt. d (1979). An illustration to section 876 of the Restatement (which Arizona follows) elucidates the kind of encouragement necessary to create aiding and abetting liability under Illustration 4: "A and B participate in a riot in which B, although throwing no rocks himself, encourages A to throw rocks. One of the rocks strikes C, a bystander. B is subject to liability to C." The Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint and the evidence submitted in response to the pending Motion establishes that Defendant's conduct was intended to encourage his followers to attack Plaintiff's business publicly. Plaintiff presented evidence that these third-party reviews were false and defamatory and are therefore unprotected speech. While Defendant's encouragement in the video does not reflect a direct request that his followers post negative reviews of Plaintiff's business, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint and the evidence submitted in response to the pending Motion are sufficient to infer that Defendant intended that result and knew it would be achieved by the statements made in his video. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Tr. Fund (Ariz. 2002) (knowledge for purposes of aiding and abetting "may be inferred from the circumstances."). Accordingly, the claim that Defendant aided and abetted the defamation of Plaintiff's business is not subject to dismissal as a matter of law, either under the anti-SLAPP statute or for its failure to allege the elements of an aiding and abetting claim. But the court also concluded that the claim was foreclosed by the statute of limitations, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed on that ground this February. Here are more details on Kaluzhin's post, from the appellate decision: [Kaluzhin's] video showed a verbal altercation between Kaluzhin and an Auto Junction representative. At the time, Kaluzhin had about 150,000 YouTube followers. {As of 2024, Kaluzhin had about 1 million YouTube followers.} To support its claims, Auto Junction highlighted a portion of the 2019 video where Kaluzhin addressed his followers and stated: Hey, gang, they don't give me my money. Here is the name of the dealership center: Auto Junction Benz & Beemers. The huge appeal huge appeal to you, guys Phoenix, dealership center they don't give my bucks. How is it possible to screw people like this?! You must show what crazy subscriber you are, who stand stand for the truth. This is the very case to stand for truth. Go ahead, my my crazy ones. Nobody can take money from an average driver. Nobody can The record shows that reviews began on or about November 1, 2019, from various sources. Some reviews included only a rating while other reviews included comments. The following are some of the comments Auto Junction received: You will delete reviews for a long time. Until you return to the driver his earned money. Awful customer service. Rude people. Don't buy anything here! Scammers! the owner rude pig. He dont wanna pay for delivery everytime. stay away! Kaluzhin's videos are apparently in Russian, and plaintiffs argued on appeal that "his fanbase is largely made up of persons in Russia and surrounding areas in Western Asia and Eastern Europe." His YouTube channel appears to be https://www.youtube.com/@i_am_americanec . Note that on Feb. 7, 2022, Judge Sara J. Agne issued a TRO blocking defendant "from posting or allowing to remain posted the video on YouTube dated 10/28/2019 with the link as follows https://youtu.be/Bpdmys6EMW8, as well as any online reviews on any internet platform to include but not limited to YouTube, Google, Yelp, Car.com, BBB.org, or Trustpilot, concerning the Plaintiff and/or encouraging others to post online reviews about the Plaintiff." By the way, the court didn't discuss 47 U.S.C. 230, perhaps because it wasn't raised by the defendant. It's not clear whether 230 have offered Kaluzhin a defense against the aiding and abetting theory. The post Influencer's Nondefamatory Service Review Could Be Aiding and Abetting of Defamatory Comments appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/140393/syria-accountability-gap-najib-icc/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=syria-accountability-gap-najib-icc Wed, 03 Jun 2026 13:05:47 +0000 The first criminal trial against a senior Assad regime official comes at a time when Syrias legal framework remains fragile. The post Syrias Accountability Gap: The Najib Trial and the Case for the ICC appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/morning-docket-06-03-26/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 13:00:26 +0000 * In another shadow docket order, Supreme Court allows Alabama to move forward this cycle with new maps that John Roberts thought were too racist until he decided Republicans needed help in the midterms. [ CNBC ] * Note that Alabama needed the Supreme Court to bend every rule for them because they missed the deadline because... they were celebrating the birthday of Jefferson Davis, which is a holiday there. [ Courthouse News Service ] * Free PACER bill is back! [ Law360 ] * AI already beginning to unsettle the billable hour. [ LA Times ] * Todd Blanche testifies that the "Anti-weaponization fund" is dead. At least the people this decision disappoints have never turned their grievances into violent riots. [ PBS ] * Unqualified judicial nominee confirmed. [ Reuters ] * Compensation suit against Kasowitz forced into arbitration. [ New York Law Journal ] The post Morning Docket: 06.03.26 appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/court-clears-the-way-for-alabama-to-use-its-preferred-congressional-map/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/court-clears-the-way-for-alabama-to-use-its-preferred-congressional-map/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.justsecurity.org/140235/defense-department-report-civilian-harm/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=defense-department-report-civilian-harm Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:52:51 +0000 A Defense Department Inspector General report shows the Pentagons failure to prioritize congressionally mandated civilian protection mechanisms amid U.S. military action. The post Congress Can Act Now on U.S. DoD Inspectors Report Revealing Violations of Civilian Harm Policy and Law appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/03/no-sealing-of-expired-harassment-restraining-order/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:34:45 +0000 From the May 26 decision in Hayne v. Akoto , by Minnesota Court of Appeals Judge Elizabeth G. Bentley, joined by Judges Keala Ede and Lisa Beane: On July 2, 2025, over a year after [a 2022 harassment restraining order against her] expired, Akoto moved to have the record of the case sealed under Rule 4, subdivision 1(e), of the Minnesota Rules of Public Access. In that motion, Akoto asserted that the public accessibility of the HRO records "continue[d] to cause significant harm to [her] personal and professional life," and that it had negatively impacted her "ability to obtain housing, employment, and to rebuild [her] reputation and relationships." The district court denied Akoto's motion [and a follow-up filing that] attached exhibits purporting to show that she is underemployed and has had to live in poor conditions because of the public accessibility of the HRO records. [T]here is a presumption in favor of access to court records. A party seeking to restrict access has the burden of presenting "strong countervailing reasons" or "most compelling reasons" why the records should be sealed. Then, "[a] balancing test is applied to determine whose interests should prevail. Those interests supporting access, including the presumption in favor of access, are balanced against the interests asserted for denying access." The district court properly applied this balancing test. It explained that it applied the balancing test and concluded that Akoto's arguments did not outweigh the presumption in favor of public access. More specifically, the district court expressed that there were no compelling circumstances that could rebut the presumption here and that "[a]ccepting [Akoto's] arguments would essentially require the Court to seal every [HRO] when requested by a party." The district court did not misapply the law. Reviewing the record as a whole, we also see no indication that the district court acted contrary to logic or facts in the record. Akoto does not argue that the district court relied on clearly erroneous facts. Rather, she appears to ask this court to reweigh her privacy interests and the alleged reputational and professional harm she has experienced as a result of the accessibility of these records. But "the role of an appellate court is not to weigh, reweigh, or inherently reweigh the evidence." The post No Sealing of Expired Harassment Restraining Order appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/03/more-on-birthright-citizenship-and-intellectual-diversity-mandates/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:34:13 +0000 I have two articles just released in their final form. One , with James Heilpern, examines how "subject to the jurisdiction" was used in legal texts in the United States through the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Making use of treaties, statutes, congressional debates, and judicial opinions, the article considers whether that language, which was used in the Fourteenth Amendment's citizenship clause, had an established legal meaning that would have been known to the legal community in 1868. If so, what might that meaning be? From the conclusion of that article : The task of this Article is a narrow one. We do not investigate the specific intentions of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment or examine their specific purposes in including the Citizenship Clause. We simply ask to what degree did the drafters of that Clause use familiar legal terms and what would have been the ordinary meaning of those terms as used in a legal text. The evidence is overwhelming that the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction" would have had a natural and obvious meaning to mid-nineteenth century American lawyers. These were ordinary legal terms that regularly appeared in legal discourse. Moreover, the evidence is overwhelming as well as to what the substantive content of that language would have been in 1866. In the legal language of the mid-nineteenth century, "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States simply meant governed by the United States. That governing authority might have been exclusive or shared, and those subject to that governing authority might have owed a duty of allegiance or they might merely have owed a duty of obedience. Those governed by the United States might be subject to American jurisdiction on a more permanent basis or they might only be subject to that governing authority on a contingent and temporary basis. Those governed by the United States might only be subject to its authority for limited purposes or they might be governed by it more comprehensively. When lawyers wanted to restrict the scope of jurisdiction, they used appropriate modifiers to do so. Using the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to express any idea other than "within the governing authority" would have been creative to the point of absurdity. That article is now available from the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy here . The second examines Indiana's statutory intellectual diversity mandate, known as Senate Bill 202. The law requires that professors teaching in state universities in Indiana demonstrate, among other things, that their courses include an intellectually diverse set of materials in order to retain their jobs. It charges the board of regents to use the tenure process to enforce this requirement. As written, the statute poses a multitude of difficulties for academic freedom and the intellectual enterprise of university teaching. From the article : SB 202 might identify a real concern about American higher education, but the solution it offers is not only ineffective but problematic. SB 202 creates a vague set of tenure criteria that can easily be misused to target politically controversial professors. The result is unlikely to improve the quality of classroom teaching or genuinely foster a climate of free inquiry on university campuses, but it might lead professors to cater to the loudest cavilers in an effort to insulate themselves from capricious reprisals. That article is based on the Addison C. Harris Lecture at the Maurer School of Law and is now available in the Indiana Law Journal here . The post More on Birthright Citizenship and Intellectual Diversity Mandates appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/03/pre-judgment-attachment-in-libel-cases/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:01:59 +0000 An interesting remedy that I've seen a few cases; here is the most recent one, Hussain v. Quraishi , decided May 20 by Judge Matthew T. Wax-Krell (Conn. Super. Ct. Tolland Jud. Dist.) (plaintiffs Hussain and Garcia are the owner and practice manager of plaintiff VCare Family Practice LLC, which owns the medical office Shifa Clinic): Quraishi worked as an independent contractor at the Clinic doing IT work. In 2017, the plaintiffs began having issues with Quraishi, which ultimately led to Hussain applying for a civil protection order against Quraishi, which the Court granted on October 12, 2018. After that, Quraishi stopped harassing the plaintiffs, but in July of 2025, for reasons unknown to the plaintiffs, Quraishi began posting on Facebook repeatedly about them. In the Facebook posts, he accused them of various crimes and fraudulent actions, including, among other claims, fraud and identity theft, Medicare and Medicaid fraud, and using a deceased doctor as their medical director. As a result, on July 7, 2025, Hussain applied for a civil protection order against Quraishi, which the Court granted on July 21, 2025. On that same date, Garcia applied for a restraining order against Quraishi (they had briefly dated in 2015), which the Court granted on July 16, Quraishi was ultimately arrested for violating the restraining order. Despite the entry of the civil protection order and the restraining order, Quraishi continued posting about the plaintiffs throughout July of 2025 and then from November of 2025 through April of 2026. These posts included more allegations of perjury, witchcraft, identify theft, Medicare and Medicaid fraud, theft of intellectual property, counterfeiting of documents, filing false statements to the police and the courts, and fraudulent billing. The plaintiffs deny all of the allegations made by the plaintiff [presumably intended to say "defendant" -EV] in his Facebook posts. For purposes of obtaining a prejudgment remedy, the plaintiffs do not have to establish that they will prevail, only that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of their claims. Under this standard, the court concludes on the evidence presented that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiffs' claim against the defendant. Quraishi's Facebook posts contain serious allegations against the plaintiffs, particularly given their professional roles in operating a primary care clinic. He accuses them of fraudulent billing, Medicare and Medicaid fraud, and countless other fraudulent actions. Quraishi's Facebook posts are detailed extensively in the plaintiffs' exhibits. In addition to the allegations against the plaintiffs, many of Quraishi's Facebook posts contain inflammatory, threatening language directed at the plaintiffs. For example, Quraishi wrote on Facebook "Hussain, I'm not just coming for you I'm going after your family line. And my not yet born children will continue if they must In this situation I'm like Liam Neeson's character from the movie Taken 'I have a very special set of skills.'" In another post regarding Hussain and Garcia, Quraishi wrote, "I would've gone full Liam Neeson on you[ ] I'll let the 5 US Federal Agencies handle you and your whole coven." In another of his Facebook posts, he wrote that Hussain "is a high level criminal in a medical masonic mafia and he should be placed into either (1) the original Alcatraz prison in San Francisco; (2) the new alligator Alcatraz in Florida." In another Facebook post, Quraishi wrote "the whole world is going to watch you burn in the hottest inferno hell has provisioned." In yet another Facebook post, Quraishi wrote "a gay male nurse and smelly jew bribed a little piggie." In another Facebook post, Quraishi accuses the plaintiffs, as well as three Judges of the Rockville Superior Court of "racketeering." Garcia testified that Quraishi has 822 followers on Facebook, and that his posts may have been seen by more people if any of his followers shared his posts with others. Garcia also testified that Quraishi's Facebook posts have affected her and the Clinic. She testified that the staff is scared, and that she has to review Facebook to see Quraishi's state of mind before she goes to work. She testified that they are particularly vigilant at the Clinic, where they have cameras "all over," and the staff is monitoring who comes in. She testified that she has worked very hard to get where she is, and that it is upsetting to be accused of what Quraishi has accused her of in his Facebook posts. She believes that the posts have harmed her personal and professional reputation. Patients and family members have called the Clinic to ask if they have seen what Quraishi is posting about them. The court concluded there was probable cause that plaintiffs will prevail on their claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and false light invasion of privacy, and, therefore granted a prejudgment remedy: Based on the defendant's Facebook posts, there is probable cause that a judgment in the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought, or in an amount greater than the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought, taking into account any defenses, counterclaims or set-offs, will be rendered in the matter in favor of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs shall be authorized to attach and/or garnish any or all of the following to the amount of $300,000.00. To attach the defendant Mansoor Quraishi's interest in 2 Davenport Road, West Hartford, Connecticut; and To attach and/or garnish such other assets, property or obligations held by or on behalf of the defendant Mansoor Quraishi as may be identified by defendant's disclosure pursuant to the plaintiffs' motion for disclosure of assets. The post Pre-Judgment Attachment in Libel Cases appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167643 Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Nearly half of the population in Government-controlled areas of Yemen are facing high levels of acute food insecurity with the crisis set to deepen further if international aid cuts continue, according to the latest analysis by the leading UN-backed global food security platform. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167644 Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Unsafe food causes an estimated 866 million illnesses and 1.5 million deaths every year worldwide, highlighting the often-overlooked toll of contaminated food on health, development and fragile economies, according to new data from the UN health agency. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167636 Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 A closely watched Security Council election delivered a mix of continuity and change on Wednesday, as Austria, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, Zimbabwe and first-time member Kyrgyzstan, secured seats around the iconic horseshoe table. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167639 Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 UN Secretary-General António Guterres expressed alarm on Tuesday over reported overnight exchanges of fire between the United States and Iran, as well as reports that Iran targeted Kuwait and Bahrain. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167642 Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 As World Cup fever rises in the Americas, countries are urged to strengthen measles surveillance and vaccination amid ongoing outbreaks across the region. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167632 Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The head of the World Health Organization (WHO) said on Wednesday that the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is showing signs of progress but significant challenges remain in testing, surveillance, vaccine development and building community trust. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167631 Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Months since Gazas nominal ceasefire began, Palestinians continue to be killed and maimed in drone and airstrikes, including the enclaves police force which is crucial to peace and reconstruction efforts, the UN human rights office (OHCHR) said on Wednesday. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167641 Wed, 03 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Children in Ukraine have been profoundly impacted by years of war, sheltering in underground schools or forced to study online and living with the psychological strain of constant air raid sirens that could spell death for them and their families. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://www.justsecurity.org/140915/early-edition-june-3-2026/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=early-edition-june-3-2026 Wed, 03 Jun 2026 11:57:53 +0000 Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here. A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Heres todays news: IRAN WAR CEASEFIRE U.S Central Command said yesterday that Iran had launched missiles and drone strikes on Kuwait and Bahrain, and on civilian mariners near the Strait of [] The post Early Edition: June 3, 2026 appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/03/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-3-1918-7/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 11:00:42 +0000 6/3/1918: Hammer v. Dagenhart decided. The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 3, 1918 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/03/open-thread-224/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/03/the-supreme-court-reverses-inferior-court-supremacy-in-alabama/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 04:30:22 +0000 Late Tuesday evening, the Supreme Court granted Alabama's emergency motion to revise its legislative maps following Callais . The per curiam opinion offers a handy summary of Callais and expressly extends that doctrine to the vote dilution context. The merits analysis stretches one paragraph, but here I want to focus on a single critical sentence: As to intentional vote dilution, the District Court did not heed the presumption of legislative good faith, see Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U. S. 1, 10 (2024), because it interpreted the State's legal disagreement with the court's earlier remedial order as proof of discriminatory animus. Cf. Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. 579, 608609 (2018). When I read the Alabama district court's order, I had the same reaction: not following a court's order that was vacated cannot be used to demonstrate a discriminatory intent. The Supreme Court's decision to vacate the district court's order rendered that order null and void, as if it had never existed. The district court cannot then turn around and claim that the failure to follow its non-existent order is proof of animus. I meant to write on this point, but I didn't get a chance. (Thanks Judge Betsy.) Now is a good time. I've written about inferior court supremacy , the notion that a single district court can settle the meaning of the Constitution. CASA v. Trump went a long way to rebutting this presumption by firmly establishing the principle of Supreme Court judicial supremacy. I have problems with this aspect of CASA , but that is now the supreme law of the land. Now, the Supreme Court's emergency docket order in Allen v. Milligan further clarifies how unsuperior the inferior courts are. Litigants, including state governments, should not violate a binding court order. Doing so would lead to contempt of court, which did not happen here. Instead, the district court ordered Alabama to adopt a new map. Alabama chose to adopt a map that the state found consistent with Supreme Court precedent. The District Court disagreed. The state had the right to adopt that new map, knowing it would be challenged in court, and the Supreme Court would ultimately resolve the matter on its mandatory jurisdiction docket. This is more-or-less what Justice Alito discussed on the cited pages of Abbott v. Perez . There was no defiance of any binding court order. However, Justice Sotomayor's dissent, repeatedly charges the state with defying and flouting the district court's order: "Alabama adopted in unashamed defiance of a prior court order directly affirmed by this Court" "It also corrodes the rule of law by rewarding Alabama's gamesmanship and outright defiance of court orders." "Second, the Court should not have rewarded Alabama's defiance of court orders and blatant gamesmanship throughout this litigation." "Alabama's hands, however, are far from clean. Instead, it defied the District Court's order in these cases even after this Court affirmed it. . . ." "First, Alabama intentionally chose to flout a preliminary injunction that this Court affirmed in Allen." Justice Sotomayor explains that Alabama hoped the Supreme Court would agree with the state on appeal: Of course, Alabama had every right to raise its "legal disagreement," ante, at 3, with the District Court's original preliminary injunction through the appellate process orotherwise. The course of action the State chose here, however, was not the proper way of doing so. Had Alabama complied with the preliminary injunction and drawn a map with a second opportunity district, it could have relitigated the merits in the ordinary course: first at a trial on the merits, and then on appeal. At either stage, it could have raised the arguments that the litigants in Callais raised and prevailed on, or advanced challenges to the District Court's remedial order. Instead, Alabama willfully drew a map that flouted the District Court's preliminary injunction and hoped that this Court would eventually see things its way. After today, it is hard to call Alabama's cynical gambit anything other than a success, and the Court's rewarding of Alabama's behavior anything other than a blow to the rule of law. Sotomayor also quotes from the Speaker of the Alabama House: The record is bereft of evidence suggesting that Alabama took seriously this Court's finding of discriminatory vote dilution in Allen. Speaker of the Alabama House of Representatives Nathaniel Ledbetter put it bluntly: "'If you think about where we were, the Supreme Court ruling [in Allen] was five to four. So there's just one judge that needed to see something different.'" This action is only improper if you accept the notion that district courts can settle these constitutional cases. But if you agree with CASA that the Supreme Court is supreme, then Alabama's actions are the only way to test the validity of a new maps. And litigants are well within their rights to hope a 5-4 decision at one stage of the litigation goes 5-4 the other way. Dobbs got to the Supreme Court because Mississippi wanted to test Roe . Callais got to the Supreme Court because Louisiana wanted to test Gingles . And Allen made several trips to the Supreme Court for similar reasons. Justice Sotomayor is wrong on this point. The post The Supreme Court Reverses Inferior Court Supremacy In Alabama appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/supreme-court-permits-alabama-to-use-congressional-map-struck-by-lower-court-as-racially-discrim/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 02:14:37 +0000 (Kevin Carter/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/supreme-court-permits-alabama-to-use-congressional-map-struck-by-lower-court-as-racially-discrim/ Wed, 03 Jun 2026 02:14:37 +0000 (Kevin Carter/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/spanish-gaming-investor-threatens-panama Wed, 03 Jun 2026 02:59:16 +0100 A Spanish gaming group has threatened an investment treaty claim against Panama, accusing the state of allowing its main rival to operate slot machine rooms illegally. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/milbank-bumped-salaries-see-also/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 23:15:00 +0000 We Love To See The Associate Compensation! : And Milbank loves setting the scale . We Have A Match! : McDermott Will & Schulte the first to match the Milbank scale ! Todd Blanche Got Mossed : The DOJ's Comey 86 prosecutions comes up with goose egg . Law Firms Are Buying Up Real Estate : Remarkable! Not sure why they'll need all that space with AI adoption, though . Might As Well Skip Office Hours : Double blind study suggests AI may be more helpful than your professors at answering questions . The post Milbank Bumped Salaries! See Also appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.justsecurity.org/140939/congress-block-deal-trump-irs/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=congress-block-deal-trump-irs Tue, 02 Jun 2026 23:04:02 +0000 Tax law experts offer three actions that Congress must take to fully unwind the Trump administrations settlement and hold its architects accountable. The post What Congress Should Do About the Presidents Sweetheart Deal in Trump v. IRS appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/colombian-maritime-and-port-firm-launches-ia-practice Tue, 02 Jun 2026 23:43:24 +0100 A Colombian law firm with over three decades of specialisation in maritime and port law has rebranded as Salas Law Group and launched an international arbitration and dispute resolution practice led by Guillermo Salcedo Salas, who has joined as partner after 15 years practising in Paris. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-biglaw-sports-law-powerhouse/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 22:30:00 +0000 Congrats for taking the top spot yet again. The post The Biglaw Sports Law Powerhouse appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.lawnext.com/2026/06/ironclad-founder-jason-boehmig-joins-openai-to-develop-products-for-the-legal-sector.html Tue, 02 Jun 2026 21:57:00 +0000 The legal industry is turning into a battleground for the two dominant frontier AI companies. The post Ironclad Founder Jason Boehmig Joins OpenAI To Develop Products For The Legal Sector appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-associate-compensation-race-is-on-with-latest-set-of-raises/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 21:27:29 +0000 Hueston Hennigan steps up fast, and they're doing it on top of already-announced summer bonuses. The post The Associate Compensation Race Is On With Latest Set Of Raises appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/02/where-have-all-the-good-lawyers-gone/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 21:12:09 +0000 I continue to find one small detail of the Slush Fund affair (Slushfundgate?) of particular interest. As you may recall, our President's suit against the IRS was voluntarily dismissed on May 16. Two days later, on May 18, the parties executed a " Settlement Agreement. " In that Agreement, the DOJ* agrees to issue "a formal apology" to our President, and "the Attorney General of the United States agrees to create the [$1.776 billion] Anti-Weaponization Fund, subject to the terms and conditions described herein." *The "Settlement Agreement" was signed "for the United States" by Associate Attorney General Stanley Woodward. The DOJ was, presumably, acting in its capacity as counsel to the defendant (I.R.S.). Daniel Z. Epstein, counsel to the Plaintiffs (our President, his two sons, and the Trump Organization), is the other signatory. In exchange for all that (the apology and the Fund), Trump and the other Plaintiffs agree to: RELEASE, WAIVE, ACQUIT, and FOREVER DISCHARGE Defendants [the I.R.S.] and the United States from, and are hereby FOREVER BARRED and PRECLUDED from prosecuting or pursuing, any and all claims , charges, counterclaims, causes of action, appeals, or requests for any relief, including injunctive, monetary, damages, tax payments, debt relief, costs, attorney's fees, expenses, and/or interest, that - as of the Effective Date - have been or could have been asserted by Plaintiffs in the Case or the Pending Agency Claims, by reason of, with respect to, in connection with, or which arise out of, matters in the Case or the Pending Agency Claims. [Emphasis added] Curious, no? On several grounds. First: Trump releases all his claims against the IRS? That doesn't sound like Trump. Given that the whole undertaking is patently a sham - Trump "settling" with Trump -- why would Trump give away anything at all? Just to make it look like there's an actual "exchange" taking place? And while it might look as though Trump is giving the "other side" something of value, he isn't. Two days before the "Settlement Agreement" was executed, his claim was dismissed, at his request, with prejudice. So when he sits down to "negotiate" his "Settlement Agreement" on May 18th, sitting across the table from his reflection in the mirror, he's already barred from ever raising those claims again. So his "waiver" is entirely redundant and meaningless. And notice: the "Settlement Agreement" doesn't make any reference at all to the dismissal of Trump's claims. That's also a little odd. Ordinarily, when parties agree to settle ongoing litigation, their Settlement Agreement will say something like: "Plaintiff promises to voluntarily dismiss his claims against the Defendant, in exhange for the Defendant's promise to [do something, or pay something]." The withdrawal of Plaintiff's claim is a big part of the consideration flowing between the parties, which is what makes the Settlement Agreement an enforceable contract; the parties are exchanging things of value. Not so, here. Trump can't promise to drop his claims against the IRS, because he's already dropped them. And notice: in the "Settlement Agreement," Trump waives any claims he might have against the IRS. It does not say that the IRS waives any claims it may have against Trump. But the very next day (May 19th), this curious document appeared on the DOJ website. It simply states, with absolutely no additional explanation, that The United States RELEASES, WAIVES, ACQUITS, and FOREVER DISCHARGES each of the Plaintiffs from, and is hereby FOREVER BARRED and PRECLUDED from prosecuting or pursuing, any and all claims , charges, counterclaims, causes of action, appeals, or requests for any relief, including injunctive, monetary, damages, tax payments, debt relief, costs, attorney's fees, expenses, and/or interest, that - as of the Effective Date - have been or could have been asserted by the Defendants (i.e., the IRS) against any of the Plaintiffs or related or affiliated individuals . . . [Emphasis added]. This document - untitled, and with nothing at all of substance other than this waiver - was signed by (a presumably shame-faced and embarrassed) Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche. Did Blanche just forget to have this clause included in the "Settlement Agreement"?! There's no additional consideration coming from the Plaintiffs in exchange for this waiver of the potential United States claims; so its either just a little gift ("From the People of the United States, in Recognition of Your Brilliant Leadership!!!!"), or it was supposed to be included in the Settlement Agreement but was inexplicably left out. And that would constitute incompetence of truly monumental proportions. Did the Acting Attorney General not read the (two-page!) Settlement Agreement between the sitting President (for whom he works) and the IRS? Or he did read it over, and fail to notice that the immunity he thought was going to be in there for the President was missing? Is it really possible? Sure looks that way, doesn't it? Here's how I think it all went down. During the negotiation sessions over the "Settlement Agreement," where the hard bargaining between Trump and Trump was taking place, Trump turned to Todd Blanche, who was there as counsel to the IRS and to the President, and said: "Draft up a Settlement Agreement - and don't forget to put in that waiver!!" Blanche turns to his deputy, Stanley Woodward - remember, it was Woodward who actually signed the "Settlement Agreement" on behalf of the United States - and said: "Woodward, draft up the Settlement Agreement. And don't forget to put in that waiver!!" And Woodward thinks to himself: "What waiver?" He figures they must be referring to a waiver by Trump for all claims that Trump may have against the IRS. After all, one would expect a Settlement Agreement to contain a waiver running in that direction, one where Plaintiffs promise to drop their claims and not to sue the Defendants as part of the overall settlementy deal. He inserts such a clause into the Settlement Agreement. Astonishingly, nobody notices the omission until the day after the Settlement Agreement is signed. Keystone Kops lawyering at its best, or worst. Today's NY Times happens to have an article about the exodus of lawyers from the federal government. [" Trump Administration Sees Striking Exodus of Legal Talent "] DOJ has lost 21 percent of its lawyers in a little over a year. AbovetheLaw.com has been reporting on this for a while, and the evidence is indeed starting to accumulate that the quality of lawyering out on the front lines is declining. Not to worry, though. Our President reassures us : The New York Times wrote a story today entitled, 'Trump Administration Sees Striking Exodus of Legal Talent,' as though that's a bad thing, when actually, it's very good. The people that are leaving are Radical Left Deep State Lunatics, who are destroying our Country, and Weaponizing Government. Many of them didn't leave, but were fired! The Failing New York Times writes this, but makes it sound like it's a terrible thing when actually, it's just the opposite. We want people that will, MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN, not people that are trying to destroy our Country, that were put in by Obama and Biden and, in many cases, they shouldn't have been representing the U.S.A. in the first place." The post Where Have All the Good Lawyers Gone? appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/all-i-could-ask-for/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 21:04:00 +0000 Thoughts on what to do as a practitioner as AI creeps into IP work. The post [A]ll [I] Could Ask For appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/did-chat-gpt-just-replace-law-school-office-hours/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 20:15:00 +0000 Surprising results from a double blind study! The post Did Chat GPT Just Replace Law School Office Hours? appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/sidleys-partnership-promotions-are-off-the-charts-thanks-to-the-firms-brand-new-nonequity-tier/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 19:33:00 +0000 The firm's embrace of nonequity partners helped produce its largest recent partnership class. The post Sidleys Partnership Promotions Are Off The Charts Thanks To The Firms Brand New Nonequity Tier appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/02/free-speech-unmuted-the-first-amendment-and-privacy-rights/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 18:47:41 +0000 For past Free Speech Unmuted videos, see: 'Defamacast' and More: How American Defamation Law Works Speech, Not "Conduct": Supreme Court Rules on Conversion Talk Therapy Equal Time, Stephen Colbert, and the Future of Political Broadcasting Student Speech, Threats, and the First Amendment Can Journalists Be Charged for Involvement in Protests? The Don Lemon Dilemma 2025: The Year In Free Speech Does the First Amendment Protect Supposedly "Addictive" Algorithms? Defamation Law in the Age of AI with Lyrissa Lidsky Free Speech and the Future of Legal Education From Brandenburg to Britain: Rethinking Free Speech in the Digital Era with Eric Heinze Kimmel, the FCC, and the Government's Power Over Broadcast Speech A Conversation with FIRE's Greg Lukianoff A Burning First Amendment Issue: President Trump's Executive Order on Flag Desecration Free Speech and Doxing The Supreme Court Rules on Protecting Kids from Sexually Themed Speech Online Free Speech, Public School Students, and "There Are Only Two Genders" Can AI Companies Be Sued for What AI Says? Harvard v. Trump: Free Speech and Government Grants Trump's War on Big Law Can Non-Citizens Be Deported For Their Speech? Freedom of the Press, with Floyd Abrams Free Speech, Private Power, and Private Employees Court Upholds TikTok Divestiture Law Free Speech in European (and Other) Democracies, with Prof. Jacob Mchangama Protests, Public Pressure Campaigns, Tort Law, and the First Amendment Misinformation: Past, Present, and Future I Know It When I See It: Free Speech and Obscenity Laws Speech and Violence Emergency Podcast: The Supreme Court's Social Media Cases Internet Policy and Free Speech: A Conversation with Rep. Ro Khanna Free Speech, TikTok (and Bills of Attainder!), with Prof. Alan Rozenshtein The 1st Amendment on Campus with Berkeley Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky Free Speech On Campus AI and Free Speech Free Speech, Government Persuasion, and Government Coercion Deplatformed: The Supreme Court Hears Social Media Oral Arguments Book Bans or Are They? The post Free Speech Unmuted: The First Amendment and Privacy Rights appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/02/court-issues-temporary-restraining-order-protecting-group-flying-8647-flag/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 18:22:48 +0000 A photo of the flag being displayed, from the application for a temporary restraining order . From yesterday's decision (which strikes me as correct) in Accountability Now USA v. Griess , by Judge Randolph Moss (D.D.C.): Plaintiff, an unincorporated association that maintains a 24/7 demonstration calling for the impeachment and removal of President Donald Trump on National Park Service ("NPS") land, moves for an emergency order temporarily restraining the Superintendent of the National Mall and Memorial Parks Kevin Griess and the Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum or their delegees "from taking enforcement action against them because of their display of a flag with the legend '8647.'" For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Plaintiff's motion. The parties' disagreement turns on whether Plaintiff's display of the "8647" flag constitutes protected speech, as Plaintiff asserts, or a "true threat" to the life or safety of the President (or an incitement to violence), as Defendants maintain. At oral argument, both sides agreed that context is dispositive. Not every use of the slang phrase "86" constitutes a threat of violence; to the contrary, it is most often used to mean that an item is no longer available or that someone or something should be removed, ejected, or thrown out. But it can, in some contexts, mean "to kill." "True threats of violence, everyone agrees, lie outside the bounds of the First Amendment's protection." "'True threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." "The 'true' in that term distinguishes what is at issue from jests, 'hyperbole,' or other statements that when taken in context do not convey a real possibility that violence will follow." The Court starts with the premise that the word "86" is a slang term with no single meaning. According to Merriam-Webster, "Eighty-six is slang meaning 'to throw out,' 'to get rid of,' or 'to refuse service to.'" The phrase "comes from 1930s soda-counter slang meaning that an item was sold out[,]" and may have been used because it rhymes with "nix." It was first used as a noun to refer "to an item that had been sold out," but by the 1950s, the term was used as a verb, at first meaning " 'to refuse to serve a customer,' later meaning " 'to get rid of; to throw out,' " and still later coming to mean " 'shut out' or 'rejected.'" Merriam-Webster further notes that a recent extension of these meanings has included "'to kill,'" although the dictionary declines to endorse that meaning "due to its relative recency and sparseness of use." According to Merriam-Webster, "[t]he most common meaning of eighty-six encountered today is the one that is closer to its service industry roots." Plaintiff represents that its display of the flag was "not in any way a threat against the President" but, rather, was part of months-long demonstrations demanding "the impeachment and removal of President Trump." Although Defendants offer no evidence or explanation regarding how (and why) the NPS understood Plaintiff's actual use of the term, the Deputy Director of the Secret Service attests that he generally "regard[s] the statement '86-47' as a potential call for acts of violence directed at the President of the United States" and that he "understand[s] '86' to represent a euphemism for acts of physical violence." Although the Court recognizes the importance and difficulty of the mission of the Secret Service, the First Amendment does not permit the government to censor political speech, which no reasonable observer would view, in context, as actually conveying a threat of violence, merely because the speaker uses a phrase that, in addition to other more common meanings, has been used to refer to an act of violence. The question whether "8647" constitutes a true threat cannot be resolved in the abstract, without consideration of context, and, here, the relevant context makes clear that no reasonable observer could have viewed Plaintiff's display of the flag as a threat to the President's life or physical safety. To start, the flag itself contains no symbols of violence; it is red, white, and blue, and is simply adorned with white stars. It contains no knives, skulls, nooses, or other threatening symbols. Even more to the point, the flag was displayed outside the courthouse, as part of an ongoing demonstration seeking President Trump's impeachment and removal from office. In a video submitted by Plaintiff, the flag can be seen hanging from one side of Plaintiff's tent, surrounded by not one, but four signs that read "IMPEACH. CONVICT. REMOVE." Yet another sign merely reads: "IMPEACH." In short, the surrounding signage urged Congress "to throw out" the President. Nor is there any evidence that Plaintiff or the volunteers who staffed the demonstration engaged in any threatening speech or conduct. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to fathom how the NPS (or the Secret Service) could have concluded that a reasonable observer would view the flag as a true threat. The term "86" is used far more often to mean "throw out" than "kill," and it appeared at a demonstration that was focused, of all things, on the constitutional impeachment and "removal" of the President. At oral argument, Defendants' counsel conceded that (1) the inquiry of whether particular speech is a true threat is context-dependent; (2) there are circumstances in which the term "8647" does not represent a true threat to the President; and (3) the Defendants are "not going to prosecute or go after everybody with an 8647 flag." But when asked, how, then, did Defendants conclude that Plaintiff's specific invocation of "8647" constituted a true threat, Defendants' counsel retreated, repeatedly asserting that the use of the term in the context of unprecedented and recent assassination attempts against the President constitutes a true threat. When asked whether the agency engaged in any case-specific fact-finding or undertook any analysis of whether Plaintiff's usage of 8647 in the context of its ongoing demonstration violated 18 U.S.C. 871 [the statute banning threats against the President -EV], Defendants' counsel demurred, noting that he either did not know or that there was nothing in the record before the Court. [T]he Court invited Defendants to supplement the record with any evidence or material explaining the NPS's thinking. Defendants failed to offer any analysis or consideration of specific context surrounding Plaintiff's display of the flag. Instead, Defendants simply repeated Deputy Director of the Secret Service Matthew Quinn's averment that he regards "the statement '86-47' as a potential call for acts of violence directed at the President," and noted that "a shooting occurred in the vicinity of the White House" on May 24, 2026, and that this "potential assassination attempt" was a "significant intervening event from when [the Secret Service] first encountered the individual holding [the] flag"; that "the Secret Service shared information with the U.S. Department of the Interior about its ongoing investigation relating to the individual holding [the] flag"; that the Secret Service has investigated or is currently investigating "over 1,300 instances of individuals using '86-47'" as a threat; that "[m]ost '86-47' investigations by the Secret Service involve online threats" and that the use of the "flag near the White House is a novel event"; and, finally, that "[t]he Secret Service does not construe '86-47' to mean impeachment." Strikingly, only two or three of these assertions have any plausible nexus to the specific context of Plaintiff's display of the flag, and none of those assertions amounts to anything. The first relevant assertion merely notes that the Secret Service is conducting an ongoing investigation of the volunteer who spoke with the officers on May 12. But the government says nothing about whether that investigation has revealed any evidence to support a true threat claim, and an investigation is just an investigation. The second and third assertions merely note that Plaintiff was displaying the flag in the same city in which the White House is locatedalbeit almost two miles awayand that a shooting occurred on the street near the White House on May 24. It sweeps far too broadly, however, to suggest that anyone displaying an "8647" flag in Washington, D.C. after the May 24 shooting has made a true threat to the President's life or safety. The Court does not doubt that political violence is on the rise and that it poses a grave threat not just to the targets of the threats but to the country as a whole. But the enormity of that problem does not change the meaning of Plaintiff's speech, which by any reasonable measure merely advocated for the President's impeachment and removal from officethat is, "to throw [him] out." The court also concluded that the speech couldn't be plausibly be interpreted as falling within the First Amendment exception for incitement to violence (a separate exception from the one for threats): The record contains no evidence that a reasonable observer would have viewed the flag as an incitement to imminent violence or that Plaintiff intended to incite political violence. Although Deputy Director Quinn attests that he believes that the term 8647 "as it is understood today, can incite violence by others," Brandenburg [the case defining the incitement standard -EV] does not refer to words that "can incite" imminent lawlessnessit refers to words that are "likely to incite"and Defendants do not even suggest that Plaintiff's flag comes close to satisfying that demanding standard. Arthur B. Spitzer, Aditi Shah, and Laura K. Follansbee (ACLU DC) represent plaintiff. Thanks to the Media Law Resource Center (MLRC) MediaLawDaily for the pointer. The post Court Issues Temporary Restraining Order Protecting Group Flying "8647" Flag appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/02/court-issues-preliminary-injunction-protecting-group-flying-8647-flag/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 18:22:48 +0000 A photo of the flag being displayed, from the application for a temporary restraining order . From yesterday's decision (which strikes me as correct) in Accountability Now USA v. Griess , by Judge Randolph Moss (D.D.C.): Plaintiff, an unincorporated association that maintains a 24/7 demonstration calling for the impeachment and removal of President Donald Trump on National Park Service ("NPS") land, moves for an emergency order temporarily restraining the Superintendent of the National Mall and Memorial Parks Kevin Griess and the Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum or their delegees "from taking enforcement action against them because of their display of a flag with the legend '8647.'" For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Plaintiff's motion. The parties' disagreement turns on whether Plaintiff's display of the "8647" flag constitutes protected speech, as Plaintiff asserts, or a "true threat" to the life or safety of the President (or an incitement to violence), as Defendants maintain. At oral argument, both sides agreed that context is dispositive. Not every use of the slang phrase "86" constitutes a threat of violence; to the contrary, it is most often used to mean that an item is no longer available or that someone or something should be removed, ejected, or thrown out. But it can, in some contexts, mean "to kill." "True threats of violence, everyone agrees, lie outside the bounds of the First Amendment's protection." "'True threats' encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." "The 'true' in that term distinguishes what is at issue from jests, 'hyperbole,' or other statements that when taken in context do not convey a real possibility that violence will follow." The Court starts with the premise that the word "86" is a slang term with no single meaning. According to Merriam-Webster, "Eighty-six is slang meaning 'to throw out,' 'to get rid of,' or 'to refuse service to.'" The phrase "comes from 1930s soda-counter slang meaning that an item was sold out[,]" and may have been used because it rhymes with "nix." It was first used as a noun to refer "to an item that had been sold out," but by the 1950s, the term was used as a verb, at first meaning " 'to refuse to serve a customer,' later meaning " 'to get rid of; to throw out,' " and still later coming to mean " 'shut out' or 'rejected.'" Merriam-Webster further notes that a recent extension of these meanings has included "'to kill,'" although the dictionary declines to endorse that meaning "due to its relative recency and sparseness of use." According to Merriam-Webster, "[t]he most common meaning of eighty-six encountered today is the one that is closer to its service industry roots." Plaintiff represents that its display of the flag was "not in any way a threat against the President" but, rather, was part of months-long demonstrations demanding "the impeachment and removal of President Trump." Although Defendants offer no evidence or explanation regarding how (and why) the NPS understood Plaintiff's actual use of the term, the Deputy Director of the Secret Service attests that he generally "regard[s] the statement '86-47' as a potential call for acts of violence directed at the President of the United States" and that he "understand[s] '86' to represent a euphemism for acts of physical violence." Although the Court recognizes the importance and difficulty of the mission of the Secret Service, the First Amendment does not permit the government to censor political speech, which no reasonable observer would view, in context, as actually conveying a threat of violence, merely because the speaker uses a phrase that, in addition to other more common meanings, has been used to refer to an act of violence. The question whether "8647" constitutes a true threat cannot be resolved in the abstract, without consideration of context, and, here, the relevant context makes clear that no reasonable observer could have viewed Plaintiff's display of the flag as a threat to the President's life or physical safety. To start, the flag itself contains no symbols of violence; it is red, white, and blue, and is simply adorned with white stars. It contains no knives, skulls, nooses, or other threatening symbols. Even more to the point, the flag was displayed outside the courthouse, as part of an ongoing demonstration seeking President Trump's impeachment and removal from office. In a video submitted by Plaintiff, the flag can be seen hanging from one side of Plaintiff's tent, surrounded by not one, but four signs that read "IMPEACH. CONVICT. REMOVE." Yet another sign merely reads: "IMPEACH." In short, the surrounding signage urged Congress "to throw out" the President. Nor is there any evidence that Plaintiff or the volunteers who staffed the demonstration engaged in any threatening speech or conduct. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to fathom how the NPS (or the Secret Service) could have concluded that a reasonable observer would view the flag as a true threat. The term "86" is used far more often to mean "throw out" than "kill," and it appeared at a demonstration that was focused, of all things, on the constitutional impeachment and "removal" of the President. At oral argument, Defendants' counsel conceded that (1) the inquiry of whether particular speech is a true threat is context-dependent; (2) there are circumstances in which the term "8647" does not represent a true threat to the President; and (3) the Defendants are "not going to prosecute or go after everybody with an 8647 flag." But when asked, how, then, did Defendants conclude that Plaintiff's specific invocation of "8647" constituted a true threat, Defendants' counsel retreated, repeatedly asserting that the use of the term in the context of unprecedented and recent assassination attempts against the President constitutes a true threat. When asked whether the agency engaged in any case-specific fact-finding or undertook any analysis of whether Plaintiff's usage of 8647 in the context of its ongoing demonstration violated 18 U.S.C. 871 [the statute banning threats against the President -EV], Defendants' counsel demurred, noting that he either did not know or that there was nothing in the record before the Court. [T]he Court invited Defendants to supplement the record with any evidence or material explaining the NPS's thinking. Defendants failed to offer any analysis or consideration of specific context surrounding Plaintiff's display of the flag. Instead, Defendants simply repeated Deputy Director of the Secret Service Matthew Quinn's averment that he regards "the statement '86-47' as a potential call for acts of violence directed at the President," and noted that "a shooting occurred in the vicinity of the White House" on May 24, 2026, and that this "potential assassination attempt" was a "significant intervening event from when [the Secret Service] first encountered the individual holding [the] flag"; that "the Secret Service shared information with the U.S. Department of the Interior about its ongoing investigation relating to the individual holding [the] flag"; that the Secret Service has investigated or is currently investigating "over 1,300 instances of individuals using '86-47'" as a threat; that "[m]ost '86-47' investigations by the Secret Service involve online threats" and that the use of the "flag near the White House is a novel event"; and, finally, that "[t]he Secret Service does not construe '86-47' to mean impeachment." Strikingly, only two or three of these assertions have any plausible nexus to the specific context of Plaintiff's display of the flag, and none of those assertions amounts to anything. The first relevant assertion merely notes that the Secret Service is conducting an ongoing investigation of the volunteer who spoke with the officers on May 12. But the government says nothing about whether that investigation has revealed any evidence to support a true threat claim, and an investigation is just an investigation. The second and third assertions merely note that Plaintiff was displaying the flag in the same city in which the White House is locatedalbeit almost two miles awayand that a shooting occurred on the street near the White House on May 24. It sweeps far too broadly, however, to suggest that anyone displaying an "8647" flag in Washington, D.C. after the May 24 shooting has made a true threat to the President's life or safety. The Court does not doubt that political violence is on the rise and that it poses a grave threat not just to the targets of the threats but to the country as a whole. But the enormity of that problem does not change the meaning of Plaintiff's speech, which by any reasonable measure merely advocated for the President's impeachment and removal from officethat is, "to throw [him] out." The court also concluded that the speech couldn't be plausibly be interpreted as falling within the First Amendment exception for incitement to violence (a separate exception from the one for threats): The record contains no evidence that a reasonable observer would have viewed the flag as an incitement to imminent violence or that Plaintiff intended to incite political violence. Although Deputy Director Quinn attests that he believes that the term 8647 "as it is understood today, can incite violence by others," Brandenburg [the case defining the incitement standard -EV] does not refer to words that "can incite" imminent lawlessnessit refers to words that are "likely to incite"and Defendants do not even suggest that Plaintiff's flag comes close to satisfying that demanding standard. Arthur B. Spitzer, Aditi Shah, and Laura K. Follansbee (ACLU DC) represent plaintiff. Thanks to the Media Law Resource Center (MLRC) MediaLawDaily for the pointer. The post Court Issues Preliminary Injunction Protecting Group Flying "8647" Flag appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/02/eventually-the-steam-drill-always-wins-law-professors-prefer-ai-over-peer-answers/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 18:03:21 +0000 Prof. Bradypus Tridactylus. Credit: Marshall, Annales du Muséum national d'histoire naturelle , via Wikipedia. From a draft by Stanford law professor Julian Nyarko and others: We conducted a blinded evaluation of short-answer tutoring in contracts courses with sixteen U.S. law professors. Participants created 40 representative questions, wrote answers, and judged 2,918 anonymized comparisons between human and LLM responses. Professors rated LLMs far higher than their peers (average win rate = 75.33%), with models performing similarly to the best instructor. LLM responses were also rarely flagged as harmful (3.53%, vs 12.06% for professors). Preferences for LLM answers were consistent across evaluators and reflected shared professional standards. Sixteen contracts professors from fourteen U.S. law schoolswho all use the same casebook to teach the materialauthored questions representative of those asked during office hours. From this pool we curated 40 representative questions spanning four instructional categories (Recall: Case or Code, Recall: Doctrine, Hypotheticals, Policy). Recall questionswhether relating to a case, code or doctrinetend to be amenable to answers which can be evaluated against a ground truth, and where argumentative strength is of little importance. In contrast, hypotheticals present a short set of facts and ask how the law should be applied. Together with policy questions, which often center on legal or policy design under heterogeneous preferences, providing a strong answer in this category often relies on displaying careful reasoning, weighing competing arguments and other latent, professional standards of qualityeven if the relevant doctrine is now settled. In a second step, each professor wrote short answers to a subset of the 40 questions. In a third step, we conducted blinded, forced-choice comparisons in which professors judged anonymized pairs of answers written either by their colleagues or by two LLMs. Among the different model families, we opted for Google's models because at the time, Google made explicit efforts to optimize their models for the educational context. Consequently, we included a stock version of Gemini 2.5 Pro and a retrieval-augmented NotebookLM with access to the casebook. Preference rankings have been shown to be a particularly effective method in ranking unstructured, open text responses, thus yielding advantages over more common, rubric-based evaluations especially where quality is a more elusive concept To probe whether any LLM advantage might be driven by surface-level writing style rather than substantive content, we additionally engineered a set of lexico-syntactic featuresanswer length, structural organization, reasoning nuance, legal anchors, confidence tone, clarity, and pedagogical supportand tested how much of the preference pattern they could explain. Each professor completed approximately 150200 pairwise evaluations, selected the better answer, and could flag any answer as pedagogically "harmful" {[ i.e., ] likely to mislead or hinder learning}. We present four main findings. First, LLMs meetand often exceedthe professional standard as defined by expert preference. Gemini 2.5 Pro outperformed all but one instructor in head-to-head comparisons (average win rate against all instructors = 75.92%), though the difference between Gemini and the better-ranked instructor was not statistically significant. NotebookLM, by contrast, outperformed every human instructor, with one tie (average win rate = 74.75%). Second, the LLM advantage was similar across all category questions. Third, harmfulness rates for LLMs were low (Gemini 3.41%, NotebookLM 3.64%), compared to the wider dispersion among professors (1.0039.75%), underscoring that the risk of pedagogically problematic responses is comparable to that of the best human instructors. When evaluating peer-written answers, each professor on average preferred LLM responses over responses generated by human instructors, suggesting that model outputs were not merely appealing to a particular subset of evaluators. Fourth, the engineered textual features explain only part of the LLM advantage: in calibration analyses, observed LLM win rates systematically exceed the win rates predicted from lexico-syntactic differences alone, indicating that the preference for LLM answers is not reducible to length, clarity, or other stylistic markers. The post Eventually, the Steam Drill Always Wins: "Law Professors Prefer AI Over Peer Answers" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-salary-wars-have-begun-first-firm-matches-new-biglaw-pay-scale/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 18:02:00 +0000 The raises are officially underway, and associates everywhere are refreshing their inboxes. The post The Salary Wars Have Begun: First Firm Matches New Biglaw Pay Scale appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/biglaw-office-space-driving-best-real-estate-boom-this-century/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 18:01:00 +0000 Law firms are leasing space like it's 1999. Which is all well and good until the robots arrive. The post Biglaw Office Space Driving Best Real Estate Boom This Century appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/boeing-pursues-insurers-over-ethiopia-plane-crash Tue, 02 Jun 2026 18:34:15 +0100 Boeing is pursuing arbitration against dozens of insurance groups for more than US$1 billion to cover legal claims arising from the 2019 crash of an Ethiopian Airlines plane. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/02/upcoming-speaking-engagements-summer-2026/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 17:30:22 +0000 NA Below is my list of speaking engagements for the summer of 2026. Unless otherwise noted, all events are free and open to the publicand in person. The listed times are those in the time zone where the event is being held. I normally post lists of speaking engagements only during the academic year. But this summer, I have an unusually large number of them. So I decided to do a post. I may add additional events and information to this post, as they are scheduled, and update details on existing ones. In the meantime if your university, think tank, research institute or other similar organization would like to invite me to speak (either virtually or in person) on any topic within my expertise, I am open for business! June 12, 12-1 PM, Southwest Florida Federalist Society, Lawyers Division Chapter, Bruno's (restaurant), 2149 First St., Fort Myers, FL: "Immigration is Not Invasion." Note: I accidentally listed the wrong date for this event (June 10). June 12 is the correct date. June 17, 3-4 PM, Housing Working Group, American Institute for Economic Research (online event): "The Constitutional Case Against Exclusionary Zoning." This event is, I believe, limited to members of the AIER housing working group, and possibly other AIER affiliates. June 17, 6-9 PM, Institute for Humane Studies, National Press Club, Washington, DC: "IEEPA and the Limits of Executive Power." This event features a live podcast recording, followed by a Q&A session, and a reception. Registration and other information available here . July 7, 6-7:30 PM, Annual Supreme Court Review, National Constitution Center, Philadelphia, PA: "Tariffs and the Limits of Executive Power" (tentative title). Panel on "The Supreme Court and Executive Power." July 15, time TBA, Brennan Center for Justice, New York University, NYU DC 1307 L Street NW, Washington, DC: "Assessing the Tariff Decision" (tentative title), conference on "Congress and the Court. The post Upcoming Speaking Engagements - Summer 2026 [Updated] appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/how-day-pitneys-new-managing-partner-is-thinking-about-growth-ai-and-leadership/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 17:13:00 +0000 Michael Byrne discusses strategic expansion, AI adoption, firm culture, and what it takes to lead a law firm through a period of rapid change. The post How Day Pitneys New Managing Partner Is Thinking About Growth, AI, And Leadership appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/alert-milbank-does-it-again-associate-salaries-are-going-up/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 16:34:30 +0000 Associate compensation is getting bumped $10k-$20k, depending on class year. The post ALERT: Milbank Does It Again Associate Salaries Are Going Up!!! appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/filevines-new-legal-ai-platform-lois-turns-ai-into-a-true-legal-coworker/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 16:14:31 +0000 [Sponsored] Legal work isnt slowing down, and the firms that win wont be the ones working harder theyll be the ones working smarter. The post Filevines New Legal AI Platform LOIS Turns AI Into A True Legal Coworker appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/canadian-investor-loses-nafta-case-over-mexican-mine-blockade Tue, 02 Jun 2026 16:55:13 +0100 A Canadian mining company says an ICSID tribunal has thrown out its US$408 million NAFTA legacy claim against Mexico over an alleged illegal blockade by local miners. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-vulnerability-window-is-shrinking/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 15:33:43 +0000 Law firms do not need to panic every time a new AI-related cybersecurity headline appears, but they do need to be ready to act. The post The Vulnerability Window Is Shrinking appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/02/new-in-civitas-the-roberts-court-needs-to-reboot-the-machinery-of-death/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 15:27:14 +0000 The Roberts Court seems to be methodically scaling back the excesses of the Burger Courts. But one area that has not yet been revisited is the death penalty. Despite the Court imposing "history and tradition" tests for other aspects of the Bill of Rights, the Eighth Amendment still follows the "evolving standards of decency" standard. This sort of living constitutionalism is an anathema to the notion of a written Constitution. One of the most egregious manifestations of this standard was Atkins v. Virginia . This standard was egregiously wrong and has proven impossible to implement. And murderers with purported intellectual disabilities cannot plausibly rely on this or any other Supreme Court precedent. Yet Atkins remains. Just last month the Court DIG'd Hamm v. Smith , I suspect, because Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett didn't want to decide it. I suspect there will be leaks from the Court to make sense of this flip . The Court needs to start over on the Eighth Amendment. Or in today's lingo, they need a reboot. My new essay in Civitas Outlook is titled, " The Roberts Court Needs To Reboot The Machinery Of Death ." Here is the introduction: In the span of one year, the Burger Court created a constitutional contradiction. Furman v. Georgia (1972) proclaimed that the Eighth Amendment prohibits states from terminating the life of murderers. One year later, Roe v. Wade (1973) ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from protecting the life of the unborn. Both rulings represented the heights of judicial hubris. The Justices, and not the elected branches, would decide who could live and who could die. Neither ruling was even remotely plausible as an originalist matter. Both rulings led to chaos and uncertainty in the law. While the Supreme Court would not revisit Roe for nearly two decades, the Court returned to the death penalty four years later. In the face of a popular backlash, the Court in Gregg v. Georgia (1976) allowed the states to resume executions. But this decision still allowed the judiciary to superintend capital punishment based on "evolving standards of decency." This sort of living constitutionalism is an anathema to the notion of a written Constitution. But worse still, this standard gives liberal elites who define "decency" the power to define our justice system. This regrettable standard persists to the present. Just last week, the Supreme Court declined to resolve a capital case where mental health professionals insisted that a cold-blooded killer could not be executed because one of his five IQ scores may have been too low. The Court owes the victims of brutal murders and the Constitution far better. The machinery of death needs a reboot. And the conclusion: Given the ham-handed dismissal in Hamm , state Attorneys should go on offense. They should ask the Court to reverse Gregg, Atkins , and all related cases in every petition and cross-petition. The states need a power saw to remove this doctrine root and branch. The Court should once and for all eliminate the evolving standards test. The Eighth Amendment should be interpreted in an originalist fashion like the rest of the Bill of Rights. IQ tests did not exist in 1787, yet our framers somehow managed to execute people. States are free to impose greater restrictions on capital punishment or ban it altogether. But this issue is not for the judiciary to decide. Gregg v. Georgia should meet the same fate as other discarded Burger Court precedents like Roe , Bakke , Chevron , Lemon , and the list goes on. Two decades after Gregg , Justice Harry Blackmun concluded that all forms of capital punishment were unconstitutional. Blackmun, the author of Roe v. Wade , may have been President Nixon's greatest mistake. Watergate was over in a few years, but Blackmun's judicial impact stretched two decades. In Callins v. Collins (1994), Blackmun declared, "From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death." Blackmun got it exactly backwards. Judicial abolition of the death penalty was the problem, not the solution. The way for judges to stop tinkering with the machinery of death is to stop tinkering with the machinery of death. The Roberts Court should reboot the machinery of death, and get the judiciary out of this interminable quagmire. The entire Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has been an abject failure at every level. In my mind, the most perverse aspect of the abolition movement is that so much effort is aimed at helping the most gruesome murderers, even as defendants who committed far less serious offenses with a greater chance of success are severely underrepresented. States are free to abolish capital punishment, and the federal courts should exit this thicket. The post New in Civitas: "The Roberts Court Needs To Reboot The Machinery Of Death" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-wiley-rein-data-breach-lawsuit-yet-another-cybersecurity-wake-up-call/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 14:46:13 +0000 Theres a potential for greater liability and claims. The post The Wiley Rein Data Breach Lawsuit: Yet Another Cybersecurity Wake-Up Call appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/cambodia-takes-thailand-conciliation-over-maritime-border Tue, 02 Jun 2026 15:13:29 +0100 Cambodia has initiated a compulsory conciliation procedure under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to resolve a long-running maritime boundary dispute with Thailand, saying it hopes to unlock exploration of energy resources estimated to be worth over US$300 billion. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://medcitynews.com/2026/06/massachusetts-lawsuit-unitedhealthcare/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 14:03:00 +0000 The Massachusetts attorney general sued UnitedHealthcare, alleging the insurer improperly inflated MassHealth members health risk scores to secure at least $100 million in excess payments. The post Massachusetts Attorney General Sues UnitedHealthcare, Alleges $100M MassHealth Fraud appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-radical-justice-thomas/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 14:00:00 +0000 (Andrew Harnik/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-radical-justice-thomas/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 14:00:00 +0000 (Andrew Harnik/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/02/suggestion-that-rabbi-endorses-jews-for-jesus-may-be-defamatory/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 13:32:37 +0000 From Amitay v. Jews for Jesus , decided Thursday by the California Court of Appeal (Justice Marla Miller, joined by Justices James Richman and Tara Desautels): In December 2023, JFJ posted on its social media pages, including on Facebook and Instagram, a blurred photograph of an Israeli soldier wearing a yarmulke. Above the photograph was the following text attributed to "Nachman": "'Thank you for leaving at my home a copy of the New Testament. I look forward to reading it when I return home from the war'Nachman, a young Haredi soldier." {" Haredim are sometimes referred to as 'ultra-Orthodox,' although this term may be considered objectionable."} {Some of the posts went on to state: "One of the ways that God provides for His people is through the generosity of other people around the World, like you. Because of your support, we were able to give a copy of the New Testament to Nachman and more than 1,000 Israelis in 2023!"} Amitay filed a complaint against JFJ, attaching screenshots of JFJ's posts. He alleged that the photographs posted by JFJ were photographs of him, that they had been posted without his consent, and that defendant had defamed him . Amitay alleged that he was a Jewish Orthodox rabbi who had "dedicated his life to the study of the Jewish Orthodox faith and committed many years studying to become a rabbi," recounting about a dozen years of study. He had finally gotten a job teaching at an institution in Israel where he had worked for two years, a position he described as his "dream job." His job "suddenly came to an end as he was terminated due to an egregious act by JFJ," namely, "upload[ing] photos of Amitay on [its] social media pages." He alleged: "JFJ posted a picture of [him] on their website giving the appearance that he supports JFJ's cause. Not only was a photo uploaded, but the post included a caption also falsely expressing that [he] supported JFJ's religious views." Amitay alleged that he is "an Orthodox Jew, a more traditional branch of Judaism, which [has] starkly different views from JFJ." He "never before associated with JFJ and disagrees with their religious views." Amitay alleged that when his employer "saw the pictures posted online," they "expressly stated that his termination was due to the posts online of him supporting JFJ, and that they could not condone or be associated with someone involved with JFJ or their views." Amitay alleged that the posts were false because Amitay "has no affiliation with [JFJ] and disagrees with [JFJ's] religious views." Amitay also submitted third party declarations. Chaim Chadad, who described himself as "a friend and acquaintance," declared: "I saw the picture and it seems that [Amitay] writes there in favor of Christianity for a non-profit organization named Jews for Jesus." Another friend of Amitay, David Menachem Mundel Shaher, declared: "When I saw the picture of [Amitay] with a caption to the effect that he believed in a false god, I was shocked, and it is impossible to express the extent of my shock." A rabbi in the Israeli army declared: "I saw a picture of Ariel Amitay in the [social] media, and I was shocked that an observant Jew would write in support of Christianity for all to see. This is contrary to his role as a religious Jew ." The appellate court held that the case could go forward. Some excerpts: JFJ's second argument is that the posts "do not reference Amitay by clear implication" because JFJ "blurred [his] face;" in other words, Amitay fails to sufficiently allege that the posts are of and concerning him. We disagree. In order to satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement, "the plaintiff must effectively plead that the statement at issue either expressly mentions him or refers to him by reasonable implication." Here, as pleaded, the quote in the posts can be reasonably understood to refer to the person in the juxtaposed photograph, and Amitay has sufficiently alleged that he is the person in the photograph. JFJ contends that "libel per quod requires plaintiff to plead and prove that the publisher intended the words to impute wrongdoing to plaintiff[,]" citing Palm Springs Tennis Club v. Rangel (Cal. App. 1999). However, we decline to impose an intent requirement, which is contrary to "the great weight of authority" including our own prior decision. (See White v. Valenta (Cal. App. 1965) [requiring the plaintiff to prove the defendant intended the defamatory meaning "is contrary to other cases [citations] and the great weight of authority"]; Carl v. McDougall (Cal. 1919) ["If the words were slanderous, the intention with which they were used is immaterial "].) Amitay has presented admissible evidence that JFJ made statements to third persons who reasonably understood the statements to be about Amitay. [T]he reasonable inference from [witnesses'] statements is that each of these individuals saw the picture of Amitay in one of JFJ's posts, recognized Amitay in the picture, and attributed to Amitay the words quoted . Second, Amitay has presented admissible evidence that others understood the posts to have a defamatory meaning, namely, that Amitay was supporting JFJ or its faith. (See Taus v. Loftus (Cal. 2007) ["The tort of defamation 'involves (a) a publication that is (c) defamatory .' [Citation.]"]; Civ. Code, 45 ["Libel is a publication which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his occupation"].) Chadad declared: "[I]t seems that [Amitay] writes there in favor of Christianity for a non-profit organization named Jews for Jesus. I was surprised that an educator would speak against Judaism . This is unacceptable . This caused me to distance myself from him for a period ." Rabbi Eichel stated: "I saw a picture of Ariel Amitay in the [social] media, and I was shocked that an observant Jew would write in support of Christianity for all to see. This is contrary to his role as a religious Jew, and it is testimony to his mental instability." Shaher declared that he "saw the picture of Ariel with a caption to the effect that he believed in a false god" and "there is no place in the community for such a person or for his children." A reasonable inference is that Shaher understood the posts to mean that Amitay had expressed support for the evangelistic views of JFJ. JFJ contends for the first time on appeal that "deciding whether Jews for Jesus harmed Amitay's reputation and standing would require the factfinder to improperly entangle itself in the tenets of Orthodox Judaism." We conclude that JFJ waived this contention for purposes of its anti-SLAPP motion. Even if we considered JFJ's untimely argument, the argument is not persuasive. The post Suggestion That Rabbi Endorses Jews for Jesus May Be Defamatory appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-state-of-the-death-penalty-at-the-supreme-court/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000 (Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/02/disturbing-lawful-meeting-doesnt-need-to-be-substantial-to-be-criminal-at-least-if-a-purpose-to-disrupt-is-shown/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 13:02:11 +0000 From a May 5 decision by the Ohio Court of Appeals in City of Nelsonville v. Nguyen , decided by Judge Michael Hess, joined by Judges Jason Smith and Kristy Wilkin: The State of Ohio, City of Nelsonville appeals the judgment rendered in this criminal case involving an offense of disturbing a lawful meeting. The State contends that the trial court erred when it added the element of "substantial" to the offense of disturbing a lawful meeting under R.C. 2917.12(A)(1) to its jury instructions. The State presented witness testimony from the Nelsonville City Council President, Gregg Clement, that the Nelsonville City Council held a regular meeting on April 14, 2025 at which two new council members were to be sworn in following the roll call. However, after roll call and before the swearing in, [former City Council President] Nguyen stepped forward and began speaking. Clement called Nguyen to order and instructed her that it was not the appropriate time to speak and that she could make comments during the citizens' comment period. Nguyen continued to speak, and Clement called her to order a second time and again instructed her that she could speak under the citizens' comment period. Nguyen continued to speak and Police Chief Devon Tolliver, who was providing security for the meeting, stepped in and tried to get Nguyen to stop speaking, but she continued so Chief Tolliver removed her from the council meeting. Clement called a recess of the meeting for approximately 10 to 15 minutes to allow everyone to regain composure. Following the recess, the meeting was resumed, there were no further interruptions, council business was conducted, and the meeting concluded. Clement testified that he believed that Nguyen had the misconception that she was the Nelsonville City Council President and could speak anytime during the meeting. However, because Nguyen had resigned from council several weeks earlier, Clement understood that Nguyen was no longer a member of council. Nguyen testified that she believed that she was the city council president during the April 14, 2025 meeting and had the right to speak when she did without waiting until the citizens' comment period. Nguyen testified that it was her intent to speak for two minutes. A video recording of the meeting was played for the jury. The video shows Nguyen speaking and arguing with council president and the police chief continuously for approximately three and one-half minutes. Nguyen continues to argue loudly with law enforcement off camera as she is removed from the meeting, such that Clement called a recess for approximately 10 to 15 minutes. Nguyen was charged with a violation of Ohio Rev. Code 2917.12(A)(1): (A) No person, with purpose to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, procession, or gathering, shall do either of the following: (1) Do any act which obstructs or interferes with the due conduct of such meeting, procession, or gathering . The question was whether a "substantiality" element, which wasn't included in the statutory text, was nonetheless required by Ohio law, and the court said no: [An earlier] case, State v. Schwing (Ohio 1975), involved the conviction of Schwing under R.C. 3761.11, which stated, "No person shall willfully interrupt or disturb a lawful assemblage of persons," after he entered a meeting room at a public university where speakers were discussing proposed changes to the Ohio Criminal Code. Schwing shouted profanities and physically restrained a municipal court judge in attendance. The Court recognized that R.C. 3761.11 was an attempt to discourage deprivation of the right to assemble. The Court found that audience activities of heckling and booing maybe be impolite but nevertheless advance the goals of the First Amendment. The First Amendment contemplates a debate of important public issues; its protection can hardly be narrowed to the meeting at which the audience must passively listen to a single point of view. The First Amendment does not merely insure a marketplace of ideas in which there is but one seller. The Court found that R.C. 3761.11 made no distinction between constitutionally protected interruptions of a lawful assemblage and interruptions which substantially impinge on the right of assembly. The Court held that the trial court's charge to the jury should have narrowed the scope of R.C. 3761.11 to willful disturbances that cause a lawful assemblage "to terminate in an untimely manner" or those which "substantially impair the conduct of the assemblage." Since R.C. 3761.11 was repealed and replaced by R.C. 2917.12, the Supreme Court of Ohio has not considered the constitutionality of R.C. 2917.12. However, other Ohio courts have. In State v. Brand (Ohio App. 1981), Brand was shouting during an event held on Fountain Square in Cincinnati where First Lady Rosalyn Carter was speaking. The appellate court held that the trial court erred when it did not give limiting jury instructions that the interference must be "substantial" as defined by the Court in Schwing. In State v. Wolf (Ohio App. 1996), Wolf was convicted of disturbing a lawful meeting in violation of R.C. 2917.12(A)(1) after he attended a local board of health meeting and attempted to sit at the board table and make statements about another attendee. The appellate court [held]: R.C. 2917.12(A)(1) does not contain the term "substantial," and therefore it was not necessary for the trial court to instruct the jury on the definition of the term or on any limitation of the statute in relation to the term. In State v. Zagger (Ohio App. 1981), Zagger was convicted of disturbing a lawful meeting under R.C. 2917.12 for a "pie in the face" attack on a speaker at a public high school. The appellate court found that Schwing was only applicable to the repealed R.C. 3761.11. Zagger was charged under was R.C. 2917.12 which the court found was "not identical to its predecessor. In addition, it so clearly encompasses the corrective principle of Schwing, that its constitutionality without a limiting instruction is patent." For R.C. 2917.12(A) contains a constricting and defining preface which attaches to all the prohibited acts which follow. That preface limits the statute's prohibitions to acts whose purpose is "to prevent or disturb a lawful meeting, procession, or gathering ." So defined the perimeter of the unlawful conduct confines only unprotected acts. Thus, R.C. 2917.12 did not require a delineating instruction to save its constitutionality. In Columbus v. Doyle (Ohio App. 2002), Doyle was convicted of disturbing a lawful meeting in violation of a city ordinance identical to R.C. 2917.12. Doyle was at a public school district meeting, which allowed speakers three minutes of speaking time during a public comment period. Doyle went over his three minutes and was told several times to stop commenting and sit down. He refused and was physically removed by police officers and charged with disturbing a lawful meeting. The appellate court found that the statute was constitutional because it does not regulate the content of a person's speech . Here Nguyen was not in the public square or on a public university like the defendants in Schwing and Brand , where strong First Amendment rights to freedom of speech exist; she was at a city council meeting. City council meetings are limited public forums. Because Nguyen was at a limited public forum, her speech could be limited to the discussion of certain topics and limited to a designated and abbreviated period. The Nelsonville City Council established a viewpoint neutral and reasonable citizens' comment period and asked Nguyen to hold her comments until the citizens' comment period. She refused and was removed and charged with disturbing a lawful meeting. Nguyen does not contend, nor do we find any evidence in the record, that she was prevented from speaking due to the viewpoint of her speech. We find the analysis of Wolf, Zagger, and Doyle persuasive. R.C. 2917.12(A)(1) does not contain the term "substantial" and targets persons who act "with purpose to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting." Because this case does not involve a traditional public form, like a public street or park, our holding is limited to limited public forums. Thus, we do not consider the constitutionality of R.C. 2917.12 as applied to a traditional public forum. A procedural twist: This was an appeal from a judicial decision that led to a jury acquittal. That is normally forbidden by the Double Jeopardy Clause, but not here, because the government was just trying to clarify the law going forward, rather than trying to undo the acquittal of Nguyen in particular: The jury found Nguyen not guilty. The State filed a motion for leave to appeal the trial court's jury instruction, which we granted. Under R.C. 2945.67(A) and App.R. 5(C) a prosecuting attorney "may appeal by leave of the court to which the appeal is taken any decision, except the final verdict, of the trial court in a criminal case." This provision grants us "discretionary authority to review substantive law rulings which result in a judgment of acquittal so long as the judgment itself is not appealed." "Even where principles of double jeopardy preclude retrial so that no current controversy exists, appellate review is permitted if 'the underlying legal question is capable of repetition yet evading review.'" See this post for more on this sort of procedure. Bradley S. Nicodemus (The Nicodemus Law Office, LPA) represents the City of Nelsonville. The post "Disturbing Lawful Meeting" Doesn't Need to Be "Substantial" to Be Criminal, at Least if a "Purpose to Disrupt" Is Shown appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/court-asked-to-bar-alabama-from-using-preferred-map/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.justsecurity.org/140084/zambia-chinese-pressure-backsliding-democracy/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=zambia-chinese-pressure-backsliding-democracy Tue, 02 Jun 2026 12:51:02 +0000 Zambias cancellation of RightsCon is an indication not only of Chinas influence, but also the country's own democratic erosion under a government that promised otherwise. The post In Addition to Chinese Pressure, a Backsliding Democracy May Explain Zambias Decision to Cancel a Major Human Rights Summit appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/02/court-rejects-claim-that-rwandan-speech-restrictions-will-prevent-rwandan-witnesses-in-u-s-perjury-trial-from-speaking-freely-about-the-genocide/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 12:01:00 +0000 From Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV yesterday in U.S. v. Nshimiye (D. Mass.): This is a criminal case arising out of a six-count indictment charging defendant Eric Tabaro Nshimiye with perjury, obstruction of justice, and knowingly concealing material facts in his application for refugee status in the United States. Nshimiye has moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting that the Rwandan government and its restrictions on speech will prevent the witnesses from speaking freely about the genocide, rendering their testimony unreliable, and that admitting such testimony would violate his due-process rights. He [also] contends that the government cannot establish that the statements alleged in Counts One and Three were knowingly false or material. For the following reasons, the motion will be denied. Eric Tabaro Nshimiye was born and raised in the Republic of Rwanda. He is a Hutu, which is the majority ethnic group in Rwanda. In April 1994, the Rwandan genocide targeting the country's Tutsi ethnic population began. At the time, Nshimiye was enrolled as a medical student at the University of Rwanda in Butare. The government alleges that Nshimiye was an active member of the Movement Revolutionaire National pour le Development ("MRND"), a group that committed genocidal acts in Rwanda in 1994. At some point in 1994 or 1995, Nshimiye fled Rwanda to Kenya. In May 1995, he applied to become a refugee to the United States and was admitted in December 1995. He became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1998 and achieved United States citizenship status in 2003. The government alleges that he knowingly made false statements about his involvement in the Rwandan genocide at each stage of the immigration process. In April 2019, Nshimiye was called to testify as a defense witness on behalf of Jean Leonard Teganya, his former University classmate and roommate. Teganya was charged with committing perjury and making false statements during immigration proceedings about his membership in the MRND and his actions during the Rwandan genocide. Nshimiye testified under oath before a federal jury. In Count One, Nshimiye is charged with perjury for testifying that while he and Teganya were University roommates, Teganya did not wear a scarf or hat with MRND insignias. When asked about the apparel, he replied "I don't remember this type of hat," and replied in the negative to questions about Teganya displaying a MRND flag and attending political rallies during university. In Count Two, he is charged with perjury for denying that he lived in Butare during the genocide. When questioned under oath, he stated that "[he] was not in Butare," but rather in Kigali. In Count Three, Nshimiye is charged with perjury for denying his own involvement in the MRND, including political rallies and trainings. He also denied wearing a scarf, hat, and lapel pin marked with MRND insignias and colors during his time at university. In Count Four, he is charged with perjury for denying his involvement in the genocide while under oath. In Count Five, Nshimiye is charged with aiding and abetting the obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. 1503 and 1502. The government contends that he knowingly concealed material evidence and testified falsely in Teganya. The court rejected defendant's due process argument: Defendant contends that the Rwandan government's strict limitations on free speech, criminalization of political dissenters, and lack of judicial independence will spill over into this case and affect the willingness of the witnesses to speak openly for fear of mistreatment. According to defendant, this would make the testimony of any witness from Rwanda inherently unreliable, which is fundamentally unfair and interferes with his ability to present a defense. That argument falls short, among other reasons, because it does not establish the requisite state action required for a due-process violation. Broadly, defendant alleges that this prosecution violates the Due Process Clause, which prohibits the federal government from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. To state a claim under the Fifth Amendment, a defendant must show government action that violates procedural or substantive due process. Defendant alleges that the government is acting as an agent of the Rwandan government by coordinating with Rwandan authorities and making arrangements for witnesses to come to the United States. However, bringing in witnesses from abroad is a normal part of criminal cases. In fact, federal law authorizes cooperation with foreign authorities in gathering testimony. Moreover, the alleged political influence of the Rwandan government over the witnesses does not constitute state action on the part of the U.S. government. The Due Process Clause applies to misconduct by the United States, not to actions by foreign governments or private actors. To state a due-process violation, a defendant must plausibly allege conduct attributable to U.S. officials, and even then, the bar is quite high. Dismissal is appropriate only where the government conduct is "so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes." Defendant contends that the U.S. government worked with Rwandan authorities to bring witnesses to testify. But routine practices such as bringing in witnesses from abroad to testify, including international cooperation, do not meet the high bar for due-process violations. In this case, there is no evidence in the record that the U.S. government has created or contributed to the conditions in Rwanda that defendant describes, interfered with witness testimony, or taken any action to suppress or improperly influence witness testimony. Nor is there any evidence that the U.S. government knowingly intends to call witnesses who will give false testimony. Without more, allegations concerning the reliability of witness testimony raise credibility and evidentiary issues that must be addressed at trial, not in a motion to dismiss. As to the claims that the government couldn't show that the statements were false and material, the court reasoned: Nshimiye contends that his testimony was (1) not knowingly false, because the questions concerned events from more than 25 years earlier, and (2) immaterial, because his statements were about trivial facts. When the elements of perjury, including knowledge and materiality, are in dispute, such determinations should be reserved for a jury. The Court cannot find as a matter of law that the statements were immaterial or that defendant could not have had the requisite intent. His arguments that his allegedly false statements reflected faulty memory, not intentional conduct, raise factual issues that are not properly resolved on a motion to dismiss. Amanda Beck, Christopher R. Looney, and Jason A. Casey, all of the U.S. Attorney's Office (D. Mass.), represent the government. The post Court Rejects Claim That Rwandan Speech Restrictions Will Prevent Rwandan Witnesses in U.S. Perjury Trial "from Speaking Freely About the Genocide" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167625 Tue, 02 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Mondays hastily convened meeting of the UN Security Council at the request of France in response to escalating violence in Lebanon between Israeli forces and Hezbollah militants has underlined deepening international concern as the conflict intensifies, despite ongoing US mediation efforts. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167626 Tue, 02 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Khalilur Rahman was elected President of the UN General Assemblys 81st session on Tuesday after defeating Andreas Kakouris of Cyprus in a closely contested vote, positioning himself to steer the world body through a pivotal year marked by intensifying global crises, UN reform efforts and major leadership transitions. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167629 Tue, 02 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Escalating violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to impact civilians and efforts to fight Ebola, UN aid coordination office OCHA said on Tuesday. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167628 Tue, 02 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Women and girls in Lebanon are paying an increasingly devastating price as violence and displacement continue despite a ceasefire, the UN reproductive health agency (UNFPA) warned on Tuesday. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167623 Tue, 02 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 As the world approaches nine years since the mass displacement of Rohingya refugees from Myanmar into Bangladesh, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) has appealed to the international community not to abandon the 1.2 million refugees living in the country, most of them in camps in Coxs Bazar. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167622 Tue, 02 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Overnight attacks in three key cities in Ukraine have left several civilians dead, scores more injured, and homes, hospitals and shops destroyed or damaged, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in the country said on Tuesday. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167621 Tue, 02 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The UN health agency in Lebanon is verifying reports of strikes on a hospital in the southern city of Tyre on Monday, amid a concerning rise in attacks on healthcare in the country. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167627 Tue, 02 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The UN human rights office, OHCHR, on Tuesday welcomed the opening of two specialised judicial units in Haiti, saying the move marked a significant step toward tackling widespread impunity in the country. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167620 Tue, 02 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The UN urged all countries on Tuesday to bolster early warning systems after confirming the onset of El Niño, warning that the Pacific Ocean-warming phenomenon will bring above-average temperatures nearly everywhere and fuel more extreme weather. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://www.justsecurity.org/140887/early-edition-june-2-2026/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=early-edition-june-2-2026 Tue, 02 Jun 2026 11:43:33 +0000 Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here. A curated weekday guide to major news and developments over the last 24 hours. Heres todays news: IRAN WAR LEBANON OPERATIONS Iranian state media reported yesterday that Tehran was halting peace negotiations with the United States and might end the ceasefire, citing ongoing Israeli attacks [] The post Early Edition: June 2, 2026 appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/could-us-deep-sea-mining-spell-the-end-of-unclos Tue, 02 Jun 2026 12:06:01 +0100 The Trump administrations bid to begin unilateral deep-sea mining could lead to inter-state disputes and potentially the collapse of UNCLOS, delegates at London International Disputes Week heard. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/02/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-2-1952-7/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 11:00:01 +0000 6/2/1952: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer decided. The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 2, 1952 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/117692/when-the-guardrails-erode-series/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=when-the-guardrails-erode-series Tue, 02 Jun 2026 10:00:14 +0000 Bringing together expert analysis that traces this erosion, assesses the risks for democratic governance, and outlines pathways to rebuild or even reinvent these safeguards. The post When the Guardrails Erode Series appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/gbs-disputes-welcomes-back-paschalidis-partner Tue, 02 Jun 2026 10:05:25 +0100 Gaillard Banifatemi Shelbaya Disputes has welcomed back Paschalis Paschalidis who was part of the former Shearman & Sterling team that founded the firm five years ago as partner, after a break during which he established an arbitration practice in Luxembourg. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/fieldfisher-adds-partner-clyde-co Tue, 02 Jun 2026 09:10:04 +0100 Energy disputes practitioner Richard Power has left Clyde & Co to join the partnership at Fieldfisher. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/02/open-thread-223/ Tue, 02 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/serv_02jun26_407_e.htm Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 At a series of meetings held from 2 to 4 June, the WTO Council for Trade in Services and its subsidiary bodies discussed a broad range of issues for possible future work, ranging from the services aspects of electronic commerce to the green services economy. Members also agreed to hold a dedicated workshop to share information on the recognition of foreign professionals' qualifications. Discussions continued on ways to help least developed countries better participate in services trade, facilitate remittance transfers, and improve the classification of environmental services. Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/serv_02jun26_407_e.htm Tue, 02 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 At a series of meetings held from 2 to 4 June, the WTO Council for Trade in Services and its subsidiary bodies discussed a broad range of issues for possible future work, ranging from the services aspects of electronic commerce to the green services economy. Members also agreed to hold a dedicated workshop to share information on the recognition of foreign professionals' qualifications. Discussions continued on ways to help least developed countries better participate in services trade, facilitate remittance transfers, and improve the classification of environmental services. Law/World Trade Organization https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/10-000-federal-lawyers-gone-see-also/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 23:30:00 +0000 We Knew Folks Have Been Jumping Ship, But The Number Is Staggering : The government has been bleeding attorneys since 2025 . Hueston Hennigan Is Paying Out The Big Bucks : Summer bonuses up to $35K ! Aging Out Of Life Tenure : The reasons for giving Supreme Court justices life appointments don't hold up anymore . Trump Gets The Boot : The Kennedy Center gets its old name back . Florida Supreme Court Tells You To Check Your Sources : You should have learned this in legal writing ! The post 10,000 Federal Lawyers Gone See Also appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/openai-is-latest-tech-company-in-the-litigation-hot-seat/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 23:02:00 +0000 Lawsuit against the artificial intelligence giant. The post OpenAI Is Latest Tech Company In The Litigation Hot Seat appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/01/my-new-article-making-the-case-against-mass-deportation/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 22:49:02 +0000 Today, the Society for the Rule of Law published my article on "The Case Against Mass Deportation," on its Checks and Balances substack. Here is an excerpt: Since Donald Trump returned to the White House in January 2025, U.S. immigration enforcement and deportation operations have become more cruel and oppressive than they have been in many decades, if not ever - with victims including both immigrants and many US citizens. The best approach to curbing these abuses is cutting back on deportations more generally. Since Trump returned to office in January 2025, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and other federal officers have killed at least three U.S. citizens (two in Minnesota and one in Texas ), wounded numerous others, and detained hundreds illegally, usually after mistaking them for illegal migrants. ProPublica found some 170 cases of illegal detention of citizens through October 2025. But that is almost certainly a severe underestimate. ICE and other agencies also make extensive use of racial profiling, which leads to detention and harassment of numerous U.S. citizens who are Asian, black, or Hispanic, or look like they might be and thus potentially suspect. The enormous extent of racial and ethnic profiling by ICE is shown by the fact that immigration arrests in Los Angeles County declined by 66 percent after a federal court order barring the use of such tactics (the ruling was eventually blocked by the Supreme Court , perhaps for procedural reasons). Conservatives and others who favor color-blind government cannot make an arbitrary exception for immigration enforcement. Conditions in ICE detention facilities are often horrific , routinely featuring overcrowding, inadequate food and denial of essential medical treatment. Since the start of the present fiscal year in October, a record 29 people have died in ICE detention, even though the fiscal year is only about half over. The brutality and violations of civil liberties have been exacerbated by the administration's massive expansion of the number of ICE personnel ( including hiring many poorly qualified people ), and by its imposition of deportation quotas incentivizing arbitrary arrests with little or no proof. There have been so many illegal ICE detentions that courts have ruled against the administration in detention cases some 11,500 times , including thousands of decisions issued by Republican-appointed judges. The abuses of the deportation system have increased significantly thanks to Trump's policies. But the system is cruel and unjust even under more conventional presidents. Illegal detention and deportation of U.S. citizens long predates Trump. Northwestern University political scientist Jacqueline Stevens estimated that the federal government detained or deported more than 20,000 U.S. citizens from 2003 to 2010. Racial profiling is also not unique to the Trump era. Ultimately, it is impossible to deport any large proportion of the estimated 13.7 million undocumented immigrants in the United States without arresting and detaining many people with little or no due process. Ultimately, the only way to end or greatly reduce that brutality is to radically scale back deportation itself. There are a variety of ways to do that.. The rest of the piece outlines a variety of potential reforms. UPDATE: In the original version of this post, I forgot to include a link to the article . That error has now been corrected. The post My New Article Making "The Case Against Mass Deportation" [Updated with link] appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/01/court-upholds-dismissal-of-u-s-coast-guard-auxiliary-officer-for-crass-statements-on-linkedin-in-uniform/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 22:31:31 +0000 From Wenzler v. U.S. Coast Guard , decided today by Seventh Circuit Judge Michael Scudder, joined by Judges Amy St. Eve and Joshua Kolar: James Wenzler posted a series of crass statements on LinkedIn while serving as a member of the Coast Guard Auxiliary and depicting himself in uniform. The Auxiliary investigated, told him to stop, and removed him from its ranks after he failed to heed its warning. James Wenzler joined the Coast Guard Auxiliary in 2007. He held various positions over the years, eventually becoming a Vice Flotilla Commander. Wenzler publicized his affiliation with the organization on LinkedIn. His profile depicted him in uniform and represented that he served as the Auxiliary's Branch Chief for Human Resources. In May 2022, a member of the public complained to the Auxiliary about Wenzler's LinkedIn posts. One of the posts accused certain Supreme Court Justices of being racist, and another included a crude remark about the Girl Scouts. Here are the details on the posts, from the district court opinion : The first [post] was in response to a post congratulating Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson. Wenzler's responsive post read: "Another racist makes the court to join racist Sotom[a]yor and Kag[a]n. Great job America!" The second post was in response to a post commending a girl scout for writing a letter to the editor to complain about an announcement regarding boy and girl scouts that the writer deemed sexist. Wenzler's responsive post read: "Well if you are proving you are just having fun, then you are. To find something sexist is to show you are the sexist. Perhaps the Girl Scouts should actually accomplish something, but alas they just sell cookies." Back to the Seventh Circuit opinion: The Auxiliary's investigation resulted in District Commodore Harvey Randall issuing Wenzler a letter of caution. The letter directed Wenzler to remove from social media any photos of himself wearing his uniform and to delete any reference to positions in the Auxiliary. It also instructed Wenzler to confirm compliance with the directive. Wenzler failed to comply. Indeed, on July 15, he emailed District Commodore Randall, stating, "I disagree with your fake Letter of Caution, and am going to file a complaint against you for your racist and bigoted action against me because I am White. I find your behavior reprehensible." Wenzler then stayed the course. In August 2022, the Auxiliary found that his LinkedIn profile still depicted him in uniform and listed him as a Branch Chief in the Human Resources Directorate. The Auxiliary also discovered additional insensitive and insulting posts. For example, Wenzler had quipped that the President-elect of Northwestern University, who had just been diagnosed with cancer, did a "horrible job" at the University of WisconsinMadison, her former employer, and "end[ed] up with the physical results of what she was" there. A member of the public saw the post and reacted negatively, asking in the comments if the Auxiliary really had put Wenzler in charge of human resourcesessentially questioning whether he was fit to serve as a leader. When the Auxiliary followed up, Wenzler doubled down. He confirmed that he had no intention of adhering to the Auxiliary's social media directive. So the Auxiliary suspended him and began a formal disciplinary process, which resulted in the Coast Guard disenrolling Wenzler. The court upheld the dismissal: "[T]he First Amendment protects a public employee's right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern." Our analysis is the same whether the speaker is a volunteer for a government organization or a paid employee. To determine whether speech is constitutionally protected, we apply the two-step Connick / Pickering test. First we ask whether the speech in question involved a matter of public concern, as opposed to a purely personal interest. If so, we balance the speaker's interest "in commenting upon matters of public concern" against the government's interest "in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees." Accepting that Wenzler's speech touched on matters of public concern, we focus only on balancing the parties' interests. On the facts before us, the Auxiliary's need for "discipline or harmony among co-workers" and continued "public confidence" dominate. The nature of an organization informs the deference we give in determining whether its employees' speech will deleteriously impact the organizational mission. The parties have latched onto language in our precedent identifying certain organizations as "paramilitary" and thus entitled to greater deference in this assessment. These cases considered the discretion afforded to law enforcement agencies, correctional centers, and the like. And indeed we deferred to those types of organizations' "own assessment of the risks to security and discipline." But the deference in reasonably determining what type of conduct is detrimental comes from the nature of an organization and its mission. It does not stem from any separate test for whether an organization qualifies under a "paramilitary" label. We are convinced that the Coast Guard Auxiliary deserves deference in assessing and responding to its members' speech when they hold themselves out as members of the organization while wearing its uniform. "For command, control, and administrative purposes," Congress gave the Auxiliary a military-like hierarchy consisting of "a national board and staff , districts, regions, divisions, flotillas, and other organizational elements and units." The Auxiliary's possible missions are substantial. As a constitutional matter, the President, as Commander in Chief, may direct the Commandant to request and authorize assistance from the Auxiliary. As a statutory matter, the Auxiliary may "assist the Coast Guard as authorized by the Commandant, in performing any Coast Guard function, power, duty, role, mission, or operation authorized by law." This includes the ability to "conduct a patrol of a waterway" if certain preconditions are met. And while Auxiliarists may not "engage in direct law enforcement or military missions" or "enforce limited access areas," they "may advise the public regarding compliance with [a] limited access area." Auxiliarists may also serve as "unarmed opposition forces" during training exercises as well as "gather information and data for the development of Coast Guard, State, and local government contingency plans." Congress further recognized that some missions could place Auxiliarists at risk and therefore provided benefits to those who are "physically injured or die[ ] as a result of physical injury incurred while performing any duty" assigned to them by the Coast Guard. For his part, Wenzler sees the Auxiliary in more limited terms, as only a volunteer "nonmilitary organization" where members elect their own leadership and may not carry weapons. He tells us that the Auxiliary is nothing more than a "government-sponsored fraternity." We cannot agree. By statute, Congress established the Auxiliary and made it a component of the Coast Guard and thus, at least indirectly, answerable to the Commandant of the Coast Guard. Wenzler also contends that because the Auxiliary lacks the means to compel obedience from its members it should receive no deference in policing their speech. Here, too, we disagree. Even in the actual armed forces of the United States, earning the privilege to lead has always required buy-in from subordinates. Given its statutory scheme and enabling regulations, we are convinced that the Auxiliary deserves deference in its reasonable determinations of how its members' speech will impact its mission. Given the uncontested facts before us, the Auxiliary could have reasonably determined that Wenzler's speech and actions would be detrimental to the Auxiliary and its reputation. He served in a leadership role and the example he set mattered. The Auxiliary could have reasonably expected that other Auxiliarists would be less likely to work with Wenzler, or at least to work well with him, following his derogatory comments and attacks on others. "[A] public employer may act based on potential disruption so long as its predictions are reasonable." Wenzler's statements alarmed at least two members of the public enough to notify the Auxiliary. On this record, the Auxiliary could have been justifiably concerned about negative impacts to its reputation and, in turn, its recruiting and retention. In the long run, its ability to serve the public might suffer, or at least the Auxiliary could have reasonably believed so. Robert Ying-Tsai Joynt and Leslie K. Herje of the U.S. Attorney's Office (W.D. Wis.) represent defendants. The post Court Upholds Dismissal of U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Officer for "Crass Statements on LinkedIn" "in Uniform" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/supreme-court-urged-to-uphold-lower-court-decision-striking-alabama-congressional-map-as-raciall/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 21:57:35 +0000 (Daniel Slim/AFP via Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/tech-fluency-is-the-new-reputation/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 21:32:00 +0000 Reputation has become contextual. The post Tech Fluency Is the New Reputation appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/the-value-of-trumps-personal-relationship-with-xi-jinping/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 20:44:00 +0000 Perhaps Trump's bloviations about his personal relationships are worth as much as his bloviations on other topics. The post The Value Of Trumps Personal Relationship With Xi Jinping appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/01/judge-ross-should-have-been-punished-for-abdicating-her-judicial-power-to-her-law-clerks/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 20:19:11 +0000 Judge Eleanor Ross, who serves on the federal bench in Atlanta, engaged in multiple acts of misconduct . She carried on a secret affair with an Atlanta police department officer for nearly two years, repeatedly had loud sex in her chambers, lied about her trysts, and obstructed the investigation. Each of these actions warranted a public reprimand and an impeachment inquiry. But one of the more stunning allegations has flown under the radar: Judge Ross routinely signs judicial orders her law clerks prepare without even reading them. Indeed, it seems she never even talks about these cases with her clerks, so likely has no clue what she is even approving. Yet the council that reviewed this case found no misconduct. Let me tell you a not-so-well-kept secret: most judges let their law clerks do far too much. Take it from my personal experience. I clerked in a federal district court for two years immediately after law school. The judge I clerked for, who recently passed away, was a dedicated jurist and an honorable man , but he let his clerks have far too much autonomy. At the time, I was overwhelmed with how many important decisions turned on my immature judgment. In hindsight, I cringe at my mistakes that the judge did not catch. Judge Ross will likely lose her judgeship, either through resignation or impeachment. But the public needs to take a closer look at judges who have abdicated the judicial power to unknown law clerks. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal's Judicial Council, which reviews misconduct complaints, interviewed six of Judge Ross's former law clerks. They explained that the judge's "longstanding practice was to handle all criminal case work without law clerk assistance." This choice makes some sense, as Ross was a former prosecutor. This work is also predictable. Virtually all federal cases wind up with plea bargains, so the most difficult work concerns calculating a defendant's sentence. This sort of judgment will be based in large part on experience and judicial philosophy. The judge I clerked for would allow law clerks to make recommendations but he always calculated the sentence himself after considering all the evidence. In contrast with the criminal docket, Judge Ross had no oversight of the civil docket. All six clerks reported that Judge Ross "did not indicate to the clerk how the judge was inclined to rule on the motion or otherwise provide any direction." Moreover, "it was generally understood that" Judge Ross "did not wish to discuss substantive civil-case related issues with clerks." I suppose her time was better spent having loud sex in chambers. To be clear, the Judge didn't talk to her clerks about cases before they were assigned, and didn't want to talk to the clerk while the cases were being considered. Worse still, it appears that the judge rubber-stamped virtually every civil order that came before her. The clerks relayed that Judge Ross "rarely, if ever, substantively edited civil orders the clerks drafted." Indeed, the clerks were "generally unaware as to whether the Subject Judge reviewed pleadings or draft civil orders." As proof, a law clerk "stated that on multiple occasions the judge emailed the clerk to docket an order within a few minutes of receiving it, indicating that the judge may not have had time to read it." Most civil cases in the federal system are resolved on motions without the benefit of oral argument. Judge Ross was likely able to get away with ignoring her civil docket unless summary judgment was denied and the case went to trial. At that point, she would have to catch up. A career clerk "recalled one instance in which, during the middle of a civil trial, [Judge Ross] made a comment indicating that the judge had recently, for the first time, read the order denying summary judgment in the case." With good reason, the clerks felt "uncomfortable with the level of discretion they appeared to exercise in handling civil cases" especially "given their inexperience." Judge Ross offered only a partial rejoinder to her clerks. Judge Ross conceded that she does not review any of the filings before assigning a case. Accordingly, she "does not offer clerks guidance, in advance, as to whether a motion should be granted or denied." The Judge maintained that she is "always available" to answer "substantive legal questions." Though it is unclear how much help she can provide if she never read any of the briefs. Judge Ross further "insisted that draft substantive orders are reviewed, and, from time to time, needed corrections are identified." Indeed, it isn't even clear what "reviewed" means in this context. She admitted "making edits to between 30 and 40 percent of draft orders." So between 60 percent and 70 percent of the orders she signed had no edits. How often is any work product perfect when delivered? As any editor would tell you, the answer is never. If "corrections are identified" only "from time to time" then the judge is not reviewing documents at all. What about those orders that she edits? Does Judge Ross read the briefs, check the caselaw, or assess the legal arguments? Or does she simply proofread to find typos? I would wager she does little if any substantive work. The Judicial Council that investigated Judge Ross's sexual misconduct and dishonesty said little about the civil docket. The committee was "troubled by the law clerks' assertion that the Subject Judge is not engaged in the resolution of civil cases (and, indeed, by the judge's own admission of such a lack of engagement)." Yet, the council found that the "facts established do not support a finding of judicial misconduct." Moreover, the council was assured that Judge Ross promised to "be more engaged in civil cases and more open to substantive discussions with law clerks." But notice what the Judge did not promise to do: read the briefs, inform the law clerks how she was inclined to rule, and read every order before signing it. This is not much of a promise. The public might be appalled that a life-tenured judge has delegated to a twenty-something law clerk the unchecked power to decide complex and impactful cases. But for anyone who has spent time in chambers, this sort of behavior is far too common. Recently, several judges got in trouble for publishing orders with AI-hallucinated cases . In each case, they blamed their law clerks . The truth is the judges blindly signed the orders without checking any of the substance. Here, I feel compelled to disclose some of my own experience. The judge I clerked for had two clerks each year. The cases would be randomly assigned based on the docket number: one clerk would manage the odd-numbered cases and the other clerk would manage the even-numbered cases. During my two years there, I don't think the judge ever told me in advance how he wanted me to resolve a civil case. To be sure, if I ever had any questions--and I had many--the judge was always willing to talk about the case. But I do not recall that he had read the briefs. The advice was more generalized. When I submitted a draft opinion, he would always read it printed out on paper, and he would leave comments in the margins with his perfect penmanship. As best as I can recall, the comments mostly involved proofreading (then, as now, my work had typos). Occasionally he would write that my prose was not clear or that he didn't understand some point. I do not remember many substantive comments. He did not appear to check my citations, or determine whether my legal arguments were fully supported by precedent. I also don't think he checked the record to make sure my assertions were supported by facts. At some point early in the clerkship, I had this painful epiphany. I realized that I bore so much responsibility for someone else's life, liberty, or property, and I felt completely inadequate for the task. I recognized that the judge was unlikely to catch my errors, and it was up to me to get everything right. That is a stunning amount of responsibility for someone a few months out of law school. But, as can be predicted, I did not live up to that responsibility. One incident still burns in my mind. I was assigned a fairly complex commercial dispute. The motion for summary judgment raised an issue of first impression for the court. I spent more than a month writing an opinion on this issue, which I found really interesting. In the end, I recommended that the court grant summary judgment on the novel claim. As I recall, the judge reviewed the opinion for typos and substance but as usual, didn't question my bottom line conclusion. Shortly after the opinion was issued, the losing party filed a motion for reconsideration. I had never seen such a motion during my clerkship, but I realized it was bad. The lawyers relayed that the novel issue was raised for the first time at the summary judgment phase, and was not raised in the complaint. I can't recall if this issue was contested in the summary judgment phase, but it didn't matter. Under the rules of procedure, claims not raised in the complaint are waived. I screwed up, big time. I remember having this sinking feeling in my stomach. I wondered whether I would get fired (not the first time and not the last time I would have that feeling). The judge, who was far more patient than I deserved, was not upset. He calmly said I should revise the opinion to remove the discussion of the waived claim, and he would reissue the order. We did just that, and the case proceeded. With the benefit of hindsight it is clear enough that the judge did not read the complaint, the motion to dismiss, or the motion for summary judgment. There was no way he would have caught my egregious error given his processes. At most, he read the opinion his neophyte law clerk put together. This near-complete delegation of authority happens in every federal court in the country. That this practice is so common demonstrates why the Judicial Council was "troubled" but found no misconduct. I suspect that at least some, if not most, of the judges on the council engage in this behavior. Judge Ross's sordid affair, and subsequent lies, should be reason enough to remove her from the bench. But there should be more scrutiny of how she manages her civil dockets. First, it should be easy enough to compare how much time elapsed between when a clerk submitted an order and when the order was docketed. If only mere moments passed, that would be some proof that she did not even review these orders. Second, the court should compare the draft orders her clerk prepared and the final orders that are submitted. Again, this test would verify if she in fact reviewed a third of her orders, and determine how substantive those revisions are. This sort of inquiry might be labor intensive, but an AI app could process these inquiries in a few seconds. If she did not even offer this minimal scrutiny of her civil docket, it is possible that Judge Ross made further misstatements to the council. Still, I don't think this inquiry should end with Judge Ross. There should be a broader discussion of whether federal judges can blindly sign orders they do not even read. The Eleventh Circuit judicial council found this act to not be misconduct, but did not explain why. The President nominates, and the Senate confirms, federal judges with a lifetime position to exercise the judicial power. They are responsible for ensuring that people are not deprived of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law. Blindly signing an order prepared by a rookie clerk seems little better than flipping a coin to resolve a dispute. Perhaps it is common enough for Presidents to sign executive orders he does not read, or for members of Congress to vote on bills they do not read, but federal judges should aspire to a higher standard. The rule of law depends on it. The post Judge Ross Should Have Been Punished For Abdicating Her Judicial Power To Her Law Clerks appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/supreme-court-term-limits-are-the-least-dangerous-most-necessary-reform-on-the-menu/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 20:18:11 +0000 Life tenure may have been a shield to insulate the Supreme Court from politics, but it's a sword now and it's destroying the Court's legitimacy. The post Supreme Court Term Limits Are The Least Dangerous, Most Necessary Reform On The Menu appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/florida-makes-new-ai-rule-check-your-damned-work-or-else/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 19:13:00 +0000 Speaking truthfully, the new rule shouldn't change anything. It may though. The post Florida Makes New AI Rule: Check Your Damned Work Or Else! appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/rwanda-loses-claim-against-uk-over-scrapped-asylum-scheme Mon, 01 Jun 2026 20:00:44 +0100 A PCA tribunal has rejected claims for more than 100 million brought by Rwanda against the UK over a scrapped deal whereby illegal immigrants to the UK would be relocated to the east African state while their asylum claims were processed. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/imprisoned-jordanian-lawyers-launch-claims-against-uae Mon, 01 Jun 2026 19:45:09 +0100 Two Jordanian lawyers who allege they suffered inhuman treatment during their detention and imprisonment in the United Arab Emirates have lodged ICSID claims against the state. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/biglaws-newest-giant-is-officially-open-for-business-at-record-speed/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 18:27:00 +0000 The newly combined firm says its focus is on delivering scale, efficiency, and cross-border firepower. The post Biglaws Newest Giant Is Officially Open For Business At Record Speed appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/court-rejects-broad-interpretation-of-compassionate-release-statute/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 18:17:13 +0000 (Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/job-of-the-month-brand-new-ultra-rare-partnership-opportunity-2-2-2/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 18:16:00 +0000 [Sponsored] The firm pays near Cravath and offers associates a realistic hours requirement of 1800 hours annually. The post Job Of The Month: Tax Associate With Chambers-Ranked Group appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/landau-slams-self-promoting-lawyers-in-lidw-keynote Mon, 01 Jun 2026 19:13:29 +0100 Toby Landau KC used a keynote at London International Disputes Week to decry a new era of self-promotion in which lawyers and arbitrators are damaging the trust at the foundation of arbitration by curating their reputations, regardless of ability. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/01/justice-thomas-faults-the-courts-inconsistent-approach-to-summary-reversals/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 17:33:25 +0000 Today the Supreme Court summarily reversed an Eleventh Circuit capital case, Whitton v. Dixon . Justice Thomas dissented, joined for the most part by Justice Alito. The Eleventh Circuit issued a 60-page decision, but the Court found objectionable two sentences. As Justice Thomas points out in his dissent, the Eleventh Circuit can simply strip out those two sentences, and the outcome would remain unchanged. This seems to be the essence of harmless error. Why, then, did the Court waste everyone's time with a summary reversal? Justice Thomas charges his colleagues with an inconsistent approach to summary reversal. This Court has increasingly granted summary relief in certain cases based on lower court errors that seemingly had no effect on the outcome of the case. See Pitts v. Mississippi, 607 U. S. 1 (2025) (per curiam) (granting summary vacatur for man who sexually abused his daughter after likely harmless trial error); Doe v. Dynamic Physical Therapy, LLC, 607 U. S. 11 (2025) (per curiam) (granting summary vacatur after likely harmless state intermediate appellate court error). It would be one thing if this practice reflected the Court's consistent commitment to correcting legal error in all cases. But, in reality, this Court routinely declines to provide relief to law-abiding Americans when it would actually matter, even after lower courts conspicuously flout this Court's precedents in ruling against them. Over the years, I've noticed this practice. The Court issues a narrow summary reversal on grounds that are easily surmounted, the lower court affirms the conviction, and then the Supreme Court denies cert. What's the point? Why waste so much time and effort on correcting an error that will not affect the outcome of the case. The Supreme Court often says its certiorari docket is not designed for error correction, but as usual, all the rules go out the window for capital cases. The murder in this case occurred in 1990. As often happens in capital cases, delay is the end and not the means. Justice Thomas also flags specific cases where his colleagues denied certiorari, even as lower courts flouted the Supreme Court. First, he noted two post- SFFA affirmative action cases involving the Boston School Committee and Thomas Jefferson High School in Alexandria, Virginia. The Court refused to "correct a glaring constitutional error." Second, he pointed to the Court's refusal to revisit the Feres doctrine in Beck v. United States . (Justice Alito did not join this part of the dissent, as he did not dissent in Beck .) Third, Thomas cited two cases from Speech First that challenged campus bias response teams. Lower courts found there was no standing, and the Court did nothing. I continue to think the Supreme Court's mandatory jurisdiction should be expanded. Too many important issues are being left unresolved, and the Justices offer no explanation why. This failure to take important cases is compound when the Justices expend their limited resources in summarily reversing a capital case where the outcome will not change. The post Justice Thomas Faults The Court's Inconsistent Approach to Summary Reversals appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/pearsall-proposes-mandatory-early-ai-assessment Mon, 01 Jun 2026 18:33:19 +0100 Gibson Dunn partner Patrick Pearsall presented a radical proposal at London International Disputes Week: inserting a mandatory requirement in arbitration agreements to conduct an early case assessment using artificial intelligence. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/booted-from-kennedy-center-trump-stomps-off-in-a-rage/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 17:26:00 +0000 Cancel culture claims another victim. The post Booted From Kennedy Center, Trump Stomps Off In A Rage appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/trafigura-gets-final-award-against-zambian-state-entity Mon, 01 Jun 2026 18:17:20 +0100 Singapore-based commodities trader Trafigura has won more than US$91 million in an LCIA arbitration against a Zambian state-owned investment company. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/01/ice-expected-the-court-to-accept-its-basis-for-detaining-petitioner-but-shield-its-rationale-from-the-court/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 17:09:04 +0000 From Judge Sanket Bulsara (E.D.N.Y.) Wednesday in Nazarenko v. Genalo : On May 25, 2026, Respondents filed an answer to the [habeas] petition in this case. That response contained as an exhibit an INA 236(a) Initial Custody Determination ("INA 236(a)"). The document was redactedincluding the date and time of the arrest of Petitioner and the "Discussion" outlining the basis for a finding of dangerousness. ICE took it upon itself to redact the document, claiming it had been "authorized for release on the condition that certain information, regarding the assessment of dangerousness, be redacted." The Court immediately noted that the filing of such a document violated its Individual Practices. And importantly, there was no version of the document filed on the docket for the Court to view in unredacted form. In other words, ICE expected the Court to accept that it properly conducted an evaluation of Petitioner's dangerousness, and the basis for detaining Petitioner, but shield its rationale from the Court. Such practices are repugnant to the rule of law, and ICE is warned that further obfuscation and misuse of sealing and redaction before the undersigned will lead to sanctions against the agency. The Court herein details the reasons why it will not tolerate such practices in the future. To its credit, upon order that the information be provided to the Court, the United States Attorney's Office filed an unredacted version of the document on the docket. With that unredacted version there was a motion to seal, to keep the information from all public view. The motion is denied. The motion claims that the information contained therein is protected by the law enforcement privilege. This misapprehends the posture of the case and the filing. The Court is not conducting a discovery exchange with the parties, where one side can claim privilege and avoid scrutiny of a document. Respondents have relied upon the INA 236(a) to justify their detention of Petitioner, an extraordinary remedy in a civil proceeding, and to respond to the allegation that his detention violated due process. Having produced the document, Respondents cannot assert a privilege over its contents. They cannot also rely on the document but then shield its contents from the other side (and the Court). See In re Sims (2d Cir. 2008) ("[A] party cannot partially disclose privileged communications or affirmatively rely on privileged communications to support its claim or defense and then shield the underlying communications from scrutiny by the opposing party."). "The unfairness courts have found which justified imposing involuntary forfeiture [of a privilege] generally resulted from a party's advancing a claim to a court or jury (or perhaps another type of decision maker) while relying on its privilege to withhold from a litigation adversary materials that the adversary might need to effectively contest or impeach the claim." And that unfairness arises when Respondents seek to use the existence of a custody determination to argueas they havethat Petitioner received due process but simultaneously preclude him (and the Court) from examining the basis on which the challenged decision was rendered. Privileges cannot be used as a shield and a sword. The law enforcement privilege also is simply unavailable. As an initial matter, "[n]o affidavits have been submitted to the Court making an official claim of privilege by the executive level officials of the departments having control over the requested information, i.e. ICE, OIA and USASDNY, based on personal consideration by those officials of the matter, specifying the information for which the privilege is claimed and explaining why it falls properly within the scope of the privilege." That alone makes the privilege out of reach for Respondents: "[n]either an unofficial invocation of the law enforcement privilege by counsel representing the government nor that counsel's assertions, with respect to the privilege, can be used to meet the threshold requirements imposed on the party invoking the law enforcement privilege." See also In re Sealed Case (D.C. Cir. 1988) (To assert the privilege: "(1) there must be a formal claim of privilege by the head of the department having control over the requested information; (2) assertion of the privilege must be based on actual personal consideration by that official; and (3) the information for which the privilege is claimed must be specified, with an explanation why it properly falls within the scope of the privilege."). But even the conclusory assertions offered by Respondents do not satisfy the assertion of the privilege. The privilege applies to "law enforcement techniques and procedures, information that would undermine the confidentiality of sources, information that would endanger witness and law enforcement personnel or the privacy of individuals involved in an investigation, and information that would otherwise interfere with an investigation." Respondents assert privilege over the basis of an ICE custody determination. But custody determinations have nothing to do with law enforcement techniques, sources, or privacy. Custody determinations are not privilegedthey are subject to review by supervisors, agencies, and courts, and are not conducted in secret. And as applied to the determination here, Respondents appear to believe that because the ICE officer relied on an Interpol notice to detain Petitionerthey are entitled to invoke the privilege. But an Interpol notice is not a secret law enforcement technique. The existence of an Interpol notice is often a matter of public record. The fact that a notice exists against a person tells us nothing about law enforcement techniques or any matter that falls comfortably within the privilege. For example, it is not information "pertain[ing] to ICE's removal operations and techniques and the logistics of removal." In this case, the reference to the Interpol noticethat it was used to detain Petitionerreveals no more information about the notice and ICE's use of the document than would be apparent from a privilege log. If it is redaction that Respondents seekthat is, to prevent the public from knowing the content of the documentthen they should have argued that redaction satisfied the [ Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga (2d Cir. 2006)] factors. Those factors govern the protection of certain information from public disclosure, notwithstanding the First Amendment interests in public access. Respondents do not acknowledge those factors , let alone attempt to satisfy them. In any event, there is no basis for permitting redaction. "[I]t is well established that the public and the press have a qualified First Amendment right to attend judicial proceedings and to access certain judicial documents. The Second Circuit has extended this right of access to civil trials, pretrial suppression hearings, plea agreements and plea hearings, information on the payment of court-appointed counsel, bail hearings, live voir dire proceedings, sentencing hearings, and even administrative hearings." The custody formand the basis for custodyfits comfortably within this scope of documents for which public access is generally accorded. And the document is central to the Court's decision-making on the petition. As the Court's decision granting the writwhich analyzes the legal basis for ICE's conclusion about Petitioner's dangerousness, concluding it violated due processillustrates, this document is a quintessential judicial document. And here's the court's opinion (released Tuesday) on Nazarenko's substantive claims: Petitioner Alexey Nazarenko ("Nazarenko"), a citizen of Russia who has lived in the United States since 2019, was arrested on May 21, 2026, by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officers at an asylum interview with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"). Nazarenko was lawfully admitted into the United States on a visitor visa on April 4, 2019, and filed an application for asylum for himself and his family members on September 27, 2019. Nazarenko is seeking asylum due to political persecution in Russia. He was an elected deputy of the Stavropol Territory Duma in Russia, which allegedly fabricated criminal proceedings against him and his family members, and also made a variety of other threats. His asylum application has been pending for seven years. And during that time, he has made every single one of his asylum and immigration appointments without fail. Nazarenko's wife and three children (two of whom are minors) reside in the United States. He has an established business in New York, which he relies on to provide for his family, and has paid his taxes. Nazarenko has no criminal history. As part of his asylum process, Nazarenko was directed to appear for an interview by USCIS. It was during this interview, on May 21, 2026, that he was arrested by ICE. The morning of the interview, ICE executed a warrant for arrest, an I-200, and a Notice to Appear ("NTA"), which placed him in removal proceedings. The sole basis for concluding that Nazarenko should remain in custody was that he "is wanted by INTERPOL in Russia for the crime of Fraud if convicted he faces up to 10 years in prison." This turns out to be false. And either ICE deliberately misstated facts or failed to investigate them before detaining Nazarenko. The Court directed Respondents to provide the document that ICE relied upon to conclude that Nazarenko is wanted by Interpol. In response, Respondents submitted a letter indicating that Interpol's notice was not a "Red Notice," but what was known as a "Diffusion." "A 'diffusion' is a request for cooperation that is processed through each Interpol member country's national central bureau and, while less formal than a Red Notice, it seeks the arrest of a wanted person with a view towards extradition." {This Court has ruled in another case that Red Noticeswhich differ from diffusion noticescannot be the purported basis for arrest and detention by ICE. See Yeleshev v. LaRocco (E.D.N.Y. May 14, 2026) ("A Red Notice confers no detention authority, and no provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act ('INA') permits detention of an individual based solely upon a Red Notice.").} The remarkable thing is that Respondents now concededays after Nazarenko was detained and only after the Court directed production of the documentthat " the Diffusion is not currently active ," and has not been since March 2026. (In fact, the document states "Warning. File under review[.]") Nonetheless, it was the sole basis for concluding that Nazarenko was a danger to the community and could not be released. There is more. The diffusion noticewhen it was validwas issued back in 2019. In the almost seven years since the notice was issued, Nazarenko has appeared for repeated check-ins with immigration authorities related to his pending asylum application. And his ties to the United States have grown stronger, having established a business, enrolled his children in school here, and never engaging in criminal conduct. It is confounding how, after the passage of years, the diffusion notice (an inactive one no less), now could be the sole basis to conclude that Nazarenko is a danger to the community. The more straightforward inference is that the custodial determination conducted by ICE was a sham. The process appears to have violated ICE's own internal regulations and guidance regarding Interpol notices. ICE personnel may not "rely exclusively on Red Notices or Wanted Person Diffusions to justify enforcement actions or during immigration proceedings." ICE Directive 15006.1 (Aug. 15, 2023). And "[t]he first thing ICE personnel must do upon learning about the existence of a Red Notice or Wanted Person Diffusion is to verify that it remains active and has not been suspended, withdrawn, or expired. ICE personnel cannot use suspended, withdrawn, or expired Red Notices or Wanted Person Diffusions." Id . 5.1. "[A] Red Notice is not independently vetted for factual and legal justification, its reliability corresponds with that of the foreign nation's arrest warrant." Yeleshev . See id. at n.7 (citing Cate Brown, Max Hudson, & Julia Luft, Russia Using Interpol's Wanted List to Target Critics Abroad, Leak Reveals, BBC (Jan. 25, 2026), https://perma.cc/5ADV-EL7A (reporting that "Russia is using Interpol's wanted lists to request the arrest of people such as political opponents claiming that they have committed crimes")). In this case, Nazarenko had an asylum application that indicated the criminal cases initiated against him by Russia were politically motivated and retaliatory. In such a situation, ICE guidance requires an officer to request additional information to make sure that the notice does not violate Interpol's rules, consult with the Department of Justice, "[r]esearch the person" and the notice to determine "whether there are indicia that the person may be the target of retaliation, harassment, or persecution." ICE Directive 15006.1 5.2. Such inquiries or investigation do not appear to have been doneat least none are disclosed in the custody determination form or the documents filed by Respondents. Despite its own directive to view Interpol notices like the present one skeptically, and to disregard invalid ones, ICE used Nazarenko's inactive diffusion notice to conclude he was dangerous. But an Interpol notice initiated by Russiaand its attendant lack of reliabilitysuggesting that a person committed fraud, does not on its face, and certainly standing alone, suggest dangerousness, particularly when it is an inactive one. In fact, ICE's own formthe one it used in this caserequires it to consider a bevy of additional factors: the extensiveness and seriousness of any criminal arrest or conviction; the length of time that has passed since any such arrest or conviction; the sentences imposed; criminal history not known to the immigration officer but disclosed by the noncitizen; statements from the noncitizen regarding dangerousness or illegal conduct; evidence of rehabilitation; compliance with sentences; employment history and ties to the community. These criteriaNazarenko's lack of criminal history, his seven-year compliance with asylum and immigration appointments, family and business tieswere plainly not considered. And ICE's failure to do so requires granting the writ. As further evidencethough none is necessaryof the botched custody evaluation is the fact there is no indication that flight risk was even evaluated. (Custody Determination at 2 (marking neither "yes" nor "no" as to whether the individual poses a flight risk and providing no discussion)). And then there are the potential other elements that should be considered in making a custody determinationincluding vulnerabilities that would counsel in favor of release. The form also marks both "yes" and "no" as to whether the officer had identified a "special vulnerability," making no reference to what that vulnerability would be and how it factored, if at all, into the custody determination. {Presumably, this refers to Nazarenko's medical conditions, ( see Pet. 41 (detailing, among other things, his ongoing mental health treatment for PTSD and spinal pain control therapy for an injury sustained during an assault in Russia)), or his asylum claim, but the Court cannot determine which on this record.} This cavalcade of errorsthe conclusory evaluation; the exclusive reliance on a diffusion notice alone for a dangerousness evaluation; the failure to consider other factors about Nazarenko's background, presence, and criminal history; and the failure to consider any special vulnerabilitiesdemonstrate that Nazarenko was not provided with the process to which he is entitled, rendering his detention invalid. [T]here is [also] a separate and independent ground to conclude that his arrest was also likely illegal and violated due process. On May 21, 2026, ICE placed Nazarenko into removal proceedings, which as the name suggests, are intended to effectuate his removal from the United States. Yet, the I-797 Notice of Action USCIS issued in 2019 to him, states unequivocally "[y]ou may remain in the U.S. until your asylum application is decided." For ICE to now arrest Nazarenkowith full knowledge of his asylum application, at an asylum interview no less, after advising him that he could remain here without the threat of removal while that application was pending, and in the absence of any changed circumstancesis a form of misconduct. And "affirmative misconduct by the Government may create an estoppel against the Government in immigration cases." Akbarin v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. (1st Cir. 1982) (collecting cases); see also Corniel-Rodriguez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. (2d Cir. 1976) ("[T]his court and others have held that the Government's improper actions may preclude it from deporting an alien, even if the language of the Immigration & Nationality Act, read in vacuo, might suggest a difference result."); e.g. , Alfaro v. Mullin (E.D.N.Y. 2026) ("As the recipient of an unexpired period of deferred action and a valid work authorization from USCISby which the agency committed to take no steps to effect his removal and permitted him to work in the U.S.Petitioner could not lawfully be arrested and detained by ICE, particularly in absence of changed circumstances and without notice or opportunity to be heard."). Respondents are directed to effectuate Nazarenko's release by May 26, 2026 at 10:00 P.M. and file a letter on the docket confirming Nazarenko's release by that time. Respondents are enjoined from detaining Nazarenko absent further direction from this Court. Respondents may not use ICE ankle monitors or similar technology to monitor Nazarenko, because in this Order the Court provisionally grants the writ. The post "ICE Expected the Court to Accept [Its] Basis for Detaining Petitioner, but Shield Its Rationale from the Court" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/justices-send-case-of-death-row-inmate-back-to-lower-courts-grant-new-first-step-act-case/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 16:56:52 +0000 (Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/10000-federal-lawyers-are-gone-and-trumps-response-basically-confirms-why-they-left/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 16:47:00 +0000 The New York Times put the numbers behind what everyone already knew. The post 10,000 Federal Lawyers Are Gone And Trumps Response Basically Confirms Why They Left appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.justsecurity.org/140413/dangerous-speech-white-houses-aliens-website/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=dangerous-speech-white-houses-aliens-website Mon, 01 Jun 2026 16:24:01 +0000 The White Houses new Aliens.gov website uses fear, dehumanizing rhetoric, and conspiracy themes to build public support for mass deportations. The post Dangerous Speech in Disguise: The White Houses New Aliens Website Is Not a Joke appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/introducing-the-legal-tech-to-english-dictionary-version-2-0/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 16:18:00 +0000 [Sponsored] It's back with updates for the AI era! The post Introducing The Legal Tech-To-English Dictionary Version 2.0 appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/farren-leaves-fieldfisher-rejoin-bclp Mon, 01 Jun 2026 17:14:24 +0100 Ania Farren has left Fieldfisher to rejoin the partnership at Bryan Cave Leighton Paisner in London. Law/Global Arbitration Review https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/summer-bonus-season-picks-up-steam-as-elite-firm-hands-out-up-to-35k/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 15:27:00 +0000 Associates at this firm are swimming in bonus money. The post Summer Bonus Season Picks Up Steam As Elite Firm Hands Out Up To $35K appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/01/the-art-of-the-deal-contd-contd/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 15:23:25 +0000 [I am assuming that you all know the basic background of the Slush Fund "Settlement"; my earlier discussions are here and here .] Things are definitely heating up on the Slush Fund front. Even for a President for whom courtroom losses are a depressingly regular occurrence [1] , and even putting aside the Order from D.D.C . requiring him to take his name off of the Kennedy Center, Friday was a tough day for our President. First, in Floyd et al v. DOJ , the district court (ED VA, Judge Brinkema) enjoined the DOJ from "taking any further action pursuant to the creation or operation of the Anti-Weaponization Fund, including the transferring of money to the Fund; the consideration of any claims submitted to the Fund; and the disbursing of any funds from the Fund." [2] And then a second court (SD FL, Judge Williams), re-opened the Trump v. IRS case (in which Trump had agreed to a voluntary dismissal of his claims), based on " grievous allegations that [Trump] voluntarily dismissed this litigation solely to avoid judicial scrutiny of a lawsuit that was collusive from the start and was only filed to provide the imprimatur of legality for an unlawful settlement . [3] " The court further ordered Trump to file a response to those allegations by June 12, "detailing his "position on . . . (1) the charges of collusion and whether the Parties are truly adverse; (2) the assertion that the dismissal in this case was premised on deception by the Parties; and (3) the question of whether the case should be reopened because the Court was the victim of a fraud." (Emphasis added) Do stay tuned. This is getting very interesting and is, potentially, very important. Coming at a time when our President is already in a weakening political position - an unpopular war, inflation, etc. - this looks like it may generate some push-back from Republicans previously willing to toe the MAGA line. The decision of the Republican Senate leadership not to vote on Trump's priority immigration budget before adjourning a couple of weeks ago was widely interpreted as a mini-revolt of sorts against the Fund, and Republican Senators have been unusually vocal in their condemnation of the Fund.* *From Sen. McConnell ("Utterly stupid, morally wrong") to Sen. Tillis ("stupid on stilts") to Sen. Cruz ("a galactic blunder") to Majority Leader Thune ("I'm not a big fan"). My crystal ball is no clearer than anyone else's, but here are my predictions: (1) The Anti-Weaponization Fund will never pay a nickel to anyone. (2) Todd Blanche's days as Attorney General are numbered. This was all a pretty clever scheme to set up a Trump-controlled slush fund plus an immunity from any and all claims the IRS might be able to bring against our President and his family. That immunity is a nice little bonus that was somehow omitted from the original " Settlement Agreement, " an omission Blanche corrected in an " Addendum " dated just one day after the "Settlement Agreement" was executed. As alert readers may have noticed, the immunity has absolutely nothing to do with the "case" that Trump and the IRS were supposedly "settling" . And Trump would get all of this without anyone other than Donald Trump and Todd Blanche doing anything ! No silly congressional "authorization" or "appropriation" needed! It has Blanche's fingerprints all over it, and it looks like he may have been too clever by half. He has, rather than enriching Donald Trump, gotten him into some pretty hot water, and at the moment, at least, it doesn't seem as though the money spigot will ever turn on. If Blanche were hoping that this bit of legal legerdemain would help convince our President to remove the "Acting" from his title, I think he will be disappointed. Memo to Republican senators: This really is a good issue to take a stand on. He'll primary you anyway, whether you lick his boots or not ; just ask John Cornyn. Seems like a good time to stand up for the simple principle that even a President can't just take tax money for his own personal purposes. [1] As I have said many times because it bears repeating: Trump has lost orders of magnitude more cases in court in a year-and-a-half than any of his predecessors in their complete terms. Indeed, though I doubt that there's sufficient data to test this hypothesis, I wouldn't be at all surprised if he has already lost a greater number of cases than all of his predecessors combined. Ask your AI agent to list all of his losses if you think I'm exaggerating. [2] Plaintiffs in this case are "former career Assistant U.S. Attorney and January 6th prosecutor Andrew Floyd, Professor John Caravello, City of New Haven, the National Abortion Federation [and] Common Cause," according to plaintiffs' counsel's website (Democracy Now ). Their claim is that "the creation of the [Anti-Weaponization] Fund violates the U.S. Constitution, exceeds executive authority, unlawfully bypasses Congress's exclusive authority over federal spending and appropriations, and violates the Administrative Procedure Act." One difficult issue in this case, and one that will surely be raised by the DOJ in its responses, is whether plaintiffs have standing to object to the creation of the Fund. I'm no standing expert, but it looks like a tough hill to climb, and I'm curious to see how the plaintiffs frame their argument that they have standing to bring these claims. Interestingly, Public Citizen has filed a suit containing similar substantive claims in SD CA , on behalf of Allison Gill. Gill, according to the Complaint, was a vocal Trump critic who was targeted by the government and improperly subjected to a criminal investigation in 2019. The Complaint continues: Plaintiff has been the subject of actions taken by the federal government that could constitute "Lawfare" or "Weaponization" and may be entitled to compensation and an apology from the Fund . Plaintiff thus has an interest in the Fund's establishment and operation, including an interest in ensuring that the Fund is legally sound, that Lawfare and Weaponization are appropriately defined to cover Plaintiff's claims, and that the procedures and standards through which claims are considered are fair and equitable. It's a nice bit of legal jiu-jitsu - people subject to Trump's "weaponization" can sue and assert standing based upon their interest in being compensated by Trump's Fund! [3] The allegations are contained in a Motion submitted to the court last week by 35 retired federal judges. [See here , and my discussion here ]. According to the court's Order re-opening the case, among the allegations contained therein are ". . . the fact that the settlement in question includes a 'three-paragraph addendum' . . . [that] purports to 'forever bar and preclude' the United States from pursuing claims that could have been [otherwise] asserted [against] Plaintiffs,'), and the fact that Defendants did not 'even try[] to defend against Plaintiffs' claims' despite their active opposition to nearly identical claims in other litigation. Finally, the non-party movants assert that Plaintiffs' claims were "clearly untimely" and therefore untenable." The post The Art of the Deal cont'd, cont'd appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://abovethelaw.com/2026/06/two-years-out-of-law-school-and-billing-1410-hr-sure-why-not/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 14:42:00 +0000 The Spirit Airlines Chapter 11 case keeps delivering. At least for Davis Polk. The post Two Years Out Of Law School And Billing $1,410/Hr. Sure, Why Not. appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://medcitynews.com/2026/05/healthcare-moves-layoffs-executive/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 14:02:00 +0000 Abridge, Highmark Health, and Merck named new executives. There were also layoffs at organizations including Innovaccer, Intermountain Health, and Novartis. The post Healthcare Moves: A Monthly Summary Of Hires, Exits, And Layoffs appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/the-most-important-cases-yet-to-be-decided/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 13:30:00 +0000 (Bill Clark/CQ-Roll Call, Inc via Getty Images) Law/SCOTUSblog https://www.justsecurity.org/138164/ukraine-drone-superpower/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=ukraine-drone-superpower Mon, 01 Jun 2026 13:03:45 +0000 Ukraine is rewriting the rules of air power, replacing stockpiles of weapons as key factors in warfare with quantity, speed, and the ability to learn faster than the enemy. The post How Ukraine Became a Drone Superpower appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/01/no-pseudonymity-in-lawsuit-by-inmate-who-claims-detectives-endangered-him-by/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 13:03:12 +0000 From Friday's decision in Watts v. Jones , by Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook, joined by Chief Judge Michael Brennan and Judge Diane Sykes: Two detectives investigating an inmate at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility tried to speak with David Watts, another inmate, who had sent letters suggesting that he had valuable information about a murder and an attempted murder. One detective appeared at Watts's cell. He feared that the inmate under investigation would get wind of anything he said, so he refused to talk. Watts relates that, even so, he was threatened and harassed. Though no physical harm came to him, Watts filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages from the detectives for exposing him to risk. The court concluded that such a claim was unavailable, at least in the absence of physical harm, but also had this to say on the earlier attempts to litigate the case under seal and with pseudonyms: The district court entered an order sealing the litigation in large measure, which effectively created anonymity for the litigants and any potential witnesses. A motion to continue the sealing during the appeal led to a one-judge order denying that request but requiring anonymity all around. The result is that the parties have filed public briefs but not identified the persons involved. After hearing oral argument, this court now concludes that anonymity is inappropriate given this court's strong presumption that adult litigants must use their own names. As far as we can see, anonymity for the defendants is utterly inappropriate. Police officers, prison guards, and many other public officials are regularly sued in their own names on account of acts said to be unlawful or even unconstitutional. At oral argument counsel for the defendants consented to the use of their names. Counsel suggested that the district judge may have believed that identifying the defendants would have identified the plaintiff too, but any such belief is unsupported. The defendants are police officers who have dealt with hundreds if not thousands of prisoners over the years. Publication of defendants' identities would not point to any one prisoner. Plaintiff sought to remain anonymous out of a professed fear that he would be harmed by other inmates. Once again, however, claims based on potential harm are regularly litigated in the parties' real names. Indeed, the table of contents in plaintiff's brief, which runs to three pages, includes many decisions addressing the potential for retaliation against cooperating witnesses, and not even one of those decisions uses pseudonyms. Although plaintiff contends that he is in fear, he does not contend that he has actually been harmed by any other inmateand this even though the genesis of his suit is the assertion that, several years ago, defendants allowed other inmates to learn his status as a cooperator. When plaintiff commenced litigation based on this unrealized fear, he surrendered his entitlement to anonymity. (Contrast persons protected by the informants' privilege, whose names are protected in criminal trials largely because they did not bring publicity on themselves by initiating litigation.) Plaintiff cannot achieve anonymity by himself making allegations that expose him to risk. The Seventh Circuit is particular skeptical about pseudonymous litigation; I'm not sure how this case would have come out in front of other courts. The post No Pseudonymity in Lawsuit by Inmate Who Claims Detectives Endangered Him by appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/06/a-brewing-tariff-refund-battle/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0000 (Katie Barlow) Law/SCOTUSblog https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/01/what-if-you-start-calling-yourself-jane-smith-and-sue-as-jane-smith-instead-of-asking-to-sue-under-a-pseudonym/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:32:40 +0000 Suing under a pseudonym can often be quite valuable to a plaintiff; for instance, someone suing over alleged mistreatment by an employer may worry about becoming known as a litigious employee, and might therefore prefer to sue as a Jane Doe. But there's a strong presumption in our legal system against such pseudonymous litigation , and worry about professional or economic retaliation generally isn't enough to rebut that presumption. But what if you start calling yourself Jane Smith in your everyday life, and then argue that you've therefore informally changed your name? People are often allowed to sue under names that aren't their official names in government documents. If you routinely go by Bill Jones, for instance, you can sue as Bill Jones, even if your official name is William A. Jones, Jr. Likewise, women often start using their married names some time after marriage, or revert to their maiden names after a divorce, without going through any formal procedures. Generally , "a person is free to adopt and use any name that he or she sees fit, if it is not done for any fraudulent purpose and does not infringe on the rights of others." Yet it's not clear how far this goes, especially if the alleged name change to a generic-sounding name happens after an earlier denial of pseudonymity. I've only rarely seen discussion of this, but there's now a court decision on the subject, Judge William Young's May 7 order in Smith v. Roe (D. Mass.): The Court addresses name change and proceeding by way of pseudonym issues and outlines its view of ways the case can proceed going forward. The Court hears from the plaintiff. With agreement of the plaintiff, The Court orders that without any formal change of name the plaintiff may proceed under the name of Jane Smith. And all Court filings will reflect the name of Jane Smith. However, the original docket will reflect Jane Smith f/k/a with the plaintiff's real name. If the case goes forward to trial, starting at the time where the Judge introduces the case to the jury, the Court will use the plaintiff's real name. Any documents that need to be presented during the trial shall reflect the plaintiff's real name. The courtroom will be open during trial. If a judgment results, the judgment (so far that is necessary) will reflect the plaintiff's real name. A bit of backstory, from an August 22, 2025 order in the same case by Judge Julia Kobick (D. Mass.): Plaintiff "Jane Doe" [a former researcher at MIT] initially sued defendants Roe [another MIT researcher] and MIT in a state court case that was removed in August 2023 to this Court. Her amended complaint asserted seventeen claims against Roe or MIT, including for Massachusetts Wage Act violations and discrimination based on sex and disability. After Roe and MIT moved to dismiss the amended complaint, Judge Young held a hearing in March 2024, where he denied that motion on the condition that Doe would file, within thirty days, a further amended complaint with her "true name" as opposed to a pseudonym, and explained to Doe that "you can't just file another case before another judge or something, because our relatedness rules do require that you come back to me." Judge Young subsequently dismissed the case because Doe failed to timely file another amended complaint. Following her unsuccessful appeal to the First Circuit, Doe sought relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which was denied on April 10, 2025. Four days later, the same plaintiff, now proceeding under the pseudonym "Jane Smith," filed this lawsuit against the same parties. The defendants' redline comparing this complaint to the amended complaint in Doe makes clear the factual allegations are materially similar and involve the same underlying occurrence. Indeed, aside from one fewer count and some minor changes, the two complaints are virtually identical and assert the same sixteen claims against Roe or MIT. This action should therefore have been designated as related to Doe under Local Rule 40.1(g). The Clerk is directed to transfer this case to Judge Young, who consents to the transfer. Back before Judge Young, Doe refiled her Complaint as Jane Smith. According to a filing by a different plaintiff but who appears to be allied with Jane Smith Jarboe v. MIT , formerly Doe v. MIT this seemed to be the rationale: On the name question, Plaintiff [presumably referring to Smith, not Jarboe -EV] has filed a sealed declaration with supporting exhibits establishing that "Jane Smith" is her true legal name, adopted through a common-law name change for safety reasons unrelated to this litigation, and that the Rule 10 / Rule 17 challenge therefore fails. Declaration of Jane Smith in Response to Order to Show Cause; 10949 Dkt. 39 (show-cause order). Massachusetts recognizes that "a person may change his name at will, without resort to legal proceedings, by merely adopting another name, provided that this is done for an honest purpose." Merolevitz, Petitioner , 320 Mass. 448, 450 (1946); see also Buyarsky, Petitioner , 322 Mass. 335, 338 (1948) (name-change statute "does not restrict a person's choice of name but aids him in securing an official record"). Washington, where Plaintiff resides, likewise recognizes a common-law name change. Doe v. Dunning , 87 Wash. 2d 50, 53 (1976). I couldn't find more details on the "safety reasons." Apparently, though, Smith's argument persuaded the court to let her be identified as Smithbut not to conceal her official name altogether. The post What If You Start Calling Yourself Jane Smith, and Sue as Jane Smith, Instead of Asking to Sue Under a Pseudonym? appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.justsecurity.org/140626/israel-nili-hamas-targeted-killing/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=israel-nili-hamas-targeted-killing Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:02:32 +0000 Legal analysis of Israel's operation to kill or capture every individual involved in the October 7th massacre. The post Hunting the October 7 Attackers: What the Law of Armed Conflict Permits and What It Doesnt appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/01/conviction-for-antifa-conspiracy-to-riot-upheld-despite-claim-of-mental-disorder/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:01:06 +0000 An excerpt from the long opinion Thursday in People v. White , decided by California Court of Appeal Justice David Rubin, joined by Justices Terry O'Rourke and Martin Buchanan: On January 9, 2021three days after the riot at the U.S. capitoldefendant Jeremy Jonathan White and several fellow Antifa movement activists traveled from Los Angeles to San Diego to meet local Antifa activists to counterprotest a planned right-wing "Patriot March." Donning full tactical armor and armed with bear spray and a taser, White led Antifa marchers up and down the Pacific Beach boardwalk as many of the Antifa protesters violently confronted right-wing marchers. The scene devolved into a riot and police ultimately declared the Antifa protesters an unlawful assembly. Over a year later, a San Diego grand jury issued a 29-count indictment alleging that 11 defendants conspired to riot on behalf of Antifa to disrupt the January 9, 2021 political demonstration. All but two defendants entered plea bargains, and the case proceeded to a joint trial against only White and codefendant Brian Lightfoot. White was [convicted of] conspiracy to riot [and] sentenced White to two years. In early January 2021, a 17-year-old supporter of outgoing President Trump posted flyers online advertising a "Patriot March" near the Crystal Pier in Pacific Beach at 2:00 p.m. on January 9, 2021. Antifa activists planned a countermarch for the same day and location. The evening before the scheduled event, White, Lightfoot, and others communicated through the encrypted "Signal" smartphone messaging app about plans to "squad up" and disrupt the "Patriot March." White, whose Signal username was "ACAB Man" and whose Instagram username was "@theantifasoldier," was one of three administrators for this messaging thread, which they named "SD Fash Bash." Signal was "really the only way [White] like[d] to talk about actions" because "it's encrypted" and "keeps conversation[s] secure." There were no direct communications between White and his coconspirators in this thread. The group also promoted the Antifa counter action through its Twitter account, "SDAgainstFash." The evening before the event, this account posted that the "main group intends to meet [at specified GPS coordinates] between 12 and 12:30" and "then move to the pier at 12:30" to arrive before the march participants. The Twitter account also posted, "Bloc is recommended, but soft if you're more comfortable in it." Detective Clark explained that "soft bloc" is "another type of clothing where maybe you blend into the general public as opposed to standing out by wearing all black." The account advised that further coordination would occur via Signal. In a Signal discussion about what time the "Patriot March" participants were expected to arrive for their event, White wrote, "I think we're just trying to get there super early to hold space and not let them gather easily." White and Lightfoot, who both lived in Los Angeles, got a ride to the San Diego meeting point from White's friend, Robert S. During the drive, Lightfoot made video calls to another Antifa activist from Los Angeles (coconspirator Luis Mora) and coordinated their arrival in San Diego. Lightfoot also messaged through social media, "Got team coming from L.A." White arrived in San Diego "kitted up" in black bloc: black clothing, full body armor, a tactical helmet, a tactical vest, a gas mask, and medic patches on his chest and shoulders. White was armed with bear spray, a flashlight-taser, a knife, and scissors. He had three walkie-talkies and gave one to Lightfoot and Robert. White also had a first aid kit and tourniquet. White's trio walked from their parking lot to the pier with the other group of Antifa activists from Los Angeles. When combined with activists from San Diego, there were initially about 40 to 50 Antifa activists "dressed in all black." The crowd grew to "a couple hundred people." At times, White led the Antifa group on a march up and down the boardwalk waving an Antifa flag as the group chanted "kill all Nazis" and other slogans. White argued on appeal that he was entitled to mental health diversion, but the appellate court upheld the trial court's contrary conclusion: Initially enacted in 2018, [Cal. Penal Code] section 1001.36 "authorizes a pretrial diversion program for defendants with qualifying mental disorders." "Diversion allows for the suspension of criminal proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of mental health treatment." A defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion if four criteria are met: "(1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant's symptoms of the mental disorder would respond to mental health treatment. [] (2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant's right to a speedy trial . [] (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion . [] [and] (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community." [White's expert, Dr. Williams,] documented that White reported that his father was physically "abusive throughout his childhood," twice requiring White to seek medical treatment. White's "mother was also physically abusive" and imposed "extreme" punishments. In 2016, White and a girlfriend "moved into an RV with the goal of traveling around and doing activism." But the girlfriend physically abused White and defamed him online when he finally left her. White reported that he attempted suicide twice and "was in psychotherapy in high school" and "sporadic[ally] since then." White stated that "for the past seven years, he has devoted himself to political activism, placing it above his regular employment in importance." Dr. Williams opined that White's PTSD arose from an incident in 2019 in which Torrance police officers severely beat White, breaking his back with a baton. The beating occurred when the mayor ordered police to remove people from a public meeting and White intervened as police were about to hit a woman. "That beating led to PTSD flashbacks and a physical tic." In 2020, "White travelled around the country joining [George Floyd] protests," during which he saw people "lose eyes," "get limb injuries ," and "los[e] a finger." Based on sustaining a broken back and witnessing these other injuries, White "decided to create his 'suit of armor' to protect himself." The report noted that at other protests police beat White and shot him with a beanbag gun as he shielded protesters behind him. During his most recent arrest, "about 30 police came to his home to arrest him" around 4:30 a.m. Dr. Williams concluded that these "circumstances would lead to symptoms of PTSD." "In [his] professional opinion," Dr. Williams concluded that White's wearing a "'suit of armor,'" "carrying bear spray," and his "role of protecting others as a medic" during protests "was a manifestation of [his] PTSD" and constituted "re-experiencing trauma, even before any violence occurred." The [trial] court explained why it found "clear and convincing evidence that [PTSD] was not a motivating factor" in White's commission of the charged offenses and why White's conduct was not within the scope of the mental health diversion statutes: This is sociopolitical behavior, and at least for this motion, that was the motivating factor along with a certain degree of anger. And that anger is replicated in the social media messages and the defendant's behavior just prior to the event and just after the event and including the event. He engages in what can only be described as violent behavior, and that is the antithesis, I believe, and I think [Dr. Shaw] correctly points out that that is not the behavior one would engage in when he or she has [PTSD]. It's also notto me, it's clearly not within the legislative intent of the mental health care diversion statute. So the defendant is not a good candidate nor would it be appropriate to divert him because of this. The issue of the defendant's body armor and wearing and flags, the armor is meant for combat, and he's been to so many protests that, to me, it became a learned behavior. And by wearing that armor, one, he won't get hurt, and two, he conceals his identity which is gonna be an issue during the trial. So that motion is denied. [S]ubstantial evidence supports [this] finding . White's motion presented "a proverbial battle of the experts." Dr. Williams opined that White's PTSD contributed to his commission of the charged offenses, while Dr. Shaw opined that it did not. The trial court credited Dr. Shaw's opinion over Dr. Williams's. As recounted in detail above [see the full opinion for that], Dr. Shaw identified several grounds for rejecting Dr. Williams's opinion regarding White's PTSD diagnosis being a contributing factor, including: the limited nature of the evaluation and materials consulted; the use of a lay description of PTSD that identified only a subset of diagnostic criteria listed in the DSM-5; the examination of only a single diagnostic criterion (flashbacks) and corresponding failure to address the highly relevant avoidance factor; and the failure to address White's specific conduct during the charged offenses. These concerns gave the trial court valid, non-arbitrary reasons to reject Dr. Williams's causation opinion. Dr. Shaw also identified evidence in the record that supported her affirmative opinion that PTSD was not a contributing factor to White's commission of the charged offenses, but rather, that he was motivated by his "sociopolitical ideology." This evidence included: video evidence showing him behaving aggressively even before the Torrance incident that allegedly caused his PTSD; undisputed evidence that White "travelled around the country joining protests" rather than "avoid[ing] stimuli associated with his past trauma"; video evidence of the charged offenses showing that White did not exhibit behaviors one would expect from a person with PTSD, but rather, showed him seeking out violence; and social media posts glorifying past violence and suggesting he intended to engage in future violence. This evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that PTSD was not a contributing factor to White's commission of the charged offenses. The record also supports the trial court's implied finding that White's persistent depressive disorder was not a contributing factor. Dr. Shaw opined that White's practice of participating in political protests was inconsistent with the behavior typically exhibited by those suffering from severe depressive symptoms. Notably, Dr. Williams did not offer any opinion on this point. And the court upheld White's conviction: First, there was substantial evidence of an agreement between White and his coconspirators to riot. White and several coconspirators were members of an encrypted messaging thread titled "SD Fash Bash." The word "[b]ash" in this title carries a violent connotation. Members of the chat talked about taking "action" and made plans to "squad up." White's Instagram handle"@theantifa soldier " rather than, for example, "@theantifa medic "also suggests he intended to engage in violence rather than render medical aid. Additionally, in a different message thread, White wrote that he was "trying to get there super early to hold space and not let them gather early. " The group also chatted about using black bloc, which consists of both anonymizing attire and disruptive and aggressive tactics that include "violent confrontation to get [adversaries] to leave." White's and others' appearances upon their arrival in Pacific Beach further support a finding they intended to riot. Six-foot-three-inch White appeared in head-to-toe tactical armor and was armed with bear spray, a knife, scissors, and a taser. Lightfoot and others were also armed. White and Lightfoot also had walkie-talkies. The swiftness with which violence ensued after White's arrival further supports a finding his group intended to riot. Within minutes of arriving, White stood feet behind Lightfoot during Incident 1 as Lightfoot bear sprayed juveniles who posed no threat. White then treated Lightfoot's eyes for bear spray "blowback," but there is no evidence that White treated anyone else that day. Ryan also testified that Whitewho "was one of the main instigators"directed the Antifa crowd to attack Ryan during Incident 5 and that White himself pepper sprayed Ryan at the end of this attack. White's involvement in Incident 5 along with other Antifa members supports the existence of a conspiracy to riot. There was also abundant evidence that White or another coconspirator took an overt act to accomplish the goal of the conspiracy. White and others traveled to San Diego with tactical attire and weapons; White bear sprayed a man and his dog during Incident 2; White threatened to cover a photographer in bear spray during Incident 3; White directed the Antifa crowd to Ryan and then chased and bear sprayed Ryan during Incident 5; and White bear sprayed an unarmed bicyclist during Incident 8. Although White's actions alone satisfy the overt act element, any of his coconspirators' many overt acts would also satisfy this requirement. Finally, White's and his coconspirators' subsequent celebrations of their violence suggest that they intended to engage in that conduct all along. For example, White wrote of the attack on Ryan, "Yeah we f[***]ed his s[***] up." White also wrote of perceived white supremacists, "We've been handing them their own a[**]es for months. They're starting to not come out as much anymore." The jury could infer from these messages that White fulfilled his intent to work with others to use violence or threats of violence to disturb the public peace. Eric A. Swenson and Junichi P. Semitsu represent the prosecution. The post Conviction for Antifa Conspiracy to Riot Upheld, Despite Claim of Mental Disorder appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167618 Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The Security Council meets late on Monday at Frances request, as concern grows over escalating violence in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah amid warnings of Israeli strikes on Beiruts southern suburbs, and confusion over the status of US-Iran peace talks linked to the faltering ceasefires. Follow live here from New York. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167615 Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 As hostilities escalate in Lebanon despite a recent ceasefire extension, the United Nations continues to push for peace and support displaced civilians by providing food, protection and other assistance. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167616 Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Years after conflicts fade from the headlines, the weapons used to fight them often continue to circulate crossing borders, fuelling crime and undermining an often-fragile peace. Now, ghost guns, 3D-printed firearms and increasingly sophisticated trafficking networks are creating new challenges for governments worldwide. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167617 Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Families in Gaza living on or near the so-called Yellow Line controlled by the Israeli military have told the UN they live in constant fear of being killed or injured. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167619 Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 The United Nations continues to warn against the dangerous escalation in the war in Ukraine, a senior official told the Security Council on Monday, underlining the need for restraint and dialogue. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/06/1167613 Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Four nurses who fell ill with Ebola in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been discharged from hospital after recovering from the often-fatal illness that sparked an international health alert. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://www.justsecurity.org/140717/early-edition-june-1-2026/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=early-edition-june-1-2026 Mon, 01 Jun 2026 11:49:03 +0000 Signup to receive the Early Edition in your inbox here. A curated guide to major news and developments over the weekend. Heres todays news: IRAN WAR CEASEFIRE President Trump on Friday requested several changes to a proposed deal to extend the existing ceasefire with Iran and reopen the Strait of Hormuz during a Situation Room [] The post Early Edition: June 1, 2026 appeared first on Just Security . Law/Just Security https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/01/today-in-supreme-court-history-june-1-1925-6/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 11:00:38 +0000 6/1/1925: Pierce v. Society of Sisters is decided. The post Today in Supreme Court History: June 1, 1925 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/01/open-thread-222/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/05/31/alexis-wilkins-fbi-directors-kash-patels-girlfriend-sues-ms-now-for-defamation/ Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:18:08 +0000 From the Complaint in Wilkins v. Versant Media Group. Inc. (M.D. Tenn.), filed Friday: This defamation lawsuit is about MS Now (formerly, MSNBC) using sham "anonymous" sources to push knowingly or recklessly false allegations that Alexis Wilkins, through her relationship with FBI Director Kash Patel, abused FBI resources. Defendants are, of course, free to comment on the leadership of the FBI and its allocation of resources, whether positively or negatively. They are not, however, entitled to lie about it. Defendants falsely asserted that Ms. Wilkins demanded, and Director Patel ordered, that federal agents assigned to her security detail which did not even exist at the time escort an intoxicated friend home after a "night of partying." They falsely portrayed Ms. Wilkins as being intoxicated even knowing that she does not drink. Defendants presumed they could get away with this fiction by citing to "anonymous sources," disingenuously claiming "nonpublic" and "inside" knowledge. This was hogwash and they knew it. Journalists cannot avoid accountability by hiding behind fabricated "anonymous" sources. This lawsuit seeks to bring accountability for Defendants' egregious lies. On December 5, 2025, Defendant, MS Now, published an article, written by its employees, Defendants Carol Leonnig and Ken Dilanian, titled, "Kash Patel ordered FBI detail to give girlfriend's pal a lift home: sources" . In the Article, Defendants wrote: FBI Director Kash Patel hason more than one occasionordered that the security detail protecting his girlfriend escort one of her allegedly inebriated friends home after a night of partying in Nashville, according to three people with knowledge of the incidents. Patel's girlfriend, Alexis Wilkins, asked FBI agents on her security team at least two times, including once this spring, to drive her friend home, and agents objected to diverting from their assignment, said the sources, who were granted anonymity to discuss nonpublic matters. But Patel insisted they do as Wilkins requested and in one case called the leader of Wilkins' security detail and yelled at him to do so. This is entirely false. Director Patel has never ordered any FBI agent or member of Ms. Wilkins' security detail to escort any of Ms. Wilkins' friends homeinebriated or otherwisenor did Ms. Wilkins ask any of them to do so. Not only did these supposed demands/orders never take place, but the entire scenario is fabricated. No FBI agents have ever escorted any of Ms. Wilkins' friends home. Defendants claimed in the Article that the substance of their defamatory allegations supposedly occurred in Spring 2025. Notably, Ms. Wilkins did not have a security detail at that time. Defendants were aware of this. Defendants had previously published, on November 17, 2025, an entire article about Ms. Wilkins' security detail. Defendants were the first to break that story as Ms. Wilkins had only then been recently assigned a detail, necessary due to credible death threats made against her. On December 2, 2025three days prior to publication of the Article at issue in this caseDefendant Dilanian reached out to FBI spokesman, Ben Williamson, to obtain comment on the accusation that Ms. Wilkins' detail had been diverted to escort her friends home. Defendants grossly misrepresented and diminished the FBI's response in the Article, writing: FBI spokesperson Ben Williamson did not answer questions about multiple inside accounts of Wilkins' detail being diverted, but broadly denied such events took place. "This is made up and did not happen," Williamson said. {Since its original publication, Defendants have stealth-edited the Article, without any acknowledgement of the change. In the current online version, the sentence reads: "FBI spokesperson Ben Williamson broadly disputed that such events took place."} This was dishonest in two respects. First, Mr. Williamson did answer Mr. Dilanian's questions about these unfounded accusations. He did not just "broadly" deny them. He specifically, and pointedly, refuted them on the record after having researched the matter by speaking to all potential witnesses, explaining that there is no record or corroboration. Second, it was Dilanian who refused to answer questions. Williamson, who was flabbergasted at Dilanian's complete lack of details or corroboration, asked him for anything that would support the accusations. Their text exchange was as follows: WILLIAMSON: This detail thing you emailed about looks like it's made up. I just checked. No record of it anywhere and Alexis, who doesn't even drink, said it's not true. As did Director. Do you have any more details? General date? Who is the friend? Anything. DILANIAN: Stand by WILLIAMSON: Do you not have this info already? DILANIAN: Just to be clear no one is saying Alexis was drunk. We don't have the details you are looking for but we are comfortable with our sourcing. So just looking for your official comment. WILLIAMSON: So you have no name, no date range, no nothing just comfortable with your sourcing. Are you serious? Respectfully Defendants were, therefore, specifically aware prior to publication that the FBI had investigated the allegations and refuted them. Not only did Defendant Dilanian recklessly disregard this fact, claiming "we are comfortable with our sourcing," but Defendants omitted this information from the Article, falsely implying that the FBI made only a reflexive and broad denial, and falsely claiming that the FBI had refused to answer questions. Additionally, Defendant Dilanian lied to the FBI in the text exchange, falsely claiming that he had no information on the general date of the alleged incident. Had Dilanian provided the Spring timeframe for the allegation, the FBI could, and would have even more conclusively refuted the story by pointing out that Ms. Wilkins had no security detail at that time. Defendants, in calculated fashion, avoided that truth. They knew about the recent assignment of Ms. Wilkins' detail by virtue of their own November 17 article. They knew that if they were to give the FBI the Spring timeframe, it would result in more than just the "official comment" they were looking to get and would derail their desired narrative. Because the alleged events did not take place, all potential witnesses, including every member of Ms. Wilkins' security detail flatly, and rightly, deny the allegations from the Article. And as the FBI has no corroborating records, Defendants' "anonymous" sources could not possibly have had first-hand knowledge. If their sources existed at all, Defendants knowingly or recklessly disregarded their complete lack of knowledge and credibility. Defendants knew this and recklessly chose to publish these anonymously sourced lies in the face of on-the-record refutation. In fact, by saying in the Article that their sources were "granted anonymity to discuss nonpublic matters," and that they were "inside accounts," Defendants falsely suggest to their readers, as intended, that the sources are official, or even members of Ms. Wilkins' security detail. This alone is evidence of Defendants' maliciously deliberate obfuscation and knowledge of falsity. As implicitly acknowledged by Defendant Dilanian, the Article also implies that Ms. Wilkins was inebriated. By claiming that on multiple occasions she was out late after a "night of partying" with a group of inebriated friends in Nashville, Tennesseea city known for late-night partying and drinkingthe Article suggests to the average reader that Ms. Wilkins is a heavy drinker. This is entirely false, as Ms. Wilkins very rarely drinks, if ever. Importantly, Defendants were on actual notice that this implication was false from Mr. Williamson's text message. The complaint also (1) alleges that the statements were said with "actual malice" (i.e., were knowingly or recklessly false, (2) argues that "Ms. Wilkins is not a public figure," so that the actual malice standard doesn't apply, and instead "she need only show that Defendants acted negligently," and (3) criticizes New York Times v. Sullivan , which set forth the actual malice requirement. That last point is of course not particularly relevant in a Complaint, but presumably Wilkins is planning to raise and preserve such a challenge in the event that the Supreme Court can be persuaded to cut back on that precedent, or cut back its extension from public officials (the precise issue in Sullivan ) to public figures. The complaint also includes a "false light" claim, which is closely related to a defamation claim: It also rests on the statements being allegedly false, but seeks to recover for their being "highly offensive" to the plaintiff and to a reasonable person, rather than for their damaging reputation. UPDATE 6/1/2026, 3:43 pm: MS NOW e-mailed to say that they "stand firmly behind MS NOW's reporting," but other than that, "[a]s a general matter of practice, don't comment on ongoing legal matters." The post Alexis Wilkins, FBI Director's Kash Patel's Girlfriend, Sues MS Now for Defamation appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/envir_01jun26_409_e.htm Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) met on 1 and 5 June - marking the start and the conclusion of the seventh edition of WTO Trade and Environment Week - with members reaffirming the significance of this platform for dialogue and cooperation on trade and environment issues. Members launched a new exercise to share information on their trade and climate measures on a voluntary basis and discussed plans for future thematic sessions. Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/envir_01jun26_398_e.htm Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 The seventh edition of WTO Trade and Environment Week is taking place from 1 to 5 June at WTO headquarters in Geneva and online. The event features 16 public sessions organized by WTO members, focusing on a wide range of issues at the intersection of trade and the environment. It began with a meeting of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) chaired by Ambassador Ram Prasad Subedi of Nepal. Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/envir_01jun26_409_e.htm Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) met on 1 and 5 June - marking the start and the conclusion of the seventh edition of WTO Trade and Environment Week - with members reaffirming the significance of this platform for dialogue and cooperation on trade and environment issues. Members launched a new exercise to share information on their trade and climate measures on a voluntary basis and discussed plans for future thematic sessions. Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/envir_01jun26_398_e.htm Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 The seventh edition of WTO Trade and Environment Week is taking place from 1 to 5 June at WTO headquarters in Geneva and online. The event features 16 public sessions organized by WTO members, focusing on a wide range of issues at the intersection of trade and the environment. It began with a meeting of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) chaired by Ambassador Ram Prasad Subedi of Nepal. Law/World Trade Organization https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news26_e/women_01jun26_401_e.htm Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 +0000 At a meeting of the Informal Working Group (IWG) on Trade and Gender held on 1 June, the co-Chairs announced the launch of the third edition of the International Prize for Gender Equality in Trade, which recognizes gender-responsive trade policies. They also updated members on ongoing work with the Informal Working Group on Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (MSMEs). Members also shared experiences on the links between intellectual property, innovation and women's economic empowerment as part of the group's second thematic focus for 2026. Law/World Trade Organization https://abovethelaw.com/2026/05/a-banner-week-for-getting-caught-screwing-around-see-generally/ Sun, 31 May 2026 21:39:02 +0000 If The Chambers Are A-Rockin' Don't Come A-Knockin': A federal district court judge was caught having sex in her chambers with a high-ranking police official and then lying about it. judicial complaint. Her fellow judges issued a private reprimand, scrubbing the report of obviously identifiable material. But the judges didn't realize that AI could decipher that it was Judge Eleanor Ross of the Northern District of Georgia within minutes based just on the reports and public internet access . Department Of Justice Served With Bar Tab: A New York bar complaint targets Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche after Chief Judge Waverly Crenshaw found that he orchestrated a presumptively vindictive prosecution of Kilmar Abrego Garcia. At the same time, more than 120 scholars and former judges reminded the Florida Bar that it previously said that as long as Pam Bondi remained the sitting Attorney General it couldn't investigate ethics charges against her. And, well, she's not anymore. A Real Dog Of A Case: Houston attorney Steven Swain faces a bestiality charge after his wife's newly installed home-surveillance cameras allegedly caught him with the family dog. Two Fox Rothschild Attorneys Shot Outside A North Carolina Courthouse: Both lawyers are expected to survive after a pro se plaintiff allegedly opened fire following a contentious hearing. DOJ Continues To Confuse 'Enforcing Criminal Laws' With 'Weaponization': The DOJ fired four career prosecutors who enforced the FACE Act and then released a Weaponization Working Group report branding their work as biased against criminals that Republicans agree with, When It Rains, It Pours Sanctions: A Cayman Islands judge concluded that a Quinn Emanuel partner's affidavit was a deliberate attempt to mislead the court, adding to a rough year that already featured a $3 million sanctions order from Judge Edward Chen. A Hot Bonus Spring: Selendy Gay surprised associates with spring bonuses of up to $25,000, the latest sign that the boutiques are again setting the pace on comp. Looking For More Experience: For the first time in years, the majority of Biglaw associate hiring happened on the lateral end of the market in 2025, with law student hires sliding to 37.5 percent. Threats To Judges Apparently Only Count Above A Certain Pay Grade: A swatting attempt at Justice Amy Coney Barrett's home generated headlines, but the documented surge of threats against lower court judges -- 241 against 202 judges in 2026 alone -- keeps getting buried near the bottom of the story. Working For Trump Is Its Own Form Of Punishment: DLA Piper's Caryn Schechtman signed a brief for Trump in the Central Park Five defamation appeal, joining a long line of lawyers serving a client who already owes a dozen firms $1.6 million. The post A Banner Week For Getting Caught Screwing Around See Generally appeared first on Above the Law . Law/Above the Law https://reason.com/volokh/2026/05/31/ukraine-turns-real-life-kills-into-video-game-thrills-for-drone-pilots/ Sun, 31 May 2026 19:08:32 +0000 That's the title and subtitle of a Washington Post article today; here are a couple of excerpts: The attack drone spots the Russian soldier in a field in eastern Ukraine and swoops in. Only when it's nearly upon him does he see it. The onboard camera, sending video back to the remote pilot in real time, captures his panic. He throws his hands above his head and begins to run. The video cuts out. Then a second video, shot from a surveillance drone: The soldier's body lies in the field, motionless. The drone zooms in to show his apparently lifeless face. [T]hese videos were submitted to the Ukrainian government as entries in a competition among frontline drone pilots, with points and prizes for high scorersa literal first-person shooter in the increasing video gamification of war. Units earn points for each Russian soldier they incapacitate or kill and each weapon, vehicle or piece of military equipment they destroy. Points may be redeemed in an online government marketplace for more drones, with which to target more Russian forces. It's an interesting story, and I have no reason to doubt its factual accuracy. But it struck me as oddly lacking in historical context. I'm no military historian, but let me lay out my thinking; I'd love to hear what more knowledgeable readers have to say about it. As I understand it, the regular use of film recording to confirm kills of enemy aircraft dates back at least to World War II. And, famously, there was something of a competition for confirmed kill counts; military members have always valued a reputation for success, just like everyone else has. To the extent there's any novelty with the Ukrainian drone story, it's just that the Ukrainian military is extending that system for monitoring the killing of aircraft to killing individual soldiers. And I'm not sure just how novel that is, either: I have heard that drones are sometimes used to confirm sniper kills, though I'm not sure just how pervasive or systematized that is. As to the rewards, if the tangible reward is indeed just more drones, that sounds like a pretty obvious approach: Give more resources to the most effective units. As I understand it, Soviet Army units who had especially distinguished themselves were labeled "Guards" units , and got better equipment. But I expect that this was common in other times and places as well. Beyond that, the Soviet Union famously gave monetary rewards per aircraft kill (particularly when confirmed photographically) during World War II; even Communists could appreciate the value of financial incentives. Here's an item from Stalin's order of June 17, 1942 (see also " Aces of the Great Patriotic [War] ," as well as this August 19, 1941 order ): To incentivize the combat work of fighter pilots, [I order that there be] established starting June 20 of this year a monetary reward in the following amounts: for every downed enemy bomber pay 2000 rubles; for every downed enemy transport plane pay 1500 rubles; for every downed enemy fighter plane pay 1000 rubles . The payment for destroyed enemy airplanes is to be made in the event of confirmation by ground forces, photographs, and reports of multiple crews. A reward in extra battlefield equipment seems to be, if anything, less noteworthy. So, again, the Post article is an interesting and informative read, and indeed the particular details of the system (drone recordings of kills of individual soldiers for purposes of allocating extra weaponry). But I expected it to tie things more to the history of military videorecording, and of military rewards for successful action, rather than just frame it as "the first of its kind anywhere." I'd love to hear what readers who know more than I do about such matters think about this. The post "Ukraine Turns Real-Life Kills into Video Game Thrills for Drone Pilots" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/05/31/forum-on-emerging-applications-of-the-congressional-review-act/ Sun, 31 May 2026 19:05:27 +0000 Last week, I participated in a Federalist Society forum on "Emerging Applications of the Congressional Review Act," featuring Michael Buschbacher of Boyden Gray, PLLC and Professor Alan B. Morrison of the George Washington University Law School, moderated by Laura Stanley of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. The discussion focused on the use of the Congressional Review Act to rescind the Environmental Protection Agency's grant of waivers of preemption to California for its greenhouse gas vehicle emission standards. The Government Accountability Office did not think that the waivers qualified as rules under the CRA. Michael Bushcbacher disagreed, for reasons explained in this op-ed . Congress disagreed too, and used the CRA to rescind the waivers. During the forum we discussed the decision to rescind the waivers, the legal and political implications of this decision, California's lawsuit challenging the rescission, and what this (and other recent actions) mean for the future use of the CRA as a means to constrain administrative agencies. Video below. The post Forum on "Emerging Applications of the Congressional Review Act" appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/05/1167611 Sun, 31 May 2026 12:00:00 +0000 Every day in Kharkiv begins with uncertainty: air raid sirens interrupt sleep; missiles strike residential neighbourhoods, industrial sites, and roads. Anxious citizens rush into metro stations during bombardments and children study underground. Law/UN Human Rights - News https://reason.com/volokh/2026/05/31/today-in-supreme-court-history-may-31-1860-7/ Sun, 31 May 2026 11:00:00 +0000 5/31/1860: Justice Peter Daniel's death. Justice Peter Daniel The post Today in Supreme Court History: May 31, 1860 appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/05/31/open-thread-221/ Sun, 31 May 2026 07:00:00 +0000 The post Open Thread appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://reason.com/volokh/2026/05/30/a-private-reprimand-from-the-fifth-circuit-with-dissents-to-make-it-public/ Sun, 31 May 2026 03:28:34 +0000 I continue to remain confounded by the Eleventh Circuit's Judicial Council decision to make Judge Betsy's reprimand private. (Yes, I know her name, but Judge Betsy has stuck.) As I noted in a post quickly written before sundown yesterday, the Council identified a clear conflict of interest, but left the public unaware of which judge possesses that conflict. How can litigants possibly determine if a judge should be disqualified if they do not know the identity of the judge? I would propose a per se rule: whenever the Council identifies a clear conflict of interest, the reprimand must be public. How could it be that not a single member of the Eleventh Circuit Judicial council felt compelled to dissent? Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit does not even publish the names of the members of the Council on the memorandum, other than Chief Judge Pryor. I've been unable to find the current members of the Council anywhere online. I found another order from August 7, 2025 that lists the following names: WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, BRANCH, GRANT, LUCK, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges; ALTONAGA, PROCTOR, HOWARD, GARDNER, BEAVERSTOCK, MARKS, BAKER, and WINSOR, Chief District Judges.* I understand this membership may change every year, so I'm not sure which members remain. I would gladly point to several distinguished members of the Fifth Circuit who took a different path. In May 2024, the Fifth Circuit Judicial Council issued a private order concerning a judge. (My post initially labeled the order a reprimand, but as noted in the update, that was incorrect.) The facts were serious: A law enforcement agency filed a complaint against a United States district court judge. The complaint alleges that the subject judge revealed sensitive and confidential information regarding a law-enforcement public corruption investigation, which the judge learned in a sealed bench conference in a criminal case pending before him, to a family member. The complainant alleges that the information was eventually relayed to the target of the investigation, and that the disclosure allowed the target to attempt to obstruct the investigation and brought the investigation to an early end. The target of the investigation was convicted of obstruction of justice and other offenses. But the "subject judge" was not outed because he was really, really sorry, and promised it would never happen again. (Sound familiar?) In a letter to the Special Committee, the subject judge stated that he would never intentionally interfere with a law enforcement investigation and he understands the risks and consequences of disclosing confidential information about government investigations. He also committed to avoid such disclosures in the future. The Special Committee found the judge's representations to be sincere and that his commitment to avoid such disclosures in the future appropriately addresses their concerns raised by the complaint. Nineteen members of the Judicial Council considered this case: RICHMAN, Chief Judge, ELROD, STEWART, COSTA, WILLETT, HO, DUNCAN, ENGELHARDT, OLDHAM, WILSON, ZAINEY, JACKSON, FOOTE, MILLS, REEVES, KINKEADE, ROSENTHAL, GILSTRAP, and MOSES But four members dissented, and would have disclosed the name of the "subject judge" Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) of the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings, it is ordered that the name of the subject judge not be disclosed. Circuit Judges Jennifer W. Elrod, Gregg J. Costa and James C. Ho and District Judge Carlton W. Reeves would publicly disclose the name of the Judge who is the subject of the complaint. Good for Judges Elrod, Costa, Ho, and Reeves. And for those keeping score at home, these judges are on very different positions along the ideological spectrum, yet they all agree on this important ethical issue: people who misbehave should receive public scrutiny. Other judges on the Council, who I know and respect, were silent. Why? While I'm at it, let me raise another issue. It is unclear when the original complaint was filed. But this case stretched at least 2.5 years. A footnote lays out this timeline: The judges named in the caption were members of the Judicial Council when this matter was considered and approved by the Council in November 2021, and they concurred in the decision. Judge Costa resigned from the Court effective August 31, 2022. The Judicial Council terms of Judges Willett, Ho, Duncan, Foote, and Rosenthal expired December 31, 2021. It took nearly three years to settle this matter. In the interim, Judge Costa had resigned from the court, and other members were no longer participating on the Council. I favor a legislative reform to put a clock on settling these matters. The public needs to know about misconduct in a timely fashion. Update : I made an error. The Council did not issue a reprimand of any sort, either public or private. Rather, the Council simply "conclude[d] the proceeding" without taking any further action. The four judges would have made the subject judge's identity public, even if there was no reprimand. The post A Private Ethics Order From The Fifth Circuit With Dissents To Make It Public (Updated) appeared first on Reason.com . Law/Volokh Conspiracy https://news.un.org/feed/view/en/story/2026/05/1167570 Thu, 21 May 2026 12:00:00 +0000 As gangs continue to “terrorise” communities in Haiti, children are the ones paying the highest price, the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict warned on Thursday. Law/UN Human Rights - Law and Crime Prevention